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THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE :

ESTABLISHED FOR THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION
OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,
AND AS A MAGAZINE OF SELF-CULTURE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

"Upon the points in which we dissent from each other, argument will always secure the attention of the wise and good."—*Dr. Parr.*

"He does me the first good office who makes me right in my notion where I was mistaken; he does me the next good office who awakens and reminds me where I had forgotten."—*Dr. Whichcote.*

VOLUME V.—NEW SERIES.

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PREFACE.

CICERO, in one of his letters to Atticus, speaks of a stock of prefaces or exordiums which he always kept ready for use, as occasion required. Such a collection would be very valuable to the editors of our periodical literature, and especially to those who, like ourselves, are required to make up half-yearly volumes. Some little difficulty would, however, be experienced, to find that which would be exactly suitable to the varied character of our work, and the numerous subjects which are taken up even in this tome. It would be undesirable to expatiate on the objects of this serial, as they are fully set forth in the title-page, and generally understood by the public. It would be useless to attempt to prove the existence of a want which the *British Controversialist* was designed to supply, because this is clearly established by the lengthened period during which this Magazine has been sustained, and the large measure of success which it has enjoyed; while the impartiality of the conductors, and the calmness and candour of the contributors, have been placed beyond suspicion by the ten volumes already published. There is, however, one characteristic of this work, which has been strikingly illustrated during the past six months, and may be remarked upon here, viz., the ease with which our Magazine is made to meet the requirements of the times, in directing thoughtful attention to those great social and political questions to which passing events give prominence, and invest with paramount importance. Thus, that fearful rebellion, which has swept over our eastern dependencies, with results more dire than ever followed the fiercest storms of heaven, has suggested the careful consideration of its origin, and the friendly discussion of its

probable causes. Again, that monetary crisis through which the commercial world has just passed, bringing desolation with it to many a "home and hearth"—this has called attention to our banking system, and led to a discussion of the principles which should regulate its issues. But while our friends have been interested in the discussion of subjects of present and practical importance like these, they have not been indifferent to others which take a higher range, and are of a more recondite character; hence the nature and relationship of Mind and Matter, Christianity and Sectarianism, have been fully considered, and

"Set in all light by many minds,
To close the interests of all."

The beneficial influence of these discussions cannot for a moment be doubted; and though they have excited considerable interest as they have appeared in our monthly parts, we rejoice to be able to present them to the public in the more enduring form of a volume, firmly believing that, as we thus give

"The strength of some *diffusive thoughts*,
Both time and space to work and spread,"

we are promoting the best interests of society, and furthering, in some small degree at least, the ultimate triumph of Truth.

We need add no more by way of introducing this volume to the general public; but we must gratefully acknowledge the kindness of many friends in enabling us to make it what it is; and we earnestly invite the co-operation of *all* to render its successor still more worthy of the high objects and honourable career of the "British Controversialist" of the present, and the "Impartial Inquirer" of other days.

THE
BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

A New Year's Glance: Retrospective and
Prospective.

BY H. RISEBOROUGH SHARMAN.

"The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together. Our virtues would be proved, if our faults whipp'd them not; and our crimes would despair, if they were not cherish'd by our virtues."—*Shakespeare*.

THE opening of a New Year is one of those divisional epochs which so clearly mark off the lapse of time as to cause the thoughtful to pause and ponder. The end of any period, and the beginning of that which succeeds it, afford ample materials for reflection. How much the more seriously then shall we reflect when we arrive once more at the commencement of one of those divisions of time which serve so forcibly to remind us of its fleetness, and to impress us with a sense of its uncertainty and brevity.

At the beginning of a year one naturally *looks back*. We were hardly prepared it should end so soon. Half that which we purposed at its opening has not been accomplished. How much we have done that we ought not to have done, and left undone that we ought to have done. The year has not found time enough for us to work out all our plans; and this becomes more and more so, as years roll on. "We spend our years," says the Psalmist, "as a tale that is told!" And Pope has beautifully alluded to this idea in the lines—

"Years following years, steal something every day:—
At last they steal us from ourselves away."

As we look around the happy hearth at this festive season, perhaps some seats are vacant which last year were filled by those we dearly loved. The older we grow the more numerous will become the ties of those who have gone before us; and the fact of whose presence in the realms of bliss, will often fix our wandering thoughts when nothing else can do so. Those of us who

A NEW YEAR'S GLANCE:

are of riper years, know much of this: the young know little; and perhaps it is well it is so. Still there are few of us who at this festive season will not have moments of sad and solemn thoughtfulness. The wife, the child, the son, the sister, the aged and the venerated parent—where are they? Where are the friends of our youth? Where are the companions of our school-boyhood?

"Time rolls his ceaseless course. The race of yore,
Who danced our infancy upon their knee,
And told our marvelling boyhood legends store
Of their strange ventures happ'd by land or sea,—
How are they blotted from the things that be!"

With some the duties of daily life are so absorbing, that it is only at such times as these that they have the leisure, if they had the disposition, to look calmly around them, behind them, before them, and within them. The strife for life engrosses all their attention; they have not the leisure to brood o'er imaginary evils, and to fret and fume at ills that ne'er may come to pass. The active man marks off the year; "Alas!—how fast it flies!" he says, and with a sigh he hurries on, plunging, chin deep, at once into the duties of the next. The Christian, too, marks off the year;—how far he has fallen from what, by this time, he had hoped to be! Yet he takes courage, relying on his sure support, and looking calmly and hopefully forward to the year to come. There is none so wretched as the idle, when the lapse of time is thus marked off. It is a weariness unto them. They exclaim, with the imprisoned huntsman,—

"I hate to learn the ebb of time
From yon dull steeple's drowsy chime!
Or mark it, as the sunbeams crawl,
Inch after inch, along the wall!"

With such, time does not even "amble;" it marches solemnly and wearily along. How many of us will say, as the year comes to a close, "*How much shorter it seems than the last!*" It is so. Up to twenty seems an age; the rest a dream—a shadow—the morning cloud—the mist which the sun chases fast away:—

"The more we live, more brief appears
Our life's succeeding stages;
A day to childhood seems a year,—
A year, like passing ages.

"Heaven gives our years of fading strength
Indemnifying fleetness;—
The paths of youth a seeming length,
Proportioned to their sweetness."

Having looked behind and around, let us *look within us!*

"Know thyself," said the philosopher of antiquity; and the modern poet verifies it thus:—

"Know then thyself. Presume not God to scan:—
The proper study of mankind is man."

Where periodical self-examination is conducted honestly and searchingly, it cannot fail to exercise a very beneficial influence on personal character. How stand you on January 1, 1858, as compared with January 1, 1857, and the Januaries which preceded it, going gradually back to childhood's years? Has your inner life been progressive or retrogressive? One or the other it *must* have been, for there is no stagnation. The moment you cease to struggle upwards, you are gliding downwards, gently and almost imperceptibly it may be, but none the less surely. It would be impertinent, perhaps, to suggest in detail the subjects on which your self-interrogatories should chiefly dwell, but one or two may be briefly hinted at. What has been your progress, morally, mentally, spiritually? Leave exceptional matters quite out of the question. What has been the *tone* of your thoughts and of your actions, during 1857,—good, bad, or indifferent?—better or worse than in 1856? What have you learned? What have you communicated to others? How have you redeemed or squandered the precious moments which you had to spare from the toil for daily bread? Have you, by energy and industry, and the general character of your demeanour, improved or deteriorated your professional and occupational position? Is your employer better or less pleased than formerly? Are your customers conciliated or offended? What has been your result for the year, taking all things into account, a profit or a loss? Do you stand in a better or a worse position? Think of this! Redouble those exertions which have brought success, and avoid, with more than former caution, all that has had an opposite tendency.

In looking within, it also becomes us to reflect, by our own bright winter fireside, upon the friendships and the enmities of the year. Go through the list of old friends,—have any of them been alienated, or lost altogether? Take your new friends,—are they worthy of your friendship, and deserving of your confidence? This is the season peculiarly fitted for the forgiveness of offences, for the acknowledgment of errors, and the reparation of injuries. The injunction of Scripture is, "Let not the sun go down upon thy wrath;" but this, alas! is often suffered to pass unheeded; and many impiously pray that God will forgive them *their* trespasses as they forgive them that trespass against them,—that is, in truth, not forgive them at all! The new year, we say then, is a season peculiarly adapted for letting bygones be bygones, for shaking hands, and for resuming friendships.

It is also a season when many new friendships are formed, and

when, therefore, young men should be more than ever on the watch.

It is a season, moreover, for the exhibition of the cheery and genial side of human nature. It is a time to dance, and sing, and feast, and relieve the poor. This present winter will be one of peculiar hardships and distress; for as the stone cast into the water produces circles which spread and spread till they become invisible by their faintness, though yet existing, so the mercantile crisis through which we have passed, beginning with the great houses, must spread through the smaller ones; and by the stoppage of large factories, tens of thousands will be starving, and without employment, so that the distress will reach the lowest of the low. For such, it is the duty of those whom God has blessed, to make provision as well as they can. This is a season which is peculiarly suggestive of large and generous sentiments towards all our fellow-creatures. It is a season which reminds us of the duty of unselfishness; of the fact that we should live not to ourselves alone :—

“ Not to myself alone,”
 The streamlet whispers on its pebbly way ;
 “ Not to myself alone I sparkling glide ;
 I scatter life and health on every side,
 And strew the fields with herb and flowret gay.
 I sing unto the common, bleak and bare,
 My gladsome tune;
 I sweeten and refresh the languid air,
 In drougthy June.”

“ Not to myself alone.”
 Oh, man, forget not thou,—earth's honoured priest—
 Its tongue, its soul, its life, its pulse, its heart—
 In earth's great chorus to sustain thy part.
 Chiefest of guests at Love's ungrudging feast,
 Play not the niggard. Spurn thy native clod,
 And self disown;
 Live to thy *neighbour*,—live unto thy God,—
 “ Not to thyself alone.”

These duties are beautiful in theory, but how much more delightful are they when carried into practice! How universally is the theory recognized, and yet how rarely, comparatively, is the practice carried out! These are truisms—common-places, says the reader. Granted. But it is just these commonest and most generally admitted duties that require the greatest vigilance and the greatest earnestness on the part of those who wish to see them more generally attended to. “ Live to my neighbour!” says one, “ Who is my neighbour?” Need we refer the question to the beautiful parable of Jesus Christ for a reply? “ Who is my neighbour?”—

- "*Thy neighbour?*—It is he whom thou
Hast power to aid and bless;
Whose aching head, or burning brow,
Thy soothing hand may press.
- "*Thy neighbour?*—'Tis that weary man
Whose years are at their brim;
Bent low with sickness, care, and pain,—
Go thou and comfort him!
- "*Thy neighbour?*—'Tis the fainting poor,
Whose eye with want is dim;
Whom hunger sends from door to door,—
Go thou and succour him!
- "Whene'er thou meet'st a human form
Less favoured than thine own,
Remember 'tis thy neighbour worm,—
Thy brother, or thy son."

Let us examine ourselves, then, and see if we are conscious of having done our duty towards our neighbour. We used to parrot it from the Catechism in our childhood, and now, perhaps, we are teaching it to children of our own; but do we really *live* it in our daily walk amongst the sons of men? Do we really love our neighbour as ourselves, in the remotest conceivable approximation to the sense in which our blessed Saviour used the terms? What a stab our self-accusing conscience gives us here!

I have read a story somewhere of a lady who was driving out in her carriage one bleak, wintry, windy day; and, in spite of her furs, and all her precautions, she felt miserably cold and cheerless. "John," she is reported to have said to her servant, who was driving her, "John, remind me that we send poor Widow Jenkins a sack of coals, when we get home, and the same to Thomas, and Smith, and Brown, and Barber."

"Yes, Ma'am."

"It is dreadfully cold, John."

"It is, indeed, Ma'am."

"Be sure you don't forget to remind me of it, John."

"I shall be sure to recollect it, Ma'am."

The story goes that the lady, having arrived at length at her comfortable home, and having dined and arranged herself before a brightly shining fire, the servant came in to inquire when he should see about distributing the coals to these poor people. But the lady put him off: "I don't think it's so cold *now*, John; and besides, I can't spare you to-night."

The blood runs hotly through the veins, and the indignation of all but the hypocrite is aroused against a woman who could act in this way; but, gentle reader, do not we do exactly the same thing, substantially, every year of our lives? How many times

have we not been guilty of essentially similar conduct during 1857? Can *you* plead innocent, honest reader? If you can, right glad am I to warm the heart and arouse the sympathies of such a one; but alas! for my own part, truth and conscience stare me in the face, and, with an angry glance that I would fain get rid of, exclaim, "GUILTY!" And I fear there are few of my readers who can say aught else.

So much for behind, around, and within; let us now *look onward*.

"The proudest motto for the young—

Write it in lines of gold

Upon thy heart and in thy mind,

The stirring words unfold;

And in misfortune's dreary hour,

Or fortune's prosperous gale,

'Twill have a holy, cheering power—

There's no such word as FAIL!"

This must be your motto—the spirit in which you launch into the unknown future: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." How beautifully has Oland Bourne expressed this noble sentiment:—

"He whose ardour brightly burneth,

With a purpose true and strong,

In the end a laurel earneth,

Nobler than the highest song."

This witness is true! A bold, self-reliant, dauntless spirit, who defies all his enemies, concludes by subjugating them. But while industry is crowned with success, the result of cowardice is an increase of the difficulty:—

"They who idly stand and tremble,

Thinking dangers fill the way,

Bid the tyrant foes assemble

In the terror-born array.

"Doubting ever makes us weaker,

Fears make coward hearts for aye,

But the true and earnest seeker

Knows no yielding but to die."

I will now point out a few of those objects towards which I think young men should direct that great and continuous energy of which I have spoken.

(1) *Mental culture*. Seek to store the mind with pearls of price from the caskets of ancient and modern authors. Rest not satisfied with a verbal recollection of them; ponder well over them, that their full meaning may be gradually revealed to you. I say this especially with respect to some of those glorious gems

which adorn the pages of Holy Writ. Controversy, conducted in a fair and proper spirit, is admirably adapted to give large and liberal and enlightened views on the topics so examined. You should also, in making your resolves for the new year, be more than ever determined to expand your sympathies beyond any mere geographical confines—to look down from the tops of the mountains, as it were, and take a bird's-eye view of the whole human race as one vast brotherhood—a single family—with a common parent, one creator, one ruler, one redeemer. Cease to confine your interest to your own little circle, or city, or county, or even country, and look out upon all nations of the earth, and long and labour for their happiness and prosperity. What is it constitutes our national greatness? This very mental power I am urging you to cultivate is one of its main constituents. It is mental power and that energy with which I have sought to inspire you that have produced us the locomotive, with its lengthened train of goods or passengers, rushing to and fro in every direction, till our little island is streaked like a gridiron. It is mental culture and indomitable perseverance which have produced the mighty monsters of the deep, who convey us to the remotest corners of the earth, and who bring from every clime all that can minister to our daily wants, and even to our luxuries. It is these which have brought the printing press to such a pitch of perfection, that the reproduction of the largest library of antiquity would be but comparatively a trifling work. It is these which have tamed the very lightning, and rendered it subservient to man as a messenger. It is these which have laid the glorious sun himself under tribute, and have brought into play his artistic powers, which till of late were quite unknown, and thus we secure portraits and pictures of unerring fidelity and surpassing loveliness. It is these which have gathered together that vast and countless wealth which places us at the head of the commerce of the world.

But this leads me to another requirement—(2) *Moral character*. Mental power and industry might accumulate wealth, but it can only be done successfully and on any large scale when there is moral character in addition to mental power and persevering industry. Without faith in one another, the vast fabric of our commerce would pass away like the chaff before the wind; and this faith is the result of integrity and fair dealing. Let your object be, therefore, to add to your mental culture perseverance, and to your perseverance integrity.

To all these add (3) *Economy*. Be prudent and forethoughtful, though not niggardly. "Cut your coat according to your cloth," as the homely proverb says.

A quaint little story will illustrate the general principle which I wish to inculcate. A worthy Scotch couple, who had made a little competence in a certain shop, retired to enjoy the fruits of

their industry, and gave the business to their son John. But though John began well, in a year or two he failed, and so hopeless was his case that it was town talk. A very commiserating kind of party spoke to the old woman about it. "How is it," said she of the inquiring mind, "how is it that your John failed, though you did so well there? You began with no connection, and he began with a good one." To this the sagacious maternal parent made a reply (as nearly as we can do the Scotch) to the following effect:—

"Hoot, woman, it's nae wonder at a'. Ye mun ken, when Tam and me began to merchandise, we took parritch night and morning, and kail to our dinner."

"Well, what has that to do with it?"

"Weel now, I'll tell ye. When things looked up a bit, we took tea to our breakfast. Weel now, the age mended, and we sometimes coft a lambkin for a Sunday dinner, and before we gae up, we sometimes coft a chuckie, we were doing sae weel."

"Well, and what can that have to do with John's failure?"

"Weel now, ye mun ken that our Johnnie *began with the chuckie first.*"

That's the secret. Don't "begin with the chuckie first." The application is so forcible that comment would be superfluous.

Finally, resolve that you will *do something and be somebody*. It is not meet for intelligent man to slink lazily through his existence, as if he were only created for the merely animal purpose of eating and drinking, and "enjoying life," as it is called. No! such a supposition would dishonour both Creator and creature. Man was made to progress, to be useful in his day and generation, and to work out the infinite purposes of his omnipotent Creator.

Push ahead! as our American cousins would say:—

"Large streams from little fountains flow,
Tall oaks from little acorns grow."

Then a few failures must not discourage you:—

"Press on! if once or twice thy feet
Slip back and stumble, harder try."

Do this, and success is certain. The greater your courage is, the greater your strength will surely be. Once well begun, your courage will "mount with the occasion," as Shakespeare has it.

Nor should a tame mediocrity content you. The new year gives a fair opportunity to "begin again," and now resolve to *be somebody*.

"Be thou a hero! let thy might
Tramp on eternal snows its way,
And, through the ebon walls of night,
Hew down a passage into day."

The fainthearted are useless to themselves, and hurtful by example to those around them. Once in the fight, let your wounds be not in the *back*. You must learn, more or less, in the school of experience; but avoid those whose lessons are learnt in no other.

Let the experience of to-day teach the lesson of the morrow; let the disappointments of to-day furnish hopes for the morrow; let the woes of the past predict joys in the future.

“The wisdom of the present hour
Makes up for follies past and gone;
To weakness strength succeeds, and power
From frailty springs. Press on! press on!”

Have you never sat down to rest in the darkest part of the forest, weary, hungry, and travel-stained? From the densest and gloomiest masses of foliage has there never arisen the joyous thrill of the song-bird, as it warbled its cheerful notes, and soared towards the skies? Just so it is that often when our prospects are most dreary they are nearest the change for the better, as philosophers inform us that the night is darkest in the moments just before the dawn. Cheer up, afflicted brother! Courage, energy, ye listless ones! Let us turn over a new leaf with our entrance on the new year. Short is the time allotted for you to accomplish your mission, whatever it be.

“Therefore press on, and reach the goal,
And gain the prize and wear the crown.
Faint not! for to the steadfast soul
Come wealth, and honour, and renown.
To thine own self be true, and keep
Thy mind from sloth, thy heart from soil.
Press on! and thou shalt surely reap
A heavenly harvest for thy toil.”

And what I say to you, I say also to myself. Let us *try*, looking for help to Him who is both able and willing to help in every good word and work. Adieu!

PERSECUTION.—It is the essence of injustice to persecute any person for omitting to conform to the established religion. No man should be deprived of any part of his liberty with respect to his opinions, unless his actions, derived from such opinions, were clearly prejudicial to the state. It is not in the power of man to surrender his opinions, and therefore the society which demands him to make this sacrifice, demands an impossibility.

WILL, WIT, AND JUDGMENT.—At twenty years of age, the will reigns; at thirty, the wit; and at forty, the judgment.—*Gratian.*

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM OBSTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand.”—*Matthew xii. 25.*

IN the consideration of the question under discussion, we propose to base our arguments upon the above statement of Holy Writ. We will deduce our conclusions after an impartial survey of the effects which sectarianism has had upon Christianity. We have nothing to do with any theories as to what sectarianism *should do* and *might do*, we take it as *it is*—analyze its pretensions, and test it by what it *has done*. Christians are men who are, professedly, followers of Christ. Sectarianism introduces amongst them the elements of discord and uncharitableness; therefore Christianity, or the cause of Christ, must necessarily suffer. It cannot be otherwise; for the Saviour, under whose banner each sect is professedly fighting, himself tells us, that “every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation.” If we can only prove undeniably that sectarianism has divided and is still dividing Christ’s kingdom into an innumerable series of hostile bodies, fighting with greater energy against each other than against the enemies of their Master, the conclusion that it is bringing Christianity to desolation is inevitable. If we succeed in showing how fiercely rampant is this spirit of discord amongst all sectaries, we must not be supposed to select for condemnation or approval any particular body of the Christian world. We believe that, however unfortunate may be the fact that instead of one Christian church, we have Christians split up into denominations innumerable—into High Church and Low Church, Lutherism and Calvinism, Methodism and Latitudinarianism, *ad infinitum*—each and all have some good points in their church polity or sectarian belief. They have one object in common; and what we lament is, that such small differences of opinion in respect to some minor points, unconnected with the salvation of our souls, should introduce those elements of discord, vain disputation, and ill-will into the Christian world, which cause Christianity to appear, in the eyes of the infidel, a worthless thing. “The Bible tells you to love your enemies; and yet, if I look around, I find not only single individuals, but

whole sects of *Christians*, condemning those who disagree with their particular form of belief, or refuse to adhere to their religious creed, to eternal ruin." This is no supposition on our part; we have heard these or similar words uttered many times by men professing no religion, yet who followed the dictates of the Bible in many particulars with far more exactness than a large proportion of our professing Christians. How comes this? The answer seems easy. The *Church* has lost its influence; men no longer allow themselves to *be guided*; they must be allowed to steer their own courses through life, to frame their own religious creeds, and carry into practice their own codes of morals. Religion has ceased to *be*, having lost its dominant power over the hearts of men. The cold formalism and the fierce intolerance of sectarianism have been for years insidiously sapping the foundations of the church of Christ. It may be argued that never before was there such an amount of apparent religion and morality in the world as at present. Granted. But it is all *theoretic*. Religious doctrines we have in abundance; moral precepts and injunctions are equally numerous; but—and here comes the drawback—we are no longer sensible to their *teachings*; we *believe*, it is true, but have commenced not to care for the practical exemplification of our belief. This latter evidence of Christianity is exhibited homœopathically. Indeed, it is astonishing what a small amount of vital religion is considered sufficient to be mixed up with our doings in real life. *Faith* there is in abundance; but it is invested in the pursuits in which we are severally engaged. For this faith in the worldly maxims which point out in the distance that wealth which all are striving to obtain, men submit to privations and hardships innumerable. But how few are the men who have faith in things spiritual sufficiently strong to enable them to *live* up to the theoretic creeds and principles of morality they profess. Is not the religion of the counting-house distinct from the religion of the chapel? Are not opinions that are groaned over in the House of Prayer applauded in the Houses of Parliament? The devout merchant, driven by vulgar necessities to enter the world of trade, is contented to take it as it is. There are things therein decidedly wrong; but now they are there, why should he decline to profit by them? The coolness with which such individuals will resort to the lowest usages of trade is perfectly astounding. Peace is being constantly preached in our places of worship; in private life the glory and the pomp of war are constant topics of conversation. Human blood is no more thought of than so much dirty water. Our officers write home from India describing the "jolly fun," the "capital sport," they have had. They talk as coolly of cutting down human bodies as they would of "beasts that perish." One has gone so far as to constitute himself professional executioner. And all this is

done with the full concurrence of the people. Our religious newspapers fill their columns with letters teeming with such expressions as above quoted. The press and the platform go hand-in-hand in stirring up the evil feelings of our nature; and they tell us, practically, that the Bible is not always to be followed in its teachings. We boast of being Christians, and yet those amongst us who have asked that the innocent should be spared, that none but those proved guilty should be punished, are ridiculed as milksops, and denounced as traitors. The destruction of populous villages, and the wholesale massacre of their inhabitants, are applauded by the religious world as a righteous retaliation, So much for our Christianity. We have one religion for the church or chapel, another for the world. Is not sectarianism at the bottom of this fearful distinction between things mundane and things eternal? Has it not broken up that which should be a grand UNITY into infinite fragments? That beautiful fabric, THE CHURCH, in which our forefathers, the early Christians, worshipped, is now a ruin; sects after sects are further demolishing the temple, and attempting to build up edifices of their own from the wreck they have made. Sectarians point to the innumerable chapels and meeting-houses thus raised and scattered throughout the land as an evidence of the vitality of religion amongst us. How false, how fallacious is such a method of reasoning! Why, one-half of the so-called houses of God owe not their elevation to the love for Christianity and its teaching, but to base and unchristian feelings. They originate in what is called a "split," which is nothing more or less than a "*religious row*." What a contradiction of terms! Professing Christians, who are told to love their enemies, *cannot dwell in unity amongst themselves*; they quarrel; members of the same family cool towards each other; they form separate bodies, and immediately is formed "the old cause" and "the new cause." The new lights set to work to erect a chapel of their own, and select a site, in many cases, as near as possible to the old one, thus proving to the uninterested observer, how dominant an element was spite in the midst of the confusion. Is it possible that out of such an unchristian commencement good can come? We have no need to point to any particular instances as illustrations of what we have said. In every town there are perpetual monuments of the evils of sectarianism, in the shape of unsightly piles, cycled chapels. The animosities which sprang out of the great Wesleyan "split" are familiar to every one; but the minor "splits," that are perpetually occurring in every town of any importance, in reality are of a far more dangerous character. We boast of our liberty and tolerance, and yet how humiliated ought we to feel that the fruits proceeding therefrom have been so injurious to the cause of Christ! How many of our religious edifices are but "whited sepulchres," their very

presence being practically to deny the truth of our Saviour's assertion as to the *unity* of his religion. They are witnesses continually announcing to the world our intolerance, our bigotry, and our uncharitableness.

Sectarianism, instead of leading men to worship God, exerts its greatest influence in making them adherents of some particular *cause*. As Carlyle expresses it, "to make people sectarians and Christians has become the primary object" of the present age. The style of preaching in vogue is of a declamatory and speculative character. More stress is laid upon the errors of other sects than upon the desirability of a Christian life. Instead of one Pope we have hundreds, each laying down the immutability and infallibility of his particular creed. Like rival potentates, they view with envy the successful sway of any one amongst them belonging to a different form of church government. They try to gain converts to swell the number of their adherents, more than from the desire to serve God. Instead of being able to say with Paul, "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord," they elevate themselves and preach the *cause*. Their sermons are mere essays, in which but a very little evangelical religion is to be found. They argue, ridicule, and make appeals to their hearers, but the whole of their conclusions end in the superiority of their sect to any other. They never make appeals to the conscience; they never speak individually to men's hearts, making the listener to understand, "*Thou art the man*," as particularly addressed to himself; all is cold, cheerless, disputatious. Men go away as they came, glorifying in the superiority of their own form of belief; instead of being better after leaving the house of God, they are worse than when they entered, being more puffed up and contented. It is no wonder, then, that amongst the various sects evangelical religion is in such a low state. By religion we understand, not merely a sentiment of the heart, an adherence to any particular form of belief, but also an all-pervading essence, to be shown and manifested in the actions and the *life*.

The Church of Christ should be as one body. We have the highest authority for our statement,—that of the Saviour himself;—and therefore to erect a temple to every whim and caprice, is a treason and a sin against God himself; and we feel no hesitation in believing that had Wesley have foreseen the evils that would spring from his separation,—the anarchy and confusion having destroyed, in a great measure, the good,—he would never have destroyed that unity in which resides the power of the Church. The Dissenters of Wesley's day bear no resemblance to those of the present period. Then the meeting-house attracted the heavenly-minded men who saw with alarm and consternation the inactivity and religious lethargy into which the Church of England had fallen. Now they have become hot-beds of fanati-

cism and political organizations; the first and most important article in their creed being hatred towards the Church of England, and the primary object of their political influence to compass the destruction of Church and State.

In conclusion, we have seen that sectarianism has destroyed the *unity* of Christ's kingdom; it has nullified Biblical teaching in respect to the great doctrines of love and peace; it has introduced discord and ill-will into the Christian world; it has violated the plainest dictates of humanity; it has placed the peculiarities of the *sect* above the broad, universal teachings of Christianity; it has entirely altered the tone of the religious world. We, therefore, can only come to the conclusion that sectarianism is obstructive to Christianity.

We have been compelled to speak thus strongly of the effects of sectarianism; we must not, however, be supposed to condemn all parties connected with the various sects. Some of our best friends, our most respected friends, are members of dissenting chapels. There are many—and we are glad to say it—very many exceptions to the state of things we have shadowed forth. The general tendency of sectarianism is, however, as we have stated. It would be well if the good of every sect, the conscientious worshippers of God, were to attempt to introduce more catholicity of feeling into the Christian world; to withdraw their countenance from anything approaching towards a display of sectarianism, and to do all in their power towards reuniting the fragments of the Church of Christ.

For the present we have done. We have yet to see what can be said in favour of sectarianism. We know of nothing.

TALIESIN.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"By sectarianism the unitive faith of Christianity has been reduced to a 'thing of shreds and patches;' its charity has been destroyed, its holiness stained, its purity spotted, its love abnegated, its whole meaning misinterpreted, its tendency misdirected, and final triumph materially retarded."—*J. A. Langford, "Religious Scepticism and Infidelity."*

In the belief that the great aim and purpose of all debate should be the derivation of truth, I have much pleasure in taking part in the discussion of this question; and the more so, since it involves a principle which undoubtedly, in an eminent degree, accounts for the present condition of the religious world—a condition which all who have given attention to the fact must be conversant with, and must view with feelings of concern and regret.

When we look around at the position religion occupies at this present, we cannot fail to be struck with the growing indifference on the part of the people to religious influences. "A

practical infidelity is everywhere rife amongst us, which in its effects is far more injurious and deadly than any theoretical infidelity can, from its very nature, possibly be;" and this being so, we are naturally led to inquire into the cause or causes which has or have contributed to bring about this state of things. Manifold and varied as their character is, sectarianism will be found, I believe, to stand paramount upon the list of hindrances and obstructions to Christianity.

Now sectarianism, as I understand it, is a selfish, arrogant, and unchristian assumption of superiority and importance on the part of its professors—a feeling which I have little hesitation in affirming has mainly conduced to engender that carelessness and apparent unconcern which real Christians so much deplore, and their adversaries so assiduously encourage and take delight in. Look in whatever direction we may, we discover the presence of this great evil. Upon the Continent we see it in the persecution of the people by an iniquitous priesthood, supported by a tyrannous and despotic sovereign; from the dungeons of Austria, France, and Italy it speaks in language which cannot be mistaken; from the Vatican of Rome and the Inquisition Chamber of Spain it is repeated; while ever and anon the wretched cry of the Madiai falls upon the ear, and tells of the tortures which Sectarianism inflicts upon its victims. And if we turn to England, we find it in the internal dissensions of the Established Church, in its Puseyism, High Churchism, and Evangelicalism; in its ecclesiastical commissions, in its Gorham cases, Denison disputes, and its Exeter Hall squabble, between the residents of St. James's and the denizens of St. Giles's; in the divisions of the Wesleyan body, in the increasing arrogance of Independency, and the incessant bickerings of its sections and members one with another; in the disunion existing among Baptists, Unitarians, and Presbyterians, down to Quakers and Plymouth Brethren. We see it "in the triumphing of Dissenters at their position in point of numbers as contrasted with the State Church, which the census returns show them to be in, and the angry impugning of those returns by the Bishops in the House of Lords, one of them charging the Dissenters with making false returns." We see it in the recent attempt made to obtain a revision of the Bible, and we find it in the continual and determined opposition offered to any scheme of national education that may be brought forward.

Thus, first one sect and then another, endeavouring to—

" Prove their opinions orthodox,
By apostolic blows and knocks,"

injure in an irretrievable manner the very cause which they profess to be desirous of serving, and in thus losing their hold upon the people, make way for the propagators of infidelity,

who, pointing with just derision to the discord and contention of professing Christians, step in and fill up the space which sectarianism has prepared for them. And no wonder, when the ministers of religion permit polemical rancour to occupy the place of christian feeling, when their zeal for proselytism is subverted by their denominational rivalries, and when they allow the energy which needs to be economized and concentrated upon what should be the all-important object of their thoughts and lives, to be wasted in maintaining some unimportant point of doctrine or paltry dogma.

"If, for the sake of experiment, a man were to go the round of our places of worship as they are called, whether properly or not, in the true interpretation of that awful word, and note by whom they are visited," what a strange and diversified imagination would gather round him! He pauses near the entrance of the parish church; the well-dressed congregation now assembling very plainly denote the kind of religion taught within. Each as he passes, holding his head erect, and swelling with conscious pride, seems to say, "God, I thank thee that *I* am not as *other men* are." Indeed, *I* would—

"Rather be
Genteelly damned beside a duke,
Than saved in vulgar company;"

and if he ventures inside, he has not long to wait ere he discovers that the pompous official is one of the class who—

"Doom dissenting souls to know
Nor bliss above nor liberty below."

Should he extend his walk, and cross the street, he enters Bethesda Chapel, and here the stiffnecked and unconsecrated worshippers retort upon their neighbours over the way—

"A man may cry, Church! church! at every word,
And yet be like all other people;
A daw's not reckoned a religious bird,
Because he sits a-cawing from the steeple."

Where such recrimination is allowed, we cannot be surprised if the ignorant and unpretending masses avoid the dispute entirely. When they find that religion, which they have hitherto supposed to be the knitting of all hearts together in the solemn worship of God, is made a matter of controversy and often malignant strife, we need not be astonished if they altogether shun the subject and neglect its duties.

Thus religion, in a great measure, has ceased to retain that power over the people which it once possessed. As they gradually become educated and informed, there is a disposition on their part to inquire into matters for themselves; and while they would fain believe in the precious promises recorded in,

and practise the teachings inculcated by, God's word, they are alienated from religion by the inconsistent, exclusive, and uncharitable character of the majority of its professors, and the perpetual contrariety and competition sustained by its ministers. If they need assistance, it is not to the ministers of religion they look for it; the charities of life are performed by other hands than religious. The most philanthropic men of the age are not only laymen, but men who desire to be known as not connected with any religious denomination." If they need reform, either social or political, they go anywhere rather than to the parish priest or dissenting parson. "Everywhere amongst them is a growing contempt for the ministers of religion. The class who used to be honoured and esteemed are now the least respected. If they on some particular occasion rouse from their accustomed lethargy, and actively labour to effect some amelioration in the condition of the people, the unexpected, and we may truly say the unwonted, attempt is received with contempt and derision; their motives are questioned; some insidious and underhand dealing is looked for; everything except a pure wish to benefit the people is attributed to them; reasons for their conduct are sought anywhere but in the programme issued by themselves; ulterior designs, which have for their object the consolidation or increase of their own power, are declared the moving springs of their actions. The sheep will not receive the shepherd; the flock forsake the pastor."—*J. A. Langford.*

That this holds good in a general sense will, I think, be hardly questioned. But to what is it all to be ascribed? Were churches uniformly, in all that lends efficiency to their ministration, what they should be, would the Gospel, as a system of spiritual persuasiou, falter in its career? In a word, is the divinely fashioned instrument at fault, or they to whom its use has been entrusted? Alas! the latter. The deficiency is not found in the means of grace, but in the character and lives of those for whose benefit the means were designed and provided.

That man is naturally religious and disposed to worship all history asserts, and all experience proves. No nation, however sunk in barbarism; no people, however savage and benighted, that we are acquainted with or know anything respecting, but have given expression in some manner, however rude and unintelligible, to a religious feeling. The idolatry of the Egyptian, the enthusiasm of the Turk, the fanaticism of the Brahmin and the Hindoo, the fetishism of the Bushman, the fiendish rites of the South Sea Islander, and the refined paganism of the old Grecian, who erected an altar to the "unknown God," is evidence of this; and an universal idea of and desire for religious worship being thus a characteristic of mankind, there requires some better theory to account for man's declension in the faith than the habitual pretended concern of our preachers, who content

themselves with complaining upon every occasion of the spread of infidelity, but take no steps to arrest the progress of the destroying angel, or heal the breach which their own insincerity and intolerance has created.

Having succeeded, then, in substantiating my affirmation, I turn with delight to notice the bright side of the picture, and to suggest a remedy.

That there are many instances among the various evangelical denominations in this country, wherein a minister has not only acted in a manner agreeable to his profession, but has been a blessing to the people over whom he has presided, I am free to admit; but this only the more strongly proves the effect of the evil complained of; indeed, I feel happy in bearing my humble testimony to the unobtrusive and Christian bearing of some few examples, for with Cowper,—

“ I venerate the man whose heart is warm,
Whose hands are pure, whose doctrine and whose life
Co-incident, exhibit lucid proof
That he is honest in the sacred cause; ”

and there can certainly be nothing more pleasing and gratifying to see than affection on the part of a christian community returned by fidelity on the part of its pastor.

“ A man whose aim is piety, not pelf;
Who claims respect, as he respects himself;
Whose only pleasure is his Master's work,
Who meets alike the Christian and the Turk.”

The want of mutual regard between a minister and his people must be a weakness and reproach wherever it is found, while the presence of it honours, dignifies, and blesses wherever it obtains.

Such reciprocity is necessary to the advancement of religion and the progress of Christianity, and can only be acquired by the promotion and manifestation of that kindly feeling,—

“ Which draws no line, and knows no party wall,
But serves, supports, and succours each and all.”

Bilston.

G. A. H. E.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I,

THE Church of Christ is, unhappily, much divided and disunited. It is presented to us in three grand divisions or schisms—the Greek, the Latin, and the Protestant churches. These portions of the Church are again subdivided into smaller groups, each occupying the position of species to the genus or primary division from whence it is derived. It is not of the cause of these subdivisions that we have now to treat, but of their tendency to obstruct or not the true character of Christianity. In order that we may more clearly understand the object of our inquiry, we

shall confine our remarks to the consideration of the tendency of Protestant sects to obstruct Christianity. With these we are more familiar, and the bearing of any argument grounded upon peculiar religious or sectarian idiosyncracies will be more readily appreciated.

A sectarian is one who, believing the general truths of that great division of the Church with which, by locality or otherwise, he is associated, differs from the orthodox creed on some point of church polity, ritual observance, or philosophical abstrusity; the saving doctrines of the gospel he receives *in toto et de fonte*, but the externals of Christianity he disputes, in most cases as a matter of opinion, founded upon the right every Christian possesses to read and interpret the Scriptures for himself.

Such being the definition of a sectarian, as understood in our Protestant community, sectarianism must be the doctrine and religious conduct of such a Christian.

Our question to the reader now is, What obstruction to Christianity can such a person be? an earnest Christian, believing all that is essential to salvation, and doing this so sincerely, that he thinks even the *minor* matters of church polity, ritual observance, and Christian speculative philosophy are, from their connection with the weightier matters of the gospel of grace, of sufficient importance to demand from him the pain and obloquy of separation from his friends and fellow Christians in all matters of social worship. Such separation from a natural necessity demands a more than ordinary strictness of life, more faultless character, and more consistent adherence to the professed tenets of the separated sectary, from the adverse criticism to which his motives and actions will be subjected by those who were heretofore bound in the closest bonds of love and friendship with him. Not only are his motives, doctrines, and actions more narrowly scrutinized by others, but the very fear of such scrutiny, added to the inward conviction of his own mind as to the propriety and truthfulness of his position, tends to produce a higher moral standard as a rule of action, a much purer and more severe religious discipline, and a faith or creed capable of more direct proof from the standard of authority in such matters—the divine record, with the contents of which, by the necessity of the case, he becomes more intimately acquainted.

Such we find to be the governing principles in our analysis of the individual sectary; in the aggregate we find similar principles to obtain also, for, as a logical sequence, as is the individual so is the aggregation of individuals, for the process of aggregation alters not the individual character; it is concerned only as a mechanical agency dealing with the numbers one and many—of parts and the whole. Should we direct our attention to any one of the Protestant sects, we shall find that each one is prepared

with a reason for the belief that is in him ; and with that reason a constant reference to the sacred Scriptures and his daily life in support of his position as a sectary—to the former in proof of his religious idiosyncracies, and to the latter in proof of the consistency of his daily walk and conversation—his practice with his faith.

Thus much may be said with respect to the subjective religion of the sectary, and may be true ; but, say our opponents, it is far otherwise with respect to his objective religion—his relation to the orthodox Christian, other sectaries, and to the unbelievers, or those commonly designated in the religious phrase, the world. Ask the sectary if he accords equal right to the private interpretation of the Scriptures, and he answers, " Every one is answerable to God alone for the opinions he forms from the book of God, and none have the right to withhold or interfere with the right of private judgment." Ask him if he lives in peace with other sectaries and the orthodox faith, and he answers, " I give the right hand of fellowship to all who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and in truth." Ask him if he holds bigoted views with respect to the accuracy of his own creed and the inaccuracy of the creed of others, and he answers, " My conscience dictates to me the course I should myself follow, and not to walk in obedience to my conscience is sin. My fellow Christian may differ from me, according as his conscience may dictate. He is responsible to God for the course he adopts, not to me. I believe him wrong ; if I can, with the assistance of God's word, enlighten his conscience, I do him service ; but I must esteem him none the worse although he cannot see eye to eye with me." Inquire his opinion respecting Christian effort in reclaiming the world from sin, and bringing the family of man into the fold of God ; he will answer, " It is the duty of all who have felt that God has been gracious to them, to tell to others what a dear Saviour they have found ; to preach Christ and him crucified as the sinner's hope and help in extremity ; that Paul may plant, Apollos may water, but 'tis God who giveth the increase ; that it is the height of folly, if not of sin, to preach to unbelievers Episcopalianism, Presbyterianism, or Congregationalism, Protestantism, Wesleyanism, Baptism, or any other ism ; the message of the gospel, in his estimation, is—Man is a sinner, and Christ is a Saviour, and whosoever will may drink of the water of life freely." Does the sectary rejoice or regret the success of orthodoxy or other sectaries ? Undoubtedly he rejoices at the success of all in the salvation of the souls of sinners. He, with the angels in heaven, rejoices more over one sinner saved than over ninety and nine just persons who need no salvation, and never questions who nor what the instrument employed, feeling assured that his heavenly Father willed it ; Christ had saved the soul, and the glory is

theirs, not the feeble instrument's. He rejoices with the instrument, but he glories in his all-sufficient Saviour and the Father's boundless love.

But it may be said, sectarianism destroys the unity of the Church, and exposes the Church of Christ to the taunt of the sceptic. These objections we deny as without any foundation. In the first place, such a unity as the New Testament requires is possessed by all Protestant sectaries, as all firmly maintain the essentials of Christianity; the saving doctrines of the gospel are held as their sheet anchor by orthodoxy and sectary. For Episcopalianism will not save, Wesleyanism will not save, and Baptism will not save, *but repentance towards God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ alone*, no other name being given amongst men by which man may be saved. In the second place, it is not the principles of sectarianism at which the sceptic directs his pointed sarcasm, but the unsanctified prejudices by which individual orthodoxy and heterodoxy magnifies its own idiosyncrasy, and pushes it into greater prominence than the fundamentals of its creed, making a Shibboleth the *sine qua non* of religious faith and practice—the passport to the empyrean, rather than the simple faith which is in Christ Jesus. The sectary and the orthodox equally deplore this, and are equally if not more severe upon it than the sceptic, regarding it as an abuse of principle attaching itself to the church militant, as an unhealthy excrescence, to be dealt with in the most relentless and inexorable justice.

Sectarianism says, repentance and belief are the sinner's sure foundations for permanent peace. Of these he must be certain; but of the thousand and one varieties of sentiment found among the sects let each be persuaded in his own mind. The word of God is placed in the inquirer's hands as his chart through life towards eternity; he may choose Church or Dissent for the route, but with penitence and faith—the former as ballast, the latter as compass—he will not fail to arrive at the haven of eternal rest and joy, at God's right hand in glory.

Sectarianism thus contributes to personal consistency, piety, and knowledge of the Scriptures—preserves the unity of the gospel Church according to the scriptural model—produces emulation in the desire to save souls—disarms scepticism—and most impartially appeals to the unconverted. We therefore do not consider sectarianism obstructive to Christianity.

Birmingham.

L'OUVRIER.

WAR.—In ancient times, war was made for conquest. To these have succeeded wars for religion. The next pretext was for commerce; and lastly, for political opinions.—*C. J. Fox.*

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

If history is to be vindicated from the contempt which Johnson felt for it, and which Lord Plunket tersely expressed, when he declared it to be nothing better than "an old almanack," it must be by the consideration and discussion of questions like the one now before us. It is only by thus allying history with philosophy that the former comes to have any intrinsic worth, or rises to the dignity of a study. Truth may, in some rare and occasional instances, be stranger than fiction, but, in the long run, it undoubtedly is common-place, if we simply confine our attention to its bare facts; hence the mere narrative of history, however vivid and life-like, can scarcely compete in point of interest with the creations of historical romance. "Waverley" takes a firmer hold on the imagination than any narrative of the rebellion it partially sketches; "Ivanhoe" charms us far more than any sketch of the social condition of England in the days of Richard I. The biography of Ulysses and Æneas, and the true history of the Trojan War, would be sorry substitutes (in point of interest) for the "Odyssey," the "Æneid," and the "Iliad."

It is, however, to be feared that history is seldom regarded by the majority of its readers in its higher aspects. The schoolboy has scarcely the temper or capacity of mind to enter into its philosophical questions; his object is only to gain sufficient knowledge of its facts to serve as a basis for further study, or to enable him hereafter to sustain the character of an ordinarily well-informed man. And perhaps but very few ever afterwards turn to the pages of history with any definite purpose of *studying* its lessons. It is read *really* because it is interesting, while it enables us to lay the flattering unction to our souls, that we are engaged in useful study. But if no further use is made of the information thus gained, we think history might as well be laid aside for the yet more fascinating pages of the epic or the romance. The supposed utility of much historical reading is but a self-deception, except so far as it stores the mind with the materials for historical study in its really valuable aspects. We rejoice, therefore, that the *Controversialist* upholds the philosophical character of history, by bringing forward, from time to time, questions, the decision of which utilizes its facts, and exercises the minds of both writers and readers in the endeavour to

draw forth those lessons in citizenship and social policy which constitute its true value and glory. We cannot fulfil our duties to the age in which we live, and discharge aright the responsibilities which rest upon us in regard to the destiny and condition of those who are to succeed us in the future, unless we study the experience of our contemporaries and predecessors. History is a mere dry body of facts, unless we inquire into their origin, connection, and mutual influence, and thus endeavour to gain an acquaintance with the principles which, so to speak, inform those facts with life. There is a knowledge of history and a wisdom of history, to which the words of Tennyson aptly apply :—

“ Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers, and he bears a laden breast,
Full of sad experience, moving towards the stillness of his rest.”

It is only by musing and reflecting upon the full record of “sad experience” that nations (like individuals) learn wisdom, and move under its guidance to truer, nobler, and more peaceful eras of existence. “Philosophy teaching by example” is a noble definition of what history is, and ought to be, to the earnest student; and it is well, when questions are raised, which compel us to dwell upon its examples, until we have eliminated from them those lessons of philosophy which they so surely and safely teach, but which are not always, nor indeed often, obvious.

A terrible and unexpected mutiny, like that which for months past has caused our very blood to curdle with horror at the fearful details of its atrocities and cruelties, and has made all England tremble for the existence of her mighty Indian empire, must awaken every intelligent mind to an inquiry into its origin and causes. Like a whirlwind, scattering ruin and destruction, it has burst forth without warning, and has raged apparently without law or purpose. A frenzied thirst for blood and outrage, and a “ravelling to destroy,” seem to be not merely the characteristics, but almost the sole aim and purpose of the mutineers. One theory alone seems to account for their conduct; to wit, a ruthless, frenzied personal hate to every European. And yet the motive or cause of such a feeling is beyond conception; for, whatever the British rule may have been to the people of India, to the native soldiery it has been mild, generous, and lucrative. They have eaten our bread, been clothed in our uniform, paid from our treasuries. They have won glory under our flags, been humoured, and almost petted by us. It is true that the pretext of their revolt was a fear that we were about to attempt their conversion, and that the cartridges we served to them could not be used without breaking one of the sacred canons of their faith. But one single fact exposes the utter falsehood of the pretext. For ourselves, we know not whether the cartridges were really greased with bullock’s fat, or no; but

one thing is certain, that those very cartridges were used without hesitation against us. The men who refused to use them on the parade ground, had loaded their muskets with them in private. We are aware that men may publicly profess their zeal for religious ordinances which they break without compunction in private; but the fanaticism which strives unto blood in defence of formalism is invariably honest. The history of Cambyses shows the true spirit of fanatical rebellion in all ages and countries. Cambyses, if we may credit the traditions which have survived, had but to place cats, dogs, sheep, and other sacred animals, between his besieging army and the city of Pelusium, to ensure success. The fanaticism of the garrison, true to its unreasoning blindness, precluded them from using the means of self-defence. The man who will revolt rather than infringe a ceremonial law of his faith, will die rather than defend himself at its expense. All the history of human nature concurs to establish this position. The avowed origin of the Sepoy mutiny is evidently and assuredly a mere pretext in itself; how far it may be connected with the outbreak remains yet to be seen. The reason assigned for the commission of a crime, though utterly false in itself, may, and often does, afford a *clue* to the real motive or secondary influences which have led to the criminal act.

It is not our intention to argue out the real causes of the revolt of the Bengal army. Such an effort would be beyond the province assigned to us by the topic of debate, and of little real utility. Suppositions and conjectures without number have been hazarded on the subject, and much has been ably said and written in favour of some few of the more plausible theories. But we hold that the time for a decision has not yet arrived; we do not possess a sufficiently broad basis of admitted facts for really sound inductive reasoning. We can only at present argue hypothetically. It is in India that the only trustworthy evidence can be gathered, and in that country action must supersede mere judicial inquiry. Prevention had been better than cure: but now the disease is raging, and our first business is to stay the evil, not to reflect upon its origin. Statesmanship must wait its turn, until generalship has quelled the strife of civil war. We are told of the seizure of papers at Delhi and Cawnpore which throw light upon the causes of the revolt. We know, too, that evidence is in the possession of the Indian Government, which has been considered sufficient to justify the imprisonment and to evidence the criminality of the King of Oude. Any of these things may, when disclosed, be of such nature as to leave no room for candour to doubt as to the primary motives and origin of the mutiny.

But while we refrain from the attempt to establish any particular opinion as truth, there can be no objection to point out

the direction in which existing evidence leans, and to consider the influence which the institution of caste would be likely to exert, if the apparent balance of probabilities be the real truth of the matter. The first and most striking fact is the purely military character of the revolt: it is emphatically a mutiny, and not a national rebellion. It is the army which has turned against us, and not the people. Our government of India has been characterized by some as a system of fraud, rapacity, oppression, and cruelty,* yet the mutineers are the very class who have been the *instruments* of our career of aggrandisement, and they rebel at the very time when our administration is becoming daily more just, lenient, and beneficial. And the people who have been the *victims* (if any) of British tyranny are, to say the very least, neutral and impassive. If any bias has been shown by the Hindu people, it has been in our favour. Yet we will not insist on this, but content ourselves with the self-evident inference, that *the mutiny of the army has not originated in popular disaffection and pressure*. Again, the treat-

* Personally, we must express our dissent from those who hold up English rule as founded in wrong, and carried out in a spirit of tyrannous oppression. There is much that we regret and condemn in the early history of British supremacy in India, but we firmly believe that it has been a great blessing to that country. The really flagrant wrongs of our Indian government belong to an era when corruption in the Senate was the recognized mode of parliamentary government in this country; when slavery was upheld almost without the consciousness of its wrongs—an age when South Sea bubbles showed that not only Indian *employés*, surrounded by temptation, but the whole nation at home, were frenzied by the greed of wealth—an age when the plaint

the oppressed was drowned in the excitement of victory, and the din of battle, sounding on sea and shore throughout the old world and the new. Our greatest oppressions even then fell on the native princes, rather than on the people, and were as richly deserved by them as they were unjustifiable in us. To the people our rule was a change for the better. Again and again the abuses of our *employés* were reprimanded and restrained by orders from home. We have no wish to be looked upon as defenders of the Company or of the Government, but, at the same time, we feel constrained to enter a passing protest against the class of politicians, whose chief aim seems to be the degradation of their country's name, and the most unsparing condemnation of their ancestors.

"The wiser laws, the loftier sense of right,
The purer morals, juster estimate
Of duties to humanity, and all
That quickened sense of virtue we possess
Beyond the ages of the past, are but
The interest of the legacies they left.
The steps by which we gained the eminence
We hold were hewn out by our fathers;
And we are dwarfs indeed, compared with them,
If their horizon bounds our sight."

ment of the native soldiery by our Government, the regularity of their pay, the privileges accorded to them, the way in which the Bengal army in particular was absolutely petted and spoiled by an almost obsequious treatment of their prejudices, and, above all, the utter absence of any plausible ground of complaint, compelling them to adopt the flimsy pretence about greased cartridges, give us little room to escape from the conviction, that *the Indian mutiny has not originated WITHIN the ranks of the army.* Let us now look to the characteristics of the mutiny. In every respect it bears the aspect of an undeveloped plot, the plan of which is imperfectly understood by the actors. The wide spread of the mutiny, and the known fact of the industrious circulation of sacred cakes through the regiments months before the outbreak, all point to the existence of a preconceived plot; while the desultory, aimless manner in which it has been conducted as plainly proves that the soldiery had no knowledge of the course of action to be adopted, in order to accomplish the final aims of the conspiracy against British rule. The Sepoys, in every act, exhibit themselves as instruments merely. The first outbreak at Meerut was the act of men who ruin a plot from their imperfect acquaintance with its schemes. Honestly enough, they revolted when the pretext they had been taught bore a semblance of truth. They had learned the *signal* of revolt, without learning the *time* when it was to be acted upon. It was then too late to remedy the blunder, and regiment after regiment followed the example of their Meerut confederates. Yet even in the spread of the mutiny we recognize no unanimity of action; each regiment acts for itself, some openly and immediately revolt, while others hesitate, temporize, and waver, or even remain faithful and apparently free from the taint of mutiny for some months. We conclude, therefore, that *the details of the plot for subverting the English Government were unknown to the Sepoys.*

Now let us consider whether the conduct of the Sepoys gives any clear hint of the ultimate purpose of the mutiny. The cry of the Meerut mutineers was, "To Delhi! to Delhi!" There and in Oude alone are there symptoms of organization—an attempt to set up a native government. The nearer these places, and the more decided is the action of the native regiments; the further from them, and the weaker is the spirit of mutiny. The Bombay army is only partially affected; the Madras army remains unshaken in its allegiance. Coupled with these facts, we have the known hatred of the Mohammedans to the British rule; the circumstance that Delhi is the ancient seat of Mohammedan power in India, and that a descendant of the Great Mogul was elected King of Delhi by the insurgents. And again, we know that the kingdom of Oude had just been taken from its native rulers, and annexed to our dominions; that the ex-Queen

of Oude had just brought her grievances in person to the British throne; that the king attempted to escape from Calcutta on the outbreak of the mutiny, and was seized and imprisoned, on the ground of being clearly implicated in the revolt. Putting all these things together, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, that *the ultimate object of the mutiny was the re-establishment of Mohammedan power in India,* and that the King of Oude (and possibly other native chiefs) had been induced to join as co-conspirators, in the hope of regaining their ancient power.*

Now, supposing that the true character and objects of the Indian revolt coincide with the *apparent* conclusions deduced from the little we already know, and stated in the foregoing paragraphs, would the preservation of caste conduce to the outbreak? Let us take a few samples of remarkable mutinies. The mercenaries of Carthage revolted from their allegiance, and brought her to the very verge of destruction, from which she was ultimately saved only by the extraordinary abilities of Hamilear Barca. The cause of the mutiny, and the bond of union between the mutineers, was the attempt to evade or defer payment of the arrears due for their service in Sicily. The first Punic war had left Carthage with exhausted treasures, and the fatal error was committed of bringing the whole body of her mercenary troops together within her own territories, and then attempting to persuade them to remit their arrears. Here we have a common injustice towards the soldiery, combining with the power and opportunity to enforce their demands, afforded by their union in one mass. Take again the War of the Gladiators, in which Rome was nearly overwhelmed by the mutiny of armed slaves, all bound to each other by the strongest ties of a thirst for liberty, power, wealth, and revenge for oppression. Sweep over the centuries of the past to our age and country, and we find the Mutiny of the Nore imperilling England at a critical hour of her history. The grievance of unpaid arrears and scanty and bad rations was redressed; the common grievance was removed, and the fleet speedily returned to its allegiance. In all these cases we find mutiny, whose causes are common wrongs and oppressions, bonds of union keeping them together, and affording the evil disposed a means of warping large bodies to their own ulterior purposes. But there is one more historical instance to which we will allude, the mutiny of a portion of the

* Several private letters from Indian residents bear striking testimony to the Mohammedan hatred of English rule. A friend of our own, in the Bombay territory, informs us that a green flag decked the mosque behind his house during the siege of Delhi, and that prayers were offered daily for the success of the mutineers in that city, until the news of its capture by our troops arrived. The Hindu population, on the other hand, actively sympathized with the English cause, by delivering up to justice some disguised emissaries of the mutineers.

Madras army at Vellore, in 1806. The ostensible cause was a change of dress, but it was pretty conclusively traced to the machinations of the sons of the celebrated Tippoo Saib. In this case the mutiny was so circumscribed, that we may readily suppose many sources of community of interest among the rebels to account for the success of the dethroned princes in seducing the native troops from their allegiance. Now, in the existing mutiny, there is no grievance pretended, but one which we have shown to be a mere nominal and false pretext. The suggestion of a promise of increased pay is insufficient to account for the outbreak; for, in such cases, the mercenary soldier is too well impressed with the truth that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," to trust to mere promises. The hope of plunder has not been the lure, or we should have seen the Sikh and Ghookha levies foremost in the mutiny, instead of fighting in our ranks, and the conduct of the Sepoys themselves would have been almost the opposite to that which has taken place. Antipathy to a foreign yoke would scarcely have shown itself in the army alone, nor would it have slumbered so long, and it would necessarily have been as active for evil in the other presidencies as in Bengal. In short, we are driven to consider fanaticism and religious superstition as the only common influence to which the Sepoys could be subjected, or by which they could be moved by plotters from without. The sacred cakes, whose distribution among the ranks preluded the insurrection, show the machinery which has been at work; the pretext of rebellion, false in itself, is yet connected, by the law of association, with the secret power by which the native soldiery has been seduced. If our view, then, of the origin of the mutiny be correct, the superstitions of Hinduism have offered the means by which Mohammedanism has brought about the present revolt in India.

We have again and again alluded to the fidelity of the Madras Sepoys, and the partial character of the mutinies among the Bombay troops, as contrasted with the utter revolt of the Bengal army. Concurrent with these circumstances is the fact, that in the Bengal army caste has been strictly preserved; in the Bombay army it has been favoured; but in the Madras army wholly disregarded. Argument, then, is needless to prove the fatal influence of this distinguishing tenet of the Hindu religion in respect to the revolt in Bengal, if we are correct in attributing it to the use made by interested parties of the common sympathy and influence of superstition among the native soldiery.

We have thus endeavoured to show how the preservation of caste has apparently been the machinery of revolt. To those readers to whom our estimate of the probable origin of the revolt approves itself the argument bears a connected force, but to those who may wish to attribute the mutiny to other primary causes, the latter part of our argument, as to the common material for

mutiny (so to speak) which the preservation of caste creates, remains sound. To our opponents will belong the task either of proving a general negative, and showing that superstition was not made use of, be the originators of the mutiny whom they may, or the yet more hazardous attempt of showing that its cause is of such a nature as to preclude the use of its potent force.

In conclusion, we shall merely call the attention of our readers to the necessary tendency to insubordination which the preservation of caste must, from its very nature, produce. The tradition on which the Hindu system of caste is founded is well known. From the mouth, the arms, the loins, and the foot of Brahma, the creator, sprung forth a Brahmin, a Kshatriya, a Vaisya, and a Sudra. These men became the progenitors of the four classes, or castes, of priests, soldiers, traders, and labourers. Caste thus forms hereditary boundaries, which no Hindu can pass. All restraint from evil, and all motive to virtue or honour, are thereby swept wholly away. The Sudra, be he what he may, must grovel in the extreme of contempt and degradation for ever: the Brahmin is assured of an almost idolatrous veneration and esteem, on the one condition of not breaking caste. The tendency and object of such a system is obvious, and we may naturally expect that the rules of caste will not be allowed to stand in the way of the wishes of the privileged classes. Hence we find that the Brahmin priest turns soldier or trader at his will; his birth has given him caste, and the observance of a code of the merest formalism preserves its privileges. Now we ask, Can a high caste army be depended upon for obedience, when officered by an alien race? Is not the very nature of discipline repugnant to the system of caste? How can you punish or degrade the Brahmin soldier? He is a Brahmin still, sacred in his own eyes and those of the masses around him. How will you reward him? He is but a Brahmin still; you may bribe the man, but you cannot raise him. How shall he obey, to whom Brahma himself made no superior? What moral argument can you bring to bear on men who look down on the whole world as beneath them? How can you hope to steer clear of some unhappy offence against their formalism and superstition? What bond of sympathy can be woven between them and their officers? What tie can bind them to a European government which is not hourly in jeopardy? It needs but the slightest consideration to show the danger of allowing a principle like that of caste to bind together a mercenary soldiery by a secret and potent freemasonry, over which there is no possibility of control.

Enough has been said for the present. It is now for our opponents to urge such arguments as they can muster. To them we leave the field for a time: our part has been to pioneer the way for a full discussion of an interesting and important

subject. On the decision of such questions as the one before us by the people of England India's future depends. Free her people from the fettering, withering influence of the curse of caste, and we may hope that her regeneration will dawn speedily; but till that is done, our government must remain a mere precarious tenure by the sword, and the Hindu must remain the bondsman of superstition and the victim of semi-barbarian ignorance and wrong.

R. S.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN addressing ourselves to the investigation of this important question, we must at the outset disclaim all intention to argue, however remotely, the rightfulness or wrongfulness of British domination in India. As to how we obtained a footing, created an establishment, or founded an empire there—whether honourably or iniquitously—we shall not stay to determine. With this we have little or nothing to do. Our task will be easier, our duty plainer, and our performance perhaps more perfect, if we confine ourselves to matter strictly relevant to the subject in hand.

India, independent of its present perplexities, has many claims upon the attention of historical students. There, tradition says, man first abode, and from thence "streams of population stole gently forth in all directions, and became the parent stock of all our civilized nations;" in short, it is as rich in historical associations as it is in present interest.

India, from its earliest periods, has been alternately torn by inward dissensions and ravaged by invaders. If we look into history, we shall find that "the native Hindoo race appear, for the most part, to have been incapable of sweeping back the fierce tide of invasion and conquest that has so frequently broken over it, attracted by the beauty and wealth of the country which it populates but does not improve."

But to the task before us. To render the matter as comprehensible to the uninitiated as possible, a definition of the term *caste* may not be uselessly inserted here. "The word *caste* is derived from the Portuguese *casta*, signifying race or lineage. In Sanscrit these divisions are called *varnas*, that is, 'colours.' The most ancient portion of the Vedas, or sacred books of the Hindoos, alludes to such a division; and in the laws of Menu and other works of antiquity, the system is fully described." That it is a baneful system, powerless for good and pregnant with evil, few will deny when they learn for the first time the confusion it is so well calculated to create, by the absurd lines it draws and the insidious distinctions it establishes and enforces. In India there are almost as many degrees of caste as there are cities—certainly as tribes—all various, all different. Irving, writing of castes, says: "To the Brahmins all animal food, save that of fish and kids, is

forbidden; yet in some districts they will readily partake of the flesh of any animal whatever, if only, as in the case of the Hindoos, it be not killed with their own hand. Rajpoots eat fish, mutton, and venison; fowl, beef, and pork are held in abomination. Many castes follow the same rules. With some, however, pork is the favourite diet; beef only is prohibited. Those who shrink from the pollution of eating the flesh of domesticated poultry, will readily devour that of the jungle fowl, which differs from the game cock only in size. All Hindoos consider themselves defiled by contact only with feathers. Among the tribes at the foot of the Himalayas, who in other respects are strict Hindoos, this prejudice does not exist. An earthen pot is polluted beyond redemption by being touched by one of an inferior caste; a metal one suffers no such deterioration. Coolies will carry any load, however offensive, upon their heads; but bid them carry a man for a few paces, and though it be a matter of life and death, they will answer you that it is the business of another caste. The Rohillas will submit to be flogged within an inch of their lives with a leather martingale, but to be struck with a whip or cane would be an indelible disgrace, and very likely to be reented with a bullet or a stab. Spirituous liquors are in general allowed only to Pariahs; in some parts of Southern India the Brahmins partake of them without scruple. Among the Nairs of Malabar the women enjoy a plurality of husbands: among the Totiyars, on the same coast, those within the degrees of consanguinity possess their wives in common. Many castes are only to be distinguished from one another by the cut and colour of their clothes, the shape and arrangement of their trinkets, or some equally frivolous and unimportant distinction." Another author observes of caste, "When Alexander's conquering legions descended the banks of the Indus, the organization of caste was firmly established. Since then twenty-two centuries have elapsed, and the institution has lost little of its pristine vigour." Having thus given an explanation of caste, we now proceed to make a few remarks upon the Sepoys whose mutinous outbreak and frightful ferocities have shocked and alarmed us. It was in the army of the Bombay Presidency that the first notice of Sepoy soldiers receiving British pay occurs. Harriet Martineau, in pp. 211, 212, "British Rule in India," speaking of the state of affairs in 1805, gives a forcible description of our Sepoy soldiers. And few will read it without recognizing the truth of the portraiture, or acknowledging the ability that drew it. A few considerations why caste should have been tolerated and preserved may justly claim attention, before we proceed to decide whether to its preservation may be ascribed, in whole or in part, "the present revolt in India." The desirability of caste being extinguished has often pressed itself upon the attention of Indian legislators. Scarce a governor thereof but who has lamented its existence

and desired its abolishment. But as there is a star in the blackest sky, so in this case—caste is a great evil, but then it is our safeguard. The incongruities of caste disserve the different tribes, and render their union impossible, at least to an extent available for a successful resistance against our rule. Moreover, “an institution so deeply rooted in the religion, habits, and manners of a nation can be destroyed only by the nation itself.” Wise, thoughtful, and far-seeing statesmen “know that such an attempt would convulse Hindostan, would endanger our supremacy, and beget a long and ensanguined struggle, therefore they do not essay it.” “Common sense clearly dictates the pursuance of a policy maintaining the disunity of Mohammedan and Hindoo; for by playing off one against the other, a lever of power is obtained. This separation has existed for centuries; it is coeval with Brahminism and Islamism; it is commanded by the Veda and the Koran; it is strengthened by the habits and feelings of the respective peoples; they cherish the barrier, and preserve it as a religious duty; why then should we scruple to use it?”

For three reasons I conclude that the preservation of caste has conduced to the present revolt in India.

1st. Because it began and raged worst where caste was strongest. It was in the Bengal Presidency that the first outbreak occurred, and where it was most intense. Therein Brahminism predominated: the following was the proportion of castes in the 34th Regiment at the time of its recent mutiny and disbandment—Brahmins, 335; Rajpoots, 237; Hindoos of inferior caste, 231; Mussulmans, 200; Sikhs, 74; Christians (drummers, &c.), 12; total, 1,039. The 19th, which also mutinied, contained 409 Brahmins and 150 Rajpoots. Here we see the preponderance of Brahmins, “the most influential as they are the most bigoted of the whole race of Hindoos.” To a Brahmin the loss of caste is an irremediable misfortune, and the greatest punishment. “A Brahmin may become the hired servant of a Sudra, but while he retains caste his master must bow before him.” Such is but one of the many immunities, indulgencies, and gratifications that the retention of caste confers. No wonder that it is dearly prized and jealously watched. “A report circulated among the native troops that it was the intention of the English Government to christianize India; that by force Hindooism was to be overthrown, and the Christian religion established. How far the report was believed is not actually known. It was, at all events, made use of as an occasion for revolt. The cartridges served out to the men were pronounced unfit for use. They were said to contain ingredients which would for ever destroy the caste of those Hindoos who employed them. Beef and pork fat were declared to be mixed with the cartridges, the first of which was unclean to the Hindoos, and the last to the Mohammedans. This was the ostensible cause of the outbreak.” The Bengal

Sepoys, "recruited for the most part from the very cradle of Brahmanism, and principally composed of its two superior castes," deemed themselves insulted, their faith outraged, their honour assailed; and a fear that the religion of themselves and their forefathers was endangered bade them disown their allegiance, mutiny, and rebel.

2nd. It was caste that conducted to the present revolt in India; because, where caste was low, there has been little or no revolt. Whilst the entire Bengal army disowned its obedience, turned disloyal, and revolted, that at Bombay, where caste is low, and Brahminism unfelt, remained quiescent, calm, and serviceable. And why was this? Upon what hypothesis may this be accounted for, save by ascribing it to the lack of caste, and Brahminism?" "In the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, the older worshippers of the aboriginal and immigrant populations exist to this time, and are adhered to by more than sixteen millions of people." To quote from a pamphlet lately published, "the Hindoo portion of the Bengal army was composed exclusively of high caste men; the Bombay and Madras corps were formed on a diametrically opposite principle."

3rd. Caste conducted to the present revolt in India, because it previously has been the one great source of disaffection. As Miss Martineau observes in the work to which I referred ere now, "None but the students of Indian history are aware how common mutiny has been in all the presidencies, and *especially in Bengal*; the celebrated massacre of Vellore, in which thirteen European officers and eighty-two privates were killed, and ninety-one wounded," and the mutiny of 1805, arose upon religious ground, and the interference of some missionaries, whose conduct was "absurd from ignorance, and extremely censurable for its violent bigotry;" and so it has been in numerous other cases. Whenever the Sepoy servant has proven intractable, violence, real or imaginary, has been done to his religious scruples. An order to obey, which would entail a forfeiture of caste, has had to be resisted. "Occasionally a question of pay or provisions has supplied the motive for insubordination: but the most frequent and formidable ground of discontent has been that which presents itself at the present crisis; namely, a suspicion of meditated interference with the inviolable immunities of their faith, and the privileges of their caste."

To conclude, the Sepoy has been an invaluable servant. His devotedness has often been tried, and his valour been severely tested; yet seldom has he shown himself untrue to his trust, or unfitted for his duty. Led on by Clive, Sepoys cleared the way to Empire; Arcot and Plassy can only be mentioned to their praise. Afghanistan, too, recalls their fidelity and their courage. Against the Sikhs they nobly fought, unshrinkingly and undismayed. In short, they have been useful partners in our peril, and

of great help in our extremity. Through the disasters of Cabul they never swerved. When British authority was feeble, when its existence was threatened by powerful chiefs," they still continued true; but now, in the moment of our strength, with power consolidated, and empire fixed, "the men whom England viewed with pride, and instanced to the foreigner as a proof of the stability and good government of her Oriental realm," have disdained her control, denounced her authority, and slaughtered her sons and daughters. "The smallest thing must have a cause;" to what, then, must we attribute this change in our petted, caprice-indulged Sepoys? Let the despatch of Dec. 6th, 1857, make answer. "There is an established church in India; the whole mechanism of society is bound up in it. It is the source and centre of the social economy of the country. It is not merely an institution, it is the very soul and life of the teeming myriads of Hindoostan. Everything has waxed and waned but that; usurpation, violence, war, anarchy, chaos, have come and gone for ages on ages. New tyrants have superseded old usurpers; rapine and lawlessness have risen and fallen. The only element of society that has, in these perplexities of the miserable people, made society possible, has been this enduring, all pervading faith, the one sole nexus of the gregarious instinct of humanity. The mere remote suspicion of a design to tamper with that which, to them, counts back to a sort of spiritual eternity, has raised all India against us; has perilled our expulsion from the Peninsula." Other causes of discontent may have existed. other offences may have been committed, and other insults endured, but, as I believe, and as I hope I have proved, the great provocation that exasperated and maddened, that roused the Sepoy's smouldering ire, and awakened his resentment, was a fear for his creed, and a love for his caste. He knew, or imagined, the first insulted and the last imperilled, therefore he rose to avenge the one and *preserve* the other.

Bilston.

H. V. M.

THE MIND OF MAN is as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the universal world, and as joyful to receive the impressions thereof as the eye rejoices to see the light; and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things, and the vicissitudes of times, but raised also to discover the inviolable laws and the infallible decrees of nature; but if any man shall think, by view and inquiry into sensible and material things, to attain that light whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature and will of God, then is he veiled through vain philosophy; for the sense of man is as the sun, which shines and reveals the terrestrial bodies, but conceals and obscures the stars and bodies celestial.—*Bacon.*

Social Economy.

WOULD THE MAINE LAW BENEFIT, OR BE POSSIBLE IN ENGLAND?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE task which has devolved upon us is an easy one. Our coadjutors have so successfully overthrown the arguments (?) of our opponents, that little remains to be said. It is well that such is the case. "Circumstances over which we have no control" prevent us from devoting but a very limited amount of time to the reply. Firmly believing, as we do, in the truth of our views, we should have been greatly annoyed to find that, through any fault on our part, our opponents had succeeded in seemingly having the best of the argument. Without any further remarks, we might safely trust to the good sense of the readers of the "CONTROVERSIALIST" for a favourable verdict. However, as it is usual to say something at the conclusion of a debate, we propose giving a hasty glance at our opponents' articles. The first thing that strikes us is the utter absence of *argument*. Our opponents are successful dealers in generalities. They may have said much, but what they have said is certainly very little to the purpose. Dr. Lees, we opine, will find it more difficult to convince the readers of the "CONTROVERSIALIST" than his alliance friends, if the following is to be considered as a specimen of his reasoning powers: "It is no fallacy, but a simple fact, that the *masses of the people* are even now (not a London mob, perhaps) favourable to a Maine law, and want the temptation removed which they cannot resist. *Twice* has this been shown in the vast Birmingham Town Hall; and the other day, in Rochdale, at an out-door meeting, 3,000 people voted for it, with only twelve dissentients; and a few weeks ago, at the Pardshaw Crag pic-nic, in the wilds of Cumberland, above 10,000 persons did the same." To us this seems very like the "We, the people of England," of the Tooley-street tailors. The masses are favourable to a Maine law, because "twice (!) in the vast Birmingham Town Hall" a few hundred voted for such a measure! The 10,000 who did a similar thing in the "wilds of Cumberland," is another *forcible illustration* of public feeling! We are not told whence came the people of England, represented by the 10,000, that attended the Pardshaw Crag pic-nic. *That* might have destroyed the "startling effect." Were they not drawn from the whole of the north of England by the most enticing inducements, *à la Bar-num*? We are not told how much the "bill of fare," or the

"programme of the proceedings," set forth in the most fascinating manner, in the most taking type, and the railway trains procured to run at the most astonishing cheap rates, had to do with the gathering! It would have been strange, indeed, if the number had been less. The sayings and doings of 10,000 Maine lawites, scattered throughout the north of England, joined to 10, 20, or even 50,000, who were unable to attend, would give no idea as to the feelings of the "masses of the people" in respect to the Maine law. The pic-nic was, to all intents and purposes, a Maine law gathering. The originators of it distinctly wished it to be such. Had any but Maine lawites been attracted by the prospect of spending a pleasant day, they would certainly not have got up a counter manifestation. They would feel themselves intruders, being much in the position of a gentleman who gets into a private party under false pretences, and would not care about drawing attention to themselves. Besides, had such a thing have taken place, the Alliance papers would have been eloquent on the disgraceful behaviour of a set of roughs who had destroyed the quiet of what was essentially a private pic-nic.

We are told that the Alliance advocates "*never* confound the cause proximate with the cause ultimate, nor a part with the whole." We are, therefore, compelled to believe that our senses have been in the habit of deceiving us. We have heard at Alliance meetings what seemed very like what we stated; we must, however, have deceived ourselves, or else the speakers did not mean what they said. They had no right to confound the cause proximate with the cause ultimate, because Dr. Lees tells us, "in an official manifesto, the following passage occurs:" (a) "*The causes of the evil of intemperance are twofold, or direct and remote, viz., (1) the use of the drink, which generates the intemperate appetite; and (2) the outward temptations to that use.*" (b) "*The cause of the use, and the temptations to the use, are resolvable into ignorance, fashion, private custom, and the traffic; the last being the public fountain which supplies and sustains, in chief part, the private custom.*" (c) "*While temperance societies find their first, chief, and permanent work in antagonizing the former, the last, as a public and licensed system, is amenable to social law, being the proved source of three-fourths of our pauperism, crime, and public burdens.*" The traffic, the cause proximate, is thus set down as being the source of "three-fourths of our pauperism, crime, and public burdens!" This seems very like what we stated,—that the Alliance advocates disregard the main cause of drunkenness, the cause ultimate.

We are next accused of "falling into a singular blunder." We are dull enough not to perceive it. We stated that "the traffic is the cause proximate of drunkenness; but there is a cause of this cause—the cause ultimate." Dr. Lees informs us that "the fact of a cause of evil having a father, seems a very bad reason for

licensing the son to do mischief." This is more than a "singular blunder;" it is a palpable absurdity. The State does not license the publican to do mischief. The disclosures that have lately taken place prove that we are all being poisoned to a greater or less extent. Nearly everything we eat or drink is a poison. Tea, coffee, pickles—the latter pre-eminently—are all poisons; and yet who would think of asserting that the State *licensed* the grocer to commit murder? The State licenses the grocer to sell tea, &c., in the same manner that it licenses the publican to sell beer. The cases are perfectly analogous, and, therefore, Dr. Lees' statement is, to say the least of it, ridiculous.

"With universal suffrage, we could carry the law in a year." This is so self-evident, that Dr. Lees thinks it unnecessary to advance a single reason in its support. It is evident he has not a very favourable opinion of "the masses of the people." He must consider them to be little better than children. They acknowledge the evils that spring from drinking to excess, and yet they have not the courage to refrain from making beasts of themselves! They know the public house is a "fountain of evil," and yet they cannot pass the fountain without imbibing a glass! It is of a majority like this that the country, which boasts of being the first nation in the world, is composed. What would Goldsmith now say were he alive? The "bold peasantry," which was once our "country's pride," no longer exists. It is our middle and higher classes that are the support of our English honour and renown. "The masses of the people" are but children when their passions and inclinations lead them. They want the State to act as nurse in their second childhood. Their mothers had to prevent them from killing themselves with edge-tools, and over-indulging in "bulls'-eyes" and "hardbake;" now the State must see they do not injure themselves by over-indulgence in—beer! This might be all very well, so far as it reflected on the individuals concerned; but how unjust towards those who are not children in men's clothes! It is very right to prevent Masters Tommy, Billy, &c., from manipulating on chins with razors in their juvenile days, but because they might injure themselves, it is no reason why Messrs. Thomas, William, &c., of maturer age, should be prevented from removing what they consider their "superfluous hair." It is no use to assert the cases are not similar,—that alcohol is always injurious in its influence. The moderate drinker denies that such is the case, and he has a perfect right to the full enjoyment of his opinion. If our opponents deny this, then we, who believe that there can be no "superfluous hair" on a man's face, would be justified in arguing for a *Maine Razor Law*!

T. U.'s article contains nothing but what has been thoroughly sifted by "Case," H. V. M., and T. L. F.

"Veritas," after describing the effects of over-indulgence in

intoxicating liquors, informs us that all measures have "signally failed in elevating the masses." "And why this result? Because the traffic, the temptation to the use of the cause, is permitted. Remove this, and *its effects* will be, must be, removed also. That a law prohibiting the sale of these liquors, which are the curse of our country, the greatest hindrance to its prosperity and happiness, would *benefit* England, cannot, we think, be doubted." And this is supposed to be reasoning! With the sage remark, "that a Maine law would benefit England, cannot, we think, be doubted." "Veritas" proceeds to dilate, in a similar strain, on the possibility of a Maine law. "Veritas" ought to have known that *it has been doubted*. We proved that it would not be beneficial: P. Q. L. R. did the same: and "Case" gave example after example, distinctly showing that it would entail far greater evils on the country than the so vehemently condemned traffic. Surely "Veritas" might have made some allusion to P. Q. L. R.'s article, if not to ours. We will not reiterate any of the arguments advanced by ourselves or coadjutors, it would be useless. The Maine lawites are so infatuated, that they will not look beyond what they have in their own wisdom fixed as the result of the prohibition of the liquor traffic. They care nothing for the evils it would substitute. It is this want of due consideration to after causes that has been the bane of English legislation. Every little defect in our social life is immediately set upon as a fit subject for legislative tinkering by our political tinkers. For every hole they mend, they make a larger one. They will not support any comprehensive system of reform in law, representation, or State functions; they prefer mending a little here, altering a little there, and patching a little everywhere.

In respect of the possibility of a Maine law, "Veritas" naïvely remarks: "Test the *possibility* of the measure, by putting it in *practice*!" This requires no comment of ours, it is so utterly absurd!

We have completed our survey, and we must say that we never remember in any former debate such a total absence of argument as our opponents' articles exhibit. Month after month have articles appeared on the negative of the question, piling up argument upon argument, showing that the Maine law would not benefit or be possible in England, and yet the affirmative writers have gone on composedly painting the evils of drunkenness (which all admit), and asserting that the Maine law would do all that its promoters hoped! Ostrich like, do they fancy by not noticing the shafts of their opponents, to come out of the combat victorious? Let the readers of the *Controversialist* decide to whom victory is due! We believe that the verdict will be that the Maine law would not "benefit, or be possible in England."

TALIESIN.

IS AN UNLIMITED BANK ISSUE BENEFICIAL TO
COMMERCE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE present commercial crisis in America, throughout Europe, and at home, renders a discussion on the currency question at this time singularly appropriate and interesting, contemporaneous as it is with its consideration in the Imperial Parliament. And if it present difficulties to the galaxy of brilliant talent and great experience collected together there, so that it has been again and again referred to select committees, in order that the House may be enabled to arrive at some conclusion, from the collected evidence of all the first political economists and practical men of the day, certainly we cannot expect its discussion to prove an easy task to the contributors of the *British Controversialist*. In undertaking, therefore, to lead the opposition upon this very important subject, we feel no slight weight of responsibility resting upon our shoulders; and if, in the development of our views, we are guilty of any errors and inconsistencies—and it would be presumptuous to expect to avoid being so—we shall plead the difficult nature of our subject in extenuation of our offence, hoping that may be deemed a sufficient apology.

It is the duty of those who undertake to open a debate to place the subject before their readers in such a manner that there may be no misconception as to the point at issue between the combatants. In performing this duty, we deem the best course to pursue will be to give an outline of the laws now regulating our paper currency. By this last term we mean only *Bank of England* notes; notes issued by other banks not being recognized as legal tender need not now be considered. The Act of Parliament which principally defines the law relative to this currency is the 7th and 8th Victoria, cap. 32, passed on the 19th of July, 1844, and commonly called the Bank Charter Act. The first clause enacts that "the issue of promissory notes of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, payable on demand, shall be separated and thenceforth kept wholly distinct from the general banking business of the said Governor and Company," and creates a separate department, to be called "The Issue Department of the Bank of England," for the purpose of conducting the business relating to such issue of notes. The second clause enacts, "That upon the 31st day of August, 1844, there shall be transferred, appropriated, and set apart, by the said Governor and Company, to the Issue Department of the Bank of England, securities to the amount of fourteen million pounds, whereof *the debt due by the public* to the said Governor and Company shall be, and be deemed, a part; and there shall

also at the same time be transferred, appropriated, and set apart, by the said Governor and Company, to the said issue department, so much of the gold coin and gold and silver bullion, then held by the Bank of England, as shall not be required by the banking department thereof; and thereupon there shall be delivered out of the said issue department into the said banking department such an amount of Bank of England notes as, together with the Bank of England notes then in circulation, shall be equal to the aggregate amount of the securities, coin, and bullion, so transferred to the said issue department of the Bank of England; and the whole amount of Bank of England notes in circulation, including those delivered to the banking department of the Bank of England as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be *issued on the credit of such securities, coin, and bullion*, so appropriated, and set apart to the said issue department; and from thenceforth, it shall not be lawful for the said Governor and Company to increase the amount of securities for the time being in the said issue department, save as hereinafter is mentioned." The saving clause is contained in the 5th of the act, and is simply to meet the case of a banker ceasing to issue his own notes, when, an Order in Council being made, the amount of securities in the issue department may be increased, and notes in excess of the £14,000,000 may be issued to the extent of the additional securities deposited. But though the Bank may not issue notes beyond the extent of £14,000,000 upon the credit of the securities, coin, and bullion referred to above, yet the 4th clause provides that "all persons shall be entitled to demand, from the issue department of the Bank of England, notes in exchange for gold bullion, at the rate of £3 17s. 9d. per ounce of standard gold."

It will be observed that £14,000,000 worth of notes are issued upon securities, of which the debt due by the country to the Bank forms a large part, no less a sum in fact than £11,015,100. Now the theory of our note circulation is, that it is convertible into gold at any moment, the holders of *all* notes issued being entitled to receive gold in exchange for them upon demand. The question therefore arises how, under the before-mentioned circumstances, the theory of a convertible paper issue can be carried out in practice? We will endeavour to explain this seeming difficulty. We will premise that there is a natural law governing the distribution of the precious metals throughout the world, so that their amount in any given country will not fall below a certain point. It is known that the ordinary business transactions of a country cannot be carried on with *less* than a certain amount of currency. This amount differs in different countries, and at different times, being regulated by the extent and nature of the internal trade, the habits and dispositions of the inhabitants, and other causes not necessary now to mention. But the *minimum*

amount required in any country can be, and is, pretty accurately ascertained. Now, fixing the amount of notes issued upon other security than that of the precious metals at a sum which, together with the minimum amount of the precious metals, the country, by the law of distribution above referred to, will always retain, makes a less sum than that required to carry on the business transactions of the country in times of the greatest depression, the amount of notes so issued never will be returned to the issuers in exchange for specie. The sum fixed upon by the Bank Act of 1844 for this country was £14,000,000, for it was calculated that, unless some very extraordinary domestic dissensions, or other impossible to be guarded against circumstances, should arise to overthrow the equilibrium of society, the actual circulation of paper money in this country never could fall below that amount. Therefore, inasmuch as for every note issued in excess of that sum the Bank must retain sufficient specie in its coffers to redeem the promise of payment thereon expressed, it follows that our paper currency may fairly be considered convertible, and as *representative*—and not merely *symbolical*—of specie, and our medium of exchange, as a whole, is justly entitled to be considered as possessing an *intrinsic* value.

Having thus glanced at the laws which regulate our paper currency, we are now in a position to judge of the meaning of, and the results likely to ensue from, “an unlimited Bank issue.” It means, in the first place, the repeal of the Bank Charter Act, and that the issue of notes, instead of being limited to £14,000,000, and to an additional extent, equal to the value of gold coin and bullion retained in the coffers of the Bank, shall be limited only by the demand and such considerations of care and safety as may influence the issuers. Further, we believe it will be found to mean the abrogation of specie payments, and the substitution of a symbolical currency for one possessing an intrinsic value. It will be found to mean an immediate temporary depreciation of the medium of exchange, an unnatural rise in prices, an unhealthy extension of trade and commerce, to be speedily followed by a sudden return to the old standard of value, a rapid fall in prices, a sudden collapse of commerce and of credit. In one word, we believe “an unlimited Bank issue” means ruin.

One of the first laws governing a metallic currency, as of all commodities, is—that the ratio of supply to demand is a leading feature in the regulation of its value as a purchasing power. So, whether the supply of gold throughout the world, for the purposes of a medium of exchange, be 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 ounces does not materially matter. Under either circumstance, the demand is the same, and the supply being only half in the former case of what it is in the latter, the purchasing power of any given quantity will be twice as great in the one case as it is in the other; that is to say, one ounce will go as far, and serve the same purposes, as two ounces. Gold, has, then, a

natural purchasing power all over the civilized world, determined by the ratio of supply to demand. There can therefore be no real scarcity of money, owing to the limited supply of gold; and to speak of the quantity of the precious metals, as media of exchange, as insufficient for the requirements of the commercial transactions of the world, is to show a complete ignorance of the very groundwork of the law upon which a metallic currency is based; and to use it as an argument for a large and unlimited issue of paper money is simply absurd. Scarcity or abundance of the precious metals (as money) is, and must be, only a relative term; true only of one locality as compared with another. Nor will this unequal distribution last for any length of time, for it produces its own cure; an abundance of money leading—*ceteris paribus*—to high prices, exportation of the surplus ensues, whilst, on the other hand, a scarcity of money leading to low prices, the foreign purchaser is attracted, and a re-importation of the precious metals follows. Thus, in either case, the equilibrium is restored. Such is the effect of a metallic currency, when left to itself. No country which adopts it can suffer from any great extent or long periods of scarcity or abundance of the medium of exchange, as it contains within itself the cure for these evils, and thus would be secured one chief means of maintaining steadiness of prices, than which nothing can be more conducive to the benefit of commerce.

But how if the intrinsic nature of the currency be tampered with by an unlimited issue of paper money? Suppose a case. There is a relative scarcity of the precious metals in this country; and the Bank, instead of allowing the price of money in the market to rise to its natural level, and prices to fall in proportion, supplies the deficiency in the circulation by an issue of Bank paper—of course, without retaining bullion in its coffers to meet payment thereof on presentation. What is the effect? The law which would bring back the precious metals to this country is prevented from operating. Prices are kept unnaturally high; there is no inducement for the foreigner to purchase; the internal commerce of the country is carried on with a paper currency, no longer possessing a representative, but only a symbolical, value. The manufacturer continues to produce, until he has exhausted his stock of raw material; and then, wishing to replenish it, hastens to convert his paper money into gold. The Bank, unable to meet the demand, suspends specie payments entirely—no raw material can be procured from the foreigner—the manufactories are closed—the workmen thrown out of employ—the trade and commerce of the country come to a stand still—and irretrievable and national bankruptcy and ruin are the final results.

But an unlimited Bank issue is no new idea. It has been put into practice, and signally failed. It was to remedy the evils it entailed upon this country that Sir R. Peel passed the Act of

1844. There can be no doubt it was the enormous issue of Bank notes that brought about the commercial convulsion of 1837. It has been tried in America, and has produced the unparalleled commercial disasters of 1857. The convulsion under which the whole continents of Europe and America is now labouring commenced in the United States, brought on by years of over trading and gigantic speculations, arising from, and fostered and encouraged by, an excessive, because unlimited—for the one follows the other as naturally as night follows day—paper circulation. Some of the speculations naturally turn out bad; the houses engaged in them apply to the banks for further advances, are refused, and their failure is gazetted for some fabulously large sum. Other houses are affected, and suspend payment—excitement ensues—credit is shaken—and the holders of paper money hasten to convert it into gold. The banks, unable to meet the pressure, are compelled to close their doors, themselves the victims of their own folly in having encouraged their customers in their unhealthy speculations. Paper money becomes depreciated in value, while that of the precious metals rises in an equal degree. A drain sets in upon those countries where they are tolerably plentiful. The failures in America have affected, more or less, all countries engaged in commercial transactions with her: some houses suspend—credit is shaken—every one is demanding money to meet the calls that may be made upon him. The currency, which in ordinary times is sufficient for the requirements of the country, is now found quite inadequate to meet the increased demand; money rises from six to seven and eight, and from nine to ten per cent. Commercial firms are unable to get their bills discounted, except at that last mentioned ruinous rate of discount, and then only those of a very first class character, and one after the other suspend payment and business together—and each, as it goes, drags down some other firm with it. And so the panic spreads from one country to another, carrying with it disgrace, ruin, misery.

Such is the commercial crisis of 1857. The remedy at last resorted to in this country was the suspension of Peel's Act of 1844, and a return to the system of an unlimited Bank issue! Alas, yes! A temporary relief at the expense of a permanent injury. It is "the hair of the dog that has bitten us." It is the drunkard's morning dram, dissipating for a time the feeling of prostration and sickness ensuing from a night's debauch, but which, in reality, is only inflicting a deeper and more permanent injury upon the constitution. We believe that had it not been that the crisis in this country had already reached its full height—that the minimum Bank rate of discount, £10 per cent., was already sufficiently high, not only to prevent any further exportation of the precious metals, but to lead to their re-importation—on a limited scale certainly; that the run upon the Scotch and Irish banks had exhausted itself, allowing them to return much

of the specie they had drawn from the Bank of England; that there was also, about this time, a most fortunate and opportune arrival of gold from Australia; that most of the large houses had provided themselves with sufficient funds to meet any demands that might be made upon them, and therefore, that the demand for money had slackened: we say, had it not been that the crisis had already reached its full height, we believe the suspension of the Bank Charter Act, instead of assisting to alleviate the distress of the commercial community, would only have still further increased it. Had the Bank been compelled to exceed the limits allowed by the Act of 1844 to the extent of £8,000,000 or £10,000,000, instead of only £2,000,000, the inevitable result must have been a depreciation in the value of the Bank note; whilst there would have been a still further demand for specie, with a corresponding rise in its value. As it is, the only result has been an unnatural depreciation of the currency. But as the extent of this depreciation has been limited, so also will be the injustice and the evils resulting from it.

Nevertheless, our opponents still have it in their power to point to the fact that in this country, with our *limited* issue of paper money, we suffered most severely from the commercial crisis, whilst in Hamburg, with an entirely metallic currency, its effects have been felt more severely, perhaps, than anywhere else. It is true. But can this be laid at the door of Peel's Act of 1844 in our case, or at the door of the metallic currency in the case of Hamburg? Certainly not. These facts have been caused, not *by*, but in *spite of*, the limited paper issue and the metallic currency. What could be expected, with the large and unlimited quantity of paper money afloat in America and many parts of continental Europe, unnaturally depreciating the purchasing powers of gold and silver, so that when there arises a contraction of this symbolical currency, and a sudden demand for the metals as suddenly raising their value, what could be expected, but that those countries which most rely upon them as the medium of exchange, should most suffer from their sudden withdrawal? This does not alter the fact, that it was an unlimited issue of paper money which lay at the root of the commercial crisis of 1857.

Space forbids our writing more. We have scarcely introduced the subject to our readers, before we are compelled to bring this paper to a close. We hope to resume the subject at some future period, when we shall go more minutely into the matter, and have an opportunity of more fully expressing our objections to an "unlimited bank issue," and to the *whole system of credit* upon which the commercial transactions of this and other nations is based. We trust, however, what we have already said, though very insufficient and incomplete, may be deemed not altogether an inappropriate introduction to the subject under consideration.

PHILADELPHIA.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS IN MATHEMATICS.

QUESTIONS (continued).

XXV. A person has £5,635 stock, the annual interest on which is reduced from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. What does he lose in income by the reduction, and what is his income after it?

XXVI. What length of carpet $\frac{1}{2}$ yd. wide will cover a rectangular room 36 ft. long and 27 ft. 9 in. wide? and what will be the cost at 4s 9d. per yard?

XXVII. What fraction of the earth's diameter (7,900 miles) is a mountain $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles high? By what fraction of an inch would the height of such a mountain be properly represented on a globe of 18 inches diameter?

XXVIII. What is the cost of constructing a railroad 125 miles long at the rate of £16 per yard?

XXIX. Extract the square root of (1) 32.1489 (2) .144.

XXX. If n be a whole number, what is the least value of n for which ($\frac{1}{3}$) n is less than $\frac{1}{2}$?

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

XIX. $5\frac{1}{4}$ to 11 o'clock.

XX. 100.

XXI. £95 7s. 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.

XXII. $\frac{ab}{a+b}$

XXIII. £714.

XXIV. 8 per cent. is the most productive by 1s. 8d. per cent.

INTELLECTUAL DECAY, doubtless, is not uncommon; but it is not universal. Newton was in his eighty-fifth year improving his chronology, and Waller, at eighty-two, is thought to have lost none of his poetic powers.—*Johnson*.

ON DEATH.—

To die is landing on some peaceful shore,
Where billows never beat, nor tempests roar;
Ere well we feel the friendly stroke, 'tis o'er.

Garth.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

170. What part of the Scriptures is best for a young student of the "Hebrew language to commence with, having almost total regard to simplicity, together with such other information as you should deem serviceable to the successful prosecution of the above study?"

171. Is Cassell's "First Lessons in Latin" (a shilling) qualified to teach the language without a master? What other books are needful or useful?—the price and publisher.—R. J.

172. What is the method of working the following question? A conical

glass, whose diameter is 5 inches, and altitude 6 inches, is filled to the brim with water,—what must be the diameter of a spherical globe, so that, when dropped into the glass, it may expel the most water possible?

173. What studies are necessary—what examination is undergone—which is the best College—what is about the expense for obtaining the degree of B.A.?—HARRISSON.

174. Where can I find the earliest History of India? Is there a work on the subject? and where it is to be obtained, and the price?—HARRISSON.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Hartlepool Working Men's Library Institute.—The third anniversary of this Institution was celebrated by a public *soirée* in the Town Hall, Hartlepool, on Tuesday, November 10th, 1857, when an excellent tea, provided by the ladies of the town, was discussed by a large number of the members and their friends; after which a Public Meeting was held in the Hall, presided over by G. J. Brown, Esq., Mayor of Hartlepool, who was supported by Henry Pease, Esq., M.P. for South Durham, Mr. Alderman Robson, Mr. Councillor Gray, Messrs. James Groves, George Moore, &c. &c.

The Mayor, after introducing Mr. Pease to the Meeting, called upon the Secretary of the Institution (Mr. Hindmarsh) to read the Report of the Committee; from which it appeared that

270 members at present were upon the roll. The library consisted of 810 volumes, and the last year's readings were 3,561. The reading room is furnished with 21 daily and weekly newspapers, besides periodicals, and the attendance is highly satisfactory. The financial position of the Institute, considering the low terms of membership (only 6d. per month), is also in a satisfactory state, showing a balance in Treasurer's hands of £8.

Mr. Pease, in the course of a lengthy and capably delivered speech, alluded to an institution in a neighbouring county which he had visited the day previously, said:—"The President of the Institution made use of the very plaintive but true language, 'Of our Society we have to report a state of general debility.' They all knew that too much

bread led, as well as too little, to debility. There was an institution with money, law, physic, and divinity, all in its favour, and yet, poor thing! it was suffering from general debility! And no wonder! See the difference between a Society too much helped and hampered, and one like their own (*the Hartlepool Working Men's*), desirous to go on its own feet, and, in its own course, direct its best endeavours towards the accomplishment of its own purpose, the latter having, in fact, done a great deal for a remarkably

small sum of money, judiciously and carefully expended."

The meeting was also addressed by the Mayor, the Rev. Canon Knight, Alderman Bobson, &c.; and the harmony of the evening was considerably enhanced by the vocal performances (with pianoforte accompaniment), of the Barnard Castle Choristers, assisted by Mr. Lawson, of Hartlepool. After votes of thanks to the Mayor, Mr. Pease, M.P., the ladies, &c., the meeting separated.—T. P. T.

LITERARY NOTICES.

THAT it is Christmas time is evidenced by the heaps of presentation books in gorgeous bindings which crowd our library table. One of the plainest exterior, but most interesting interior, and especially *à propos* of the time, is Professor Christmas' new work, "The Hand of God in India," illustrative of her past and present history, and pointing to her only course of safety for the future. All our readers should peruse its pages attentively in connection with the debates opened up in our present number.

The Sabbath discussion is far from allayed. The champion of the "League" has met the Rev. Robert Maguire, Incumbent of Clerkenwell, on the well-known platform of Exeter Hall. As to which got the day, we must refer our readers to the full and verbatim report issued by the joint committee at the low price of 6d.

Charles Reade, the Author of "Never Too Late to Mend," has been charged by his enemies with piracy from the French, in his new tale, "White Lies;" but we think that they have merely fallen into the trap laid for them, and been deceived by its French style.

A new work by Mr. Borrow, Author of the "Gipsies in Spain," entitled, "A History of the Gipsies," with Vocabulary of the Language.

The retirement of M. Nefftzer from the *Presse* has led to a lawsuit between the manager, M. Rouy, and the proprietor, M. Millaud, who bought the property of M. E. de Girardin, subject to certain rather unusual and complicated conditions. M. de Girardin endeavoured to convey the *Presse* in such a way as to enjoy, to some extent, the privileges of a testator as well as a vendor, and to imprint the stamp of his own will upon the management of the journal for some time to come. A difference has now arisen, which the Tribunal of Commerce will be called upon to solve. In the meanwhile, both parties are agreed that the duties of *rédacteur en chef* shall be confided to M. Peyrat.

A report is in circulation that Mr. Scott Russell, the builder of the *Leviathan*, offered to launch her for £50,000. This was thought extravagant, and Mr. Brunel undertook to perform the task for £10,000. It is said that the unsuccessful efforts to set her afloat have already cost upwards of £70,000.

M. Daubree, a French geologist, has laid before the Academy of Sciences casts of certain impressions found in sandstones of the *Gress Bigarre* (Trias, or new red sandstone) in the department of Haute Saone. They are compared to some impressions found in

Thuringia—namely, those of the Labyrinthodon, a reptile noticed by Sir C. Lyell (*Manual*, p. 342). "They have some resemblance to the paw of a dog, and seem to afford a new proof that Manuifere existed when the last beds of the Trias were deposited."

A copy of the first folio of *Shakespeare's plays* (1623) has been met with in a carpenter's shop near Maidenhead, and is now in proper hands. It seems that it was sold at a country auction many years ago, and bought, with some other books, for a few shillings, by the present owner. A copy of *Spenser's Works*, folio, 1613, which formerly was the property of one of our greatest poets of that day, has also turned up in the same neighbourhood, together with the second edition of the notorious production of Philip Stubbes, "The Anatomy of Abuses."

Mr. Horace St. John has nearly completed his long-announced "History of the First Reform Bill," based in great measure upon exclusive materials.

Earl Grey is preparing for the press a work connected with the progress of Parliamentary Reform.

An action has been brought against M. Alexandre Dumas, by M. Auguste Marquet, to enforce his contract for 150,000 francs, payable in eleven years, for his share in "Monte Christo," "Les Mousquetaires," and seventeen other productions, the paternity of which is hitherto supposed to be the Creole's.

Mr. Murray's sale was, as usual, well attended, and the sales both of old and new works completely satisfactory. Dr. Livingstone's book was the great feature, and of this 10,000 were sold in the room; orders for nearly 4,000 more were then in Mr. Murray's hands, and the subsequent sale has been so large, that the actual sale must now amount to 16,000. Amongst the sales of other books were 1,500 Blunt on the Fathers; 500 Croker's Essays; 1,200 of Lord Duf-

ferin's *Yacht Voyage*; 500 of Dr. Waagen's new work; 1,450 of Stephenson's *Life*; 600 Bircb's *Ancient Pottery*; 3,000 King Edward VI.'s *Latin Grammar*; 1,300 *Domestic Cookery*; 1,200 Smith's *Latin Dictionary*; 1,500 Liddell's *Rome*; 800 Somerville's *Physical Geography*; 800 James's *Æsop*; 500 *Philosophy in Sport*; 6,300 Markham's *England*; and 5,900 Little Arthur's *England*.

A new comet was discovered at Florence, on the 10th, by M. Donati; and, according to his observations, its mean time was 7^h 5' 34", right ascension 232° 8' 59", and declination 55° 44' 12". It was very faint. A telegraphic announcement of the discovery was immediately transmitted to Pavia, London, Berlin, Altona, and Vienna. The comet has since been observed at Rome and Paris.

The venerable ruins of Carnarvon Castle, where King Edward II. was born, are about to be protected from further decay, and placed as far as possible in a state of repair. The castle is Crown property, and the necessary funds will be obtained from the admission fee charged upon visitors.

Dr. Livingstone has sailed for Lisbon, to make arrangements with the Portuguese Government relative to the navigation of the Zambesi river, and commercial intercourse with those regions of the interior where the coast is under the Crown of Portugal.

The venerable Baron Humboldt has entirely recovered from his recent indisposition; and, notwithstanding his advanced age of eighty-eight, he is labouring actively in order to complete the last volume of his "Cosmos."

Lord Derby has appointed the Rev. Drummond Percy Chase, M.A., Fellow of Oriel, and Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford, in room of the late Dr. Bliss.

Sir E. B. Lytton has been re-elected Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow.

Communion of Thought; OR, THE MEANS OF LITERARY CULTURE.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

"In working well, if travail you sustain,
Into the wind shall lightly pass the pain;
But of the deed the glory shall remain."—*N. Grimoald.*

CIRCUMSTANCES beyond the writer's control deprived him of the pleasure of meeting, *in type*, with his many friends—the readers of this serial—and in loving companionship utter, with them, a word of welcome to the yet young year. It was a pleasure to him that another was found to address some such words as he would have wished to utter regarding the need of seriously considering "the time that *now* is." These words of our friend were, as their title ran, "Retrospective and Prospective." It will not be felt, either by him or the reader, too intrusive if, trusting to our lengthy communings with each other, the present writer should attempt one word of gentle admonishment upon the duty of making our "glance" an *introspective* one as well. In—

"The tug for wealth and power;
The passions and the cares that wither life,
And waste its little hour;"

we too frequently forget to commune quietly with our own hearts, and to "examine *ourselves*." This ought not to be. Man must measure himself with his destiny, and make himself equal to it. To do this, he must not only know what is to be done, nor even what part he can do, but he must "gird up his loins," and *do* it with all his might. Power and opportunity are the two measures of duty. Any power unexercised, any opportunity unused, is a duty left undone. Man should have a higher aim than mere living—living nobly—

"Only the actions of the just
Smell sweet, and blossom in the dust."

Justice imperatively demands that each possible power should be exerted to the utmost in the performance or the furtherance of that which is right and holy. By toil of brain or limb we should labour *in* circumstances, *by* circumstances, and, if need be, *against*

circumstances, for the true betterment of humanity. Body, instinct, impulse, opinion, thought, knowledge, vital activity,—the whole aggregate which constitutes our manhood,—ought to be honestly, and as continuously as possible, exercised in restraining the wrong, and in maintaining and sustaining the right. That is true utility, genuine manliness, real *life*. If the writer or the reader should cast his “glance” within “the gentle closure” of his own consciousness, could either or each venture to say,

“Within the knowledge of mine own desert”

I can inscribe the words, “All these things have I done”? Alas! that tenant of the heart, we fear, would shrink from answering a confident “Yea,” to this self-questioning. And if it, indeed, be so, that the introspective glance which we advise display the flaws which disfigure the “precious jewel” of our being, shall we, thereupon, take refuge in despair? We counsel no such cowardice. Let us rather rally our whole energy and force for another trial,—one other more determined onset against each foe by whom man’s future is threatened, assailed, or jeopardized. Not as “Time’s fool,” shall we treat the visitant whom he has lately sent us, but as God’s youngest angel come—

“What’s new to speak, what’s *done* to register.”

Thought is the soul’s highest form of life; action is the embodiment of thought. Union in action is only possible through communion of thought; and, therefore, we intend to devote the present paper to a critical notice of some of “the means of literary culture,” with special reference to what we conceive to be the grand characteristic of our age,—“the communion of thought.”

It is true that several topics, justly coming under the wide category of “means of literary culture,” have already at some length occupied our pen; and these pages, *e. g.*, “The Art of Reasoning,” “The Elements of Rhetoric,” “The Art of Speaking,” “Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies,” “Aids to Self-Culture,” &c. &c., while some of our *collaborateurs* have undertaken the consideration of several other items of a similar kind. To these same matters it is not our present intention to do more than refer *en passant*, before we enter upon fresh fields of detail and criticism.

The more usual means of literary culture, schools, universities, books, &c., do not enter into our plan; neither do the more popular forms of conveying knowledge, *e. g.*, Mechanics’ Institutes, Philosophical Associations, Athenæums, Working Men’s Colleges, magazine literature, or newspapers, come within the scope of our intended observations. We desire strictly to confine our present paper, as we have said before, to the “Communion of Thought: or, the Means of Literary Culture,” which are capable of being made available for that purpose.

Of these we shall at this time mention and discuss three only;

viz., 3rd, the British Literary Society, and its descendants; 2nd, Manuscript Magazines; 1st, *The British Controversialist*.

1st, *The British Controversialist*. Of this department of our subject we shall say little, as our readers must be well aware that the marked characteristic of this serial is that it is the only existant medium for the communion of thought on debateable topics, or matters of primal interest to thinking young men of the age. Not until after it was established, did "*Notes and Queries*"—that most valuable and precious confabularian repertory of literary small talk, and antiquarian nick-nackeries about books and bookish men—take the field. Nor was the value of true and honest controversy fully recognized, felt, acknowledged, and appreciated, till it had hewn its way into a considerably wide circulation. In it the freedom of expressing thought, which theoretically belongs to every man, was first made practically possible; and the beneficial influences, which have resulted from its projection, may best be seen in the readiness with which communications on either side of a vexed question are now admitted into the columns of the public prints, compared to that shown about nine years ago. Not only, therefore, as the public promoter, defender, and medium of the communion of thought, but as the embodiment and realization of that much dissiderated want—"a free press,"—"a fair field and no favour"—for thinking men, the *one* public organ for the communion of thought,—it deserves the notice of those in whom mind is labouring for expression, or whose faculties—

"Teem

With too much life, and that vitality
Which eats into itself."

The present writer has not now, for a long time, taken any part in the controversies of the times, but he has often felt gratified at perceiving the fine, rich, healthy vein of thought which, through the agency of this Magazine, has been opened up to the public; and he has marked, with more pleasure than can be told, the gradual yet steady development of the might of thought in many of those contributors who first "hoisted sail" in the private exercises of "The Young Writer and Students' Assistant," of which he had the honour of being the projector, and, for some time, the conductor. It is no utterance of mere theory, therefore, which we now venture to make, when we say that *The British Controversialist* is one of the best existing agencies for "Literary Culture, and the Communion of Thought." We say this not in boastful terms, in the interest of the editors, but of our own free and spontaneous desire to call the attention of any one of our readers who has not yet as one—

"Whose armour is his honest thought;
And simple truth his utmost skill,"

entered his name upon the lists as a combatant for what he conceives to be—*truth*. Having made this asseveration, in justice to the editors, more than from fear of being misjudged ourselves, we change the subject.

2nd, *Manuscript Magazines*.—It is seldom advisable, even if it were possible, to place our earliest crude thoughts before the public,—to rush, as the saying is, into print. Not only is maturity of thought desirable, maturity of style is almost as requisite. Any agency by which a due excitement of the literary faculty may be kept up, any means by which practice in composition may be attained, by which the pleasure arising from communion of thought may be enjoyed, by which interest in improvement may be maintained by fear of criticism, as well as love of bearing a good repute among our fellows; by which the delight of production is enhanced by the hope or the certainty of appreciation, must be beneficial. This has already been felt and acknowledged in the wide diffusion of literary associations. There are many circumstances in life, however, which prevent attendance upon such societies or unions, as well as many conditions in the lot which may fall to a man which render these an unsuitable medium for the exercise of his literary talent therein. Obviously, there lies against such congresses of thinking men, in most cases, the objection of *localness*, which necessitates a greater degree of confinedness than may be compatible with the designs of many persons who are yet ardently longing for some medium through which a definite and useful curriculum of literary culture may be possible, practical, useful, pleasant, and exciting. Still more obviously these societies require personal attendance, necessitate personal contact, and are liable to be contracted in their range and efficacy by the accidents of their constitution, place of meeting, or the chief demand of the district in which they are held. In many cases these, instead of being objections, are the very elements of life and energy. It cannot be doubted, however, that there are not only many individuals, but also many classes of men who are, by a great variety of considerations, shut out from the enjoyment of the progress and the suggestiveness to which these unions contribute in so high a degree.

Such wants have called into existence a notable invention—of the originator, or the period of origination of which we confess ourselves ignorant—but the utilities of which are sufficiently clear, *viz.*, manuscript magazines.

Persons whose occupations prevent their attendance upon literary institutions at the times usually fixed for their meetings, whose residences are inconveniently situated, or the nature of whose employment make their attendance matters of uncertainty, will find this agency highly useful, as well as highly agreeable. Others, whose domestic circumstances or business requirements make it inadvisable to be regularly or continuously absent during the

evening hours, may feel the stirrings of thought sufficiently strong within them as to make them yearn for such intellectual companionship as might be enjoyed, without demanding the sacrifice of other duties, or of such a kind as might be engaged in by the home hearth. For such as these, manuscript magazines are specially valuable, and to them they cannot be too strongly recommended.

Again, there are peculiar studies for which congenial minds may not be readily found in the particular locality in which a man may find himself placed, or which require for their effective prosecution a wider induction than the limited experience or knowledge of an individual, or the immediate circle in which he moves, affords. Manuscript magazines seem to find their true sphere of action in furthering such efforts as these parties make.

Although, however, manuscript magazines appear to be more peculiarly fitted for carrying out special studies, or for supplying the intellectual wants of people who occupy exceptional or marked positions in life, their whole utility is by no means bounded within such narrow limits, or hedged in by such strict and unyielding requirements as these remarks might at first lead one to infer. Wherever *effort* is truly and earnestly seeking an outlet, these agencies offer themselves, and especially where it is engaged in a single-handed combat with the difficulties which environ the self-culturist.

A pretty full account of their objects, methods, and advantages, has been already given in the first series of *The British Controversialist*,* and need not here be repeated, except in briefest characterisation.

Any number of persons feeling within themselves either the Juvenalic *cacoethes scribendi*, or the more resistless promptings of literary aspiration, and mutually desirous of subjecting themselves to training and criticism, agree together to place their productions in the hands of an editor, who decides on their admissibility, arranges the modes and times of its issue, corresponds with the writers, and generally manages the business affairs of the brotherhood. In other cases, the Magazine is a mere circulating packet, into which each contributor stitches a new paper as he extracts the old, and there is little or no editorial oversight or trouble. In general, we believe, pages are attached on which the critical decisions of the readers may be written. We believe that these agencies are very valuable, in affording opportunities of, and encouragement to, literary effort; delight the mind with the thought of being read, and, in many cases, appreciated, without the loss of privacy, of individuality, or of peace of soul, which are too apt to be withdrawn after one makes his advent in printer's ink. They are excellent stimulants, admirable substi-

* Vol. IV., 1853, pp. 235—237.

tutes, and for the patient, invaluable practical aids towards knowing what to write and what to avoid.

In instances where money is of little consequence, or where the judgment of a critic is wanted, we cannot help thinking that this same agency might be beneficially used for the private spread of works of interest or art, of which the authors are afraid to venture on publication, as tentatives and experiments. In this wise would the *modus operandi* proceed:—an editor being appointed as before, the contributions being received, let the manuscript be submitted to a printer, who would give an estimate of the cost of supply,—say twenty copies to each of the contributors—thereupon let a subscription be raised among the writers to make up the estimated sum, which, being placed in the printer's hands, the work might be proceeded with. This joint stock system of printing, *not publishing*, would afford a gratifying means of making our capabilities known to friends or to critics, and be a pleasing memorial—after the great change.

III. *The British Literary Society*.—Towards the latter part of 1850, the present writer's papers on "The Art of Reasoning," then published in *The British Controversialist*, were honoured with much attention, as they were the first attempt made to make a knowledge of that science available to the struggling classes of the community, whether in books or collegiate halls. They were widely read, and deeply studied. This interest awakened the writer's zeal in his anxiety to make himself useful to those who had favoured him, then an unknown author, so kindly and readily, caused him to run over in his thoughts several means by which the said papers might be made more effectual in working out the design with which they were written. At last he determined upon commencing "The Young Writer's and Student's Assistant." On reference to the editors, permission was readily granted, and in January, 1851, the first lesson for examination was announced. The success of the scheme was immediate. By the month of March, the exercises sent in outnumbered a hundred. These were carefully read, criticised, and classified. Much private correspondence ensued. Amongst many congratulatory letters received, those of the late Mr. L. H. Gerrie, of Aberdeen, were much valued. In one of these he proposed the extension of the scheme, and gave a sketch of the plan subsequently set in operation under the designation of *The Neophyte Writers' Society*. The then editors of this Magazine were also corresponded with, and requested to homologate the proposed association. The matter was finally referred by them to the decision of the present writer, who had the privilege of speaking the first public word of approbation of the young guild. The presidency of the association was offered to and accepted by the conductor of the Logic Class, and the society was inaugurated in October, 1852. The first *reunion* of any of the members took place in the house, and

under the presidency, of the author of "The Art of Reasoning," on the 1st of January, 1853, an account of which, under Mr. Gerrie's own hand, was contributed to *The British Controversialist* of February in the same year. Under the great labour and excessive anxiety entailed upon the writer, in addition to those necessary to the due fulfilment of his professional duties, by this correspondence and the examination of so many exercises with a critical eye, his health broke, and it has never wholly recovered the strain then given it. During the period of this illness, some unexplained estrangement arose between the president of the association and some of the members, which led, at last, to the severance of the society from any *formal* connexion with the classes conducted through this Magazine, as well as with the conductor of those classes. This step was, we know, very much regretted by the originator of the Neophyte guild,—than whom a more honest, earnest, loving, and lovable young man never existed. Alas! that the *past* tense is that in which we must speak of him. This disjunction might have arisen either from the rapid adhesion of members to the new association of persons, neither aware of the occasioning cause of the society's existence, nor acquainted with the labour of the president, and who may thus have been unprepared to sympathize with his then enfeebled state and painful condition, or from the decided tone which he took in dissuading its members from attempting, *at that time* to open their efforts to the public gaze, in a projected serial being misconstrued into a jealous fear of dangerous rivalry. However this may have been, Mr. Gerrie rested not until he prevailed upon the Neophytes to request their first president's acceptance of a seat in the honorary council, and among some of the first authors of the day. This position he felt disinclined to accept, under the circumstances, and his connexion thereupon ceased. But though thus disunited, his interest in its success has not abated. Its prosperity gave him joy; and as he usually had access to the more important transactions passing within its limits, he has been enabled to follow its path upward, and to know that it has been efficacious in producing many of the prime benefits which it was anticipated it would do. Its numbers have largely extended, emulation has been keenly excited, friendly zeal has been awakened, literary tastes and aptitudes have been cultured, a large-hearted and generous love of knowledge has been excited, and a kindly yet jealous criticism has been so exercised, as to conduce to very considerable improvement. The constant assiduity, which frequency of communication necessitates, is highly useful; the co-operative agency which it provides is most powerful, and the active interest in literature it not only fans but feeds, is deserving of the highest praise, and the honestest encouragement. To many of its members this serial has, we know, been very much indebted for keen thoughted, well-ex-

pressed papers, and we can trace the pen-strokes of many an old student in our own logic class, in several of the news sheets and magazines of the day. Nor are their names unknown in Pater-noster-row, who seven short years ago placed their earliest literary efforts into the box allotted to "The Young Writer's and Student's Assistant," in our publishers' office.

Of late the progress of this training arena for the warfare of the pen has been such as to render its extension both in numbers, modes, and aims exceedingly desirable, and it has, at the same time, been considered right to leave the days of its pupilage, and to assert its attainment of majority by a change of title. The association, therefore, which sprang from the pages of "The Young Writer's and Student's Assistant," into "The Neophyte Writer's Society," is now known as "The British Literary Society," and describes its object in the following terms, which we copy from the prospectus for 1858, recently issued, viz., "that of endeavouring, by mutual aid and criticism, to ensure correctness of thought and style in literary composition, whether with a view to embracing literature as a profession, or to acquiring the pen of a ready and correct writer for the ordinary purposes of life."

We do not pursue the descriptive portion of our narrative further, as all information is readily attainable on application to Mr. James Drake, Secretary, Honley, Huddersfield,—a gentleman who has been most indefatigable in his efforts to make the association useful, and to give any assistance in his power to those who seemed to be ardent in the pursuit of expressional skill.

The success which has attended this guild has led,—as is almost always the case,—to some imitative adaptations, *e. g.*, "The British Corresponding Debating Society;" "The Law Students' Corresponding Society;" "The Christian Bond of Brotherhood,—which all seem likely to be useful, and need not lead either to jealousy or ill-feeling.

We are still sufficiently egotistical and persistent to reiterate our former advice,—an advice which many of the noblest thinkers of the time concur, *e. g.*,—Thomas Carlyle, J. S. Mill, and G. H. Lewes—to abstain carefully from publication *as an institute*.

We have much pleasure in directing the attention of our readers to this means of pursuing "the communion of thought." It has stood the test of years, and stood it well. Let those, who feel like yearnings, band themselves together and be strong. Let the brotherhood of literature be felt as a sacred one, and let true, honest, kindly, yet searching and expressive investigation, be made into the qualities of thought, style, feeling, &c., which each individual possesses. Let the public receive the advantage in the rich, ripe, genuine product of lengthy and careful culture

and co-working, and the pleasure will be deeper, if the reward be less or longer delayed than seems fitting to the aspirant.

This communication, written under most disadvantageous circumstances, personal, domestic, and professional, is admittedly very defective; but it will be much more defective than the writer intends, if it fails in leading some of his readers to think seriously either of entering into or continuing with greater energy in the elaboration of literary skill, for the purpose of securing "the communion of thought."

PRIDE AND CHOLER.—Pride and choler are like the fox offering to go out when his belly was full, which, enlarging him bigger than the passage, made him stay, and be taken with shame. They that would come to preferment by pride are like those who would ascend stairs on horseback.

Other dispositions may have the benefits of a friendly monitor; but these by their vices do give a defiance to counsel. Since when men once know them, they will rather be silent, and let them rest in their folly, than, by admonishing them, run into a certain brawl.

There is another thing shows them to be both base. They are both most awed by the most abject passion of the mind—fear. We dare neither be proud to one that can punish us, nor choler to one that is above us.

Every man flies from the burning house: and one of these hath a fire in his heart, and the other discovers it in his face.

I would not live like a beast, pushed at by all the world for loftiness; nor yet like a wasp, stinging upon every touch. And this moreover shall add to my misliking them, that I hold them things accursed, for sowing of strife among brethren.—*Feltham.*

LAUGHING AND CRYING.—Democritus, who was always laughing, lived one hundred and nine years; Heraclitus, who never ceased crying, only sixty. Laughing, then, is best; and to laugh at one another is perfectly justifiable, since we are told that the gods themselves, though they made us as they pleased, cannot help laughing at us.—*Steevens.*

MAN.—Man is an animal formed for and delighting in society; for in this state alone his various talents can be exerted, his numberless necessities relieved, the dangers he is exposed to can be avoided, and many of the pleasures he eagerly affects enjoyed.
Fielding.

ERROR IMBIBED AND CHERISHED.—We often believe what our fathers believed before us, without searching into the reason of our belief. There are few sublime wits that pry into the original of things, or endeavour to make a perfect discovery thereof.—*Lady Gethin.*

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM OBSTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Few questions admit of unqualified answers. The common proverb, that "An exception proves a rule," shows how fully men are aware of the impossibility of exhibiting absolute truth in general terms; and yet, by a strange perversity of human nature, the fact, that exceptions occur to a general affirmative, is frequently made a reason for upholding an equally general negative. Again, a joint effect is constantly referred to a single cause, and we are strenuously urged to condemn or acquit, as if the *one* cause specified even the *sole* cause of the result. "By their fruits ye shall know them," exclaims the fervid discussionist; and forthwith he condemns the tree for its want of fruit, without an inquiry into the character of the soil in which it *grows*. The vine, in his northern climate, produces but a few tart, shrivelled grapes, and he, forsooth, would therefore banish it from the earth! The adage of the bad workman blaming his tools, contains a vast amount of shrewd satire on the absurd use which is daily made of the law of causation in different discussions, though it were, doubtless, originally aimed at the folly of mere personal excuses. Suppose we have two husbandmen occupying contiguous farms. The one, intelligent and toilsome, uses all the appliances of agriculture, and secures a golden reward in harvest time: the other scarcely does more than cast in the seed, and finds that his crops have almost wholly failed. Here it matters little what the soil may be, humanly speaking,—the causes of the diverse two results are the diverse characters of the men;—there is no room for doubt or discussion. But let us take a more complex case, and ascertain in what manner we should be most likely to arrive at a true decision. Let us imagine that we are ignorant of the characters of A. and of B.; that we know nothing of their agricultural skill, or their personal industry. Let us suppose, also, that their farms are far apart, and that we have no means of comparing the soil and climate of the one with those of the other; that we merely know, in short, the bare fact, that in a given year A. has had a most abundant harvest, while B. has had a most scanty one. A partisan of A. may plausibly impute these results respectively to the good and evil farming of the two parties; while a friend of B. may *as* plausibly refer

them to the respective fertility and barrenness of the two farms. The one argument is as good as the other; and we should not be one whit nearer a trustworthy decision if we could appeal to the uniform results of a dozen years, instead of reasoning on the harvests of a single year. In what way, then, might we attempt to arrive at a sound conclusion? We might appeal to *experience*; and if we found that *wherever* A. had been, his crops were fully equal to the average of the year, and that *wherever* B. had been, his farming had been unproductive, we might reasonably infer that A. was a hard-working, intelligent man, and that B. was an idler, though we had no personal knowledge of either. Or, on the other hand, we might reason *abstractedly* as to the nature of the land of either farm, and thence deduce a sound comparative judgment, although we had no means of actual comparison. Thus, if the soil which A. has so successfully farmed, is shown by chemical analysis to be naturally a poor, thin, stony soil, we may safely argue that A. must be both a skilful and industrious man to have secured his rich harvest from such a soil; and we may draw the very opposite conclusion as to B., since no man of common intelligence would attempt to farm land so utterly barren as to account for the difference between his crops and those of A., supposing equal industry to have been exercised by both.

We have apparently digressed from the subject before us; but if we have succeeded in showing the true mode of reasoning, where joint causes are concerned in the production of given effects, the digression will be really pertinent to our inquiry, and its homeliness will but enhance its value. Let us now endeavour to apply our conclusions, and to ascertain what inferences may be deduced from *experience* and *abstract reasoning*, as to the obstructive influence of Sectarianism on Christianity.

We are pointed to divers evil results, in this world of ours, as being the effects of sectarianism. Are they natural and necessary, or are they accidental and occasional? Take the one general head under which the whole catalogue of evils, supplied by "Taliesin" and others, may be classed,—the want of brotherly love and christian charity. Is it *impossible* for a Lutheran to feel brotherly affection for a Calvinist? Does it strike one as *unnatural* to find the representatives of half a dozen different denominations charitably met together on the platform of a Bible Society meeting? The questions are sufficient to raise a smile. No man, possessed of sanity, can aver that bickering and discussion is a *necessary* consequence of sectarianism; and few would venture to say that it is even a *natural* result. Other causes, therefore, besides sectarianism, are concerned in causing the long catalogue of antichristian forms of religious strife and jealousy specified by our opponents. Let us appeal, then, to *experience*. Have these evils been absent in ages and countries where sec-

tarianism did not exist? We turn back to the earliest age of Christianity, when the whole body of its followers were classed together by the world as "the sect of the Nazarenes," and we find the same antichristian failings, the same disputes and quarrels, which are now charged upon sectarianism. In one church the converts were severally exclaiming, "I am of Paul,"—"I of Cephas,"—"I of Apollos." Of another church Paul writes,— "I hear that there be divisions among you."* John, also, tells us that in a certain church, "Diotrephes, who loveth pre-eminence, receiveth us not." We thus see that *before* Christianity became sectarian, all the evils charged on sectarianism were existent and in full play. We might, therefore, as reasonably join the infidel, and condemn Christianity itself as a cause of envyings, divisions, and uncharitableness, as join with those who represent these *accompaniments* of sectarianism as its *results*. But we will take another example from the history of Christianity. Were these evil fruits absent in the early centuries of church history? About A.D. 95, we find the church in Corinth in such confusion, that five deputies were sent from Rome, bearing an epistle from St. Clement with them, in the hopes of restoring charity and peace. In this epistle we find St. Clement declaring that the Corinthian believers exhibited "wrong, lawlessness, arrogance, strifes, malice and treachery, evil speeches and slanderings, superciliousness, deceiving, and vain-glorying."† Such is the picture drawn of a Christian church in the earliest uninspired Christian writing which has come down to our age! Three centuries later, sectarianism is still unknown: and what do we find in the "One Church?" We read of the excommunication of Arius, and of Athanasius,—thrice degraded, and thrice restored! We find the Council of Nice ruling one way, and the Council of Rimini establishing directly opposite doctrines; and we hear of Semi-Arians, Homoiousians, Anomoians, Eunomoians!

* It is possible that some readers may regard these facts as evidences that *sectarianism* had even then arisen in the bosom of the primitive church, but this is a misapprehension of the term. Sects are social bodies *externally separated* from each other; while the instances adduced above are *internal* divisions and personal dissensions. Sectarianism in Christianity corresponds to nationalism in the world; while divisions in a particular church, or body of churches, answer to intestine divisions in a nation. To take any other definition of sectarianism would make the term equivalent to *personal differences in opinion*, and would make the present discussion a useless quibble. In this world it is impossible for all men to think alike, either on Christianity, or any other subject. Unanimity did not exist among the twelve Apostles. Paul tells us that on one occasion he withstood Peter "to the face, because he was to be blamed;" thus evidencing, not merely the difference, but the collision and opposition of opinions between two of the greatest and most holy Christians,—men to whom, as agents, the early spread of Christianity is chiefly due.

† Clement, Ep. i. c. 35. I have endeavoured to translate as literally as possible.

And all this confusion is accompanied with persecution and violent dissension in the bosom of the "One Church!" We might continue our review, and speak generally of the so-called Donatist, Nestorian, Eutychian, Sabellian, Novatian, and other heresies; or we might point to particular instances, as that of Justinian, who received from one general council the title of "Most Christian," yet died in the heresy of Phantasticism. But space forbids us from thus dilating. We are content merely to point to the strife and wrong rampant *within* the church, before the outward divisions of sectarianism were in existence—in the days when Rome was in fact, as well as in pretension, the catholic or universal church. But there is yet one further argument which we shall draw from *experience*. In the eleventh century, we find the *unsectarian* church burning to death persons charged with Manicheism; in the 12th century, the still *unsectarian* church was outvying the barbarity of Pagan persecutors in its treatment of the Waldenses and Albigenses. In the 11th, 12th, and 14th centuries, rival lines of popes and anti-popes were excommunicating, deposing, and even warring with each other. Such were the exhibitions of christian charity ere sectarianism was allowed to exist in Western Europe! Nor were these things confined to one country. Our own forefathers, in the 14th century, held sectarianism to be "obstructive to Christianity," and burnt the Lollards, lest so great an evil should increase. Queen Mary would allow no sects, and burnt men like Hooper, Ridley, and Latimer. Queen Elizabeth, on the other hand, was herself a Protestant sectary, and persecution in consequence became modified, and savoured more of state-craft and apparent policy, than of theoretical objection to freedom of worship. Another century passed, and under the rule of Oliver Cromwell sectarianism flourished, and persecution died away. But the master-mind passed from the scene, and the old doctrines of the wrong and "obstructiveness" of sectarianism were again revived. *Then* christian charity was exemplified in the imprisonment of John Bunyan in Bedford Gaol—in Conventicle Acts, Five-mile Acts, and Conformity Acts. In the present age, sectarianism, on the contrary, has its full play, and we find our Sovereign now joining in the liturgy of Episcopalianism in the village church of Osborne, and anon worshipping in the Presbyterian kirk at Crathie; and the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Premier, and many of the nobility and clergy, have been seen listening to the eloquence of a popular Baptist sectary. Nor need we compare different ages to show the effects of sectarianism. In England we have vital religion, brotherly emulation in good works, abundant charity, and goodwill, side by side with our religious divisions; on the other hand, in Spain there is stagnation in morals and religion, degradation, dissension, and no outward divisions. In England we *have* sectarianism, and a

little unmannerly use of the tongue at times, in the way of recrimination and uncharitable dispute; in Naples they have *no* sectarianism, but they *have prisons* for humble Bible-readers, and sectarian England has actually interfered to "obstruct" this little exhibition of charity!

We see, then, by appealing to experience, that those evils, which have been charged on sectarianism, existed in the most exaggerated forms when sectarianism was non-existent, or was put down by the strong hand of power. We also find that in proportion as sectarianism has had free course, those evils have been reduced to a corresponding extent. Our opponents, therefore, have been guilty of the fallacy of *non causa pro causa*. It requires but very little thought to attribute the evils *attendant upon* Christianity to their true cause. Men are naturally "desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another." Saith Paul to the Corinthian church, "for whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions; are ye not carnal, and walk as men?" It required but a simple generation to develop the tendency of fallen human nature towards enmity and jealousy into the fearful crime of fratricide. It is a singularly instructive fact, that the first murder was prompted by religious jealousy. Cain found that Abel's sacrifice was accepted, while his own was not regarded, and (in the grand simplicity of Scripture narrative) "Cain talked with Abel his brother; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother, and slew him." Thus early did religious differences and discussion eventuate in murder, through the *depravity of human nature*. As it was in that primeval time, so hath it been, in various degrees, throughout all ages. It is hard for hearts to agree in love when heads differ in belief; but the strife that so often follows condemns the *moral*, not the mental, nature. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour," is the second great commandment; "thou shalt think as thy neighbour," is a rule not to be found in the Bible, however often man may endeavour to insist upon it. We conclude, therefore, that history—the *experience* of man—establishes the fact, that the evils imputed to sectarianism are wholly due to the infirmities of human nature, and to the imperfect submission of man, as man, to the spirit and commands of Christianity.

We now turn to the other ground of argument—the abstract question, "What is sectarianism, and what are its natural tendencies and results?" We have already (page 18) been favoured with one formal definition. "Sectarianism," says G. A. H. E., "as I understand it, is a *selfish, arrogant, and unchristian* assumption on the part of its professors"! To start from such a definition is the very height of absurdity and folly. One might as rationally preface a discussion on American slavery by defining negroes to be "certain black men created to be bondsmen."

G. A. H. E. forecloses argument: If his definition be correct, it is a puerile waste of time to pen a single sentence beyond; and if it be incorrect, it must necessarily place him beyond the pale of discussion. "Taliesin" goes almost to a similar extreme, though in a less glaring manner. He compresses the argument into a syllogistic shape:—"Sectarianism introduces among Christians the elements of discord and uncharitableness; *therefore*, Christianity must suffer." Verily, the conclusion is irrefragable if the premise be granted. "Murderers ought to be hung, therefore capital punishment is just," is a parallel specimen of logic, but we imagine it would not be difficult for Mr. Ewart and his supporters to dispose of such a miserable attempt at reasoning. Again, "Taliesin" quotes the words of Christ:—"Every kingdom divided *against* itself is brought to desolation;" and then endeavours to base an argument thereon, by asserting that sectarianism has divided the church "into hostile bodies." But here, again, the apparent argument is a mere assertion, and its force hangs wholly upon the use of the single adjective, "hostile." Sectarianism certainly divides professing Christians into several *distinct* bodies, but we deny, point blank (and appeal to reason and fact in support of our denial), that the various sections of Christians are either necessarily or actually "hostile" to each other. It is an utter abuse of terms to apply any such language to the sectarianism of the present day. The only plea, on which the accusation can be based, is the occasional occurrence of those skirmishes between individual members of various sects, which are equally to be found among individuals of the *same* sect, or even of the same congregation. Sectarianism may, and sometimes does, become the cause of unchristian strife, just as party politics may lead to an election riot, or even to serious civil bloodshed and disturbance. But who would dream of declaring that political parties have *hostilely* divided this country? What despot would venture to hold up England as an argument in favour of tyranny, on the ground that our civil liberties have divided this country into hostile parties, and that, therefore, it is a kingdom divided against itself, and must come to desolation? The two cases are strictly analogous. Freemen *must* differ in thought and in action. Emulation, collision, and anger are common to all human action, and not peculiar to religion. Independence implies severance. Difference is division. But strife is not caused by independence, and charity would be an imaginary virtue if there were no differences between man and man. Take the very lowest ground of experience and of morality, and sectarian divisions are seen to be desirable and right to a certain extent. Which is better for man, which truer in God's sight, a semblance of unanimity hiding utter differences of religious belief and practice, or a course like Luther's, Calvin's, or Wesley's? Charity towards men is the

greatest of human virtues, but love to God and to truth is a loftier duty still. There is a maudlin mode of talking of charity at times, as if charity and true freedom were utterly irreconcilable; as if we were bound not only to love the *man*, but to treat his very errors as sacred. Is it any *breach* of charity towards my neighbour, because I issue a pamphlet expressing my views on any given subject on which I differ from him? Yet the fact of a man holding peculiar religious views, associating with those who agree with him, and occasionally expounding the nature and grounds of his belief, is spoken of as a breach of charity towards those who believe differently! The true breach of charity is where one man will neither yield to the scruples of another, nor allow him to indulge them; when he not only refuses to admit his neighbour's opinions, but would fain *make* him outwardly conform to his own. Men may "agree to differ,"—that is, be sectarian, yet charitable;—but the anti-sectarian, who would fain have no outward differences, must either tyrannize or be engaged in perpetual quarreling. When the herdsmen of Lot and Abraham were together, they strove together. And what was the remedy adopted by Abraham? "Let there be no strife, I pray thee," said he, "between me and thee, for we be brethren: *separate* thyself, I pray thee, from me." Surely this was a wise, peaceful, and charitable sectarianism in things earthly; and why should not the same view be taken, and the same results occur, in things religious, when men, finding themselves unable to join in the same forms of worship, divide themselves into distinct communities or sects?

What has been said, in answer to the definitions and descriptions of our opponents, suffices to show what sectarianism is in our own judgment. By that term we understand the principles which lead men, differing in religious sentiment or practice, to separate from those with whom they differ, and to associate with those with whom they agree. Sectarianism is the public avowal of the freedom of the mind in matters pertaining to religion. Its primary tendency is peace, by distributing into various classes those opinions and practices which must clash if brought together. If sectarian hostilities arise, they are the result, not of the principle, but of its infringement. If the Churchman rail against the Wesleyan, the former, and not the latter, breaks the law of love and charity. If the Independent attack the Church, he is simply exhibiting an individual infirmity of temper, just as distinct from sectarianism as aggressive warfare is distinct from nationality. The strife between a dissenting body and the Established Church is just the same, in origin and nature, as any quarrel between individual men in private life. The bickering between two distinct sects arises in the same manner as the quarrels between any two divisions (*e. g.*, Evangelical and Tractarian in the Church) of the same sect. Hence, if the jealousy and evil spirit

at times existing between religious bodies be termed *sectarianism*, then every quarrel between individuals on religious grounds must bear the same name. If *sectarianism* be obstructive to Christianity, because evil arises in connection with it, then private judgment must suffer the like condemnation. The anti-sectarian has no resting-place—no true and consistent basis for his arguments—save in *Divine* infallibility.

What are the benefits of *sectarianism*? Need we, in this country, enumerate them? Need we insist upon its evident practical results, and show how the religious and moral character of nations is in direct proportion to the freedom which is allowed to the exercise of *sectarianism*? Was Luther obstructive to Christianity? Did Wesley deaden the religious fervour of his country? Would England have been holier and purer if she had had no reformers like Cranmer, Jewel, Chillingworth, Hooker—no sectaries like Bunyan, Howe, Baxter—no lofty Puritan heroes? Has Scotland to mourn that a Knox poured forth his fiery soul in behalf of Protestant faith and truth? But time and space would fail us to enumerate the glorious names that protest against the deadening results of uniformity. We pass on, therefore, to ask what must *necessarily* result from the existence of numerous sects. Is emulation a dream? Is there no such thing as “provoking one another to good works”? Can any one believe that *one* church would have put forth the moral power, the missionary agency, the earnest efforts for the spread of God’s truth, which the many sects of this country have put forth? Is the division of labour—that great principle of secular civilization—wholly inoperative in religion? If some men of ungoverned temper raise contentions and quarrels which disgrace both their own sect and universal Christianity, are there none who will the more earnestly endeavour to exemplify the virtues and excellencies of the creed they have chosen? To the reader we leave such questions, little doubting that a host of kindred queries will rise in his mind, each one suggesting its own answer, and showing the utter fallacy of that surface reasoning which confounds the infirmities of our nature with the results of a principle wholly distinct.

In conclusion, we must be allowed once more to call attention for a moment to the article of “*Taliesin*.” According to that writer, the evil of *sectarianism* is the want of charity which it engenders; yet he himself denounces all existent Christianity in terms of the bitterest scorn—nay, even denies its existence, and declares that “religion has ceased to be.” Dissenting places of worship are termed “perpetual monuments of evil;” “unsightly piles, yclept chapels;” “whited sepulchres,” &c. The very language of intolerance, so rife last century, is revived, with its most galling terms (*e.g.*, “meeting-houses,” &c.), and its sweeping denunciations (against dissent) of “fanaticism,” “political

organization," "hatred to the Church," &c. Is *this* style of writing a specimen of *anti-sectarian* charity? Is this an exemplification of the amenities which "Talesin" desires to see established among Christian professors? Again, he alludes to the Indian mutiny, and charges a spirit of revenge on sectarianism. Are the remarks just or true? Were such expressions as "jolly fun," &c., used by sectarian missionaries, or uttered by lay sectaries like that noble man and high-souled Puritan religionist, Havelock? "Talesin" speaks of the religious press. Will he *produce* extracts from the leading articles of religious newspapers, "applauding" "the destruction of populous villages and the wholesale massacre of their inhabitants"?* We have seen articles in religious publications condemning the cry for vengeance, sufficiently numerous to justify us in defending them from the charges of "Talesin," and in calling for the *production* of evidence in support of his assertions.

One question more. Sectarianism has destroyed "that beautiful fabric THE CHURCH, in which our forefathers worshipped." When did it exist in undisturbed peace and unity? Was it when Paul accused the Corinthians of contentions, and the Galatians of divisions? Was it in the dark ages, when Pope and Patriarch were excommunicating each other—when Arius and Athanasius were hurling anathemas against each other's doctrines? Was it ere Luther arose, or in the days when the stake and rack were the portion of those who worshipped the God of their fathers in the way which men in power called heresy? Was it when Laud was in power, and High Commission Courts were administering an English Inquisition—when Charles II. was driving the best men of the Establishment from their flocks? When was this ideal unity and peace which sectarianism has destroyed? Readers, judge ye! B. S.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It has been wisely remarked, that Christianity is embodied in a word, that word—Love. To this the various manifestations of God's laws may be traced. God is love. Holy fear has been by some considered as part of the Christian's duty; but fear of any description is, I think, exhibited in the same proportion as love is found to be wanting. "Perfect love casteth out fear;" or, as we would say, Where perfect love exists, fear is unknown. If this then be granted, that Christianity is love, we must come at once to the conclusion that anything productive of the oppo-

* Will he even mention the *names* of "populous villages" which have been destroyed, otherwise than by siege or the necessities of war? or substantiate the charge of "wholesale massacre" against our brave soldiers in the East? Such assertions have appeared in *Le Nord*, the organ of Russian Anglophobia, and in one or two other anti-Anglican journals, but we have yet to see even the shadow of an authentication in their behalf.

site to love is obstructive to Christianity as the religion of love. Before entering upon the argument, I may remark that many fall into error in attributing to Christianity what, properly speaking, belongs only to sectarianism. Let this ism bear its own fault, Christianity will remain as ever; but when sects assume to themselves the term Christian as peculiarly their own, exhibiting intolerance towards those who differ from them, they bring from rash judgment the imputation of bigotry upon Christianity, whereas the real fault lies at the door of their sectarian prejudice. We shall show, if permitted at a future period, the peculiar evil in their sin-of-unbelief-in-any-particular-doctrine principle, such as the Trinity, &c. To return to the argument. 1. Christianity is love. 2. Anything obstructive to love is the same to Christianity. 3. Sectarianism opposes love by bloodshed, persecution, and intolerance; therefore, 4, Sectarianism is obstructive to Christianity.

1 and 2 granted, we have then to prove our position as to the conduct of sectarianism. We omit for the present any lengthy consideration of the waste of time, money, and talent by different sects in their efforts to establish and promulgate their peculiar opinions or prejudices. We say waste in a comparative sense, because it seems to us had those gifts been used in the effort to eradicate intemperance, ignorance, war, and the like, we might now have been a happier and a wiser people, and other nations might have blessed us where now we have ill feeling and contempt. Could we even now sink doctrinal matters as private opinions, acting upon the principle that belief is not an act of the will, or agree to differ, and unite in an effort to vanquish some of those monster evils that infest our country, disbursing in this some of that immense wealth now swallowed by sectarian effort, future generations would remember us with holy fervour, and continue the good work, instead of repairing the old and erecting new sectarian fortresses to awe and combat their fellow sinners. Surely our English heathens and starving or vicious brothers and sisters require this effort at our hands.

We have to consider some of the revolting effects of sectarianism to prove the position we have taken. The Roman Catholic sect numbers on its pages, if we mistake not, the most elaborate chronicle of murder, torture, and persecution which any party in the civilized world can boast. The massacre of the Albigenses may rank with Cawnpore. The particulars of the Bartholomew slaughter are singularly akin to the cruelties of the Sepoys. The Waldenses must not be omitted, and Philip II. of Spain may rank as a true sectarian commander. The atrocities of this church are patent, and in Protestant England are so frequently alluded to that further mention is here unnecessary. Each sect, however, seems to ignore its own past history in raking up the evil acts of other parties with whom they may differ in opinion.

The Evangelicals will "harrow up thy soul" about the "Scarlet Lady," but seldom refer to the atrocities of the Orange gentleman (William III.) in the Glencoe massacre, or the ears bored with hot irons, public whippings, banishments, racking, hanging, ripping up, quartering, crushing, and boiling, in the reign of the "Virgin" Queen. We are treated in abundance to Gunpowder Plot sermons, but hear little of the connection between Church and State and the Peterloo massacre. Discourses upon the "seven hills" far exceed in number those upon the Calvinistic burning of Servetus. It is no less painful to dwell upon sectarian barbarism of the past than to peruse the Indian atrocities of the present time. Did not our argument necessitate the record, we should gladly pass over those blood-stained pages of European history to the pleasing task of recording a few steps of the present time in the right direction. We must, before leaving for the present this painful record, refer again to the reign of Elizabeth for a few more results of sectarianism. The persecutions of Dissenters during her supremacy rise to confront the bigot, and utter a warning voice to him who seeks not to allay party spirit. Act 35 Elizabeth, chap. 1, begins thus: "For the preventing and avoiding of such great inconveniences and perils as might happen and grow by the wicked and dangerous practices of seditious sectaries and disloyal persons, be it enacted," &c. This act was framed for those who dared to differ with the opinions of the dominant party, viz., Dissenters or Nonconformists. Here the bitter sectarian spirit terms opponents "wicked," "dangerous," "seditious," "disloyal." Laws there were to imprison them for life, and to persecute them out of prison; yet this was insufficient; the above act was therefore passed with the view of compelling all people to attend the State church under pain of imprisonment; it also required the victim to make a declaration that he had "grievously offended God" in "using unlawful conventicles and assemblies," or dissenting chapels. To us it seems that the reign of Elizabeth was one great obstruction to Christianity, in that sectarianism was armed with State authority. Turn we now to Edward VI., and still the dark cloud of party bias obscures the light and denies the full warmth of Christian love—persecution rampant. The preamble to Act 5 and 6 Edward VI. states, "that great numbers of people in divers parts of the realm do wilfully and damnably abstain and refuse to come to their parish churches." It also enacts for those who shall attend any other sort of worship—for the first offence, six months' imprisonment; second offence, one year's imprisonment; for the third offence, imprisonment for life. This sectarian persecution would of necessity beget strife. The same Act, chap. 4, sets forth: "Forasmuch as of late divers and many outrages and barbarous behaviours and acts have been used and committed by divers ungodly and irreligious persons, by quar-

relling, brawling, fraying, and fighting in churches and churchyards." The act then enumerates the various punishments of sundry offences in these brawls—for laying violent hands; excommunication: using a weapon cost a man both his ears; if he had no ears he was to be branded with the letter F, signifying fray-maker, and to receive excommunication besides.

For the present at least we have written enough upon this painful matter; sufficient, we opine, to prove the evils of sectarianism: its fruits in the present time I defer to a future paper. Ere concluding I may inquire, Is it at all a matter of surprise that, as we remember these horrifying stages in the world's history, Dr. Baylee should announce the fact that "for fifteen hundred years the Christian church has made no real progress"? and that Dr. Cumming speaks of the Church of England as "trembling at the very verge of its disorganization," and, with the Church of Scotland, "will be wickedly but hopelessly broken up"? "Methodism fast breaking up; Independency to be shattered; Baptists not to be spared." We ask, Can we be surprised that any system, worked upon sectarian principles—exhibiting persecution so far as it has power, outbidding others so far as it has wealth, anathematizing others so far as it has slaves—can we be surprised at the end that must come to all this?

In conclusion, I may refer to the gradual change that of late seems to be gaining ground amongst the sects. We frequently hear of meetings where the clergy of various denominations meet upon one platform to advocate some important cause. This is a noble sight. But we find that general agreement on doctrinal matters permits the union—methods of church government are the chief differences. Instances there have been, and we trust they will continue, where doctrinal differences have not prevented union in effort. Thus the Rev. F. Bishop (Unitarian) and the Rev. J. Bardsley (Episcopalian) were present at the Alliance Conference held this year in Manchester. That similar gatherings may increase, until sectarian prejudice is swept from God's earth, and Christian love rule the hearts of all, is our earnest prayer.

Birkenhead.

EDGAR.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

On entering for the first time the lists of debate, we cannot fail to be struck with the demeanour and carriage of our adversaries.

"Talliesin" we have seen before; we know full well his fiery energy, his glittering brilliancy, his martial rattle, and his reckless hardihood; every word, thought, and expression brings back to our mind the dark image of the fierce hospitaler; there is with him all the pomp and circumstance of words, the flourish of trumpets, the waving of banners, the dauntless challenge, the defiant arm, the applauding shout, and the desperate charge.

His strong arm points a polished lance, but his heart is faint, his vizor is down, and his lips are white; energy, hardihood, strength, and skill, all most miserably fail when striving for the wrong. In plain English, "Taliesin" is wrong, as usual; in his desperate hurry, he altogether overlooks one or two important facts, and these facts we now wish to urge against him.

1st. That sectarianism is a necessity arising out of the fundamental principle of the Protestant church, "that every man has a right in all spiritual matters to follow the dictates of his own conscience."

We acknowledge the Bible, and the Bible only, as the rule of faith, and we demand an equal right with you to interpret that Bible. As Protestants, we protest not only against the pope, but against all popes; our conscience is our own, religion an affair between that conscience and its God, and unless you can take the responsibility, and be damned in our stead, we protest against your interference.

2nd. That sectarianism is by no means an anomaly. What is it? Difference of opinion, variety, that is all. Why are we surprised at that? Did you ever see two trees alike? two flowers, two clouds, two birds, beasts, or insects? If, then, in the material world variety is the universal law that renders nature charming, why in the inner and spiritual universe should we look for lifeless sameness and insipid unity?

True, we are, as Christ tells us, members of one body, but that body is neither all head nor all heart; we are, in truth, one; we fight side by side with all true soldiers of the cross, and care little whether their uniform be red or blue; we have one object, one aim, one leader, one King, and if he himself divide us into regiments and battalions, why should we grumble? Our place is to obey, to fight right on; and although the battle may look to us like confusion and disorder, our Captain, looking down from his holy hill, sees the eternal beauty of his own design, and knows full well it will all come right at last.

3rd. Our opponents argue as though unity were an untried experiment. Will they go back to the palmy days of the good State Church of England, long before Wesley and Whitfield, with their "unsanctified fanaticism," or even Oliver Cromwell, with his stern old Independents, stirred up her peaceful bosom? She prospered then; her priests got fat, but the people starved.

Compare those quiet, placid days with the present, and see the difference. Then the parish church was quite sufficient; now "unsightly piles, yclept chapels" stand in every street, and the lecture room, the music hall, and the theatre, ring with the name of Christ. Then a sermon on the Sunday was thought enough; now Sunday and week-day, morning, noon, and night, in the crowded hospital, the sickening alley, under the green-wood tree, or beneath the open sky, is the trumpet blown, and

the name proclaimed. Then the Book was kept chained to the reading desk, and the chain and clasp rusted from disuse; now it is printed, bought, given, lent, or read to every man, woman, and child within our gates. Then Christ was only known to the masses as a departed Saviour, now, by the instrumentality of books, tracts, or periodicals, they recognize him as the great Prophet, Priest, and King of his people. They know that his kingdom is set up, and that *He* reigns, directing and supervising the affairs of this world for the good of his saints. Who wishes again to see the good old days of "unity" and laziness?

4thly. Our opponents both seem utterly oblivious of the fact that the "outward and visible" church is not "*the Church*," and that all unchristian feelings, words, or deeds, come not from true Christians, in the proper sense of the term, but from professing and hypocritical members. The "Church" and the "world" are totally distinct; "a religious row" is an impossibility; uncharitableness, insolence, pride, ill-will, selfishness, all belong to the world, to human nature; they cannot belong to the Church, for all her teachings and all her practice is exactly the opposite.

We have confined our strictures to the article of "Talesin," principally because G. A. H. E. seems to have no definite idea what he is writing about. He talks about "the Vatican of Rome," the "dungeons of Austria," the "Inquisition Chambers of Spain," the "persecutions of the Madiai," as if they were chargeable to Christianity; and then, by a gentle drop, he goes into the "internal dissensions of the Established Church," as if they were chargeable to sectarianism. The greater part of his article apparently comes from the pen of that respectable member of society, J. A. Langford, of whom I need not say one word; his reckless generalities and false assertions, as quoted by his humble follower, G. A. H. E., speak for themselves.

If the wild beast scene drawn by "Talesin," or the equally disgusting sketch by G. A. H. E. (after J. A. Langford), were correct, they might stand as arguments, not only against sectarianism, but Christianity itself. Thank God, they are false, and we appeal to the conscience of our readers to say that hypocrisy, selfishness, and stiff-necked formalism, is the exception and not the rule.

Leaving our opponents to bask in the "cloudy brilliancy" of their own moonshine, let us ask, with "L'Ouvrier," how the sectarian can be an obstruction to Christianity? Suppose the "splits" are "infinite," and every sect "does its utmost" to spread its "peculiar doctrines," one would think *that* would be all the more likely to advance the general cause; and for our own parts, we confess we would rather see the people Puseyites, Methodists, Independents, or Ranters, than see them living the life of sots, and dying the death of dogs.

J. T. N.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THIS question, at first sight, may seem to many to offer, at most, only a moderate field for discussion, and to be altogether void of practical effect;—that while it may afford an opportunity of trying with each other the strength of our lances, the result will amount to nothing more than several pages of mere verbiage. Such, in fact, at first sight it appeared to ourselves. A little consideration of the subject, however, invested it with a deep and hallowed interest, and soon it assumed the form of a question affecting not only the interests of an individual, of a church, of a country, but of a world,—of a world drifting on towards an eternity,—an eternity on the character of which this question most intimately and directly bears. We would wish, therefore, to enter on the consideration of this subject, not as mere debaters, with mere kill and eat feelings, but as calmly endeavouring to answer a question which affects so materially the best interests of the Church and the world. Christianity is the moral reformer of the world; it is that twinkling but cheering star which points out the way from hell to heaven—which cheers the traveller on his way, holding out a noble and happy destiny. Whatever in any way interposes between the panting soul and the guiding star surely claims our attention, and demands our earnest consideration.

Sectarianism and Christianity are to be individually examined; the genius of the one set against that of the other; the faith which is in them is to be revealed. When this is done, the question is answered: it then turns on an axiom as plain as "Magnitudes which exactly coincide with one another are equal."

Sectarianism is a word which has been grievously misunderstood, at least, misapplied. In the garb of sectarianism is wrapped up nearly everything which is bad,—impure desires, stunted feelings, grovelling affections,—in fact, a legion of unmentionables. All these are huddled together, and make up one of almost fiendish character, who, with a powder-horn by his side, and a gun over his shoulder, is sent out to poach in the fields of pure Christianity. In plain language, sectarianism has been tied down to everything that is "earthly, sensual, devilish." It is often, nay, almost universally understood to mean,—a blind man clinging to a particular sect or party, extolling its virtues and its glories, and an universal hatred of all other parties, by "whatever name they are known." How it has come to obtain such a monstrous—for we can use no other epithet—signification, we really cannot tell, unless it be that the world has got into a fashion,—a bad fashion, nevertheless,—of twisting words from their original signification, and of clustering so many associations around them with a new meaning, that, from that time

henceforth they appear clad only in stolen garments. The word "Temperance" is such another term, and all we can say to our teetotal friends, they still persist in affirming that temperance is equal to total abstinence. Such a practice, we say, the world seems to have got into, and all we know of the process is that it is gradual. We must not, however, be dragged along in such a manner without, at least, lodging our protest. Sectarianism means, both in derivation and primary use,—devotion to a particular sect. Now, what does this imply? Simply that, granted the existence of a particular sect, held together by some common bond of union, in the present instance some peculiar dogma of religion (though Coleridge holds that religion has no dogmas), this sect you have joined, to this sect you are devoted, and it demands, or at least obtains, your special efforts. Mark, the existence of other sects is not so much as alluded to, and a person may be a sectarian with or without the knowledge of the existence of other and opposite parties. In fact, sectarianism is altogether a natural feeling in the human soul; it arises as soon as man is placed in certain circumstances favorable for its development, just as much as patriotism; and as long as it exists as a purely natural feeling, it is just and right, and cannot oppose either the works or the words of God. This latter part of the proposition, that so long as it exists a purely natural feeling it is just and right, will, we suppose, be taken for granted; meanwhile it must be admitted as such, since to prove it would require an investigation into a man's whole moral, if not intellectual nature, which, in present circumstances, is impossible. The *perversion* of this feeling is what is commonly called Sectarianism. None lament the existence of such a feeling more than we do, but we cannot call it "Sectarianism" unless we wish to have a jumbling together of names and things in inextricable confusion. Intemperance is the result of a perversion, or rather the carrying beyond proper limits the natural and proper appetite for drink (whatever other causes may sometimes enter into it), which has been implanted in our frame by an all-wise Creator. Keeping that appetite within its proper limits is temperance. What is commonly called sectarianism is the perversion, or rather carrying beyond proper limits, the natural and proper feeling of devotion to sect. The proper exercise of that feeling is sectarianism, although the term is often applied to the feeling itself.

The subject with which in this paper we are concerned is sectarianism in religion. Sectarianism implies a sect: a sect is just another term for a church. The religious world is divided into sects; the members of each sect bound together, mayhap, by some peculiar view of church government. One is a Presbyterian, another an Episcopalian, while a third is an Independent. Each is devoted to his own sect; his feelings are towards it; the wishes of his heart bid it "God speed!" and he fancies even that

he sees the heavens opened, and the blessings of Jehovah being showered down upon it. His affections are bound up in it; he may wish the prosperity of any or all other parties, but his noblest efforts, and his most earnest labours are in that church of which he is a member. Because he loves his own, he does not therefore hate others; and if he does not wish the prosperity of each and all, it is not, and cannot be, because he belongs to and takes the deepest interest in his own particular church; in other words, it is not because he is a Sectarian. Now, is such conduct opposed or obstructive to Christianity? Does such a man put clogs before the wheels of the gospel chariot, as by the united efforts of Christians it rolls along? Are the labours of such an one worthy only of the man in whose breast sit the passions of enmity, and who goes about feeling the pulses of the churches, and rejoicing in their weakness? Surely no! What is the genius of Christianity? "All men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Love, like a fair angel to the Christian's eye, stands beckoning him forward, and onward, shows him the world for his labour, heaven for his reward. And does she not point to the Sectarian, too, the wide, universal field, the happy, eternal home? I am a Sectarian. I take a deep interest in a particular church; and I thank God for the great prosperity he has given to that church; but, because my best wishes are towards it, am I therefore like a poor, chill soul, shut out from all participation and interest in the transactions and prosperity of the Universal Church? The riddle is solved. "The field is the world." "The harvest is plenteous." To each section of the church there is allotted a particular part of that wide, far-waving field; and as, morning after morning, the sky-lark awakens the labourer to his work, to endure the burden and heat of the day, he goes joyfully to his post, there is his work; there, too, is his heart; he labours in his part of the field; he has companions in his labour; the ripening and gathering in of his portion is his peculiar care, but he labours for the good of the whole; and as he goes along he does not forget to ask a fellow labourer how he prospers, and to exchange a loving and encouraging smile. The Church is an organized whole; each member apart, each community apart, and the hope that bears them up in their toil, and cheers their hearts in their often solitary labours, is, that one day the world will become one universal scene of righteousness; that one day the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose, and they shall be permitted to swell with redeemed thousands the glad hosannas to their king, amid the golden streets of the New Jerusalem.

True sectarianism, therefore, involves no feeling of enmity, evolves no feeling but love. What is generally understood, in conventional usage, by sectarianism, is exactly the opposite; it

is a feeling of universal hatred, of envy at every church except some one in particular; it is a low, grovelling feeling against ministers and members of all sections, either because they exist or flourish; it is worthy only of souls chained to a post amid the yellings and roarings of hell's darkest fiends. Such a feeling, alas! permeates too great a section of society, and reminds us more of schoolboys (pardonable, at least to a great extent, in them) viewing with beating heart the glittering medal, and with envious look the more clever scholar, than of those who are bound to recognize one noble aim in all their labours, and who profess to have "one Lord, one faith, one baptism." Such feelings are as foreign to sectarianism as to Christianity; and we trust that ere long this will be shown by abler pens than ours, and shown, too, perhaps, that not only is sectarianism not obstructive to Christianity, but that it is even an aid, a powerful aid, in its propagation and universal diffusion.

The great question of the unity of the church as affected by Christianity some may regard as still to be solved. It does so only when sectarianism is viewed in a wrong light, and so long as sectarianism is defined to be what it really is not, the unity of the church is most materially affected by it—affected, too, for the worse.

It is solved, however, when we regard sectarianism as referring only to the prosperity of a particular sect, and as being related to Christianity simply as a part is related to a whole.

This question, along with another of great importance, viz., the interests of the church as affected by its sectional divisions, we leave to a future paper, if not taken up before that by other hands.

A. G. A.

EPITAPH ON A MISER.—Here lies one who lived unloved and died unlamented; who denied plenty to himself, assistance to his friends, and relief to the poor; who starved his family, oppressed his neighbours, and plagued himself to gain what he could not enjoy; at last Death, more merciful to him than he was to himself, released him from care, and his family from want; and here he lies, with the muck-worm he imitated, and with the dirt he loved, in fear of a resurrection, lest his heirs should have spent the money he left behind; having laid up no treasure where moth and rust do not corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal.

ELOQUENCE, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection, but addresses itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains.—*Hume*.

PLEASURES.—Put this restriction on your pleasures; be cautious that they injure no being which has life.—*Zimmerman*.

Philosophy.

IS MIND NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO MATTER?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THIS is a question of great apparent difficulty, and one, along with many others, which has engaged the attention of some of our most profound thinkers. In considering it I shall endeavour to prove that the answer is both simple and the proof easily to be understood, and build upon my own foundation without allusion to other writers. Let me, in the first place, call attention to a very important fact, which is, that all our ideas originate from, and can be reduced to, something existing in a material form. We can think of nothing but what evidently originates from the material. Every idea and imagining is a combination or dissection, and to suppose it possible to originate a single idea apart from that derived from some material existence is a fallacy, which the slightest attention will prove. Now I wish boldly to assert that this truth alone fully proves that the mind is not only entirely dependent upon matter, but could not possibly exist apart from it, *i. e.*, could never have originated were matter an anomaly.

I think that this is also proved by the consideration of the differences of idiosyncrasy which distinguish the different tribes of mankind, arising from the different scenes and various material influences to which they are subject, which would seem to affect, nay, to form and primarily model, the mind. According to this, I conclude that the mind is not inherent, although many are of this opinion.

I would, however, give some definition of the term mind. By mind I understand the meditative power; that principle which enables us to reason upon existing objects; it is not the power of conception; for, as I have tried to show, we cannot conceive of anything the elements of which are not everywhere presented to our view in a material aspect. As an example, look at the original colours. We see them, but can devise no more, simply because we have no conceptive power; and why? Assuming the mind to be formed by material influences, the reason is obvious; as such a principle could not give rise but to ideas synonymous with it in expression.

Again, it is impossible to suppose oneself capable of thinking without some material objects as the basis of consideration. Without such I cannot see how mind could exist, because, even granting its inherency, there would be nothing to call it into exercise, so that it would, at any rate, be practically useless, and

its existence consequently indeterminable. Let us take the case of a child. They evidently learn by degrees, and by experience, proving that the mind expands upon the contemplation of natural and social existences; and although it may be urged that the difference of character proves an inherent mental distinction, I insist that this does not disprove my general hypothesis; for it is quite possible that every person may possess a kind of vivifying element which nature variously affects, and yet that this is powerless until set in action and developed by material agents. According to this, I hold that nature is necessary for the development of the mental faculty, and will conclude with the following supposition. Fancy a man situated in space who has never beheld the earth or any material object; what could he think of?—could he think at all? I believe not, if by man we suppose that instinctive element, devoid of all material embodiment, which characterizes human mind, upon which the material universe would seem to impress the loftiest functions of thought.

J. A. D.

TREATMENT OF NEW COMPETITORS BY THE MEAN AMONG AUTHORS.—How often do we see a person whose intentions are visibly to do good by the works which he publishes, treated in as scurrilous a manner as if he were an enemy to mankind! All the little scramblers after fame fall upon him, publish every blot in his life, depend upon hearsay to defame him, and have recourse to their own invention, rather than suffer him to erect himself into an author with impunity. Not only the dull and the malicious, which make a formidable party in our island, but the whole fraternity of writers, rise up in arms against every new intruder into the world of fame: and a thousand to one, before they have done, prove him not only to be a fool, but a knave. Successful authors do what they can to exclude a competitor, while the unsuccessful, with as much eagerness, lay in their claim to him as a brother.—*Addison*.

COMMUNICATION WITH POSTERITY.—How much valuable and useful information of the actual existing state of arts and knowledge at any period might be transmitted to posterity in a distinct, tangible, and imperishable form, if, instead of the absurd and useless deposition of a few coins and medals under the foundations of buildings, specimens of ingenious implements, or condensed statements of scientific truths, or processes in arts and manufactures, were substituted. Will books infallibly preserve to a remote posterity all that we may desire should be hereafter known of ourselves and our discoveries, or all that posterity would wish to know? And may not a useless ceremony be thus transformed into an act of enrolment in a perpetual archive, of what we most prize, and acknowledge to be most valuable?—*Herschel's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*.

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN addressing myself to this subject, I presume it is unnecessary for me to occupy the limited space at command with geographical details respecting our Indian possessions; suffice it to say, they comprise a territory as large as the whole continent of Europe, exclusive of Russia, extending "some two thousand miles from east to west, or from the Indus to Assam, and nearly the same distance from south to north, or from Cape Comorin to the Vale of Cashmere;" inhabited by "little short of 200,000,000 of human beings, or one-fifth of the entire population of the globe." Well might the *Times* observe, "There are few countries, and few histories, about which the English know less than they do about India." With the exception of missionaries, and the few who were connected in some way or other with the military service for the government of that country, "few," indeed, were they whose information exceeded the brief outline of the extent of India just given.

Hitherto, the people of this country have been accustomed to consider and speak of India as an immense country, of almost fabulous associations, as a land inhabited by a depraved and repulsive people, at once as idolatrous as they are fanatical. They have been led to look upon India only as a producer of silk, rice, tea, ivory, and so forth—as a land of fairy magnificence in the customs of its natives—as the El Dorado of English adventurers, and as the habitation of rajahs, nabobs, elephants, and "Bengal tigers." Henceforth it will cease to be an imaginary scene,—it has become a dread reality, and India, and its inhuman cruelties, will from this time be "familiar in their mouths as household words."

We have now to speak of it as the stage upon which has lately been enacted a drama of transcendent horror, known as the Indian Mutiny; and in whatever aspect we examine the matter—and it is capable of being viewed in a variety of phases—it undeniably forms one of the most extraordinary and eventful epochs it has ever fallen to the lot of the historian to record.

A careful investigation of Indian history has resulted in my answering the question heading this paper, in the negative; and this in all due deference to those who think differently,—part, I incline to the belief that of all things *caste has*

conducted least to the present crisis; but that the cause or causes of the revolt is or are of a far different character.

The mutinies of regiments are as old almost as the institution of an army itself, and the consequences resulting from some of them have been of marvellous importance. From the time of Alexander to our own day, the insurrectionary spirit has continually manifested itself, until it would seem to be an inherent principle of the soldier—a necessary appendage of a standing army—a nuisance which, like a railway accident, is almost constantly occurring, though “the reason why” is not so readily apparent. Thus, the old Roman legions revolted, and thus commenced the decline of that mighty empire. The rising of the janissaries of the Sultan Mahmoud—the revolt of the Strelitz regiments of Peter the Great—the disaffection of the Russian army at the accession of the late Czar Nicholas to the throne—the revolt of the Hungarian forces, endangering the safety of the Austrian empire—and the mutiny of several Spanish regiments, which shook the throne of Isabella, are matters of modern history. The mutiny of the Bengal army, however, surpasses in extent and its attendant atrocities, any that has ever preceded it. But to the question—

The purely military nature of the revolt, and the partial manifestation of dissatisfaction only, are features which must not be lost sight of. “In no one instance have the non-military classes arisen, excepting where the very lowest of the rabble—the wretched dregs of the people—have taken advantage of the tumult to plunder the dwellings of the Europeans, and the more respectable natives;” and it is a well-known fact, that when the outbreak at Meerut occurred, “many Europeans passed the night, depending entirely on the fidelity of their native servants; and it is gratifying to state, that in more than one instance that fidelity was proof.” Besides, there have been cases of native civilians betraying concealed mutineers into the hands of the English.

Now, if an infringement of caste was the great grievance, it is singular to suppose that discontent would have been confined to the army, and that only to a portion of it—or that a man would have betrayed his neighbour when defending a cause ALL must be supposed to be interested in, and deliver up his friend to justice, when yielding himself up a martyr to the “faith,” the “honour,” and “the religion” ALL must be supposed to have in common. Further, the fact that the sepoys were using the “greased cartridges” (the ostensible cause of all the mischief) some time before they became aware of it—which, if they were scrupulous on the point of *caste*, they should have discovered at first—coupled with a belief existing among them, long previous to the cartridge affair, “that the Government had plotted to take away their caste, by mixing the ground bones of bullocks with the flour sold in the market,” is sufficient evidence, I think

that they pay little attention and respect to, and very slightly study, the claims of *caste*; but that their religion (like our own, I am sorry to say) is made subservient to pecuniary gain, and not unfrequently to baser purposes; for "it has undoubtedly been proved that on many occasions, especially during the Afghanistan war, these men, generally so tenacious, have forgotten their prejudices, and have infringed many of their strictest precepts." Again, the absurdity of the caste allegation is shown in the fact that, though Lord William Bentinck, during his administration, by many acts—such as the encouragement of education, and the dissemination of Gospel truth, forbidding suttees (the cremation of Hindoo widows), putting an end to infanticide, homicide, and bloody rites of all kinds—struck at the root of the Hindoo religion, the cry of "Our religion is in danger" was never once heard; and we may, therefore, sum up the alarm exhibited on this occasion, in the exclamation of the old Scotchwoman, "I ken ye're cheating me, but I dinna ken *exactly* hoo."

The character of the sepoy, as delineated by Harriet Martineau, may not, perhaps, be out of place here. She says they are "a stalwart soldiery, of tall stature, and unmixed blood; men believing nothing, and insisting upon everything they are accustomed to; with no faith, but plenty of superstition; servile to power, and diabolically oppressive to helplessness; prone to self-torture, without any power of self-denial; bigoted to home and usages, without available affections or morality; smooth in language and manners, while brutal in grain; incapable of compassion, while disposed to good nature; good-tempered in general, with exceptions of incomparable vindictiveness; timid for a twelvemonth, and then madly ferocious for a day, or heroically devoted for an hour; frivolous and fanatical; liars in general, and martyrs on occasion; scoundrels for the most part, and heroes by a rare transfiguration"—"the hope of plunder alone inspires him in action, and the same base thirst of lucre makes him a savage mutineer, and a relentless robber on the *first convenient occasion*."

The wretch thus portrayed is no stranger to sedition, no novice at mutiny, seeing that a paltry "question of pay or provisions has supplied the motive for insubordination," and "that the plea of caste prejudice is a mere excuse for immunity from the claims of duty, and a valve for hatred and ill humour." Thus, in 1764, the *Lal Pultun*, or "Red Battalion" of Bengal mutinied, on the pretext of some promises which had been made to it having been broken.

In 1782, the *Matthews Ka Pultun*, or Matthews' Bengal regiment (named after the officer who had raised it), mutinied, under an apprehension that it was to be embarked for foreign service.

In 1779 or 80, the 9th Madras battalion mutinied when ordered to embark for Bombay.

The great mutiny in 1806, at Vellore, when the sepoys of two regiments united, and murdered in cold blood the greater part of H. M.'s 69th Foot, originated in the attachment to *caste*. Changes had been made in their costume to assimilate them with the Europeans.

At Java, in 1815, several native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sepoys, conspired to murder their officers, because they had been kept four-and-a-half years on foreign service, instead of three years, the usual period.

In 1824, the British Government was at war with the Burman empire, and a large force was despatched from Madras and Bengal to enter the territory of the king of Ava from Rangoon. Among the regiments ordered from Bengal were the 26th, the 47th, and 62nd Native Infantry. Towards the close of that year, when the time for their departure arrived, the 47th refused to move. Their minds had been disturbed by reports that the Burmese were possessed of charms which rendered them invulnerable; by their habitual dislike to the sea; by the difficulty of procuring land-carriage, and the supposed disinclination of the authorities to aid them in obtaining it; and by the refusal of the Government to yield to their demand for extra allowances, in the shape of what is called *double batta*.

They were summoned to parade, and repeating their determination not to march, they were fired upon by European troops, drawn up to enforce their obedience.

Numbers were killed, and *the rest of the army marched to Burmah*. (How about caste then?)

Three years after Lord Auckland's assumption of power (1838), an expedition was ordered to Affghanistan. The sepoy could not refrain from again taking advantage of the demand for his services to stipulate for increased allowances. The Government resisted the exaction; the sepoy resorted to his old tactics, and mutinied.

Again, in 1844, we find symptoms manifesting themselves of a disposition to mutiny on the old question of extra pay. The 34th Regiment refused to march to Scinde, and were disbanded.

The 64th Regiment mutinied on the march to Scinde, and their colonel was cashiered.

Lastly, in 1849, the Government found it necessary to discontinue a certain amount of pay to the sepoys in the Punjaub. They had been placed on that extra pay when they crossed the Sutlej to war with the Sikhs; but the Punjaub having, after a series of victories, become part and parcel of the British territories, the pay was stopped.

Bound to the British Government by, unhappily, no other tie than pay and allowances, and believing themselves indispensable

to the authorities, the 13th and 22nd Regiments of N. I. refused their pay, and mutinied. General Sir Charles Napier now commanded, and his *vigorous measures nipped that piece of insubordination in the bud.*

(*"The Indian Mutiny: its Causes and its Remedies," by R. J. R. Campbell, Esq., M.P. for Weymouth.*)

On the other hand, "in 1852, Lord Dalhousie requested (*mark the word*) the 38th Regiment to proceed to Burmah. They refused; Lord Dalhousie succumbed. *From that moment a revolt became a mere question of time and opportunity.*

The result of this unpardonable pandering to prejudice, and contemptible truckling to rebels, seems to be then, that the sepoy, having for so long a period been petted excessively, fed luxuriously, clothed splendidly, paid lavishly, and indulged extravagantly, became at last conscious of his importance, and imagined himself an individual that could not possibly be done without, and must consequently be conciliated upon all occasions, and at any sacrifice—and this feeling being encouraged by such incapable rulers as Lord Dalhousie, ultimately led the sepoy to attempt the possibility of regaining independence. This is my humble opinion.

And had the sepoy manfully asserted his rights, and boldly called upon the European "to show cause" why India should not be left to govern itself, or else decide by force the question, which was the best man, I could have applauded him for his courage—but when a man, from whatever cause it may be, takes an undue advantage of his fellow-man, and worse than that, cowardly wreaks his vengeance upon the unoffending woman and the innocent babe, then I hold him up to the execration of humanity generally, and believe that the man who slays him is "doing God service."

In conclusion, though slightly digressing, I take this opportunity of protesting against the maudlin sympathy, and the sycophantic pity that would interpose between treachery and retribution,—that would stand between the dastardly savage and brutal murderer, and the magnanimous avenger of England's slaughtered sons and daughters,—between the powerful and bloodthirsty sepoy, and helpless and defenceless women and children.

Bilston.

G. A. H. E.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE affirmative side of this question has produced from B. S. one of those earnest, eloquent, and lucid articles which the readers of the *British Controversialist* are accustomed to expect from his pen whenever history is concerned; but unfortunately, he seems upon this occasion to have taken up the wrong side of the question, or what can we understand by passages such as

the following?—"It is true that the pretext of their revolt was a fear that we were about to attempt their conversion, and that the cartridges we served to them could not be used without breaking one of the sacred canons of their faith. But one single fact exposes the falsehood of the pretext—these very cartridges were used without hesitation against us. The men who had refused to use them on parade loaded their muskets with them in private."* This fact, we should think, would have kept B. S. from any supposition as to what *might* have been the causes conducing to the Indian revolt, seeing that, according to his own showing, caste was nothing but a "pretext" as regards the present revolt in India. If we accept B. S.'s summing-up, that "the ultimate object of the mutiny was the re-establishment of the Mohammedan power in India, and that the king of Oude, and possibly other native chiefs, had been induced to join as conspirators, in the hope of regaining their ancient power," we find it most difficult to arrive at an affirmative, because the premises and the conclusion are so decidedly negative.

The fact is, as the *Times* asserts, that "after the lapse of several months, with the aid of unlimited discussion, those who are best informed confess their inability to explain the causes of the revolt." The main causes were probably Mussulman and princely intrigues, joined with the most unbounded faith in Sepoy fidelity amongst those who should have known them better. "And among the immediate causes of the mutiny," says the *Times*, "it would be strange if no place could be assigned to the errors of those in power. Supineness, irresolution, and ill-timed severity, were undoubtedly displayed on different occasions. The truth, when it comes out, as come out it must when the question of Indian government comes to be fully debated in the House, will probably be found to be, that the main, if not the only, cause lay in the system of squeezing and extortion practised by every class of India's rulers. The Sepoys were but the ready instruments in the hands of others; the head of the revolt was higher than these disciplined tigers. The Mussulman and Hindoo had learned to look upon England as a distant taskmaster, from whom nothing was to be expected but heavy demands and tardy justice." And yet with all this there was mixed up so much of imbecility, so much conciliation, so much temporizing; the master lowered to the level of the servant, the conqueror to the measure of the conquered; the Hindoos treated with marked indulgence, while systematic obstacles were thrown in the way of independent European enterprise; the Indian subject pampered and petted, while a rigid monopoly was maintained against Englishmen at home; Buddha, Brahma, and Vishnu, and their besotted votaries,

esteemed and caressed, while the poor convert to Christianity is dismissed from the ranks; the dominant religion of the dominant race is supplanted by every passion, every propensity, every moral sin, and every physical abomination which the Hindoo chooses to elevate to the rank of a god, and think himself only the more religious for the very abomination he has practised. And these are the men we have trusted and honoured; these are the men whom it is a sin to doubt, and, when found out in their horrid crimes, it is a still greater sin to punish. It is for these men, for these religions, that the religion of Christ has had to skulk in bye-ways and hedges, wounded well-nigh to the death in the house of its friends. The whole moral and social government of India has been a mistake, and we are now reaping the bitter fruits of our folly; and it will not be till the double government of our empire in the East is done away with, and we have responsibility placed somewhere or other; it will not be till English Christians are at least placed on an equal footing with the followers of Brahma; it will not be till the Sepoy gives place to the British soldier, who, though perhaps a trifle dearer in the outset, will be found cheaper in the end; it will not be till the bartering, trading spirit of Leadenhall Street gives place to equal laws, equal justice, and equal government;—it will not be till these things come to pass that we shall be able to *hold India without the sword*. Havelock, and Neill, and Lawrence have re-conquered India for us. Now is our time to take advantage of that for which these veterans have fought, and bled, and died, treating caste as the contemptuous falsehood, the hollow “pretext” it is, and governing India in an English spirit, by English laws, supported by the presence of English troops.

Caste is confessedly *not* the concurring cause of the revolt, but Mussulman intrigues and Oude money; caste is but the cat-paw, Hindoo subtlety the grinding hand.

A BAD ARGUMENT.—It is a common argument amongst divines, in the behalf of religious life, that a contrary behaviour has such consequences when we come to die. It is indeed true, but seems an argument of a subordinate kind: the article of death is more frequently of short duration. Is it not a stronger persuasive, that virtue makes us happy daily, and removes the fear of death from our lives antecedently, than that it smooths the pillow of a death-bed?—*Shenstone*.

MOTION.—Though the motion of the cart-wheel is so obvious, and seems so plain a thing that the carman himself never looks upon it with wonder, yet, after Aristotle had taken notice of the difficulty that occurred about it, this trivial phenomenon has perplexed divers great wits, not only schoolmen, but mathematicians, and continues yet so to do.—*Boyle*.

Social Economy.

IS AN UNLIMITED BANK ISSUE BENEFICIAL TO COMMERCE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE own to a partiality, perhaps a strange one, of taking the field single-handed; and when compelled to fight in company, we prefer to be with the minority. There is a sort of charm in taking your stand with your back to the wall, defying a world in arms—throwing down the gage to all comers; it is but a cowardly, unsatisfactory way of fighting, when you know that it is but a mere question of time, and that if you only wait, your forces will wear out the foe. Hand to hand, foot to foot, the hot breath scorching each other's faces, is the only delightful, manly way of fighting. 'Tis not half a battle when you have an overwhelming majority; and this, we think, is the case with our opponents. On their side they have a goodly array of Chancellors of Exchequer, financiers, bankers, and stockbrokers—the monied interest almost to a man—and to crown all, to consummate their triumph, they have the *Times*, with all the weight of ponderous leaders in large type, and adroit leaders in small type stuck into the money article by way of notes on current matters, made up letters by Printing House scribes, and stray paragraphs inserted with all the Thunderer's *usual* and *noted* correctness and fairness; and yet, in spite of all these helps and aids, "Philaethes" feels borne down by the weight of responsibility resting upon his shoulders as the opener of the debate, and fearing lest the momentous nature of his subject should lead him into "errors and inconsistencies." If he had followed his leader, we should have had the errors and inconsistencies the same, but without the apology; so that "Philaethes" has in this case the merit of modesty, through not being quite so case-hardened as the old debater of Printing House Square. The opponents of any change in the Bank Charter, as affecting the currency, contend for the following palpable absurdity—that though the Bank may issue £14,000,000 more notes than they have specie, not only without injury but with positive benefit to the trading community, and with enormous profit to themselves, and yet that another £2,000,000 would be suicidal and certain ruin. If there is to be any over issue upon securities, why place any limit? If the securities are not convertible, or not worth the amount advanced upon them, they then become like the Branksea Clay Company's shares, and Hubbard Weguelin might fairly be placed in the

same dock with Stephens and Waugh. The whole question is a question of confidence or no confidence in the Bank Directors. Its injurious effects upon trade cannot be denied. Mr. Glyn, before the House, says, with respect to the limitation of the circulation to £14,475,000, "there, he confessed, he found the great difficulty of the question to lie, for he thought that no person who had watched the progress of the crisis in 1847, and again in 1857, could fail to arrive at the conviction, that although the pressure was not caused by the Act, yet, the pressure existing, the limitation to issue became in itself a primary cause of evil. . . . It was reduced to a simple matter of fact that when a time of pressure came, a letter or some such instrument must be issued to relieve the Act of 1844." What, then, can be said for an Act so mischievous in its tendencies, that "it is a primary cause of evil," and so futile, that in a time of pressure, something must be devised to "relieve it," or, in other words, to set it aside. The Act was passed to prevent panics, and to maintain convertibility. How has it operated? With a panic three and thirteen years after it is passed and becomes law, the first point is at once disposed of; and with regard to the second, how can the £14,000,000 be paid in specie if applied for, as applied for it undoubtedly might be if public confidence were destroyed. Its convertibility is evidently and knowingly based on the assumption that it can never be applied for; but public confidence is the only guarantee the Directors have, and that confidence is as good for £40,000,000 as for £14,000,000, and without that confidence, even with an issue limited to £14,000,000, the Bank would soon be compelled to close its doors. An unlimited Bank issue, upon proper *bonâ fide* and valid securities, we contend, is a positive benefit to the trading community, for it enables them, at a time of unforeseen pressure, to increase the amount of available capital by just the actual realizable value of their legitimate securities; and we shall look forward with great interest to the disclosures in committee, feeling assured that an Act which is of necessity stultified by the exigencies of the times must become at last permanently shelved. Here, then, we leave the question, and trust that some one abler than ourselves will take up the defence of an unlimited Bank issue as beneficial to commerce.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In giving a negative reply to the above question, we are but expressing opinions which the exercise of ordinary perception must at once recognize as salutary and just; we are advocating the cause of honesty and prudence, as opposed to that of recklessness and improvidence: for the gist of the whole matter is contained in the problem, "Is a debased currency to be preferred to a pure currency?" When we consider the magnitude of the interests that are connected with commercial enterprise,

the multitudinous channels into which commerce is diverted, and the powerful influence it exercises upon society at large, it behoves us to give a careful consideration to any plan that may be propounded, for the advancement of an institution which is the key-stone of the arch of our national greatness. It is always instructive, and generally pleasing, to investigate a subject upon which a difference of views are known to exist; it stimulates the inquirer with a vigour unknown, when engaged in the study of indisputable facts; it tends to draw forth any latent energy or ability, as well, perhaps, as to kindle feelings of noble emulation in his mind. In proceeding to argue our subject, "Is an unlimited Bank issue beneficial to commerce?" we shall divide it into two sections. In the first we shall treat of "Unlimited Bank issue," and in the second of "Limited Bank issue;" endeavouring to show clearly and concisely the results which have been attendant upon the adoption of each particular course of action, also the principles involved in either case. 1. The period to which we shall confine our remarks whilst treating of "Unlimited issue," will be from the passing of Sir Robert Peel's first Bank Act, in the year 1819, until 1844, the time of Sir Robert's second Act, a space of twenty-five years. When Sir Robert introduced his first Currency Bill, the object he had in view was to terminate the suspension of specie payment which had existed during the war, to place the currency upon its proper metallic basis, and to establish the convertibility of a bank note. This was a step in the right direction; and, although it was but a partial reform of the monetary system then in existence, yet it was productive of much good, and must have been considered a great boon by the public. Instead of a man receiving his dividends in notes, which were inconvertible into gold, except at heavy discount, the bill provided that in future those notes should be instantly convertible when demanded at the Bank. But the Act left the power of issue intact; the Bank of England was enabled to issue notes to any amount upon the one condition, that gold should be forthcoming upon presentation. The power to create country banks was unlimited; an exception, however, being made in favour of the Bank of England relative to the number of partners. These banks were allowed to create bank notes to any amount; the same was the case both in Ireland and Scotland. In accordance with the law then existing, any individual could establish a bank, and issue notes payable to bearer on demand, provided those notes were paid in specie when presented at the bank. Here, then, was a vast machine, with ramifications extending throughout the length and breadth of the land. No limitation of issue to impede its action. What ought to have been the effect produced by such a cause? According to the theory advanced by those who clamour against limitation, we ought to have witnessed an era of unprecedented

prosperity; trade and manufactures should have flourished under an influence so favourable to success; the seller would obtain highly remunerative prices, the purchaser would have abundant funds at his disposal, panics would be an impossibility; whilst "paper" money could be created so readily, and everything would betoken uninterrupted happiness, and commercial prosperity. But when we dismiss our theoretical inductions, and refer to ungarnished facts which the period exhibited, we shall find that, instead of having reason for congratulation upon the stability of the system, which the unrestricted issue of bank notes developed, the contrary appears to be the case.

What a spectacle did the state of things present in the year 1825! Distrust evinced in every direction, the credit of the banks gone, and, amidst the all but universal wreck, houses of undoubted means were compelled to succumb to the unmitigated pressure of the times. In a short period, no fewer than seventy-three banks were compelled to suspend payment. The inference that must naturally be drawn from the occurrence of such unfortunate events is clear; it proves that commerce is liable to convulsions, and that the power of unlimited bank issue, though it be supported by usury laws, is totally inefficient to prevent the recurrence of such evils. If, then, that power does not act as a preventative to panic, and to the upholding of national credit, it certainly cannot be conducive to the benefit of commercial interests. If we inquire minutely into the circumstances connected with the panics that have from time to time taken place, we shall find that in nearly every case their cause was attributable to over-speculation in the first instance, combined with the efflux of gold from the country, which is the inevitable result of such imprudence. If the imports of Great Britain should exceed the exports, the consequence is, that the balance due by us to our creditors will have to be discharged in specie, thus contracting our metallic currency; and, as gold is subject to the same law of supply and demand as any other commodity, it follows that any exportation of specie must necessarily enhance the value of that which remains.

The scarcity or abundance of an article, is at all times a true criterion of its worth; for if the amount of gold in the world were doubled to-morrow, the effect would be, that goods which are obtainable to-day for one sovereign would then be worth two. But it is contended by those who advocate "unlimited bank issue," that when gold is leaving the country, either to discharge our liabilities, or through the course of exchange being against us, its place can be supplied by notes, and so prevent the difficulties that must otherwise arise from the contraction of the metallic circulation. Now, for unlimited issue to prove of any advantage or support to trade, it is absolutely necessary that the credit of the banks should be unimpeachable, and that they

should exercise their discretionary power of issuing only to an extent compatible with their means. But this is perhaps a limitation stricter than that which exists at present. In times of commercial distress, it would certainly not tend to improve the credit of the Bank of England if we daily witnessed the departure of bullion from the country, to be replaced by notes, demandable in gold, but which you knew had been issued without any provision being made for their ultimate discharge in gold. The principle is pernicious in the extreme, and one that could never be practised without abuse; it would enable banks to obtain funds which would be applied to purposes detrimental to the interests of every legitimate trader. Increased means would be thus provided for the discount of dubious paper, the overdraw of banking accounts, and numerous other improprieties, which tend to deprive the capitalist of that due advantage he ought to possess over men whose sole property is comprised in bundles of accommodation bills.

The working of the system, when subjected to the pressure produced by mercantile difficulties, we have before noticed. It clearly demonstrated that it failed, both as a preventative and a remedy. It is also a system of injustice, for it debases the currency. If, through a scarcity of gold, caused by a foreign drain, say £4,000,000 of notes were created to supply the vacuum, so long as the credit of the banks that issued them sustained their circulation, there would be a palpable fraud committed, because it would prevent gold from assuming its proportionate value, according to its scarcity, which would be a debasement, in the fullest sense of the word; for, although it may be asked, "How can it be a debasement of the currency, when you can instantly obtain gold for each note?" yet the answer is definite and clear:—If those notes were not in existence, gold would be worth more; but so soon as they are put into circulation it is depreciated in value. Hence if, by the instrumentality of mere promissory paper, you reduce the worth of specie, it is evident that a debasement takes place, to the amount of the issue of that which acts as a substitute for the precious metal; a tangible illustration of which will be found, if we consider the case of a man who wishes to purchase sugar or tea: he finds that, by the issue of notes reducing the price of gold, he has to give a higher figure for his goods than he would have had, if the currency had not been debased, thus depriving him of any benefit he might have reaped from his foresight or experience. Having thus far endeavoured to point out the shortcomings and injustice of "Unlimited Bank Issue," we shall proceed to examine the question of "Limited Bank Issue," trusting to the inherent soundness of the principles it embodies, to justify the opinions we have formed on the subject.

2. When Sir Robert Peel introduced his first Bank Act, in

1819, it was with the view of gradually improving our monetary and commercial system; and in this there is no doubt he succeeded even beyond expectation. In the year 1844, Sir Robert brought forward and passed his second Bank Act, which was intended as a supplement to the previous one. The object of the Bill was to secure, in reality, that convertibility of the note which was only legalized by the Act of 1819; and for this purpose he provided that the Bank of England should be allowed to issue notes, on security, to the amount of £14,000,000, and any further sum that might accrue from the lapsed circulation of the country banks. Pursuant to this provision, £475,000 was authorized, a few years since, by an Order in Council, to be issued on security, thus making a total issue of £14,475,000 guaranteed by Government securities. The law, however, enables the Bank to issue notes equivalent in value to the amount of bullion in its cellars. The Bank of England is, by the provisions of this Act, divided into two distinct compartments,—the Issue and Banking; and in the weekly returns which are published, the assets and liabilities are always classified under these two divisions.

The Act of 1844 also contained the important restriction, that no country bank that should be established after the passing of the Act, should be permitted to issue bank notes; and it limited the issue of the then existing banks, to the amount in circulation at that time, giving them no optional power of issuing on bullion security. In the succeeding year an Act was passed relating to Ireland and Scotland, which was intended to form part of the same measure. It affected the Irish and Scotch Banks of Issue in a similar way to the English, by fixing their issues to the amount circulating then; but it authorized them to issue notes in excess of their limits, against a deposit of bullion. With these prudent restrictions, we find that the estimated paper circulation of the country averages about £38,000,000, and out of this large sum, the only part strictly secured on bullion, is that which is issued by the Bank of England, beyond the £14,475,000 represented by Government securities. Sir Robert Peel explained in his speech of the 3rd December, 1847, in the House of Commons, the purposes which the Act of 1844 was intended to accomplish. He said:—"I say, then, that the bill of 1844 had a triple object; the first object was that in which I admit it has failed, viz., to prevent, by early and gradual, severe and sudden contractions, and the panic and confusion inseparable from it; but the bill had two other objects of at least equal importance—the one to maintain and guarantee the convertibility of the paper currency into gold; the other to prevent the difficulties which arise at all times from undue speculation being aggravated by the abuse of paper credit, in the form of promissory notes. In these two objects, my belief is the bill has succeeded. My belief is that you have had a guarantee for the

maintenance of the principle of convertibility, such as you never had before; my belief also is, that whatever difficulties you are now suffering, from a combination of various causes, would have been greatly aggravated, if you had not wisely taken the precaution of checking the unlimited issue of the notes of the Bank of England, of joint stock banks, and private banks." The experience of the present day fully bears out the soundness of the assertions contained in the foregoing extract, which was spoken at a time of great distress, and under analogous circumstances to those which have been witnessed very recently. The fact, that a bill regulating the paper currency should have proved unable to preclude the possibility of panic, can be a matter of no surprise, when we have discovered that a metallic currency is no specific for the evil, as events that have transpired at Hamburg prove; the remaining objects of the bill have, however, been completely and satisfactorily attained. In drawing our article to a close, we cannot refrain from expressing our admiration of the statesman, whose sagacity was never more conspicuously displayed than in framing the Bank Act of 1844, leaving to our opponents the forlorn hope of proving his proceedings in the matter to be a fallacy. T. G. F.

ILLS OF LIFE.—

War, famine, pest, volcano, storm, and fire,
Intestine broils, oppression, with her heart
Wrapt up in triple brass, besiege mankind.
God's image, disinherited of day,
Here, plunged in mines, forgets a sun was made;
There, beings, deathless as their haughty lord,
Are hammer'd to the galling oar for life,
And plough the winter's wave, and reap despair.
Some for hard masters, broken under arms,
In battle lopp'd away, with half their limbs
Beg bitter bread, through realms their valour saved.
If so, the tyrant or his minion doom,
Want or incurable disease (fell pair!)
On hopeless multitudes remorseless seize
At once, and make a refuge of the grave.
How groaning hospitals eject their dead!
What numbers groan for sad admission there!
What numbers once in Fortune's lap high fed,
Solicit the cold hand of charity!
To shock us more, solicit it in vain.—*Young.*

SLANDER.—It does not depend upon me, said the Grecian, to prevent being spoken ill of; it is only in my power that it be not done deservedly.

The Reviewer.

THE OLD BACHELOR IN THE OLD SCOTTISH VILLAGE. By
THOMAS AIRD. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Son.

SOMEWHERE about a year ago we had the pleasure of noticing the second edition of Aird's "Poems;" and though it is a little out of our province in this periodical to review the literature of fiction, we have such an overpowering admiration of the writer that we venture to step beyond the usual line which circumscribes our criticism to give a glance at this work of a true, genial, kindly-hearted author; a man whose mind is suffused and permeated with the splendour of genius.

The work before us is full of that quaint, dry drollery, that love of nature sublimed to a passion, that keen, observative acuteness, that fine, flowing facility of expression, that feeling-heartedness, that nice, metaphysical distinctness, that admiration of real, living heroism, which might be produced could we fuse into one mind and soul Steele and Addison, Coleridge and Christopher North, Carlyle, Chalmers, and Robert Hall. Yet there is no exertion, or sign of an imitative spirit: the whole product is a genuine one—fresh from the mint of a royal soul—new from the thought-fount of one who has been dowered by nature with the very intensest appreciation of every sight, sound, feeling, act, or word in which the poetical is embodied, or can be expressed:—

"Hence at each sound imagination glows;
Hence at each picture vivid life starts here;
Hence his warm lay with softening sweetness flows,—
Melting it flows, pure, murmuring, strong and clear,
And fills the impassioned heart, and wins the harmonious ear."

Since the magnificent and richly endowed spirit of John Wilson departed from among men, no representative Scotchman has arisen, and no one was left behind him to whom, as a specimen of true national genius, we can point with such emphatic pride as Thomas Aird. Intense and vivid imagination, glowing and productive, yet ordered and controlled by the keenest observation, the steadiest intellect, and the highest morals, is united to lofty thought, pawkie humour, shrewd, proverb-like quaintness, and the power of evoking the terrible and the sublime, unmatched, if not unmatchable. He never lays a finger to any work but he puts the touch of perfection upon it. We remember in our boyhood's days the intense joy with which we took to the fields with Aird's "Old Bachelor" as our companion, in the pocket of our well-worn jacket; and in our youth's years, when the poetic was fermenting in our own thoughts, and mani-

festing itself in our experience, we recall the hour in which a patriarch of the church first directed our attention to Aird's "Poems," and the peculiar emphasis with which he said—"Here is a mind of genuine poetic power, chastened by holy feeling—it is a *ripe* book, full of the sublime, the grand, the playful, and the solemn, but the Sun of Righteousness shines in it, and the rainbow of God over-arches it." We read in the light of our beloved adviser, and felt that, more truly than many of the famed, Thomas Aird enjoyed—

"The light that never was on land or shore—
The consecration and the poet's dream."

To those who know how few of life's pleasures can be tasted twice and yet retain their piquancy, we need only say that reading these works *now* creates as fresh and as enrapturing a feeling as they did when we deemed that even to touch the hem of Aird's garment would have been productive of intense delight. Since then we have clasped his hand in the gripe of friendship, have listened to the murmurous flow of his discourse, have tasted the highest joy of life—conversation in his company—and the enchantment is strong as ever. There is in Aird what no other living man, known to us, in the wide circle of our literary friendship, possesses in an equal degree—a uniform self-sustainment. He seems to us to be a compound of the most ethereal and intellectual elements which distinguished Burns and Wilson—less effervescent, indeed, perhaps even less masculine, but withal a genuine *man*—one in whom there is no "Brummagem" at all. If there is one of our readers with whom our voice has power, we say, unhesitatingly, that whichever of his books he may open he will find that no common everyday scribe speaks in them—that the freshness, the vitality, the undying vigour of a great, true soul, has laid them down as the richest and rarest fruit of that real "garden of God"—a mind imbued with the science and beauty of the earth, and enriched with the teachings of "the Spirit of all Truth." Our space will not permit quotation; but we would like no winter evening's employment so well as to sit in a quietly intellectual circle, and read, amid alternative smiles, tears, and suspirations, the humour, the pathos, the wisdom, and the poetry, which are all combined in these works of Thomas Aird.

Yet can we not refrain from culling the following choice description of one month of the year, as an illustration of extraordinary graphic power, but not as one of the best passages in the "Old Bachelor":—

"OCTOBER.—October is to me the most delightful month of the year. To say nothing of the beauty of the woods at that season, my favourite month is very often a dry one, sufficiently warm, and yet with a fine bracing air, that makes exercise delightful. And then what noble exercise for you is your sporting jacket! To saunter through the rustling woodlands, to stalk across

the stubble field, yellow with the last glare of day; to skirt the loin of the hill, and, overleaping the dyke, tumble away among the ferns, and reach your door just as the great red moon comes up in the east, how invigorating! I say nothing of the clear fire within, and the new magazine just laid on your table. Moreover, October is associated with the glad consummation of harvest home and all the fat blessings of the year—not forgetting the brewing of brown stout. Altogether, October is a manly, jolly fellow, and that Spenser knew right well, as thus appears:—

‘Then came October, full of merry glee;
For yet his noule was totty of the must,
Which he was treading in the wine’s fat sea;
And of the gentle oil, whose gentle gust
Made him so frolic.’

What fine, quaint, picturesque old words these are! But, oh, the dismal look of a wet October and a late harvest! The central figure of the dreary picture is the farmer on the first dry breezy evening that comes after a fortnight’s incessant rain in the end of the month, bending and looking through his black beanfield, sticking sodden to the ground in every stook, slimy with slugs, all going to alaver, and losing the sprouted pulse from every open pod. The miry hunters riding homewards sink to the fetlock as they cross the deep clayey country. The husbandman turns cheerlessly to the higher lands. The small birds, starting from his feet, shriek adown the wind in the watery evening light. The green and yellow (both in one) glint of the oats, tussled by the wind on the edge of the waste, with the chaff of every top-pickle (thrashed out by the windy blasts that have contrived to blow in every interval of the rain) shimmering them, and white to the level eye, fluctuates away before him. They won’t be ripe and ready yet for a fortnight to come.”

N. L.

PROGRESS AND EFFECTS OF EDUCATION.—The general desire for education, and the general diffusion of it, is working, and partly has worked, a great change in the mass of the people. And though it has been our lot to witness some of the inconveniences necessarily arising from a transition state, where gross ignorance has been superseded by a somewhat too rapid communication of instruction, dazzling the mind, perhaps, rather than enlightening it, yet every day removes something of this evil. Presumption and self-sufficiency are sobered down by the acquirement of useful knowledge, and men’s minds become less arrogant in proportion as they become better informed. There cannot be a doubt, therefore, but that any evils which may have arisen from opening the floodgates of education, if I may so say, will quickly flow away, and that a clear and copious stream will succeed, fertilizing the heretofore barren intellect with its wholesome and perennial waters.—*Charge of the Bishop of Lichfield, 1836.*

BENEFITS.—He that loves his neighbour as himself, is at the extent of the commandment: he that does more breaks it. I would so serve others as I might not injure myself; but so myself as I might be helpful to others.—*Feltham.*

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

175. Can any of your readers give me an explanation of "The Five Mile Act," in operation about the year 1650?

176. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* point me to any work (naming price and publisher), where I could obtain plain instructions

for making a cheap pianoforte, or a harmonium?—W. T.

177. Can any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me in what publication, or by what means, I could obtain an engraved portrait of the late Sir William Herschel, not more than 3½ inches in size?—ASTOR.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Lord Macaulay has replied to Mr. Hepworth Dixon on the subject of William Penn and the Pardon-brokerage at Taunton. An elaborate note to the second volume of the new edition of his "History of England" sets forth the argument. "If it be said," his lordship concludes, "that it is incredible that so good a man would have been concerned in so bad an affair, I can only answer that this affair was very far indeed from being the worst in which he was concerned. For these reasons I leave the text, and shall leave it, exactly as it originally stood."

Prince Albert, as Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, announces "Delhi" as the subject of the English prize poem for 1858. It may not be generally known that among the gainers of this prize was Lord Macaulay, whose first published work was his Cambridge prize poem on "Pompeii," in 1817.

A meteor of extraordinary brilliancy was seen on Wednesday evening, the 16th, in various parts of the country, about ten minutes before eight. In Berkshire it is described as being of a blood-red colour, and traversing the heavens from north to west. The labourers who saw it were quite terrified at its appearance. At 4 a.m. the following morning, the sky presented an extraordinary appearance, the heavens being illuminated in the north-west by a bright fiery red, as if lighted up by a conflagration.

The President's message, arriving at

Liverpool from New York too late for the London mail on Sunday, the 19th ult., it was transmitted by telegraph to the *Daily News* office, and appeared in that journal next morning. It filled six columns, and took seven hours in transmission. This is, we believe, a deed without parallel in the annals of journalism.

Twenty-four unpublished letters of President De Thou, the French historian, have just been discovered at Bordeaux; they are in French, and are addressed to eminent personages. Only one letter of his has heretofore been known to exist: it is addressed to James I. of England, and is a justification of an opinion on Mary Stuart.

The division of the mineral department at the British Museum, long spoken of as probable, has at length taken place. Mr. Waterhouse, the present keeper, retains the superintendence of the geological collections, while that of the mineralogy has been transferred to Mr. Nevil Maskelyne, late Deputy Reader in Mineralogy to the University of Oxford.

On Saturday last, Mr. W. H. Russell started for India by the Overland Mail, to act as correspondent of the *Times* at the seat of war. He proceeds immediately to join the headquarters of the army with Sir Colin Campbell, and will remain until the last act of the mutiny is played out. We may now look for some graphic pictures of Indian life.

The Harpers, of New York, give Mr

Thackeray two thousand dollars for early proof-sheets of his story, "The Virginians." They gave a similar sum to Mr. Dickens for sheets of "Little Dorrit." One of the New York papers, they complain, has begun to reprint the chapters of "The Virginians" in its columns; an act against which the Harpers protest, in the interests of English authors. It is impossible, they say, for any house to pay two thousand dollars for a work that will be reprinted.

The first volume of a work containing a literary history of the Austrian empire, by M. Schmidt, has just appeared at Vienna, and the other volumes are to be published shortly. This work has cost immense labour, and not fewer than from 60,000 to 70,000 publications will be noticed in it.

The fourth volume of Baron Humboldt's "Kosmos" has just left the press; and a work prefaced by him will shortly appear, under the auspices of the King of Prussia, entitled "Travels from the Mississippi to the shores of the Pacific, by B. Mohlhausen." The colour-printed illustrations are said to be splendid.

A little printing-press has been sent from Paris to Constantinople. It is to find its place in the harem of Ribardy Effendi, and will be used exclusively for the benefit of the Turkish ladies. The wife of Ribardy Effendi is said to be well versed in French and English belles lettres, and intends to publish a collection of the best occidental novels in a Turkish translation. The enterprising lady is busy turbaning Mr. Thackeray's "Newcomes."

Dr. Mackay delivered at Mozart Hall, Broadway, New York, on the 3rd ult., the first of his course of lectures on the "National, Popular, and Historical Songs of England, Ireland, and Scotland." The audience was large and select, and many persons of mark were upon the platform. The lecturer was introduced to the audience by the Pre-

sident of the Mechanics' and Clerks' Library Association, by whose invitation the lectures are to be delivered. At the conclusion of the lecture, which was warmly cheered throughout, the Doctor read a few verses of his own composition, on the "Voice of Poetry," and after announcing that the remarks which he had made were merely introductory, he closed amid great applause.

There is now in the press, and will shortly be given to the public, under the sanction of Sir John Romilly, a catalogue (compiled by Mr. T. Duffas Hardy, of the Record Office) of all existing materials for the History of England, from the earliest time to the final close of the Wars of the Roses on the accession of Henry the Eighth, the point at which modern history begins.

A Mr. D. Smith, of Melbourne, Victoria, claims a discovery prior to that of Sir Henry Rawlinson, of the Assyrian alphabet. He says that he made his discovery years ago at the British Museum by accident; but to obtain credit it will be requisite that he publish his proof. Mr. Smith confesses his ignorance of ancient and oriental languages, and the chances are, therefore, much against his deciphering the Assyrian cylinders.

The Jerrold "In Memoriam" money is sufficient to secure an annuity of £120 a year for Mrs. Jerrold and her unmarried daughter, and the survivor of the two.

Her Majesty has granted a pension of £150 per annum to the daughters of the late Dr. Paris. Mr. Paris, the eldest son of the family, has just received an appointment from Mr. Justice Cresswell, in the new Court of Probate, an office for which his literary habits render him especially qualified.

Two more volumes of Lord Macaulay's history, bringing it down to the end of the reign of Queen Anne, are said to be approaching completion; and will be published shortly after the completion of the cheap edition now in course of issue in monthly volumes.

The Logic of Controversy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

"EACH age has to fight with its own falsehoods," as well as against the falsehoods of the past, whether embodied in history, creed, custom, law, or social life. *The truth is neither so easily got at, or held by, or maintained, as many people fancy.* "Certainly there be," as Bacon saith, those "that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief." And it is in many cases too true that "a mixture of a lie doth give pleasure." The innate vileness and shame of falsehood has been openly pronounced; but the surpassing value of truth has never been fully and thoroughly acknowledged by being universally acted upon. Hence it is that a keen satirist has said that social existence is based on a platform of latent lies, and that nothing is so inconvenient or unpalatable to man as the plain and simple truth. The existence of truth and falsehood is the justification of controversy, which is only the means of determining, so far as may be, the claims of two contending parties to the estate of "Man-soul." It is fashionable with certain men, and even classes of men, to deprecate controversy as a disturber of life and thought, the handmaid of doubt, and the "servant of all work" to infidelity. We are so far from believing this, that we continually look upon it in the light of an angel, which troubles the stagnant waters of thought,—that it may bring healing to the soul. It argues but a weak faith in the supremacy of the true and holy to assert that inquiry is likely to result in error. Even to suggest an equipoise of probabilities in the case seems to us to be a direct denial of the power and loveliness of truth, which is altogether unjustifiable. Why should the sequence supposed be enquiry, controversy, doubt, denial, rather than enquiry, controversy, hesitance, belief?

Our main object at present, however, is not so much to advocate the righteousness and advisability of controversy, as to endeavour to give some formal instructions regarding the manner in which it ought to be conducted by those who desire to use it rightly for the attainment of right ends. For this purpose we have only to accept its existence as a fact in every-day life, and proceed to show in what way it may be so regulated as to effect beneficial results. We esteem this topic as one especially *germane* to a magazine bearing the title which this bears, and having for its object the "impartial discussion of all impor-

tant questions." We have no *defence* to offer for ourselves for having taken up our position among the agencies for human improvement of our own day, for *that* is already triumphantly furnished in the acceptance which our efforts have met, in the benefits which we *know* have resulted from them. To be convinced at any time that any matter is our *duty*, is with us conclusive, so far as regards our setting about it, and that right earnestly. We are perfectly convinced that the shaking of the torches makes them shine, and that it is the fault of the thing investigated, and not of the light, if it cannot bear to be seen on all sides, if it was made to be so; for many opinions, now-a-days, are like pictures, or like the gambler's play coin, made to be seen on one side only, instead of resembling statues, which can be viewed all round. To such opinions charity may be shown; but ruth demands that they should be sternly dealt with, so long as they petition for our faith on false pretences. The challenge of a sentinel on duty will do no injury to a friend. To any enemy of course it is likely to be disagreeable. We are the sentinels of truth. We ask only to know that the challenged should give "the word," show the signet, or display the colours of the rightful and true sovereign of the human soul.

But to our task.

Controversy, in the large and liberal meaning now generally attached to it, signifies "a reasoning together,"—a turning of the same thought into all possible points of view,—in community of examination,—to determine upon its accuracy or inaccuracy. It does not signify a hot-headed and begotting disputatious series of jangling and contentious invectives, in which each endeavours to trip up and outwit his antagonist, but a true and genuine earnest search after the truth by thorough and unbiassed inquiry, in which the excitement to attention, fair dealing, and just research, is a fact that an on-looker is noting our method, detecting, it may be, our carelessness, our error, or our dishonesty. It is not a fiery and inflammatory process, in which temper is consumed, and honesty condemned to torture and the stake, but a calm, cool, deeply reflective exercise of the mind, in which some given thought is so placed before the centre light of reason, that it may have "all its flaws observed, set in a note book, learned and conned," only that it may be more highly valued if found to be capable of substantiating the claims it had registered; or that it may be rejected and disbelieved if incapable of showing that its claims are just, right, and true. In other, briefer, and milder words, controversy is mutual reasoning upon one point,—that reasoning being watched and criticised in its processes by two or more parties holding opposite opinions, but each desirous of becoming acquainted with the truth in the love of it.

The Logic of Controversy is a phrase which we shall employ

to designate the special processes of the ratiocinative faculty by which fallacies are sifted in contests regarding the accuracy or inaccuracy of any method of proof adopted to settle any disputed question.

The necessary *preliminary* of controversy is debateability, *i. e.*, the possibility of forming two (or more) opinions regarding the same subject, the terms being understood in the same sense, and the facts, in so far as they bear upon the significance of the terms, being held as proven or accepted as true.

The subject being stated, the earliest duty of each thinker is clearly to define the terms in which it is stated, explaining, without ambiguity or reservation, the precise meaning which he attaches to the words employed. When this has been done, it is, in almost all cases, advisable to announce the limitations or conditions upon which it is intended to reason; to state the kind and quality of the facts to be appealed to, or the authorities to be relied on.

The whole platform of debate being thus swept clear of any possible, conscious or unconscious, duplicity, and made honest as a marshalled chess board,—the operations of attack and defence,—the warfare of thought, rightly begins by the statement on the affirmative side of the premises upon which the belief entertained is founded, supported by such facts, or accompanied by such references to admitted truths as may show that the premises are *bonâ fide* admissible as *grounds of reasoning* on the subject under consideration.

That knowledge, real and belief worthy, may be gained, it must be *sought*:—that it may be verified, it must be *proven*.

Knowledge having been sought, reveals itself in premises, which, on being subjected to the scrutiny of the reasoning faculty, results in some conclusion, favourable or adverse, to the interrogation or expectation of the inquirer and thinker.

Facts are the *data* of reasoning, and the foundations on which premises are built.

Propositions are judgments of the mind passed upon *data*; *i. e.*, assertions regarding the agreement or disagreement, the congruity or incongruity, the connexion,—possible or actual,—or the disjunction of any two thoughts.

Premises are propositions employed to substantiate or prove a certain [predetermined] conclusion.

A conclusion is a proposition in which one act of illative or ratiocinative thought is completed and expressed.

Illation is the act of deducing or inferring one thought as proven, and therefore true, from two other thoughts expressed in antecedent propositions, between each of which, in their order, there is a certain degree of connection, either of inclusion or exclusion.

The requisites of sound reasoning will be fulfilled if, 1st, the

data have been accurately observed and registered; 2nd, the premises correctly state the precise nature of the judgment formed, and that judgment is itself a proper and just one; 3rd, the premises bear the right relations of antecedents and sequents, capable of resulting in a genuine and valid act of reasoning, or a syllogism.

The *canon* of affirmative syllogisms is,—if, as premises, there is or shall be given two propositions, in which there is an assertion made, *in the one*, of a given relation of agreement between one term and another, and in the other of a similar relation between some other term, and that other the conclusion, must be affirmative.

Whosoever, then, adopts the affirmative of any argument is bound to produce, 1st, such *data* as support the premises relied upon, in the fullest extent of the signification in which they are employed in the argument. 2nd, such evidence as shall satisfy ordinary thinkers of the accuracy of joining or disjoining, as the case may be, any two terms in any one premiss. 3rd, Two premises in which congruency is predicated; and, 4th, a conclusion so expressed, as shall cover the whole field of thought exigible from the given premises, *but no more*.

Similar remarks, as regards *data*, premises, propositions, &c., apply to the advocate of the negative side, but the *process* in some measure differs; for the great object of the *negatist* is to shew the incongruence of two given terms, and therefore the incompatibility of their being thought together *as one*. This he can only accomplish, effectually, by proving a more intimate congruity or consistency with some antagonist thought than that asserted of it by the *affirmist*; by shewing that there is a latent, if not an apparent deficiency of relationship; or by denying—if that can be supported by counter evidence that the asserted agreement is competent and true. To do this, it will be requisite to plead instances as *data*, bring forward refuting premises, and so place them as to lead inevitably to the deduction of a negative conclusion. The *canon* of a negative syllogism is as follows:—

If of two given propositions, used as premises, one expresses a relation of inclusion or agreement, and another a relation of exclusion or disagreement, the conclusion deduced therefrom must be in some degree, or to some extent, negative. The universal formula of a syllogism may, therefore, be given as somewhat like the under-shown:—

Major premiss: A genus, class, &c., being mentioned (M)—there is affirmed [or denied] of it—a thought or idea—[P].

Minor premiss: Another thought or idea [S]—is affirmed [or denied] to be included in—the class, genus, &c. [M]

Conclusion: That thought or idea [S]—is affirmed [or denied] to bear a given relation to the thought or idea [P].

The respective counter-syllogisms being thus placed before the

mind, the parties change tactics, and endeavour to bring the syllogisms of negation into play against the affirmations—whether in premiss or conclusion—made by the opponent of the views respectively entertained,

Reasoning may fail either in *matter* or in *form*. In matter (1) the *terms* may be misunderstood, (2) the *facts* may be misapprehended, or (3) the *judgments* made may be incorrect.

In form the due relationship of the premisses may be neglected, mistaken, or overlooked.

These, therefore, are the points to be attacked by each: *definition* will bring out the fallacy latent in the misused terms; *induction* will test any statement relative to facts; and an appeal to *consciousness* will decide any dispute regarding judgments. A practical knowledge of syllogistic forms of discourse is the only safeguard against invasion of the rules of correct, formal thinking, or violation of any of the logical processes of the ratiocinative faculty.*

Pure reason rejects all mutually contradictory propositions, but the *practical reason* is compelled to admit some modifying principles, as active in neutralizing the universality of any given decision of the mind; indeed, so far has this become necessary, that it is quite commonly observed that there is *no* rule without an exception. Most probably, therefore, in every possibly disputable theme there may be much room for acute and discriminating thought; as well as good reason for holding to different opinions on the same subject. In fact, the *gist* of an argument must often turn upon the extent—whether whole or less—of the assertion made by the maintainer of any opinion. There is great likelihood, therefore, that in most debates the prime arguments on each side may be described as, on the one part theoretical or pure, and on the other practical or empirical. In all cases it is best to be able to appeal to both, and to make both species of reasoning subordinate to the labour of *proof*.

To *prove* is only possible through the agency of *disproof*. Controversy may either apply itself primarily to proof or disproof; the affirmation of one thought is the denial in *thought* of another, its opposite, while, *vice versâ*, the denial of one is the affirmation of another.

If all possible modes of accounting for any belief fail in satisfying the mind, it is probable that the belief itself is a mistaken one.

If all possible modes of assailing any belief fail to satisfy the mind that it is unworthy of credit, that belief is likely to be true and right.

Perfect certainty is rarely possible regarding any opinion;

* "THE ART OF REASONING," by the present writer, is intended to furnish, in a popular and compendious form, to the self-instructing student the requisite knowledge, and *no more*.

therefore that which, after due and full discussion, retains the predominance of *reasonable* evidence, is entitled—so long as it retains that extra evidence—to be held as true.

In estimating evidence, regard should be had chiefly to *weight*, not the *number* of witnesses, and to the relative intelligence, morals, &c., of the believers of any opinion.

Passion bedclouds the reason, renders it less valuable as a guide, impedes its progress, and retards its force. To give way to passion in controversy is, therefore, voluntarily to dim one's own power of intellectual vision, and to make ourselves conspicuously unworthy of the trust and reliance of those who observe our contest of thought, and desire to learn from us the right opinion on the given topic.

Ridicule is a test of *temper*, not of *truth*.

The office of reasoning is "to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are;" of controversy, to disentangle the true conclusions which *ought to be* drawn from the false ones, which *may be* drawn from already admitted truths, *i. e.*, premises; of ridicule to move the feeling of contempt when the voice of truth has been unheeded, and the teachings of reason have failed. It is a rhetorical instrument, therefore, rather than a logical one. It moves the passions, but has no effect upon the intellect that is true to itself.

Truth has nothing to fear from free discussion, provided it is discussion, *i. e.*, the agitation of any question, that clearer views of it may be obtained, and the liability to error in holding any opinion may be lessened; if the ascertainment of evidence honestly sought be the object, and not the vain glory of word conquest.

Controversy ought to be carried on with gentleness, moderation, suavity, yet with a strict regard to truth, honour, and cautious reasoning. To vituperate, calumniate, or misrepresent, is not to controvert, but to pervert. They are ignoble weapons, unworthy to be used by honest and sincere truth seekers, with whom it is *not* a maxim that "the end justifies and sanctifies the means," and with whom the object is not success in resisting the arguments of an opponent, but success in overcoming the tendencies to error which hold their dwelling-place in his own soul, and make it needful to accept the stimulations of intellect, produced by controversy, to quicken the detective power of the mind, that by the power of logic and "the force of truth," the whole doings of the man should be regulated by, and subordinated to, such laws of conduct as are the result of a correct apprehension of that which is right and holy.*

* Some other observations on this same topic will be found in the *British Controversialist*, Vol. I., *fifth* edition, page 358. They are from the pen of the same writer as the above.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM OBSTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"And John answered him, saying, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and he followeth not us: and we forbid him, because he followeth not us. But Jesus said, Forbid him not; for there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me. For he that is not against us is on our part."—*Mark ix. 38—40.*

In order that we may arrive at a full comprehension of and right decision upon this question, it appears requisite that we should return to the first principles of Christianity, glance at their import and design, briefly show that their tendency in practice is the formation of different opinions, and that, consequently, the existence of sects is not, nor can be, obstructive to the true course of Christianity, nor yet destructive of that real unity of the Church militant which is so much insisted upon in the New Testament.

The first and chief observable feature of Christianity, and the one which marks its essential difference from every other form and belief proposed for man's adoption, is the universal appeal it ever makes to each and every man's own individual conscience, imperatively requiring of him the exercise of his own mental powers in examining its credentials, demanding that he should judge for himself in everything relative to the conditions of his welfare as a moral and spiritual being, and realising the vast importance of the personal duty devolving upon him in deciding for himself questions and principles affecting his eternal destiny; that he should "pin his faith on no man's sleeve," nor be content with the mere literal knowledge of any creed, or formula, however excellent; but, accepting the divinely inspired message of salvation as heaven's most precious gift sent to him, make good use of it by personal, minute study of its every precept, and grounding himself thereon as on the "Rock of ages" alone, and not "awayed by every wind of doctrine," be ever ready to give to every one who asketh a *reason* of the hope that is within him. We notice, therefore, in the first place, that, in our opinion, sectarianism is not obstructive to Christianity, because it is the natural result of a written revelation.

The existence and origin of sects is doubtless owing to the

necessity being placed upon man to read the written word of God, and interpret it according to the best of his judgment; hence have arisen differences of opinion, as it were to be expected there would, for no two men ever yet could exactly agree upon every point when they had perused a given book, even on mundane matters; much more were this difference to be expected in matters relating to faith and practice; and how much more important and more imperative the duty of recording their conscientious convictions upon those principles which affect their higher nature and its eternal destiny? The manner in which it has pleased the Divine Being to reveal his will renders this difference of opinion a matter of certainty: He has not seen fit to give us an epitome of truth, nor a systematic summary of doctrine, or creed of belief, but has left it for each man to search out of the golden mine immortal principles by which to regulate his faith and practice. The materials being furnished, "each man must build his own system of truth: he must laboriously collect the items of the code, and for himself resolve their applications." In Old Testament times, while the will of God was made known by inspired prophets, sectarianism had hardly any possibility of existence; for, while individual errors could be readily checked as they arose, divine truth was also made known and interpreted to the people by their inspired teachers; the same would be the case in the time of the apostles while they lived; but when inspiration ceased, then sects arose, first in the Jewish church after the cessation of the prophets, and again in the Christian church, when the apostles were gathered to their fathers; and this, we affirm, was by reason, and a natural consequence of man's being left to his own conscientious interpretation of the written word, studied in obedience to the Saviour's own injunction, that men should "*search the scriptures*" if they would inquire and know concerning his work and his purpose in coming into the world. Revelation insists upon man's own individual responsibility, affirming that "every man must bear his own burden," and "give an account of himself before God;" it prohibits all priestly interference between the soul and its creator, and forbids all uncharitableness or intolerance in matters pertaining to religion. "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth." Every one is urged to be "persuaded in his own mind," and to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made his people free;" and still while ever walking charitably with brethren entertaining opposing sentiments, if any difference of opinion still existed in reference to matters of importance, the principle to be observed was, "Let as many as are agreed follow the same rule, mind the same things." Hence it is that individuals may quite lawfully join themselves together in societies holding common opinions and principles, that they may so work harmoniously, together, and forward their

master's work. This is all that is understood by the term sectarianism in its proper signification, and ought not to be confounded with bigotry; for while the former is, as we have seen, the natural and legitimate result of the method of the divine revelation, bigotry is that spirit of intolerance which claims for itself "infallibility" in its own conclusions, and denounces the opinions of others. This, all must allow, is most hateful, but it does not follow that a man may not belong to a sect, and be as free from all such arrogance and conceit as we deem ourselves, and being so may respect and treat others for their differing opinions, with a frank and manly confidence, claiming no privilege or freedom of opinion and judgment which he would not claim also for others. It may be asked, Would it not have been better had there never existed any cause for such difference of opinion as has occasioned the rise and formation of sects, and all Christians lived in harmony and peace with each other? We reply, that we cannot question the wisdom of the Divine procedure in reference to the method He has chosen of making known His will, and as He has seen fit to give us a written revelation, and left it to us for our own study to reduce it into practice, we may be sure that it was the best way, and we rather opine that the existence of differing opinions has furnished a wider field for the exercise of Christian charity than would have otherwise existed: in the words of a popular writer that we have before quoted from, "Surely, had God intended the absence of sectarianism, He would have planned that men should read His truth with one eye and one soul; or He would have added the 'conclusion of the whole matter' in a creed of theology, a polity of Church government, and a casuistical table of Christian duties; in either case His children had been all of one stature, their praise all one note, and their life all one routine."

But, 2ndly, sectarianism promotes religious inquiry.

The diversity of judgment upon the doctrine and practical duties, and ecclesiastical polity of the New Testament, is certainly very extensive, but so far from deploring it as an unmitigated evil, we rather view it as betokening the existence of a wide-spread, earnest spirit of inquiry, that will not be content with merely acknowledging a form of words, sound though they may be; and, so far from their many claims, and, too frequently, the emphatic asseveration of each sect that they alone possess the truth, we conceive that this, so far from repelling the earnest seeker after truth, would stimulate him more intently to prosecute his examination of their claims, following the maxim of the apostle, to "prove all things," and "hold fast that which is good," believing not every spirit, but *trying* them by the standard of eternal truth "whether they be of God." The superficial and part-informed may be led to doubt the truth of Christianity from the existence of so many sects, and ask the rather unmeaning

question, out of so many, "which is the best *religion*?" instead of examining their creeds in the light of Scripture, which alone contains and teaches the only best and true religion, and which is summed up in love to God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. Were it not for sectarianism, the "multitude would in a much greater degree receive religion as something made to their hands, its doctrines undisputable, and its practices uniform; they would more slavishly utter echoes, and honour traditional customs," Priestcraft would sit like a deadly nightmare upon the mental world, producing nought but senseless, servile obedience to unmeaning rites and ceremonies. But differences of opinion, conscientiously and tenaciously held, prevent this reign of death in the religious world: upon nothing is the jealousy of man so much excited in reference to personal rights as this, and the "theme is often pursued so variously, as to afford to the self-willed ample opportunity for any eccentricity, and demands of all readers the deepest humility and sincerest care" in their study of the sacred record. Thus are men constrained, almost whether they will or not, to examine for themselves, that so they may be able to distinguish false from "sound doctrine," and ever hold fast the "form of sound words" without any admixture of error; this necessity being laid not on one only, but on all, it happens that creeds, articles, doctrines, and usages, are ever being examined afresh by the light of Scripture, and this, so far from being an evil, appears to us a good thing, as inciting men to inquire and search after a closer familiarity with the whole will of God.

3rdly. From the existence of sectarianism we may derive an argument in favour of the truth of Christianity.

Infidelity has often pointed the finger of scorn, and avowed its unbelief, because of the "discord of the sects;" they ask, What truth can there be worthy of credit amidst so much contrariety and difference of opinion? But so far from its existence being an argument against Christianity, it is one in its favour; for, if Christians had been all one sect, how plausible would have been the charge of collusion and conspiracy to deceive! But so many are their divisions, of such a nature, and so determinedly do they hold them, that the infidel attempts in vain to discredit the word of God through this favourite accusation. As the Jews, so also have the sects in the Christian church, jealously watched each other, and strove together to preserve the purity of the records, and their various creeds and formulas of doctrine, &c.; and whenever any, even a slight departure from the standard rule of orthodoxy has been attempted, it has immediately been assailed and defended by the several parties, and which passage of arms, so long as their weapons were confined to those taken from the spiritual armoury, was calculated to promote the cause of truth; but when others of a material nature were employed,

error grew apace, truth, eternal as the uncreated One, received a cruel injury, and withdrew unto its native air as too pure and holy for its cause to be forwarded by impure and unconsecrated weapons of earthly warfare. Among Christian sects every shade of doctrine, practice, and church government may be found. "Some affirm the 'verbal inspiration' of the Scriptures; others look upon it as the result of sanctified genius. Some affirm the Trinity of the Godhead; others its absolute Unity. Some worship Christ as divine, and look upon his death as their vicarious sacrifice; others simply admire him as a man, and imitate his example. Some believe in an eternity of future rewards and punishments; while others expect annihilation for the wicked or universal redemption; some work through the medium of an imposing ritual; while others renounce all ceremonialism." Some esteem one day better than another; others esteem every day alike. The result of all this difference of opinion is, that "there is no book, no text in a book, nor doctrine deduced from any text, or practice enforced by a doctrine, but its meaning has been discussed and contested over and over again, until it is almost impossible for advocate or opponent to bring forward an argument that is not hoary with age. And when it is remembered that these differences have often been held with a bitter and unscrupulous acrimony, it must be seen that no book has passed such an ordeal as the Bible, and no mission of truth and love is so abundantly proved as that of the Lord Jesus Christ."

4thly. The existence of sectarianism is not incompatible with real and essential Christian union.

Religious diversities ought not to be any stumbling-block in so discordant a world as ours; for, though differing upon many minor doctrines and practical duties, there may yet be agreement upon all the essential truths of Christianity. Men are generally far from one opinion in any matters of thought and inquiry, and yet they often unite on common ground for the advancement of their common interests. "Politicians, philosophers and moralists have their 'schools;' and so, in matters of religion, it is rational to suppose that free inquiry thereon would lead to divers conclusions analogous to its results elsewhere; and the fact, that religion has given to these a more distinct embodiment, is the proof of its greater hold upon the sympathies of men." A very wide difference of opinion may be allowed on all less important matters, and yet it may not affect the real union of the Christian brotherhood, as, in the words of our Saviour, when rebuking the hasty spirit of intolerance among his disciples, "he that is not against us is on our part," and, if possessed by the true Christian spirit, churches and sects may "provoke one another to love and good works" even as individuals. To confirm our opinion, that while the great number of sects existing in our country would seem to indicate a want of harmony, there is yet essential unity prevailing among them; we here quote the con-

cluding remarks of H. Mann, Esq., in his "Sketch" of the English churches suggested by the returns of the last census. "If this sketch has been at all adequate, it will probably be seen to what a great extent, amidst so much ostensible confusion and diversity, essential harmony prevails. Especially is this apparent if we limit our regard to Protestant communions; which, indeed, comprise together nineteen-twentieths of our religious population. With respect to these, the differences which outwardly divide are not to be compared with the concordance which secretly, perhaps unconsciously, unites. The former, with but few exceptions, have relation almost wholly to mere formalities of worship—not to the essential articles of faith. The fundamental doctrines of the Reformation, as embodied in the standard of the Church of England, are professed and preached by Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, Methodists, and many minor sects, comprising more than nineteen-twentieths of the nonconforming Protestant community: and though the different organisations of these several bodies seem to present externally an aspect of disunion, probably a closer scrutiny will show that they are separated only as to matters whose importance, even if considerable, is not vital; and that thus they may, without excess of charity, be recognized as truly, though invisibly, united to the general church of Christ. Perhaps, in a people like the English—trained to the exercise of private judgment, and inured to self-reliance—absolute agreement on religious subjects never can be realized; and certainly if, as the trifling cost of a merely superficial difference, the ever various sympathies or prejudices of the people can obtain a congenial resting place, we scarcely can behold with discontent a state of things by which at worst external rivalry is substituted for internal disaffection; while this very rivalry itself—perhaps in part, and growingly a generous emulation—tends to diffuse the gospel more extensively, since their religious zeal and agency are roused and vastly multiplied. Rather, perhaps, we shall be led to recognize, with some degree of satisfaction, the inevitable existence of such co-operative diversity; and shall perceive, with Milton, that 'while the temple of the Lord's building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, some hewing the cedars, there must needs be many schisms, and many dissections made in the quarry and timber, ere the house of God can be built: and when every stone is laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous in this world: neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay, rather the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilarities, that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.'"

We have exhausted our space but not our subject, and in

* See Religion Worship, p. 55.

conclusion would observe, that we claim the fullest freedom of enquiry into religious matters for all men; that all should possess as their right the exercise of private judgment in everything pertaining to religion; and while we deeply regret that religious controversy has been carried on with so much bitterness, and in a spirit anything but accordant with the spirit and precepts of Christianity, we do think that, when carried on in the spirit of Christian love and zeal for the truth, religious controversy may be productive of much good; and we trust that this question will be discussed with that same spirit of charity, in love, "striving together for the faith once delivered to the saints," and we may then hope that the holy cause of truth will not suffer, but be promoted in some small degree by our interchange of thought.

Ashton-under-Lyne, 10th Jan., 1858.

CLEMENT.

PASSIONS AND DESIRES.—The passions and desires, like the two twists of a rope, mutually mix one with the other, and twine inextricably round the heart: producing good, if moderately indulged; but certain destruction, if suffered to become inordinate. —*Burton.*

DIFFICULTY OF DETECTING FABULOUS STORIES.—The difficulty of detecting falsehood in any private, or even public history, at the time and place where it is said to happen, is very great; but much more so where the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of altercation, and debate, and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken party on either side. In the infancy of new religions the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention and regard; and when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar. —*Anon.*

A GENTLEMAN.—The following is the negro's definition of a gentleman: "Massa make de black man workee—make de horse workee—make de ox workee—make ebbery ting workee, only de hog—he no workee; he eat, he drink, he walk 'bout, he go to sleep when he pleases, he liff like a gentleman." —*West India Paper.*

Philosophy.

IS MIND NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO MATTER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It will be universally admitted, that the question before us is one which cannot be answered at a first glance. It is a subject which, more all others, demands the exercise of deep and continued thought, and which, less than all others, admits of a clear and logical proof. It is, therefore, necessary in entering upon the discussion of it, that we proceed with that diffidence and caution which such a state of things should produce. The difficulty and uncertainty attending this question arise principally from the want of distinct and accurate definitions of its component terms; for the fact is, that of the real nature and distinctions of mind and matter, we are, and must be, profoundly ignorant: and to demonstrate our answer to this question, with the same exactitude as a proposition in Euclid, is simply an impossibility. Still, though the subject is one of peculiar difficulty, yet it is a question of deep interest, and, as such, we will endeavour to give it some sort of answer.

We shall, therefore, attempt to shew, as plainly as the nature of the subject admits, that mind is necessarily opposed to matter; and that in three ways—namely, in its *nature*; in its *origin*; and in its *destinies*.

We say first, that mind is opposed to matter in its *nature*. But here we are met by the above-mentioned difficulty, for how can we prove that two things are opposed to each other in their natures, when we know nothing of the real nature of either of them? Yet while it is impossible to prove this, in a complete and satisfactory manner, we think we can shew, that so far as we are acquainted with certain properties of the two, they are in those properties manifestly opposed to each other. Now, the assertion, in its unlimited form, that mind is opposed to matter, evidently resolves itself into these two propositions, that matter is not mind; and that mind is not matter. In respect to the first of these forms—that matter is not mind—it is not at all necessary that we should attempt to prove it. For although some eminent persons have denied the existence of matter, and asserted that the whole visible universe existed only as idea, yet we think that the question, as it stands at the head of this paper, tacitly assumes the existence of matter as such. And, indeed, if any person really doubts the actual existence of matter, and the reality of the forms around him, he might as well doubt his own existence, as he will find the two about equally easy to prove.

The real form of our proposition, then, is, that mind has a

separate and independent existence, or, in other words, that mind is not material in its nature. But before we proceed further, it is necessary for us to place some limitation to the word mind. Now, this word, in its general sense, not only includes every kind of *created* intelligence, whether materially embodied or not, but also includes the *ETERNAL MIND* of the Creator himself. It is evident, however, that, in the question before us, we must confine our thoughts to created intelligence, inasmuch as the question, whether the Eternal Mind is necessarily opposed to matter, is as unnecessary as it would be impious. Now, man, as a compound being, unites in his own person the two things about which we are now concerned. In man we see mind brought into the closest possible connexion with matter; and we shall, therefore, in treating of the difference in the nature of the two, confine our remarks principally to the mind of *man*.

On reviewing the definition of mind given by our opponent, A. D., as being "the meditative power, or the principle which enables us to reason upon existing objects;" we would ask, if this be true, does it not at once prove that mind is opposed to matter? If mind is not opposed to matter, it must be one and the same thing; and if so, any definition of the one must apply equally to the other; the very attempt to define mind as distinguished from matter, clearly assumes that it has a separate existence, and is, therefore, opposed to it. If, then, we can shew that mind has any power of thinking or reasoning not produced by surrounding matter, we shall have succeeded in shewing, that it has an independent existence; and might, therefore, have existed, had matter never been formed. We admit, indeed, that mind is, to a certain extent, dependent on matter; but the nature and extent of that dependence form no part of the present inquiry; our duty being merely to prove that certain properties and powers exist in mind, which are, in their nature, independent of material objects. The powers of man's mind may be divided into two classes, viz., 1st, the *intellectual* powers; and 2nd, the *moral* powers. Of the intellectual powers we shall notice, first, the power of thought and reason. We say that there is in the mind of man a power of *thought*, which matter not only does not possess, but could not alone have formed there. J. A. D. attempts to prove that this power of thought is originated by matter, in saying, that "all our ideas originate from, and can be reduced to, something existing in a material form. We can think of nothing but what evidently originates from the material." Now, even if we admit the truth of these assertions, yet what do they prove? Only that matter gives employment to thought; certainly not that thought is *produced* by matter; for if it were so, it is plain that the same combinations of matter must produce the same powers of thought in every mind submitted to their action. But the plain fact is, that two minds may be subjected to the same material influences, and yet the ideas formed in those minds shall be as diverse as light

is from darkness, clearly proving, that mind possesses an *inherent* power of thought, which surrounding matter serves merely to develop.

But mind has, 2ndly, a power of *abstraction* which cannot be produced by matter. From what material forms do all our abstract terms come? as holiness, justice, virtue, &c. For, admitting them to have been formed originally from material objects, yet the abstracting them from the material proves, that mind must have an *innate* and independent power. 3rdly. Mind possesses a *creative* faculty. If mind had no power independent of matter, it is obvious that our ideas must be restricted to those combinations which actually exist in the material world. Now that this is not the case, is so evident, that we need scarcely advance a single argument to prove it. If the creative faculty did not exist in mind, of course fiction could not exist, consequently the vast flood of fiction constantly coming from the press is overwhelming proof of the existence of that faculty, and, therefore, that mind has an existence entirely independent of matter: or, in the words of the poet,—

"What though my soul fantastic measures trod
O'er fairy fields; or mourn'd along the gloom
Of pathless woods, or, down the craggy steep
Hurl'd headlong, swam with pain the mantled pool;
Or scaled the cliff; or danced on hollow winds
With antic shapes, wild natives of the brain?
Her ceaseless flight, tho' devious, speaks her nature
Of *subtler essence* than the trodden clod;
Active, aerial, towering, unconfined,
Unfetter'd with her gross companion's fall."

4thly. The mind of man has a *progressive* power. From the earliest times to the present, the history of mind has been one of progress. The whole body of human science is but the expression of this progressive power. Now, if mind has no existence independent of matter, by virtue of what law does this constant progress take place? We see nothing like it in the material universe, the whole history of which being one of perpetually *recurring* revolutions. But the fact of this onward tendency is a proof of the independent existence of mind, being nothing more or less than its natural growth. 5thly. The last of the intellectual powers of mind which we shall mention is the power of *memory*. If mind is material in its nature, by what power or function of matter is memory produced? The power of mind, to leave present forms of matter and go back to the past, proves mind to be something, in its nature, independent of matter.

But besides the intellectual powers, the mind of man possesses, 2ndly, *moral* powers, but of which our space is too limited to allow more than the mention. We would, however, allude briefly to the *religious element* in man's mind, or his inherent belief in the existence of a God: and man's *conscience*, or the perception

of right and wrong. These are universal: no people, however sunk in ignorance and barbarity, have entirely lost all traces of them. Now, if they are produced from matter, let those who think so shew in what way, or by what power, or combination of matter, these are formed. We say, positively, that they could not have been produced by any power of matter; they, therefore, prove that mind has an existence apart from matter. Again, whence comes all the moral evil which exists in the world? Not from matter, certainly, for matter never has broken, and never can break, the laws by which it is governed; and the fact, that mind has broken away from those laws which should control it, proves that it possesses a power which matter cannot possess.

Moreover, the assertion that mind could not exist without matter, is best overturned by the fact, that mind *did exist* when matter did not; the fact that created mind existed before matter was formed, is, to those who believe the plain declarations of the Bible, so clear, that we need not waste our space and time by attempting to prove it.

But mind is not only opposed to matter in its nature, it is so, secondly, in its *origin*. Let us refer to the only book which gives an authentic account of their origin, and we shall find, that for the formation of the various combinations of matter, till the creation of man, nothing more was necessary than the plain word of God. Thus we find that God spoke, and "the earth brought forth grass and herb," the "waters brought forth abundantly," and the "earth brought forth the living creature, cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth." Now, if the mind of man were only a material thing, why was it not produced in like manner? But we read, that after God had "formed man out of the dust of the ground," yet something more than this was necessary; for the *mind* of man did not exist till God "*breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul.*" We see, then, clearly, how widely opposed in its origin mind is to matter; being, indeed, nothing less than a direct emanation from the *Eternal Mind* of the Deity.

And, thirdly, mind is opposed to matter in its *destinies*, both immediate and ultimate. We see mind is destined to triumph and reign over matter, not only by the direct command of God (Gen. i. 26), but the fact, that mind *has* triumphed, and *does* reign, over matter, and makes matter in its various forms subserve its purpose, and do its will, is so plain, that no one will deny it. And mind in its ultimate destinies is clearly opposed to matter. That matter is mortal, and will be dissolved, not only appears from the constant decay which it is everywhere subject to, but believers in the word of God know it by the direct assertion, that a time is coming when "the heavens, being on fire, shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat,—the earth also, and the works that are therein, shall be burnt up;" and that mind is immortal, and will survive this dissolution, we know, not only from

the declarations of the same word, but also from the innate consciousness which is in every mind, that it is destined for immortality.

If, then, mind possesses independent powers, both of an intellectual and moral nature, which are not possessed, and cannot be produced, by matter,—if mind owes its origin to a direct emanation from God, and not to any combination of matter,—if mind has a power to triumph over, and govern, the material world,—if, indeed, matter in its many forms exists only for mind,—if mind was when there was no matter, and shall continue to exist when matter shall be dissolved,—*is it not* something essentially opposed to matter? And if it be opposed, it is clearly so by *necessity*; for by this expression we generally mean, that a thing is not only so, but that it could not be otherwise. Now, some facts are true of necessity, others are not so; for instance, it is a fact that the leaves of a tree are green, but they are clearly not so *necessarily*, inasmuch as they might have been blue, black, or any other colour: on the other hand, when we say that two colours, as black and white, are opposed to each other, they are evidently so by necessity; for if they were not opposed, they would cease to be separate colours. And in the same way, if mind is something diverse from matter, it is of *necessity* opposed to it. For although mind might have existed without matter, and matter might have existed without mind, yet each having an independent existence, the two *must be* opposed to each other.

In conclusion, the assertion that mind is *not* opposed to matter not only runs counter to the teachings of the Bible on this point, but also gives up at once the dearest hope of the human soul. For if mind is not opposed to matter, and cannot exist without it, it is clear that it either is not immortal, or if it is, can be so only as it continues to be embodied in, and dependent on, matter. So that those who hold this belief must choose between an immortality not worth possessing, and no immortality at all. On the other hand, those who hold the contrary can rejoice in the glorious anticipation of

“—— the hour when this material
Shall have vanished like a cloud,
When amid the wide etherial
All th' invisible shall crowd.
And the *naked soul* surrounded
With innumerable hosts of light,
Triumph in the view unbounded,
And adore the Infinite.”

Not only believing their minds capable of existence under such circumstances, but “looking forward and hasting unto” the time when, liberated from the gross impediments of matter, by which they are now surrounded, they may freely participate in that refined and spiritual existence—

“The life of Gods (O transport!) and of man.”

NEMO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"What can we reason, but from what we know?"—*Pope.*

"Nothing enters the mind of man but through the medium of his senses."—*Aristotle.*

In venturing to answer this question negatively, we must in fairness to ourselves premise, that though the position we take is an unpopular one, and the arguments we adduce may be inconclusive, we claim the credit that is due to sincerity when we say that the position we hold we are prepared to defend, and the arguments we use such as we firmly believe.

To determine beyond a doubt the relationship that exists between mind and matter may not be given us, indeed, where so many abler and wiser than ourselves have halted in despair; we cannot be reasonably expected to do more than indicate the conclusion to which we would arrive. It is a subject upon which some of earth's noblest sons have bestowed both time, talent, and devotion. It is one around which interests the most vital centre, and a problem the solution of which would dispel a host of doubts.

But to the subject before us, that mind is not necessarily opposed to matter, may, I think, be shown by referring its existence to the brain. Dr. Priestley, LL.D., in his disquisitions upon matter and spirit, published in 1777, affirms that, as "There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking when his brain was destroyed, we may safely conclude that the latter is the seat of the former; and that whenever the faculty of thought is impeded or injured, there is sufficient reason to conclude that the brain is disordered in proportion." He likewise quotes two rules laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, that ought to be strictly observed in the consideration of the present question; the first of these rules is, "that we are to admit no more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances; and the second is, that to the same effects we must as far as possible assign the same causes." Adopting these rules as our guide and groundwork, we proceed to establish our position, viz., that the brain is the seat of the mind; and that our senses minister to its development. As in all other cases we judge by the circumstances that invariably attend them, so shall we in this. We daily witness an affinity between mind and body. We see it in those around us, and feel it within ourselves. They are reciprocally affected. If the mind is sad, the body is not active; is the body afflicted? the mind is depressed, "as is evident in the visible effects of all strong passions, hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair." Each in its turn is sympathetically moved; there is a corresponding action between them; and in whatever else these conditions are found, we readily admit that they are inherent, and that they are necessarily dependent upon one

another. Yet thousands deny the application of such a rule in this case, as though there were fewer "reasons to conclude that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization," than there are to prove "that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air." Marvellous inconsistency. "For in both cases equally the one accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a stronger argument for the necessary connection of any cause and any effect." If mind is a something apart from and independent of the brain, why should a blow on the head derange or destroy it, or an indentation of the skull make it imperfect? Why has the poor idiot, whose vacant stare awakes slumbering humanity in the brutal, invariably an ill-shaped head and ill-formed brain, if there is no connection between his mind and the latter? These questions might be pursued *ad infinitum*; let these suffice. The faculties of sight, of sound, and feeling, are each of them in the abstract as wondrous as the faculty of thought; yet no one disputes their being the grand results of a superior organization, or argues that they are opposed to matter. Mind, or "the meditative power," as J. A. D. defines it, admits of growth and development, of decline and extinction. Without the necessary material conditions to call it into exercise, it in all probability would remain undeveloped, undisplayed, unused, and unknown. "Man, originally savage, must have learned from repeated trials the use of his organs. Successive generations must have invented and refined upon the means of subsistence, and the understanding, at liberty to disengage itself from the wants of nature, must have risen to the complicated art of comparing ideas, digesting reasonings, and seizing upon abstract similitudes;" in short, "passing from the surprise of a first thought to the reverie of curiosity, he formed a chain of reasoning," clearly showing that all his ideas, notions, and modes of existence have been gradually acquired and augmented one by one, slowly or swiftly, as circumstances have favoured or deterred. Lawrence, in his Lectures upon Man, pp. 5, 6, asks, "Where is the mind of the child just born; do we not see it actually built up before our eyes?" Through all the stages that mark the progress of human life, from the cradle to the tomb, the mind undergoes various transitions. The mind of the child is not that of the man, and age influences it considerably. For as time goes on, the seriousness of age succeeds to the lightheartedness of youth; buoyancy gives place to rigidity; the fibres become stiff, and the nerves non-elastic. The eyes become dim, and the ears grow slow to fulfil their office. The ideas become confused, memory a blank, and the imagination cold; and all that bespoke the man of culture, of intellect, and of mind, dwindles, decays, and disappears with the body's dissolution. Seeing this, we infer that mind, "which is deemed spiritual, which is considered immaterial, which it is

endeavoured to distinguish from matter, undergoes the same revolutions, experiences the same vicissitudes, submits to the same modifications, as does the body itself."

Again, it is only of things with which the senses have made it acquainted that the mind can rightly judge. Without these auxiliaries, unprompted by their joint action, shut out from their magnetical influence, the mind would doubtless remain in embryo. Sleeping or waking, in mid-day reverie or mid-night dream, in vain the mind essays to escape its trammels, but all to no purpose. Some touch of earth still clings thereto; some traces of its dependence upon material adjuncts are discoverable. Vainly the poet strives to body forth some aerial form or image unseen, unheard, unknown before, but to no purpose; despite his utmost efforts, some verisemblance to things actual may be seen. In conclusion, we are conscious that while we may have failed to do justice to our views, or wisely delineated our side of the question, much that is highly plausible may be urged on the other by our opponents. Let this be as it may; for reasons here stated, and for others that we could urge, we are of opinion mind is not necessarily opposed to matter, inasmuch, to quote from M. de Mirabaud's "System of Nature," "If we can only form ideas of material substances, how can we suppose the cause of our ideas can possibly be immaterial? To pretend that man, without the aid of exterior objects, without the intervention of his senses, is competent to form ideas of the universe, is to assert that a blind man is in a capacity to form a true idea of a picture that represents some fact of which he has never heard any one speak."

Bilston.

H. V. M.

AGE DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONFER EXPERIENCE:—nor does even precept; nor anything but an intercourse and acquaintance with things. And we frequently see those, who have wanted opportunities to indulge their juvenile passions in youth, go preposterous lengths in old age, with all the symptoms of youth except ability.—*Rochefoucault.*

PUBLIC MONEY.—Public money ought to be touched with the most scrupulous consciousness of honour. It is not the produce of riches only, but of the hard earnings of labour and poverty. It is drawn even from the bitterness of want and misery. Not a beggar passes, or perishes in the streets, whose mite is not in that mass.

ADVICE.—Except thou desire to hasten thine end, take this for a general rule, that thou never add any artificial heat to thy body by wine or spice, until thou find that time hath decayed thy natural heat, and the sooner thou beginnest to help nature, the sooner she will forsake thee, and trust altogether to art.—*Sir W. Raleigh.*

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE felt gratified when we saw this question announced for discussion, not merely because of its importance, but also on account of the great interest that must attach to it at the present time.

The debate has been commenced by a writer, all of whose productions in this journal we have read with delight and advantage. To use a House of Commons phrase, his articles are generally of that exhaustive character as to leave but little to be said on that side upon which he writes. His style, too, is so lucid, and his method so logical, that those who follow him labour under the disadvantage of being brought into comparison with excellence of an order that it would be vain for them to attempt to emulate. We trust this writer will give the friends of the *Controversialist* the benefit of his talents for a long time to come. B. S. has been followed by an intelligent writer on the same side, and thus the ground for the affirmative has been pretty much occupied. At the time we write no negative article has appeared; so that we must proceed in ignorance of the line of argument that any who come forward as opponents may take.

If the talented opener of the debate has not exhausted the affirmative view on this question, it is because all the materials, from which a perfect digest of it could be drawn, were not in his possession. Every day is furnishing additions to the general stock of information regarding the causes of the mutiny, and not until an extensive inquiry has been instituted, will the generality of intelligent persons be disposed to give their opinions in a positive manner. It is possible that in the course of our reading we may have met with a few facts which have not come to the knowledge of the two writers referred to. It may also happen that there may be a lack of perfect concord between our views and theirs; if, however, we are with them in seeking to establish the affirmative of the question, that is all which under the circumstances can be expected. It will, therefore, be no valid argument to be urged on the opposite side that the affirmative writers do not agree amongst themselves, if, whilst not exactly at one, on all points they concur in arguing that caste has conducted to the revolt. The imperfect information possessed by the public seems to us likely to lead to confusion and bewilder-

ment. The cause at first assigned for the mutiny was ridiculed and scouted; after further investigation not a few writers of high respectability have declared that cause to have been the true one. We of course allude to the greased cartridges, but we will refer to this again in the proper place. Of all that we have read upon the outbreak, nothing has appeared to us more appropriate than the following words of the Lord Advocate of Scotland:—"He thought all ought to be very cautious in forming their opinions as to what had led to the mutiny. He did not believe there were ten men in the country who had such a knowledge of our Indian possessions and the Indian Government as would entitle them to speak in a tone of ordinary confidence. The whole subject was a matter for sober inquiry." This is in exact accordance with the tone of B. S., and indicates the spirit in which we shall present our thoughts.

In imitation of the example that has been set, we shall studiously avoid all extraneous topics, however seductive (and the history of India for the last century suggests many), and keep as closely as we can to the subject.

The mutiny, with its attendant atrocities, has been so frequently described as for it to be quite superfluous for us to rehearse the dreadful tale. In truth we had rather not attempt such a task; for our mind has been so much appalled by the horrid deeds that have been perpetrated, that we willingly leave them with a passing notice, and go on to matter which we can survey in a calmer mood.

Caste has been described to some extent by B. S. and H. V. M. The accounts given of it by different publications do not by any means harmonise; so that plain readers are puzzled to know the real nature and practical operation of the institution. Most of the articles in the leading reviews on the mutiny and its causes and Indian institutions, make mention of four great divisions into which the people are divided by caste, and affirm that no person can rise above the condition of life in which he was born; that the trade or occupation of his ancestors from time immemorial must be his; and that the Sudras, or low caste men, may never expect to rise in the social scale, but must for ever remain low and despised. Not only is caste thus described by influential writers, but also by public lecturers and missionaries. We heard the Rev. Mr. Smith, many years a missionary in India, speak of the divisions of caste in much the same way. According to Irving,* the above representation is not true of caste as it actually exists, but applies to its regulations as laid down in the code of Menu. Irving says, "the second and third orders do not now exist as separate classes." And again, "the people are all comprised in two classes, the Brahmins and the Sudras;

* In his *Theory and Practice of Caste*.

while, at the same time, thousands are hardly acquainted with the latter name. Instead of the three twice-born classes, with their inferior divisions, and the Sudras, with some few exceptions, not only the Hindoos, but even the Musulmans, Jews, Parsees, and Christians, are divided into an almost infinite number of castes. These, far from being venerable for their antiquity or religious character, partake more of the nature of clubs or associations for mutual support and familiar intercourse. In many cases they are dependent on the occupation of their members; in others, they have their rise from whatever cause may happen to distinguish men from their fellows. The principal of those castes, which have been described by Mr. Coleridge in the fifth volume of the "*Asiatic Transactions*," have for the most part had their origin either in being species of guilds, or in schism, or separation from some other caste." In another place this author says, "Caste no longer ties a man down to follow his father's business. If we except the priesthood, which now chiefly belongs to the Brahmins (and even in this great latitude is allowed), caste has not necessarily any effect on the line of life in which a man embarks." There is nothing to prevent a merchant of high rank sinking into the most menial occupations. Men of all castes have held commissions in our army." There are many other points that arise in considering caste, into which want of space and their remote bearing on the question in debate alike forbid us to enter. H. V. M. has given samples of the observances of caste; and, in regard to them, it may be observed in general, that there is nothing like uniformity. In some parts of India caste prejudices are strong, and in those places a great degree of strictness in attending to its requirements prevails; in other parts it is held with a more loose hand, giving rise to somewhat of laxity. It has been confessed by Brahmins, that if a rigid adherence to all that the rules of their order enjoin were strictly enforced, very few would retain their caste. The aspects in which it chiefly concerns us to view the institution are those from which we shall derive considerations that will give force to the argument we shall presently offer, and these are the strength of some of the prejudices it has created, and the power and consideration enjoyed by the Brahmins. With regard to the former, the aversion of the Hindoos to animal food is so strong, that it is said thousands of them perished in 1770, a year of scarcity, rather than partake of it. Beef and swine's flesh particularly are held in abhorrence, both by Hindoos and Mohammedans. As to the status of the Brahmins, in a sense not put upon the words by the people of these countries, they are the "Lords of creation."* Indeed, they are above the gods themselves, and have only to issue their fiat to bring new gods and new races of

* Theory and Practice of Caste.

beings into existence. They are to be the instructors of kings ! Special punishment of a severe kind is to be awarded to any who may injure them ; they are to enjoy exemption from taxation : it is held to be a virtue in the rich to support them if they become poor ; and they may remit punishments on the receipt of gifts from offenders. These privileges we should conclude beforehand would necessarily give their possessors immense influence over the lower castes, and such an inference is in perfect harmony with facts. Now it is to be remembered that although, as before observed, caste, as it exists, is different from caste as it is written of in the sacred books ; and although what we have said of the extraordinary powers and immunities of the Brahmins be derived from those sources, it yet remains a fact that the authority and prestige of caste rest entirely upon those books : and hence, if the homage shown to the Brahmins fall short of the extravagant degree in which by the written code it is supposed to be due, it is yet very palpably manifest, whilst their influence over the people is commensurate therewith. With these two considerations, then, before us, namely, the strength of Hindoo prejudice against eating the flesh of cows or hogs, and the power of the Brahmins over the lower orders, and coupling them with the fact of the Brahmins being numerous in all the Bengal regiments, it is clearly seen what formidable elements of mischief existed, and how terrible were likely to be the results if the might that could be called forth was worked against British authority.

It will add to the completeness of our argument to notice the influences that have been at work, slowly but surely undermining the system of caste, and with it the entire structure of Hindooism. British modes of thinking, British science and philosophy, British skill and enterprise have, by their joint operation, been sapping the foundations of this institution. British science has, in some instances, overcome native prejudice, so far as to dispose high caste men to study the anatomy of the human frame through the medium of dissection,—the touching of a dead body being prohibited by caste. It has demonstrated the folly of bringing diseased persons to the banks of the supposed sacred Ganges ; and by the introduction of the steamboat, the railway, and the electric telegraph, it has proved the advantages arising from the study of the laws of matter, contrasting strongly with the pretended sway over matter of the Brahmins. The progress effected has been accomplished at the sacrifice of Hindoo prejudice and custom. Now the knowledge of human nature, as its qualities have appeared under more favourable conditions than it is found in India, will enable us to form some conception of the private sentiments of the superior castes of that country, in view of the innovations upon their system by the science and the arts of the dominant race. No fact is better

attested than that the persons who are interested either by their reputation being at stake, or their means of living endangered, in the upholding of a dogma, or set of dogmas, become embittered against the introducers of new opinions that show the falsity of such dogmas. The treatment of Galileo by the University of Pisa; the ridicule with which Hervey was assailed by the medical profession of England; and the reception the grand discoveries of Newton at first met with from the University of Cambridge, are well-known examples. The feeling secretly cherished by the high caste Brahmins is, we may be sure, of tenfold the strength experienced in those instances; for if the islanders of the west afforded manifest proof to the millions of India of their superior wisdom, what was there to sustain the lofty pretensions of caste? and what to preserve for the Brahmins the influence and consideration they have so long enjoyed over and with their countrymen? We thus show that causes clashing with caste have long been in operation, engendering a predisposition to rebellion; or, in other words, that the fire of animosity and deadly hatred has been smouldering, though not observed, and only required a breeze to fan it into a flame; and our present belief is, that such a breeze sprang up when the order was issued to use the greased cartridges.

Having given our opinion as to the exciting cause of the mutiny, we proceed to the evidence on which that opinion is based. We beg to state that we are indebted for our facts on this, the real point at issue, to the writings of two gentlemen, whose productions have been much regarded by the public; one of them being a military officer, more than thirty years a resident in India, the other a writer in the *Times*, who signs himself "Indophilus." These gentlemen appear to have had access to the best sources of information on the matters they write upon. The first fact we mention is, the excitement of the native press of India, in consequence of the obnoxious order of Government.

From the beginning of last year, week after week, vehement denunciations of the Government were poured forth, which, it was alleged, was seeking to ignore caste by causing the worshippers of the cow and the swine to take into their bodies the fat of those sacred animals.* That the feelings and views of the Brahmins were truly represented by the press, cannot for a moment be doubted;—just as it is unquestionable that the press of England truly represents the state of public opinion in England. Another fact is, that shortly after the promulgation of the order, an unusually active correspondence commenced between the members of the different regiments. Persons who have borne a part in agitations, having for their object the redress

* Those who have read and studied Irving's book on caste will see that the Brahmins form what there is of public opinion in India.

of real or supposed grievances, will be the most ready to perceive what this circumstance implies, though we think there are very few persons who will not comprehend its meaning.* It further appears, from Parliamentary papers, that the Court of Directors gave directions for tallow to be used in preparing the cartridges: that on one occasion, when a detachment was on parade, the native commissioned officers, and many of the men, respectfully stated their objections to the mode in which the cartridges were prepared. The following extract is from a letter of "Indophilus:"—"There is no trace in the evidence which has reached this country of any conspiracy previously to the issue of the new cartridges. The first manifestations of feeling were, as might be expected, on the part of the Hindoos. A low caste man, employed in the magazine at Dumdum, asked a Brahmin Sepoy to let him drink from his lotah, or brass drinking vessel. The Brahmin replied,—'I have scoured my lotah: you will defile it by your touch.' The low caste man rejoined,—'You think much of your caste; but wait a little,—the sahib log will make you bite cartridges soaked in cow and pork fat! and then, where will your caste be?' The report was not long in travelling to Barrackpore, and other stations, where the Sepoys brooded over it, until it took hold of their minds as a fact. About the same time the Commander-in-Chief passed through Umballah with an escort composed of two companies of one of the regiments, detachments from which were practising at the rifle school at that place. The Sepoys belonging to the detachment asked their newly arrived comrades to an entertainment, which was declined, on the ground that they would lose caste by eating with those who had imbibed the polluted cartridges. This spread the feeling through the up-country stations."

Quite in keeping with this is the deposition of a zemindar of the 34th Native Infantry. In substance, he stated that a number of the Sepoys, with their heads partly covered, came to him on the parade ground, asked him to join them, asserting their readiness to die for their religion, and even to murder the Europeans that night, February 6th, 1857.

With facts like these before us, we cannot regard the plea as to the cartridges as a mere pretext. To us it seems that the Sepoys spoke and acted like men, in real earnest about preserving their ancient faith and customs. It has been frequently asserted that they used against us the very cartridges of which they complained. Let it be borne in mind that cartridges of this description had been distributed to a part of the army only, and that there is no absolute necessity for putting cartridges to the mouth at all. If, therefore, it be true that the Sepoys did

* See Report of the Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines, Fort William.

use them in firing at our troops, the most reasonable supposition, as we think, is that they did with their hands what the military regulations prescribed should be done with the mouth. Reviewing the several facts adduced; first, the tone of the native press with respect to the cartridges; next, the numerous communications, through the Post Office, between the members of the different regiments; then the remonstrances of the men with their superiors; and, lastly, the declaration of some of the soldiers, that they were ready to die for their religion, we are unable to resist the conclusion that it was owing to caste that the mutiny broke out.

Predisposing causes have been adverted to; and though the effects of their operation had not previously shown themselves in overt acts, but remained in the hidden recesses of the native soldiers' minds, in the form of a sullen hatred of the ruling power, yet, when their strongest prejudices were suddenly set at nought, that nursed hatred would burst forth, and its manifestations be all the more violent from the intensity the feeling had acquired by long accumulation. In this way we account for those acts of fiendish malignity which outraged all the laws of humanity, and disgraced our common nature.

The conduct of the different regiments was what might have been expected, supposing our view to be correct. Nothing like plan governed their movements. They were carried away by enthusiasm. Some, at the outset, were relentlessly cruel; others were more forbearing. Some despatched their officers at once; others spared their officers, and assisted them to escape. Some, who at first fought against the rebels, afterwards joined their standard.

These are facts which, we think, tell against the hypothesis that the mutiny arose from a Mohammedan plot. The king of Lucknow, with his chief minister, was in Calcutta, in communication with the Indian Government, and his mother and other relatives were in London at the commencement of the outbreak. If a conspiracy had been organized by these parties at that time, they surely would not have deserted their posts when their presence was most required. The sacred cakes were distributed, it would appear, amongst the people, and not amongst the soldiers; and, except in Oude, the population have not joined the mutineers. Looking at the part taken by the King of Lucknow and his people, from our point of view, we regard their rising as an after-thought; that they took advantage of the prevalent disaffection amongst the Sepoys; that both having grievances, they coalesced; that oppressed, as they imagined, by the common foe of both, it came to be determined to make a grand and united effort to rid their country of the tyrants.

The part acted by the Indian Government is to us quite unaccountable, upon the ordinary principles of prudence. If it had

been the practice to ignore caste, all would have been consistent and harmonious; but that the caste prejudices of our soldier priests should have been so tenderly regarded up to a given time, as that even Governors-General have not allowed meat at their tables which Hindoos would not eat, and that, all at once, the Sepoys should be dealt with as though the rules of caste had never been heard of, may well excite our surprise. We offer no opinion upon the policy so long observed by our Indian rulers. It may have been erroneous; but to change, unceremoniously, a habit of a century's growth,—a habit of treating a whole army,—was surely, to say the least of it, very unwise. This subject we cannot discuss. If we have advanced anything that will assist in the formation of correct opinions on the important question of this debate, we shall be satisfied.

Dublin.

ALPHA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It is to be regretted that so little reliable information has reached us of a nature to determine the real cause of the present rebellion in India: there is no end of conjectures; almost every one you converse with ventures a supposition, but very few, indeed, presume to understand the subject sufficiently to pronounce with certainty as to the real motives which prompted, or the causes which produced it. However, there is the fact—a great fact, too,—terrible in its truthfulness, and overwhelming in its sorrowful consequences to thousands of hearts, both English and Indian. The issue of the contest, and the commission which will undoubtedly be appointed to investigate the whole affair, may possibly bring to light much that now lies concealed of the real cause of the outbreak; till then we must be content to take up the threads and fragments of its history one by one as they reach us; collate them with the past history of Anglo-Indian judicature, and we have all the materials requisite for forming a tolerably correct opinion of the producing cause of this revolt.

B. S.'s article has the appearance of being hastily written; the theory he propounds at page 23, is contradicted at page 27; and his modesty at page 24, contrasts singularly enough with his bold assertions at page 23 and elsewhere. "A frenzied thirst for blood and outrage, and a 'ravening to destroy,' seem to be not merely the characteristics, but almost the sole aim and purpose of the mutineers. One theory alone seems to account for their conduct, to wit, a ruthless, frenzied personal hate to every European." If these assertions be true, we ask, where are we to look for the proofs of the "great blessing" which has accrued to India from the exercise of British supremacy there? Do not the above assertions militate against the sentiments expressed in the foot-note at page 25? for if, as Mr. B. S. asserts, "our rule was a change for the better," upon what principle, we ask, does he

explain the diabolical feelings manifested by the mutineers towards their benefactors? The law of kindness and the principle of gratitude are universally recognized and respected, but in this revolt, according to B. S.'s statement, they have been outraged beyond all precedent! If the English are detested by the Bengalees in the manner and to the extent indicated above, surely some more tangible reason than that of caste must be assigned as the cause. And unhappily, the historical records of the last 200 years exhibit conduct on the part of the East India Company, in relation to India, of a most revolting nature; the wonder is not that the natives have *now* rebelled, but that they did not *sooner* make the effort to throw off the galling yoke.

Another sentiment in B. S.'s article demands a moment's consideration,—he says, "The first and most striking fact is the purely military character of the revolt. . . . It is the army which has turned against us, and not people." The Directors in Leadenhall Street are of the same opinion, or rather, this is the light in which they desire the nation at large to regard it; but "facts are stubborn things," and on the present occasion they supply evidence to the contrary. We are aware that the military took the initiative in the revolt, but it does not follow that it was confined to them;—nay, we have positive evidence to the contrary; the official despatches, as well as private communications, have not scrupled to inform us of the sympathy of the villagers with the soldiery, and of their aiding them, paying for their unreasonable temerity with their lives when discovered. Is it confined to the military in Oude? What, then, is the meaning of the following statement in an official dispatch?—"The whole country is risen up against us."

But suppose, for the sake of argument, the revolt is confined to the Sepoys, is that any proof that caste is dangerous to the safety of the empire? No; the prejudices of caste are not so likely to incite to rebellion, as oppressive enactments. The relation of the Sepoy to the ryot class is both intimate and sympathetic, and, to a certain extent, their interests are identical. Numbers of the Sepoys, besides their military avocations, are renters of land; and every year they are allowed a long furlough to attend to their landed interests; hence they are thoroughly conversant with the system pursued, and the tortures practised by Government functionaries, in collecting the revenues; and although these indignities do not fall upon them personally, many of their relatives are victims; and is it so very startling that they should espouse the cause of the class to which they belong, and punish their oppressors? But there is more of the popular element in this outbreak than many are disposed to admit. Our opinion is, that this revolt is but another throes of the strong man bound to regain his liberty, another effort at nationality. The transactions of this outbreak will have a record writ-

ten in blood for the study of future generations, and we prognosticate that, ere the events now occurring in that unfortunate country shall have died out of the recollections of Englishmen, the smouldering embers of this tragedy will ignite another flame, which will tax all the brain and energy of England to extinguish.

That caste has not conduced to the present revolt in India is demonstrably evident from two things:—viz., 1st. The perfect unanimity in the ranks of the mutineers; and 2nd. The general character of the rebellion.

It is a singular fact of this outbreak—the waving of all religious distinctions by the Sepoys. The object before them is made paramount to even their cherished fondness for caste. Caste, in this instance at least, is *not* “our safeguard.” In spite of Miss Martineau’s assertion, that “the incongruities of caste disserve the different tribes, and render their union impossible, at least to an extent available for a successful resistance against our rule,” we see the amalgamation—the union of these different tribes, sects, and factions, combining, as by common consent and instinct, to effect their purpose. If caste had promoted this revolt, we should undoubtedly have heard of disunion in the ranks, where the distinctions are so numerous and broad. Again; if the object of the mutineers was the “re-establishment of Mohammedan power in India,” and if the number of Mussulmans is less* in comparison to the other castes; and if, as is the fact, the Mussulmans and their religion are alike hateful to the Hindoos, how does it appear that a coalition—a junction of these heterogeneous masses, was possible? Had this been the object of the mutineers, the Bengal army,—if we may be allowed a paradoxical expression,—had been now in existence. The very nature of the principle not only militates against such an assumption, but effectually prevents its realization; for it is not feasible that two such antagonistic castes would have fraternized for that object. In order to our forming a well-balanced opinion of the causes of this outbreak, we should be well read in the history of India during the last 200 years, or, in other words, during the time of British rule and supremacy there.† We may just notice *en passant* that Clive and Warren Hastings were men of grasping dispositions,—selfish and unprincipled. Politically speaking, they had done great things for the East India Company; but owing to a want of Christian principle to regulate their conduct, their rule was characterized by acts of violence towards the native

* We believe we are right in stating that the proportion of Hindoos to Mohammedans in the native army is as five of the former to one of the latter.

† We take this opportunity of recommending to the perusal of our readers that portion of Macaulay’s history which treats upon this subject. Also, a volume written by Mr. Henry Mead, late editor of the *Friend of India* newspaper, on “The Sepoy Revolt.”

princes, which destroyed confidence and made many enemies. The rights of princes were contemned,—sovereigns were dethroned,—whole kingdoms annexed; but, as though divine retribution followed them, Clive died by his own hand, and Hastings a beggar. But they had sown the seeds of disaffection broadcast over that peninsula. The few, and comparatively insignificant, outbreaks which have, from time to time, occurred, have served to remind us of its undying character; and now that it has found vent in the present revolt we learn that fraud and injustice, as opposed to the moral government of God, cannot in the end be successful: and although it may be argued that seventy or eighty years have elapsed since the lifetime of these men, it is no argument against a divine retribution. "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day."

As a general rule, the policy of the Company's employees has been subversive of good government. The characteristic features we observe have been, and are, undisguised contempt of the natives, and arbitrary seizure of their property. The sentiments of Mr. Barlow, a former secretary of the Indian Government, corroborate the truth of our propositions,—he says: "The two principal objects which the Government ought to have in view in all its arrangements are, to insure its political safety, and to render the country as advantageous as possible to the East India Company and the British nation." These sentiments express most faithfully the views and conduct of the majority of Indian statesmen. *Mirabile dictu*—the happiness of the governed, and the development of the country's resources, are principles in jurisprudence that cannot be applied in the government of our East Indian dependency!

From what we know of the history of India, and from our knowledge of the native character acquired during a residence among them, and from "facts and scraps" gathered since the breaking out of the revolt, we arrive at the following conclusions with regard to the predisposing causes of the mutiny:—

1st. Duplicity, and the violation of treaties whenever self-interest demanded it.

2nd. Conquest and annexation, otherwise murder and burglary.

3rd. The system of land tenure, which originated and perpetuates those infamous cruelties—the bare mention of which is horrifying. We believe this to be the crowning act of the Company's cupidity.

4th. Interference with the Hindoo law of adoption, which is in effect the same as will-making with us.

5th. Interference with the Hindoo marriage law.

6th. Lowering the pay of the Sepoys.

7th. Utter contempt of the natives.

In conclusion, we beg to invite the reader's attention to the

following incident, illustrative of our last proposition. "Upon the annexation of Oude some thirty thousand petitions were presented by the Sepoys against the assessment made by our commissioners and collectors upon their lands. Will it be believed that none of these were attended to, because they were informal, not being on stamped paper? Stamps were a more important consideration than the ill-will of 30,000 mercenary soldiers, who trembled for their estates. We think a sixpenny stamp is all that is requisite for such petitions; but supposing that the rupee stamp were the proper one, the empire was imperilled, and mutiny incited for £3,000."—*Extract from Morning Star, Dec. 15, 1857.*

Southampton, Jan. 23, 1858.

J. E. P.

NIGHT—

Each river, every hill,
Sent up their vapours to attend her will,
These pitchy curtaines drew 'twixt earth and heaven,
And as Night's chariot through the ayre was driven,
Clamour grew dumb, unheard was shepherd's song,
And silence girt the woods; no warbling tongue
Talked to the echo: satyres broke their dance,
And all the upper world lay in a trance.
Onely the curled streams soft chidings kept;
And little gales that from the greene leafe swept
Dry Summer's dust, in fearfull whisp'rings stir'd
As loath to waken any singing bird.

Brown's Pastoral.

THE ADVANTAGES OF LEARNING.—Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature, which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus's theatre, where all beasts and birds assembled; and forgetting their several appetites—some of prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stand all sociably together, listening to the airs and records of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased or was drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to his own nature; wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.—*Bacon.*

Social Economy.

IS AN UNLIMITED BANK ISSUE BENEFICIAL TO COMMERCE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE neglect of political economy, as a part of education, is a singular and striking characteristic of the day. In Oxford and Cambridge there are professorships of this branch of social philosophy, but we understand that the classes are all but deserted. At Durham, and in King's College, London, there appears to be no provision for its instruction; and even in University College, London, with its "Ricardo Library," the professorship was for many years vacant, because students could not be found to study the subject. The same thing is observed in other classes of the community. In looking over the programmes and class lists of various Mechanics' Institutes, we have found more or less provision made for the study of almost every subject, from astronomy and metaphysics down to the alphabet and the multiplication table; but we never happened to observe an elementary class in political economy. And in the so-called "Commercial Schools," where boys are exercised in the composition of imaginary "business letters," and drilled in elaborate systems of book-keeping (which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred prove utterly unlike anything they meet with in after life), we find that the pupils are left in utter ignorance not only of the principles, but even of the existence of such a science as political economy. Hence, on the simplest subjects connected with monetary matters, we meet with a surprising amount of misconception and ignorance. Multitudes of intelligent and even highly educated men—including probably, the bulk of all our retail traders and small manufacturers—would be utterly unable to give an intelligible explanation, or to state the utility, of the weekly returns of the Bank of England. And to many more, these returns just serve as a weathercock, to show how the wind blows in commercial matters; while, beyond such skill as this, they often know as little of the laws which govern commerce, as the rustic knows of the "law of storms."

The result of this inattention to the natural principles of commerce is a fearful aggravation of the evils attendant upon a crisis, like that through which the trading community have just passed. There are certain evils which no legislation can prevent, and which, perhaps, no amount of foresight can avert. For instance, the evils of over-trading seem almost beyond control; the mischief does not show itself until it is well nigh too late for remedy. It is obviously impossible for the English merchant to ascertain

the condition of a market at the antipodes, so as to regulate his consignments of goods, in exact accordance with its variations. The day may come, when electric telegraphs, worked by steam power, shall flash across from continent to continent, not merely brief summaries, but ample details, which will almost give to the man of commerce the attributes of ubiquity, and enable him, by the exercise of ordinary prudence, to avoid many of those evils now more or less inevitable. But, for some time to come, the commercial world will be unable to avoid occasional disasters of considerable severity. Again, while man remains what he is—while commerce holds out golden crowns, and dazzling instances of wealth to beings in whom the love of money is one of the strongest passions—so long must we expect reckless modes of trading. Bubble companies must and will arise. Fictitious capital, fraudulent accommodation bills, and a thousand other schemes will be resorted to and brought into play, in order to bolster up the credit of men, who, having nothing of their own, are resolved to gamble for wealth at the expense of others. Legislation cannot, as we believe, interfere to give a decisive check to these things, without fettering trade in a manner which would prove its speedy ruin. Morality is not sufficient to stay and uproot the evil. Men not only will, in some cases, set at defiance their own convictions of what is strictly moral, but in many cases they are scarcely aware what they are doing, until they find themselves committed beyond recovery. There are often times questions arising which seem to be fair subjects for moral doubt and discussion; and in the whirl of business, a man has seldom time to enter into a consideration of their social bearings. Hence he diverges, gradually, yet surely, from strict morality, and eventually comes to have a practical code of morals for his counting-house, in glaring opposition to the theory and practice which mark his other relationships in life. In these cases we are apt to speak of the hypocrisy of others, when the truth is, that they are the victims of unconscious self-deception. The most evident way to remedy these evils is to indoctrinate the public mind with the principles of political economy, so that men may not blindly follow the examples of those around them, or be lured, by an instance of success, into courses which, if generally adopted, would necessarily result in wide-spread ruin. The common proverb tells us that honesty is the best policy; and, if we examine the phrase, we shall find that it is an absolute truism. The subject and predicate are convertible terms. For by honesty we mean a certain degree of conformity to the law of nature; and if it be shown that commerce is subject to certain natural laws, the infringement of which brings its own punishment, the best policy will at once be seen to be and to mean conformity to those laws. Unless, therefore, there are two different and opposite kinds of natural

laws governing human actions—an impossibility—honesty and true policy are concurrent in action, and identical in effect.*

There is another advantage in the wide spread of a knowledge of the principles of political economy, beyond its effect in strengthening and quickening a general sense of commercial morality. To be forewarned is to be forearmed; and, consequently, a knowledge of the natural laws of trade must greatly aid every man engaged in commerce, to note the signs of the times with an observant eye, and thus to foresee the approach of a season of trial and of pressure, and (so to speak) to take in sail ere the storm bursts out in its full fury. This the honourable and fair-dealing merchant may generally do to a great extent, if not wholly; while the reckless speculator, and the fraudulent class, whose capital and credit are based on the hollow foundations of accommodation bills, *et hoc genus omne*, can escape only by sheer accident. Thus the mischief of commercial crises may be made to fall chiefly on the right shoulders. The wrong-doers will become the chief sufferers.

Another beneficial result of making an acquaintance with the principles of political economy a part of each man's education, is its probable effect in checking the tendency, so often manifested, to aggravate the difficulties of general commercial pressure, by senseless panics. Most persons have heard the anecdotes of the Irish banker, who saved himself by roasting his sovereigns, and giving it out that he was coining them to meet the demand. The credulous were satisfied with such convincing evidence of solvency, and the sceptical found it a difficult matter to count the heated

* Let not our readers infer that we place political economy on a level with morality, or that we suppose knowledge a substitute for conscience in trade, any more than in other matters. We are merely endeavouring to show that knowledge dictates the same course as morality, and may, therefore, serve to arouse the conscience where it might slumber, to strengthen it where it might otherwise be silenced or unheeded, and in matters distantly connected with morality, to lead to the same result, by a shorter deduction. Just in the same way, we believe, that physiology will lead men to right decisions on many moral questions. A sincerely conscientious man needs no other than moral argument against drunkenness; but physiology will certainly offer him shorter and more practical arguments against slight over-indulgence in eating, or in favour of early rising, than are easily deducible from moral considerations. Besides, the moral faculty is in no small degree dependent on education. *Ceteris paribus*, an educated man will be a better moralist than an uneducated man. The efficiency of conscience greatly depends on the promptitude of its action. Hence the value of an *enlightened* conscience, which can act *at once* in matters of apparent difficulty. Indeed, if we have to consider and argue out our duty in a particular case, we can scarcely be said to have a conscience in the matter. *Pro hac vice*, we are governed by reason. *Conscience*, as its etymology denotes, is a *knowledge* of our duty, concurrent *with* the occasions for its exercise.

coins. The panic was thus held in check, time was gained, and the bank saved. Of course, we do not subscribe our belief to the tale as a narrative of fact, but to its *moral*. Every one capable of forming an opinion on the subject must yield a full concurrence. It is really melancholy to see the ruinous effects sometimes resulting from the panic-fears of men who ordinarily exhibit a full amount of intelligence. A very slight consideration of the natural and necessary laws of commerce would surely suffice to raise men above these fits of unreason, and lead them to the exercise of thoughtful discretion and mutual forbearance. Were all classes of the community subject to be called upon, at any moment, to pay current coin for every amount due by them, trade would be almost an impossibility. Due reflection on this would induce men, in the time of pressure, to endeavour, as far as possible, to extend to the banker, the money-dealer, and the merchant, the same immunity which they themselves enjoy. It may, perhaps, be thought that we are arguing in the interest of these classes, and be urged that, when a doubt is whispered as to the solvency of a bank, or similar house, self-interest justifies every man in withdrawing deposits, and calling for the immediate redemption of its notes or bills, by payment in coin. But such objections arise from a narrow view of the relations between the parties concerned. A bank is to be viewed in respect of its functions. It is, in general, the nervous centre of commercial life and activity in its own vicinity. Hence, its sudden stoppage acts like a shock of paralysis on the community, and is a catastrophe, which it is the true self-interest of every man to strive to avert. Very strong, and we believe sound, reasons may be urged against a sudden and general demand for gold, even in cases where there are good grounds for believing that a bank is on the verge of insolvency. Morality condemns the selfishness of attempting to save oneself scathless, by throwing the whole burden of disaster upon others; and experience warns that the direct gain of the individual is seldom equivalent to his indirect loss, as a member of the general community. But we are not now wishing to insist too strongly upon instances where there is no real and patent cause for fear. The advantage which we are desirous of showing to be a natural result of a general elementary acquaintance with political economy, is its effect in preventing *general* and *groundless* panics. Money is the circulating medium,—in other words, the life-blood of commerce; its utility depends on its free and healthy course. And yet no sooner does a commercial crisis come upon us, than the mass of men are found endeavouring to withdraw their share of this vital element from its ordinary channels, and, gathering it, to stagnate round themselves in the shape of gold. We might as well endeavour to remedy congestion of the brain by stopping circulation, and

causing the blood to coagulate in every little blood-vessel throughout the body! It is bad enough when men are to be found

"Tying their treasure up in silken bags,
To please the fool and death,"

under ordinary circumstances; but the injury done by such, through avarice and selfishness, is not to be compared with the mischief arising from that *ignorance* which leads men to act as though they imagined that they were to be the sole survivors of commercial ruin, and could feed upon and clothe themselves with gold. Let them once learn the true nature of money, and that its future value to themselves depends upon the recovery of the community from the disasters which their unreasoning acts and fears have immensely aggravated, and then we may hope for a wiser course in days to come.

There is one further motive for the study of political economy, to which we would advert—its connection with true patriotism, and with world-wide philanthropy. The *condition* on which England's power and position rests is commercial prosperity. Our civilisation is inextricably twined with our commerce. They stand or fall together. We may boast of our liberty and our learning, but neither of them can long survive the era which marks our commercial decline. Is it not strange, then, that so few are found to study the science of this essentially national subject? Ought not every one, as he loves the country of his birth, so to examine the foundations of its power and rank among the nations of the world, that he may do his part in aiding to strengthen and secure them from violence and decay, and to ensure (as far as possible) their permanence through the generations yet to come? No man, we maintain, has fulfilled his duty to his country and his fellow-citizens, until he has studied the elements of those departments of knowledge, which treat of the laws of national growth and development; and, foremost among these, in the case of England, stands political economy. As we write, meetings for the promotion of Parliamentary Reform, and the Extension of the Suffrage, are being held daily in various parts of the country, and many are now preparing to struggle for the possession of the franchise, who have not hitherto had any direct share in the government of the country. The result will be, doubtless, an increase in the power of members; and hence it becomes more than ever necessary that sound principles on vital questions should be rapidly and widely spread. Legislation, in these days, is not wholly, nor indeed chiefly, political. Session by session, the attention of Parliament is increasingly directed to *social*, *legal*, and *economical* questions. There may be many political grievances in our system of government, but we have no longer to struggle for freedom, as our fathers have done, in

days past; the dangers and difficulties of the present age are chiefly of an economical character. And it must be remembered, that while we may trust almost to instinct to direct a people towards freedom, it requires deep thought and wisdom to teach men how to use that freedom. Manhood Suffrage and Annual Parliaments would be only too likely to legislate in the spirit of trade unions, strikes against capital, and we may expect even Household Franchise and Triennial Parliaments* to be in danger of errors as great, and far more fatal, than the ancient absurdities of "forestalling and regrating acts."

The remarks we have just made in regard to the duty of the patriot are equally applicable to the wider field of universal philanthropy. It is not England's civilisation, and wealth, and power, and learning alone that are the offspring of commerce, but these of the whole world. Does the philanthropist sigh for peace? There is no human bond between nations so strong as that of trade. Communities, like individuals, are seldom likely to exchange profitable trade for destructive quarrels. Do we long to see liberty established throughout the earth? Commerce necessitates a certain amount of freedom, and pioneers the path for its full development. Look across commercial Europe, and there is not a state where personal freedom is not secure to every member of the commercial order;—there is not a state where the despot dare act as our King John did when he extorted wealth from his subjects by the process of tooth drawing, or as Empson and Dudley acted in their contrivances to enrich the coffers of Henry VII. three centuries and a half ago. Political freedom has yet to be won in continental Europe; but by securing individual freedom, commerce has evidently prepared the way for its establishment. Do we mourn over the hydra curse of slavery? Not even the power of Britain's ocean rule has done more to repress the slave trade than the commercial demand for palm oil from the African coasts; and the discoveries of Dr. Livingstone, as to the commercial capabilities of South Africa, open up a bright prospect of the final extinction of the horrors of the slave trade. Nor will the benefit cease there. The free African will undersell the negro slave holder, and compel him, sooner or later, to renounce a system at utter variance with the natural laws of trade. Nor is commerce without favourable relation to Christianity. In the days of Paul, the true faith found a readier access to the mind in commercial Corinth than in learned Athens;

* We hope it will be understood that we here express *no political opinion whatever* on the question of Parliamentary Reform. This paper is intended to urge upon *all* the study of Political Economy. Our allusions to the franchise question are introduced for the purpose of illustrating the duty and necessity of a more general spread of knowledge, in respect of the elementary laws of commerce, trade, currency, and similar subjects.

and in modern times, missionary labours have succeeded best, as a rule, among people who have shown the greatest aptitude for true commerce. In no country has the same amount of effort been put forth with so little effect as in India; and there we find the withering influence of caste opposing commerce to the utmost; rapine, fraud, beggary are honourable in the Brahmin, violence and war in the soldier, while the born Vaishya, or man of trade, occupies a lower place, and the sudra, or labourer (who is a producer of that wealth which commerce circulates), is held to be little better than an unclean animal.

We appeal, therefore, to the readers of the *Controversialist* as to a band of self educators, to see to it that an elementary acquaintance with political economy forms a part of their studies. To do so is their *interest*, as individuals who have to seek their own subsistence and comfort by engaging in some department of commercial life, and their *policy*, as needing every source of aid and counsel to enable them to take part intelligently and successfully in the great battle-field of life. We would urge it upon them as an *obligation*, if they would pass through life with a pure conscience and a spotless fame; and as at once a *duty* and a *privilege*, since it affords a means of testifying to good citizenship and enlightened patriotism, and of contributing to the welfare, happiness, and onward progress of the whole human race. A sneer is sometimes uttered against trade as sordid and engrossing; but it is sordid only when abused,—sordid as literature is sordid when its pen is prostituted to hireling scribeship, or as art is sordid when debased into the service of the voluptuary. "To the pure all things are pure," and to the high-souled there is nothing grovelling. The laws of commerce, when rightly studied, become a practical science, which exercises the intellect, and trains the reasoning powers, as surely as those studies which we are accustomed to term *par excellence*—"philosophy." In point of beneficial influence on the progress and happiness of the world, we may probably rank Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" far above all the sublime speculations of Plato.

There are probably many of the constituents of the *Controversialist* who stand in no need of the advice we have urged upon them,—who, in fact, have already thought out the first principles of political economy, or have studied them in the works of standard writers. To such we must apologize for diverging from the topic of argument at the head of these pages, and occupying so large a space with essayistic and didactic remarks on the value of the branch of social philosophy to which that topic belongs. If we have succeeded in awaking the attention of any of our younger readers to the importance of this department of education, and in inducing a resolve to enter upon its study, we shall have performed a task in full harmony with the general objects and design of the Magazine, and have rendered a service more

pregnant with good than if we had merely contributed our mite of argument towards the elucidation of a particular discussion. Trusting, therefore, to these explanations as a justification of our course, we now propose, in furtherance of our design, briefly to place before those of our readers who have yet to make their acquaintance with political economy, a few simple propositions as a basis for individual thought and inquiry,—presenting them just as they occurred to our own mind when first led to reflect on the phenomena of commerce. At the same time, that we may not seem wholly to evade the special subject under debate, we shall endeavour so to connect our remarks, as to form a simple chain of reasoning in favour of an affirmative answer to the question in debate.

First, let us enquire into the nature and origin of the subject of our investigation, and define the most commonly recurring terms connected with it.

What, then, is commerce?—how did it originate?—in what respects has it changed from its original nature? A very slight consideration of what is daily passing around us enables us at once to declare that all commerce is in the nature of *exchange*. We give goods, and receive in return some other species of goods or coins; we yield services as labourers, or employ our knowledge in behalf of others as professional men, and receive some stipulated return. Whatever complication may occur in a general survey, as soon as we disentangle matters, we at once perceive that every single transaction is a simple exchange. As we trace back the history of the human race towards primeval simplicity, or of any particular people towards the rude ages of barbarism, we see the same proposition holding good. The *mode* changes, but the *nature* of commerce remains the same: it originates in rude and simple barter between individuals, and it eventuates in the complicated artificiality of a world-wide commerce; but first and last it is, in the phraseology of the Roman law, a simple matter of *do ut des*.

The act of exchange presupposes individual ownership in the things exchanged; in other words, the institution of *property* is the basis of commerce. Much has been written on the origin of this institution; but we confess that the subject appears to us of the simplest and most obvious character, and to find its full explanation in the necessary results of bodily existence. We see the origin of property exemplified even among the irrational creation. The beast selects an empty cave, and occupies it; and the mere fact of that occupation constitutes a species of right for the time being; no other animal can dispossess the first occupant, save by violence and aggression. We thus gain the idea of temporary ownership. If we turn to another class of animated beings, we find the bird selecting a particular bough in the forest, and there, by its own toil, raising a nest. Here we have occu-

pancy combined with labour, and mere instinct asserts a right of continuous ownership. In its original state, the site of the nest was open to all birds alike, when one vacated it, another might perch there; but now that a certain degree of labour has been spent in improving it, and converting it into a nest, the builder of that nest has a permanent right of possession to it and to its site: were it otherwise, the feathered race could not rear their young, and would become extinct. So far we may draw a strict parallel between man and the irrational creation, and declare property to be a necessity and an instinct. But here the parallel ceases. Man is a being of many necessities. He can neither graze like an ox, nor hunt down prey, and feed like the carnivorous animals around him. He needs weapons for offence and defence, implements for tilling the soil, clothing for his body, and he has a thousand wants and desires, all yearning for the means of gratification. His own labour will more than supply any one want, but cannot satisfy a tithe of his varied cravings. He may hunt down a large animal, but he can devour only a small portion; he may clothe himself in the skin of his game to-day, but can find no use for the numberless skins which from day to day reward his skill in hunting. On the other hand, his neighbour may have a superabundance of the fruits of the earth. Here, then, reason steps in, and suggests the idea of exchange, whereby both are benefited, without loss to either. Property is then no longer a mere instinct, but recognised institution. Each individual feels that he has an interest in his neighbour's possessions, and a rude system of law, in the shape of a common league for the mutual defence of property, as well as of person, commences. The division of labour follows necessarily from the special aptitudes and inclinations of individual idiosyncrasy, and the facility of obtaining the satisfaction of *all* wants by bartering the results of *one* special talent.

We need not follow the gradual development of these principles. Sufficient has been said to justify the assertion, that modern civilisation is built on the principle of exchange. The whole relations of the different members of the community are essentially commercial. Strength, skill, thought, advice, knowledge, and genius, all form so many species of property, which are exchanged for the necessities and luxuries of life. But we shall pass by the professional classes of society, and confine ourselves to the consideration of commerce in its narrower and ordinary sense. We have defined commerce by its *nature*; let us now endeavour to define it by its effects and objects. It is evident that the result of a system of exchange is the circulation of property from hand to hand. But the term property is too indistinct, pointing to ownership rather than to the subjects of ownership. We must, therefore, ascertain the characteristics of the subject matter of commerce, and thence fix upon proper terms. The most obvious

thought which occurs to the mind is probably to classify the subjects of commerce as "valuable." But what do we mean by value? If it be examined closely, we shall find that value has no real meaning beyond that of capability of being exchanged. A thing of great value is that for which we can get a great deal in exchange; a thing of low value is that for which we can get but little. Even the common phrase "of no value but to the owner" means that none else would give anything in exchange for the particular article. Value, then, expresses a *relation*, and is synonymous with "recognized capacity for exchange." We have dwelt on this point, because the term is of most frequent occurrence, and is twisted to all manner of purposes. A clear idea of this word, and a strict and uniform adherence to its primary and natural meaning, will prove no small help to the student of political economy. Another term of equal importance is *wealth*. Few words have been so fatally abused, yet few are so simple in themselves. Wealth is a general and collective term, expressing everything or anything which contributes to the *weal*, or material well-being of man. But it is evident that whatever contributes to the well-being of humanity will necessarily be an object of desire. Men will seek for it, and give something for it; in other words, it can be used in exchange—it has *value*. We therefore lay down the definition—"Wealth is that which has an exchangeable value; using the adjective, by way of pleonasm, in order to impress on the mind the true signification of the noun 'value.'"

* Were this one definition (i. e., of *wealth*) impressed upon every mind, the result would be one of incalculable benefit. The popular idea of the term "wealth" is to regard it as a synonyme for *money*. We reckon a man's wealth in money, and hence have for centuries regarded wealth as money. The consequence is, that whenever commercial difficulties occur, every one is struggling for money in a wild scramble, and all other forms of wealth are needlessly depreciated, neglected, wasted, or even destroyed. This is just as if from observing bread to be a prominent and general article of food, men came to regard food and bread as synonymes, and in times of scarcity were ready to sacrifice cattle, grain, and all other forms of food, in order to hoard up bread alone. It is easy to see the waste, want, and aggravated misery which would ensue from such madness. The confusion of wealth and money, however, if less obviously absurd, is every whit as illogical, irrational, and mischievous. It has led men to regard a temporary drain of gold as a symptom of national ruin, and an accumulation of it as an infallible sign of prosperity. Devices without end have been adopted for the purpose of attracting and retaining an accumulation of money. Thus nations have deemed *miserhood* the perfection of economical wisdom! and though misery, fraud, poverty, discord, and war have been the purchase of their folly, they still cling to the belief! Under the influence of this idea, Spain dispeopled the New World, within a few years of its discovery, by the inhuman haste and avarice with which she grasped at its treasures. Then she revelled in the abundance of money, till her nobles shod their horses with gold; now where is she? The hour of fancied "wealth," and overflowing bullion, was the commencement of her national decline."

From these definitions we may at once deduce the proposition, that *commerce* has for its object the circulation of wealth. This is the end towards which its efforts are directed. Action, however, is followed by reaction, here as elsewhere, and the effect of commerce is to necessitate increased *production* of wealth, just as the circulation of the blood demands continuous supplies of food for the elimination of fresh blood.

The natural and spontaneous products of the earth would soon be exhausted. Hence million-handed labour is called into action, and the gigantic agencies of science are pressed into human service, to aid in the *production of wealth*. Space forbids us to enlarge on these points. We have pointed out the principal features of commerce, and thus cleared the way for entering upon the study of its laws, as deduced from consciousness and experience. We have endeavoured to direct our readers into the path of economical study and inquiry, and must now leave them to pursue its course. Thought and observation will do much for them; and in the works of Senior, Whately, Hill, Ricardo, Adam Smith, and other writers, they will find ample opportunity for comparison, instruction, and information.

We now turn to redeem our purpose of pursuing a simple train of thought from the principles already laid down, to a conclusion in respect of the special topic of debate. The question being purely monetary, the inquiries arise—what is the nature, and what are the purposes and objects of money? We reply, that *money is simply a commercial convenience*. We have shown commerce to be a system or series of exchanges. A difficulty immediately occurs as to the mode of effecting these exchanges. Let the quantity of corn given for a sheep be called its *price* in corn; how are we easily and readily to ascertain its price in any other article? How are the grazier and the tailor to settle their dealings? The answer is, that a standard of comparison must be agreed upon, and a double rule of three sum worked out: given the price of a sheep in corn, and the price of a coat in corn, to find the relative value of a sheep and a coat. If we wish to ascertain whether $\frac{3}{4}$ or $\frac{2}{3}$ is the greater fraction, we reduce both to a *common denominator* (i.e. $\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$), and the question is answered at a glance. Money, then, is the *standard of comparison in exchange*, or the *common denominator of commerce*. Hence, anything may be selected as the money of a community; and confining ourselves to this view of its nature, we might determine any article of universal and common use to be the best species of money; we consequently find this to be the case in rude communities. In one part of the world shells are adopted, in another salt. Adam Smith tells us, that in his day there were villages in Scotland, where the workman carried nails to the alehouse; and Dr. Livingstone has found calico adopted as a current money among some of the African tribes. The progress of civilisation, however, soon necessitates a change

from these simple devices. Having fixed upon a standard of comparison by general consent, it will naturally become a habit to use the money so adopted as a *medium* of exchange. It thus becomes what we denominate *currency*, i. e., it *passes* from hand to hand, with the understanding, that all men will receive it in return for any property they are willing to sell. In this way the circulation of wealth is greatly facilitated; for instance, the man who has a sheep, and wants corn, is no longer compelled to seek out a man who has corn, and wants a sheep, but can dispose of his sheep for money to any one who will buy it, and then purchase corn of any one who has corn to sell.

As a result of the above remarks, we may define money to be a *recognised standard of comparison*, or *measure of value*; and *currency*, to be *money in circulation*. The question now occurs, What is the best form of currency in a highly civilized state? Passing from hand to hand, it should possess durability in wear, portability, for the sake of those who have large transactions, and divisibility, for the sake of the ordinary dealings of life. The first and last of these characteristics at once point to the metals; while the second requires that the chosen metal should be of great value. Hence gold and silver have a *primâ facie* fitness for the purposes of money. Again, it is desirable that the measure of value should be as little liable to variation as possible, or all transactions will be liable to confusion; and of all known articles, there is none so little likely to sudden and violent fluctuations, as the precious metals. Many additional reasons might be adduced in support of the selection of these metals, as the substances for money, but we must hurry forward.

The utility of money, as the measure of value, depends on its being *recognised universally* as such; it is, therefore, the duty of the State to determine upon and enforce the adoption of a system of currency. If a metallic currency is chosen, its very nature necessitates a system of national coinage, in order to check fraud, and to provide for the subdivisions of money in such manner, as to meet the ordinary requirements of society, and to fit it for use, as a circulating medium, in all transactions high or low. These ends are accomplished by moulding the metals chosen, as the material of money, into certain shapes, of varying size and weight, bearing some impress chosen by the sovereign powers, which vouches for their character. The power of coining being thus placed in the hands of the State, and secured to it alone by means of legislative enactments, all questions of division and of genuineness are avoided. Suppose, then, that a country adopts gold as its money, and the State coins it in certain shapes, called *sovereigns*, *half-sovereigns*, *quarter-sovereigns*, &c., what is the sovereign? The answer is—"the unit of value by which we calculate the present worth of all commercial articles,"—i. e., it is a certain weight of gold which the State has fixed as the standard of comparison in exchange; as we said before, it is the common

denominator to which we refer in commercial dealings. Being a material thing, it may and will vary in intrinsic worth, but this will produce no sensible effect on the nation. The former will still reckon his wheat as worth so many sovereigns; though, in consequence of the decreased worth of gold, he may get twice as many as in years past, he will be no better off, for he will find that they will only go half as far in purchasing for his daily wants.

Now in the remarks we have made (which in substance agree with our English coinage, omitting the silver and copper currency), it will be plainly seen that the nature of money necessitates a standard union of comparison of *intrinsic worth*. We cannot compare that which has worth, with that which has none; to recur to our illustration,—a common denominator must be *real*,—a fraction with 0 for its denominator is irrational. Again, we cannot compare the material with the *ideal*. Homer tells us that the armour of Diomedes cost one hundred oxen, but Milton would have turned his immortal poem into ridicule, if he had told us how many oxen Ithuriel's spear was worth. We might as well have ideal measures of length, as ideal money. In this country the pound or sovereign is the standard money unit, and being made of a certain weight of gold, has in itself an intrinsic value, or capacity for exchange.

But while the unit of comparison must be one intrinsic or *real* value, it is plain that we might have a *currency*, i. e., a circulating medium of exchange, of a purely *symbolical* character. Thus, suppose A. sells 5 oxen to B. for 100 sovereigns, and the next day buys 25 sheep, at 4 sovereigns each, from C. It will be seen at once that to B. the sovereigns have been merely a medium of effecting the exchange of 5 oxen for 25 sheep. As far as he is concerned, it matters not whether he carried gold coins or tin counters in his pocket during the twenty-four hours intervening between the sale of the cattle and the purchase of the sheep. He might have carried with him a written promise by A. to pay 100 sovereigns to the bearer of the promise; and if C. had sufficient faith in the honesty of A. to accept such a document in payment for his sheep, we should have an instance of the adoption and use of a symbolical currency between individuals. The superior convenience of this paper money to actual gold coin is obvious; portable as gold is, B. would find the carriage of 100 sovereigns onerous and troublesome. It is, therefore, probable, that the precedent once set, would be frequently followed;—how far could it be carried? A. has "issued a limited" amount of symbolical paper-money,—to wit, a promise to pay 100 sovereigns;—B. and C. have accepted this paper-money, but they might have refused it; they were not bound to accept it. They did so, because they had faith in A.'s honesty and ability to perform his promise. In short, A.'s issue of paper-money is "limited" by the opinions and trust of B. and C. Unless he can convince those around him that his *power* to pay is fully equal to his promises to pay,

he will be unable to push his paper into circulation. And, therefore, since his power to pay, either in gold or in any other form of wealth is necessarily circumscribed, his power to circulate promises to pay will be circumscribed likewise. To attempt an unlimited issue of promises or paper-money would be dishonesty in A., and to accept them, would be madness on the part of others. We have but to remind the reader, that morality knows no distinction in its laws between man and men, between the actions of an individual and those of a community; and that folly in one can never be prudence in the many; and the question at the head of these pages is at once answered.

But let us examine the actual case of the Bank of England issue of notes. We believe that there is a banking firm of "Battens and Co., at *Penzance*, in Cornwall, who issue their own notes, and, doubtless, our Cornish readers would unhesitatingly accept their notes as symbolical money; yet this acceptance is wholly a matter of choice. If Messrs. Batten's notes were carried into a Northumbrian town, as Hexham, it would become a matter of difficulty to find ordinary tradesmen who would accept them; every one might, and, perhaps, every one would, refuse them. We thus see an evident existing restraint upon the circulation of the Cornish bankers' notes, although there may be no doubt as to their *bonâ fide* character. In the same way (*ex uno disce omnes*) the circulation of all bank notes is restrained by the mere action of public caution. Their issue is limited by legislative enactments; but it is easy to see that, without this check, it would be impossible for any banks, but those of very wide fame and of great reputed wealth, to issue any great quantity of notes. There is, however, one exception to this reasoning. The notes of the Bank of England will be accepted alike in Penzance and in Hexham, or anywhere else. Nay, more; men are not allowed an option: these notes are *legal tender*: each man is bound to accept them in payment of debts due to him; for if he refuse payment in this shape, the law will offer him no aid in recovering those debts. The Bank of England notes, therefore, are a part of the national currency of this country; all check is removed from their issue, so far as public opinion and caution are concerned. It is evident, therefore, that the public would be at the mercy of the Bank, and that the whole internal trade of the country would depend upon the credit of a single commercial association, unless a legislative limit were assigned to its issue of notes. But the relations of the Government and the Bank of England are so closely connected, that we may look upon its issue department as a sort of mint, for the fabrication of symbolical paper money; hence, some may not directly see the necessity for limiting its issue of notes. But the error is shown by recurring to the nature and origin of symbolical money. A bank note represents sovereigns, by promising to pay them on demand; i. e., by asserting its power and ability to pay. If,

therefore, the Bank issues notes to no greater extent than the coin and bullion (or material for coin) in its cellars, then the notes are truly representative, and form a *bonâ fide* symbolical currency. But if the issue exceeds these limits, and notes are put forth promising to pay that which the Bank has no *means* of paying, either by coin, bullion, or the sale of some other form of property, *then its promises* are falsehoods, and the State, which declares them legal tender, pledges itself to a falsehood, and turns the currency of the country into a hollow fraud. To set morality at defiance is the ruin of nations, as surely as it is their shame and dishonour; and, therefore, we again answer the question in debate negatively.

The present English currency laws allow of notes to the amount of £14,000,000 beyond the coin and bullion in the Bank; but this only affects the *immediate* convertibility of the notes. It is enacted that specified securities shall be deposited to answer for these £14,000,000 of Bank notes; they are, therefore, as truly representative of *wealth* as those notes issued on the credit of actual coin in hand. A nameless writer, in the February number of the *Controversialist*, asks why the Bank may not issue £40,000,000 beyond its coin and bullion, if it may issue £14,000,000? The answer is obvious, viz., that the question has nothing whatever to do with the subject. Forty is as definite a *limit* as fourteen. Sir Robert Peel may have been right or wrong in fixing the limit where he did. We are here only called to decide the question of "limit or no limit."

We have argued from principles, and in the most elementary way, hoping to draw attention to this debate, and to the science to which its subject belongs. More advanced arguments and practical illustrations of the workings of an unlimited issue, and its inevitable results, will be found in the able remarks of our coadjutors. On one point, however, we wish to make a saving remark. "Philalethes" condemns the temporary suspension of the Bank Charter Act, but we are scarcely disposed to side with him in this opinion. We regard the step as a remedial one. Bleeding daily would soon bring a strong man to the grave; and yet it is a useful remedy in disease, by reducing inflammation. The suspension is *temporary*, and its amount is known and advertised week by week. The credit of the Government and the nation is implicated and pledged to provide for the consequences. Two millions of notes may be issued beyond the accustomed amount, but they are really backed up by the whole wealth of England. They just serve to carry on trade until the return tide of specie flows back to our shores, and are then withdrawn again. We venture to differ, therefore, in this slight item from our friend "Philathetes," but in all else we fully concur with his remarks.

Apologizing to our readers for the space we have occupied, and claiming their indulgence as an old acquaintance, we now leave the subject of our remarks to their consideration. B. S.

Epoch Men.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

VICO—THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

"I study to bring forth some acceptable work; not striving to show any rare invention that passeth a mean man's capacity, but to utter and revive matter of some moment, known and talked of long ago, yet overlong hath been buried, and as it seemeth laid dead for any fruit it hath showed in the memory of man."—*Churchyard.*

"For out of the old fields, as man saith,
Cometh all this new corn fro year to year;
And out of old books, in good faeth,
Cometh all this *new science* that men lera."

Chaucer.

It is not he alone who has carved a new fact on the tablets of history with his sword; who has set his signature to some state document; who has won an empire by right of might, or might of right; who has revealed a new star in the sky, a new continent on the globe, or a new species of animal or plant upon the earth; or who has dragged from the darkness of antique treasures some old memorials of men and times gone by—that is worthy of the world's honour and the blazonments. There are conquests, explorations, inquisitions, and discoveries, not less important than these. Science and literature have had their heroes, investigators, and martyrs, "of whom the world was no worthy." To one of those toilers after truth as for hid treasure, whose life and labours are less known and less appreciated than they deserve, do we desire now to direct attention—the creator of an *epoch* in historic thought—Giovanni Battista Vico.

It were easy for us to accept, as our "representative men," those more heavily laden with the world's applause, than some of those of whose merits we have striven to present a glimpse in the papers of the present series. Many of our readers doubtlessly believe that we do them, our heroes, and ourselves wrong, by refusing to place in the fore-front of our set of contributions the men whose laurels are already wreathed round their brows in the world's pantheon, whose name and whose fame are heard on "the four winds of heaven." We believe we serve a higher utility, by permitting the cymbals to tinkle on regarding these awhile; there are too many ready to undertake the facile task of expending the enthusiasm of their souls upon the universally

acknowledged grant, to require our voice to mingle in the mob of sound. We prefer, therefore, to examine for ourselves what men have done, said, thought, written, discovered, suffered, or projected; and if, after that, the true manliness be found in him which marks the epoch-former, to him we do all honour—seeking first, however, to pay our homage to those whom the world have, to our thought, done scanty justice, or, from misapprehension, may have been neglectful. Our readers are thus saved from the stale raptures of “transmitted” reputations, and we have scope for topics less frequently treated of, and therefore more likely to be interesting. Besides, let us frankly confess it, our sympathies lie more closely nestled to those whose nobility of soul have made mankind their enemies, because of the jealousy which mean men invariably feel towards those of loftier moral dignity than theirs. The loudest applause is not always bestowed on the best player; he who best consorts with, and most luckily hits, the taste of the audience and the time, becomes the idol of the hour; while the painstaking student of dramatic art may “fret his hour upon the stage,” without the appreciation he merits, or the reward he ought to win. Our present selection is a hero of thought, whose genius initiated the philosophy of history, and gave effective impulses to the speculations of Herder, Schlegel, Kant, Humboldt, Hegel, Schiller, Fichte, Michelet, Comte, Mill, and Lewes. This of itself is no mean honour—it is to be the leader of the van-guard of the soldiers of thought to conquests, whose value is more priceless than the jewels “beneath the pillars of Chilminar.”

About a hundred and eighty years ago, a keen-eyed, lean, and fallow boy might be seen, night after night, in the pale light of a feeble lamp, which flickered and spurted on the rude table, in a mean garret in Naples, toiling on through huge, unwieldy tomes, while all around him lay in silent, if not tranquil slumber, his parents and his sisters. In this abode, so humble that the one apartment was used for all the purposes of life, the stern will of a noble soul exercises itself. The day has been spent under the care of Padre del Balzo, or Padre [afterwards Cardinal] Ricci—Jesuits, and eminent metaphysicians—in the study of the writings of Francis Suarez (1548—1615); yet new work lies before the boy's mind for the evening. The limits of his home deny him solitude or even seclusion; in the silence of midnight, when sleep has hushed the prattle round the hearth, and sealed up the cares of the day in the heart of the father—then only is he able to find quietude for study. The lamp is lit, saved by his loving mother for *him*; the volume is opened, and he reads slowly, carefully, cautiously turning the leaves, lest their rustle disturb the light, uneasy, semi-conscious slumber of his mother, who if she awake will pray him to lay aside his books, and cease the labour which hollows his large black eye,

and thins the cheek that should be dimpled. There is a will whose voice is stronger than fatigue, and louder than a mother's entreaties—the determination, by dint of self-toil, to carve into the secrets of history, jurisprudence, and morality, has already made itself felt, and has steelled his soul against the claims of sleep, and the exigencies of exhaustion. Yet little more than ten years have passed over the head of that hardy student of Vultegus' "Civil Institutes," whose frequent use of the dangerous monosyllable—why?—has excited the anger, and even drawn down the rebukes, of his reverend instructors.

In that very garret where he now sits, Giovanni Battista Vico was born in 1668, about the time of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. His father was a bookseller in straitened circumstances, whose income could ill afford his maintaining a son of his age at books and studies, had it not happened that when about seven years of age the boy's skull had been fractured by a fall, during the illness consequent on which the mind of the sufferer outgrew, over-mastered, and over-informed his tenement of clay. His precocious genius attracted the notice of the quick-witted disciples of Ignatius Loyola, who offered to superintend the education of the son of the bibliopole, whose stores they were wont to ransack. This they had done for a while with great success; the enthusiast toiled amazingly, and made marvellous progress; question succeeded question, book after book was voraciously perused; but the greed of his soul was unsatisfied. Formulæ and routine explanations brought no conviction to his mind. The time-grooved pathways of science he could not keep; the wretched pedantry and parrotry of what was then called knowledge, the unenticing drudgery and dulness then dignified by the name of education, filled him with disgust, but could not cool his ardour. He would be no hoodwinked teamster in the tramways of custom, but a clear-seeing inquisitor into the *wherefore* of each accepted thought. With politic caution—too little observed by him in after life—he took his daily and allotted tasks to his teachers, and had his revenge in large but stolen draughts from other, and often forbidden fountains of knowledge, than those with which they juggled and decoyed the soul. The insatiable reading goes on, the restless curiosity increases rather than diminishes, the toil of the mind outwears the body still, and the keen eye becomes keener, as the cheek pales and the body thins, even to lankness. He frequents libraries, and pries into the literary wares which his father has on hand; he reflects, he questions, he annotates, and will sometimes even propound new theories in his classes, as well as among his friends. The intense activities of his thoughts startle and displease. He is marked "dangerous" in the minds of the fathers, because he is not sufficiently *frozen* into their schemes and system. He has become a student of the law, and is well-read in "cases." Meanwhile his

father's affairs become embarrassed, and the law lays its unpleasant gripe upon the bibliopole's property. His son had little more than attained his sixteenth year when this happened, and the case was conducted on the father's behalf successfully by the studious youth. His praise ran through Naples, and he might have become a popular advocate; but he had no heart for the triumphs of the former, and thought that the world had other sources of existence and emolument, than the dribble sums wrung out from the avarice or the necessities of men. He therefore gave up the design of becoming a lawyer, and by this determination had just exposed himself to be the plaything of fortune, when luckily, as it appeared, Rocco, Bishop of Ischia, struck by his looks, both woe and study worn, spoke to him in a public library, was gratified by his humble and intelligent replies, became interested in him, and at last offered him an engagement as tutor in jurisprudence to his nephews, who lived in the castle of Vatolla, among the mountains, at a short distance from Naples. The situation was favourable to health, agreeable for its duties, and highly useful, because he had access to an extensive and well-selected library. That he executed his trust faithfully and well, may be inferred from the fact that he held it during nine years. This time he had employed not only in teaching others, but also in enlarging his own acquaintance with canon and civil law, theology, Latin and Greek literature, the works of the old writers of his own country—Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio—as well as the moral and logical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

On leaving this situation, he returned to Naples, and resumed, or rather attempted to resume, his former profession—an advocate. It is a difficult struggle to achieve professional success when one has made himself obnoxious to the possessors of patronage, or the jealousies of those who are engaged in hot competition for renown and its gains. This was "Vico's" case. He resolved, however, to push his way; and to inspire him with other than merely selfish inducements to try all means for success, he married. What he failed in acquiring by practice at the bar, he earned quietly by private tuition in families, and in the execution of orders for odes, ephithalamii, élogés, epitaphs, &c., which the wealthy could pay for, though they could not compose. This latter occupation has been by "Vico's" severer critics objected to as being humiliating, if not dishonest; as a voluntary wearing of "motley," shameful in a man of mind both daring and subtle; as a deplorable weakness which excites pity, if it does not justify contempt; as an iniquitous truckling to political, military, or monetary dignities or dignitaries, almost inexcusable in a spirit so essentially noble. Such critics aver that there have been men who, when the abjectness of the times demanded it, have not scrupled to refuse to palliate the foul social rottenness of their

age, have, with the heroism of martyrs, borne the branding-iron of ignominy and distrust, and even perished, and seen those whom they best loved undergoing death's agonies before them, and yet have kept intact the precious jewel of their soul—integrity, and foreborne to play the hireling to the base necessities of those whose virtues need a special pleader to make them felt, or gain the acknowledgment of society. Surely these critics do mistake the matter! "Vico" was an advocate. What matters it, whether in the court of the law, or in the wider court of public opinion, the pleader delivers his charge? His duty is to do best that which is set before him. The fault, if any there be, lies in the profession, not in the person who lives by the profession, and being educated with all the bias of professional life, has not attained freedom from its prejudices, its necessities, or its contumelies. Besides, "Vico" was a professional rhetorician, made a living by teaching the precepts and illustrating the practice of rhetorical delivery; and it must be remembered, in his behalf, that though logic implies the dexterous manipulation of thought *as thought*, rhetoric, at least in its then understood form, implied merely the dexterous manipulation of *words* as the exponents of thought.

In the university of Naples a professorship of rhetoric, endowed with the handsome income of one hundred *scudi*, became vacant in the year 1697. Those who thought him "dangerous" could not dispute his talents and ability, and hence he received the appointment—an appointment by which his *claims* were shelved, although his *wants* were scarcely provided for. Though nominally placed in a suitable position, he required to eke out the provision for his family by those scanty and precarious earnings derived from teaching, and "authorship to order." In these times the life of a literary man was sad indeed. There was no public, by addressing whom a man might hope to gain, or rather regain, the costs of publication. The nobility, as patrons, expected unlimited acquiescence in all their demands, and for their hireling fee, stipulated not exactly in words, but in reality for perfect slavery of thought and soul. To express, in the most pleasing and forcible language, the thoughts furnished by them, was the highest duty of the hack-author in that day when all authors were either hacks or nobles. There was no thought given to the fact that the writer might have an independent opinion upon the subject, or if there was a thought given to it, it was driven out by the threatenings implied or expressed of exile, poverty, or death. Monstrous presumption, intolerable revolt against lordly supremacy, or hopeless insanity, were the only verdicts to be hoped for in any case where the sturdy assertion of innate unpurchasability of soul or effort flung defiance into the ranks of the wealthy, the powerful, and the governing. So "Vico" continued to sell his literary wares to whatsoever pur

chaser offered, just as an advocate takes his brief, and labours to do his best in the cause; and bethought himself but little of the disparagements to which he would expose himself in other days and lands, when and where the public have become the patrons of letters, and iniquitous jobbing, is a thing unknown and unheard of in the history of the world. (P) Whatever work he did, however, he did well. This is clearly borne witness to by the fact that he often received orders from the heads of different parties. For example: in the year 1708, during the war of the Spanish succession, the Austrian troops, by the aid of some Neapolitan conspirators, conquered his native country. "Vico," according to order, wrote "A History of the Conspiracy of Naples," in which he stigmatized, with every opprobrious epithet, the invaders and their home-coadjutors; shortly thereafter Count Daun applied to him to furnish epitaphs for the graves of two of the ringleaders of that conspiracy. This incident shows two things, (1) that "Vico" regarded himself merely as the mouth-piece of his employers; and (2) that his employers did not regard his writing in their behalf as at all tantamount to giving his own adhesion to the opinions expressed by him while so writing. It is important to notice, likewise, that "Vico" did not take the *onus* of publication upon himself, but left his employers the right, the honour or the odium, as the case might be, of issuing the products of their orders to the public.

Another instance of a similar kind may also be related. Antonio Caraffa was descended from a distinguished Neapolitan family, entered the Austrian service, and was employed against the Turks, and to punish the Hungarian revolutionist, Count Emeric Tekeli. In the execution of the latter part of his commission he perpetrated unheard-of and inextenuable atrocities. The uncle of this monster, against whom history testifies, furnished "Vico" with the materials, not of a defence only, but of an eulogium also. This task "Vico" performed so well, as to have his work designated "The Immortal History," by Pope Clement XI., and to receive from his employer a thousand ducats—a sum which enabled him to give a handsome dowry to one of his daughters.

All the time that he was employed in those various labours, he continued to discharge the duties of the professorial office with acceptance. In 1708 he delivered the inaugural lecture of the session. In this address he expatiated on the harmony of the sciences; endeavoured to point out the common uniting bond among them; contended that it was impossible to study one subject well if kept wholly apart and alone; maintained the possibility of cultivating them simultaneously, or successively, in such a way as to perceive their true unity; and recommended the resumption of the ancient method pursued by Plato and Aristotle of regarding all knowledge as one body, informed and

animated by one spirit, and held together by unity of plan, principle, procedure, and aim. The same thought he more fully developed in a series of small works issued between 1708 and 1720, viz., 1st,—"An Essay on a System of Jurisprudence, which Explains the Civil Law of the Romans by the Revolutions in their Government;" 2nd, "An Essay on the most Ancient Knowledge of Italy, derived from the Roots of the Latin Tongue;" 3rd, "The Unity of the Principle of Universal Law;" 4th, "Concerning the Constancy of Jurisprudence." Having laid these performances before the public, *i. e.*, the learned, and received acknowledgments of their value and originality, he considered himself entitled to make application for the professorship of jurisprudence in that university, to the success and renown of which he had devoted twenty-three of the best years of his life. He was admitted as such, and delivered a lecture, which was highly applauded, as a specimen of his powers; but being unwilling to stoop to personal solicitation for that which seemed due to him, both on account of past services and present capacity, and finding that, on that account, he would be unsuccessful, he retired from the contest. For this disappointment he consoled himself with writing a sonnet, in which he addresses Naples as his mother, protesting that he cannot forget he is her child, though she is so stern and severe that she will not caress him; and engaging with greater earnestness than ever on the *magnum opus* of his life—"The New Science."

At this time his domestic condition was far from enviable—indeed, very little apart from the region of the unendurable. His weakly health, aggravated by long vigils, deep study, and scanty food; his wife overtaxed by family care and labour; a well-loved daughter languished in severe and tedious illness; his children ill-fed, ill-clad, and, in the instance of one of his sons, so ill-behaved that he was compelled to petition the authorities to imprison him, or to confer on him the right to employ more than the usual parental restraints; himself looked upon as a crotchety though sagacious old man, with whom the *omne scibile* was a passion, but whose immense and even encyclopædic learning had failed to rescue from obscurity, or to procure for him the comforts and ease of an ordinarily furnished home, and his family regarded as the offspring of an ingenious and laborious semi-pauper, he yet felt within himself the strength of soul and purpose to set his thoughts in opposition to the whole thinking of his own age; the daring to cope with problems whose vastness, magnificence, and grandeur had appalled the greatest labourers in the vineyard of science; and the hardihood to believe that from his garret study the rays of truth might shine on the highways of knowledge; and his soul was, like that of all great men, a true prophet. Disappointment only made him harder; neglect only caused him the more ardently to throw his inner nature into the

grand topic of his thoughts. Calamity could overcloud, but not dispirit him; defeat could not destroy his faith, or check the aspirations of his nature.

During four years he toiled manfully,—shall we not prefer that even to saying heroically?—and by dint of that toil brought together into distinct and systematic order the whole mass of thought that had been ripening towards such a harvest for half a century. In 1725 the great work was accomplished, and ready for the public eye. The “Principles of a New Science relative to the common Nature of Nations, by which are discovered New Principles of the Natural Laws of Races,” when published in that year attracted little attention in his native country, and in other lands appears to have scarcely, if at all, become known. It had the effect, however, of cutting the chagrin and sorrow out of his heart, and of strengthening him to bear more bravely his trials and bereavements. In a letter to a friend who had favourably noticed his work, written shortly after its appearance, he nobly remarks:—“Providence, even when it seems to our feeble view only a severe justice, is, in reality, goodness and love. Since I have finished my great work, I appear to have become a new man. I am no longer tempted to declaim against the bad taste of the age, since, by refusing me the office I sought, it has led me to compose the ‘New Science.’ The composition of this work, if I am not deceived, has filled me with an heroic spirit, which raises me above the fear of death and the calumny of rivals. I feel myself on a rock of adamant when I think on the goodness of God, who does justice to genius by the esteem of the wise.”

There is, in this writing, at once the modesty and the self-reliant consciousness of a great mind, feeling its own insignificance before the purposes of Providence, his own potency among men. Such a voice from the humble abode of obscurity concurrent with fame, poverty of purse with plenitude of mental power, distraction and distress with repose of soul and superiority to affliction, is notable in any age; more so in the age of Vico.

The pantheism of the volcanic Giordano Bruno, the naturalism of the placid Bacon, the selfish theory of the impassive Hobbes, the egoism of the timid Descartes, had each, in some measure, wrought their influences into speculative science, and were combinedly effecting the possibility of *encyclopædism*. Vico had the unshrinking hardihood to condemn the tendencies of his times, and to utter in its ear a demonstration, as he thought it, of the all-ruling energy of an Omniscient Providence, whose creature nature was, and to which the human Ego was subservient. To the intrepidity of a theorist he joined the enthusiasm of a prophet; and though he lacked the patience as well as the opportunities of an experimentalist, he held each thought in the inexorable grasp of a strong mind, and believed thoroughly in

the power of his soul to test, with the most refined nicety, the truth or falsehood of principles or facts. His faith in *intuition*—the beholding of truth by the soul in its own clear light—was, perhaps, unjustifiable; his aversion to the slow and tortuous processes of analysis, and his readiness to pass on through a long file of synthetic deductions was, perhaps, excessive; yet the general fidelity with which he guides his readers through the labyrinths of history, law, and life, by the clue which syllogistic logic furnishes, is not less remarkable than praiseworthy. The vigilance of his syllogistic police suppresses all riot by deporting or imprisoning all insubordinates.

The spirit of his age was far otherwise: then facts had begun, in some measure, to be regarded as the tests of truth. He, on the other hand, asserted the right of truth to assay (so-called) facts. Logic, the touchstone which truth bestowed on man, to enable him to distinguish the right from the erroneous, could in nowise else proceed than by claiming the power and the right of judgment. Hence, whenever facts contradict the necessities and requirements of *reason*, they must contain some fallacious element, however much any individual's actual power of *reasoning* may fail to detect or signalize the error. In this way, a full century before, Niebuhr had begun "to explore, connect, and animate the scanty records" of early Roman history. Vico had endeavoured to remove the veil which poetry had thrown over facts and dates, and to point out the means by which fiction had attempted to supply the want of interest in the dry chronicles of the ages of antiquity; and long, long before, Jacob Bryant had published (1774) that "Mythology, wherein an attempt is made to divest Tradition of Fable, and to restore Truth to its original purity;" or F. A. Wolf had issued (1795) the "*Prolegomena ad Homerum*," which startled Europe with the thought that "the blind old bard of Scio's isle" was a myth; the heretic Vico had doubted his personality, and denied the world-received dogma of the single authorship of the "*Iliad*" and the "*Odyssey*." His intense love of the plaguy word "why," clung to him from youth to age; the acute, ingenious, and sagacious subtlety of his mental vision enabled him to detect in a moment all that was questionable or dubious; and he hesitated, at no time, to lay the mark of criticism on every statement which seemed at variance with the suggestive intuitions which his soul revealed, in its depths, to him. His heresies, we may be sure, were not likely to make "his corn and oil abound." His keen-eyed, speculative faculty must have aroused suspicion, if not enmity. The dictatorial tone of superiority assumed by the poverty-haunted and threadbare vested rhetorical hack and university appendage was scarcely to be tolerated, but for the senile eccentricity and intense absurdity which contained their own refutation, and bore upon their fore-front the stigma of stultiloquence.

It is not to be denied that there are great flaws in the jewellery of his thoughts; that "all is not gold that glitters" in the mint of his works; that many weaknesses creep forth, and many fallacies lurk, and many errors unblushingly confront the light of the days of the nineteenth century in his writings. But whose works of the same age are free from blemish or stain? and whose pen is free, even now, from the tricks of "the dainty Ariel" of fancy, or the clumsy awkwardness of the Caliban of ignorance? "Whoever is without sin, let *him* cast the first stone."

The grand map of his conceptions is finely and nobly drawn, its great outlines are clearly and distinctly marked, the continent masses are plainly pointed out, and the chief water-sheds of thought as well as the leading streams of events, are ably exhibited: his method is good, his object admirable, his execution of the task most praiseworthy; and hence the New Science has initiated a new historic school, and introduced into philosophical literature a new branch of research. The prime object of "Vico" in this work is—to prove that the history of the human race is subject to definite and determined laws, dependent upon 1st, the pre-ordinations of Providence; 2nd, the nature of man; 3rd, the qualities of the universe. What has not previously been discovered or known is *new*; whatever is true, intellectual, and systematically thought out is *science*. The "New Science" is the law of human progress, based upon the vital principle of the humanity of nations. In existence there are postulated knowledge, power, and will; these operate in God and man, with the difference in degree between Infinity and finity. The superior overrules the inferior, and Providence governs humanity: 1st, creatively, 2nd, conservatively. The human mind judges of the remote and unknown by the near and known. Philosophy contemplates reason, and is the science of *the true*. The personal judgment, uncertain in itself, receives the infallible sanction of *common sense*, which is a judgment felt, rather than consciously or logically deduced by states, peoples, and races. Such ideas as thus arise and powerfully affect men, who have no knowledge of the thoughts or feelings of each other, bear in themselves the stamp of truth; from the teachings of this *sense* "Vico,"—prior to the advent of the Reid-philosophy—inductively gathered these truths, viz.: 1st. The reality of God—proof, universal religion; 2nd. The idea of duty—proof, marriage and family feelings. 3rd. The belief in future life—proof, universality of sepulture, or respect for the dead. 4th. The permanent need of social life, *i. e.*, of law, *i. e.*, of government, by which, contrary to the teaching of Hobbes, the passions being moderated, are led to co-operate in effecting the welfare of others, while labouring for our own. The elements of law existed in each nation, and expanded into international law. Nothing can long endure in a state abhor-

rent to its nature. Man has long existed under the dominance of law; subjection to law, *i. e.*, sociality, is therefore the law of human life. Self-interest secures that government shall ultimately fall to the *best, i. e.*, those who in each state of social being are able to preserve the conditions of being and progress. The line of progress is through aristocracy to democracy, and thence to monarchy—the most perfect of possible forms of authority, when a due place has been allotted to the other elements of power to operate in, and to exhaust themselves. These leading principles and their results are unfolded in the “*Nuova Scienza*,” in five books, of great interest and value: viz., 1st, an exposition of principles; 2nd, poetic wisdom; in this book, “Vico” shows himself a man of wide and varied erudition, of keen and penetrating intellect, and becomes, in fact, the creator of the theory of myths and forms of worship. 3rd. A digressional proof of the principles of the second book, in an inquiry into the question of “the real Homer,” in which Wolf and Briant are anticipated. 4th. A chart of the course of history: in this division, clear-sighted guessing is more prominent than historical accuracy. Subsequent investigations from other points of view have established these exertations of prevision, and Heyne, Niebuhr, Warburton, Montesquieu, Guizot, &c., run their elaborate criticisms into parallel lines with the conjectures of “Vico,” and found the results correspond. 5th. A view of the cycles of history, in which he endeavours to prove, that in reality all history is a series of self-repetitions and recurrences essentially similar, though, in accordance with the law of progress, changed in their outward phases. This we cannot but believe to be a sad fallacy—a fallacy which we shall take an early opportunity of attempting to demonstrate, in a projected paper on “The Philosophy of History,” and therefore we shall not at present enlarge thereon. History has three recurrent eras (*a*) *divine*, (*b*) *heroic*, (*c*) *human*. In the first, law is *theocratic*; in the second, *forceful*; in the third, *intelligent*. Through these the ancient world ran, and the modern world inaugurated the recurrence with (1) Christianity, and had already passed through (2) feudality, and was entering into (3) constitutionalism.

These are but the briefest and most imperfect shadows of the wondrous wisdom, the foresight, the Sybilline and subtle mindedness of this Neapolitan garreteer, the man who, more than any one in his country and times, maintained a heroic faith in the worth of science, and the power of right; one of “the serene creators of immortal things,” regarding whom the generous and sympathetic soul impulsively exclaims—

“Blessings be with them and eternal praise.”

This work, which had become endeared to him by trial and by labour, was now the darling of his intellect, and completely con-

centrated his whole powers of mind. In 1730, he issued a remodelled—and as he thought—popularized form of it, and even thereafter continued to work into it greater and greater maturity of thought, more of the vintage of research, and more of the fatherly love of a theorist whose labours the world had but ill-requited.

"Remote, unfriendly, solitary, slow," the stream of fortune had rolled on for many years, yet poured no ample tide into the life-lot of "Vico." Other times and other fortunes did indeed come, but they were very late of reaching him. The disputed succession of Poland occasioned a war, in which Don Carlos, son of Philip V. of Spain, conquered Naples and Sicily from the Austrians. His father thereupon made a solemn renunciation of his claim to dominion in these realms to his son, their conqueror; and Don Carlos, 1735, as king of the two Sicilies, assumed the government. He was a good monarch, identified himself with the interests of his subjects, and encouraged useful studies and literary pursuits. He could not overlook such a man as "Vico," dwelling as he did in the very capital of his dominions. Old age and ill-health combined to relax the energy and enfeeble the powers of the only man in Italy who had attempted "to justify the ways of God to man," and with the king's permission, his son, Gennaro, was appointed his successor in the professoriate, while he himself received the position—to which a moderate honorarium was attached—of Historiographer to the king. By the time these arrangements were adjusted, "Vico" had nearly reached the limit which the Psalmist assigns to the span of life. Care, labour, poverty, obscurity, contempt, disease, he had long contended against, not ingloriously, though successlessly. Now, just as the sad and evil day of his life had drawn to its close, one or two stray sunbeams shine in upon him through the wintry inclemency of his fate; he occupies these in urging into perfection that monument, by which the world was yet to learn to revere his memory. Life had no leisure days for him. He was one of those enthusiast souls who feel as Festus did, and who exclaim in act and life, if not in word,—

"I hate the thought of wrinkling up to rest—
The tooth-like aching ruin of the body,
With the heart all out, and nothing left but edge:"

and yet that fate was his. For his beloved theories he laboured in such a way as to overtax his bodily strength. Even with his son's assistance, he could do little more than present the age in which he died with the third edition of his "*Nuova Scienza*," before the ruthless demon of paralysis struck at the citadel of thought, and plunged him in unconsciousness. For fourteen months he lay in merely animal vitality, knowing neither children, friends, or old familiar faces, with no capacity of thought,

no sense of time, change, or circumstance. On the 20th day of January, 1744, he expired. One of the world's lights was quenched; but death's victory has not been altogether complete, for "the triumphant adamant of soul" survives, and he has left "a handful of eternal truth," that men may make "a heartful of it"—a monument of thought,

"for which

A century full of life were cheaply given."

He entered life a garret-tenant, and as such he departed from it; leaving the after ages much his debtor. Now and again his name was plausively pronounced by some admirer, but no re-echoing shout attested the gratitude of men. In 1818, the Marquis of Villa Rosa published a complete edition of his works, his autobiography, and its continuation by his son; more recently, 1827, the noble French historian, Michelet, issued a biographic sketch of him, and a judiciously winnowed expository abstract of his writings; later still, 1844, the Princess Belgiojoso translated his works into French, and prefixed a criticism of his times and labours. The discipleship of Cousin, Guizot, and Comte is potent to their readers, and the ordinary tone of historic criticism has now-a-days become quite *Vico-ish*. To him we owe it that now our whole historic literature is

"bright

Already with that glorious planet's ray
Which guideth man through every path aright."

We have spoken freely our admiration and our love. In his age it was impossible to do more than he. Free-thought and free-debate are the conditions of the attainment of truth. He shook the then stable tyranny of error; if he has not built a temple such as truth merits, let us undo his work, and re-erect a better. We have uttered in weakness our thoughts upon this illustrious thinker. Such as desire to pursue the topic farther may study Michelet, when

"A soul more worthy shall conduct their flight."

BOUNTY.—He that spends to his proportion, is as brave as a prince; and a prince exceeding that, is a prodigal: there is no gallantry beyond what is fit and decent. A comely beauty is better than a painted one. Unseemly bounty is waste both of wealth and wit.—*Feltham*.

A TRADE AN ESTATE.—He that hath a trade, hath an estate, and he that hath a calling, hath an office of profit and honour: but then the trade must be worked at, and the calling well followed, or neither the estate nor the office will enable us to pay our taxes.—*Franklin*.

REVENGE is a kind of wild justice, which the more man's nature runs to, the more men ought to weed it out.—*Lady Gethin*.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM OBSTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

FROM the earliest ages of Christianity, even till now, the spirit of schism has stalked triumphant in the church of Christ, and has clouded every creed. Dimly, through the vistas of the past we look back upon the infancy of the church, and we behold her ever fighting against the world and the devil; heresy and schism ever creeping in through one door or another; controversies and false doctrines promulgated, thereby engendering terrible and lasting strife, but plainly and more plainly fulfilling the words of our Great Founder when He said that He was come to send "not peace, but a sword." "For I am come to set a man at variance against his father."

We propose to ground our arguments upon these two propositions:—

1. Sectarianism is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Gospel.
2. That in its effects it has been materially obstructive to the spirit of Christianity.

To the first of these propositions we believe that no one will be bold enough to raise objections. We cast a glance over the whole glorious scheme of Christianity; we pause for a moment on the grand doctrines of the world-wide redemption,—of the atonement,—of the resurrection,—of the life everlasting. We mark the rapid spread of the Christian faith through all nations, into every land; we take an abstract view of it, and we imagine that we see "one Lord, one faith, one baptism." We take up the Bible—the rule of faith—and we peruse the many and earnest exhortations to unity; first and foremost, that heart-breathed prayer of our Lord, "that they may all be one;" and often and often the holy writers of the inspired epistles inculcate upon the faithful the inestimable value of peace and agreement. But oh! where is the brotherly love, the like-mindedness that the apostle speaks of? Sadly defaced and broken is the tower, whereof Jesus is the corner-stone; all marred the beauteous framework of the church of Christ! "I of Paul, and I of Apollos" are the cries that are loudly raised, and sharp are the contentions that separate us from one another! Well may we

join the saints in crying, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, how long?" for the body is torn asunder, and there is no whole part within us. Thus has sectarianism riven the bosom of the church catholic.

The fallacy of the argument used by those who deny the divine institution and origin of the church is easily shown. To the Christian a certain book was given as their standard and rule of faith; but in order to meet that very spirit of sectarianism which we are now discussing, there was instituted the *ecclésiastical*, or church, by whom the true meaning of the Holy Scriptures should be determined. So, whenever a new doctrine or theory was started, a council was immediately held, consisting of the bishops and other ministers of the church; the new doctrine was discussed and put to the test, and condemned by the common voice. To the preservation of true faith a church is necessary; otherwise faith would be all vague and undefined, and men would scarcely know what they believed. As in everything of importance which we undertake, a fixed principle and certain system is required, so is it with religion. The man who is content to entertain an undefined belief,—to hold what are sometimes called *broad* and *general* doctrines, takes upon himself an awful and terrible amount of responsibility; he forms his own creed; he judges the Bible by his own intellect; he rejects the writings of the holy and learned fathers, and of those who lived almost in the apostolic age; he frees himself from what he calls the *trammels* of forms and ceremonies, and sneers at those who believe in the efficacy of the sacraments, or defend the Liturgy; he builds an altar to an unknown god, and walks proudly on his way, despising and condemning all who differ from him. Such is the infallible consequence of having a Bible with no expositor.

Every Christian sect under the sun draws its peculiar doctrines from the Bible! • The Catholic Church, and more especially that branch of it established in this land, takes its stand upon the Bible, and has for its motto, "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus,*" and so expounds the Holy Scriptures committed to her care, by her creeds and liturgies. We are aware that even this guards not against error; for if we gaze for a moment on the Church of Rome, we behold how lamentably she has fallen from her first love, and perverted the faith once delivered to the saints; but it must be remembered that she has made a fatal addition to the Catholic theory, and by asserting her absolute *infallibility* can make new doctrines as she pleases, without referring to the writings of the fathers and of primitive teaching.

We have been led into these few remarks rather unintentionally; but they are not so digressive as at first sight they may seem. The very existence of the church is a living argument against sectarianism; but because human nature is frail and weak, but, nevertheless, thinks mighty of itself, it

must be that strifes and divisions come among us. The age is an age of controversy, cavilling, and questioning. Intellectualism is in the ascendant, and man will not easily believe that which his intellect cannot grasp. O fool! O worm! as if the intellect of the wisest man was sufficient to lay hold upon the awful majesty of God! We cannot *understand* eternity—we measure everything by our earthly senses, and they are all powerless to comprehend *interminable existence*. Wonderful and mysterious seems the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead; marvellous is the certain knowledge that the same body that has been buried and corrupted in the earth, and whose ashes have, perchance, been scattered to the four winds of heaven, yet shall be all re-united, and live again! Oh yes; the veriest infant that has learned at its mother's knee to whisper, "Our Father, which art in heaven," is, to our thinking, wiser than the proud man, who tells us that his mature reason prevents him from believing in the existence of the blessed Trinity!

But we can scarcely adduce any stronger argument in favour of unity in doctrine, to which sectarianism is the greatest enemy, than by pointing to the many passages in Holy Writ, where schisms and divisions are so loudly and so strongly condemned.

We now pass to our second proposition; and we cannot but think that they are few in number who differ from us in opinion. Once more we gaze abroad over Christianity; but when we look narrowly, we perceive that there are "lords many, and gods many." Through the clouds of the past, we review the onward march of the Christian faith, and we behold false Christs, and false prophets innumerable. They profess, indeed, to teach the doctrines of Christ; but, alas! they are maimed and perverted; one denies his divinity, another disbelieves the atonement. His sayings and preachings are misinterpreted, and are glossed over to suit individual fancies. Turn we for a moment in spirit to Jerusalem, where he was crucified and buried; and, oh! how terrible are the divisions that there meet our gaze. Along the hill of Zion loud swells the chant of the unbelievers, and unhallowed temples are filled with the false worship of the Moslem; the sectarianism of Mahomet here holds its own around the very tomb of the Redeemer! And oh! sadder than all, there are times when the infidel must keep peace between the wrangling and discordant Christians! Noble and majestic was the great plan of Christendom, as laid out by the Almighty Father; but puny man, in his arrogance and pride, has endeavoured to mutilate it. Oh! if we could but rightly appreciate it in all its intensity, surely jarring and contentious voices would be hushed, and we should grasp at the glorious boon, struck speechless with admiration, gratitude, and awe.

But these times are essentially filled with the spirit of sectarianism, and throughout England it holds its own. We raise

the cry of "Religious Liberty;" but we hesitate not to condemn those who do not worship in our own way. We talk about evangelizing India, but many will not subscribe to the funds, because they imagine that the S. P. G. is a *sectarian*, or party affair; a memorial church is proposed for erection at Cawnpore, but many will not hear of it, because it is to be under episcopal direction; clergymen devote themselves to missionary labours in the vilest parts of London, and unshrinkingly devote themselves to the work of reclaiming lost and truant souls; but they are looked upon coldly and distrustfully, because they hold and teach certain views, which, beyond all doubt, their church justifies them in doing; sectarian prejudice fills our very churches, and raises its discordant voice in our very sanctuaries, and exerts all its energies to tear down the cross; it stigmatizes as treacherous and false, that which it has not sufficient faith to realize; it sets up its idols in public places, and abuses those who will not fall down and worship them. The spirit of sectarianism has given birth to Socinianism, Rationalism, Atheism, and, in fact, every so-called religious body that there is, and so has materially obstructed the advancement of Christianity. We all of us remember the old fable of the father, who explained to his sons the advantage of co-operation and unity, by the impossibility of breaking the bundle, but the easiness of crushing the individual stick. So is it with Christendom. The house divided against itself cannot stand.

Oh, glorious but vain dream of unity in the Christian church! Oh that men would with one heart and one mind glorify God! But alas! alas! in these days faith is faint, and the love of many has waxed cold! Dark, indeed, are the clouds that hang around the glowing walls of the heavenly Jerusalem; thick the mists wherewith time and man have obscured the truth! Oh, come the day when this earthly warfare shall be accomplished, and men shall turn with pure hearts and minds to worship God in verity and truth; when peace, and love, and faith, have won the victory over the world, the flesh, and the devil, and when the grim spirit of sectarianism shall be buried in the past, and its voice be hushed for ever!

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

Dec. 9th, 1857.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"TALIESIN" bases his arguments against sectarianism on the text, "Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand." It does not, however, follow, that because there are various sects the church is divided against itself. "My kingdom," said Christ, "is not of this world." A difference of opinion amongst members of the same church may be detrimental

to the progress of religion. "Talesin" fails to prove that difference of opinion amongst sects has the same effect. Has the British empire or the world suffered by the American revolution? Certainly not. The colonies, being formed into an independent republic, became our rivals, rousing us to more energetic action; and so each having the other's commerce to contend against, became stronger by the healthy opposition. Which is better, a large empire torn with internal convulsions, and thus weakened, or two powerful people acting beneficially on each other? The world will be sooner converted by small energetic bodies than by a large and lethargic church. "Talesin" professes to consider what sectarianism has done, but forgets the most important part. No mention is made of Luther shaking the walls of Rome, and leading the Protestant Reformation. Did sectarianism do no good thing when the Puritan fathers, after remonstrating again and again, unsheathed the sword, and hazarded their lives and fortunes for the truth? Or were the labours of Wesley nothing, when, sad at the sight of a dreamy, irresolute church, he originated that sect which holds so important a position in the christian world to-day? Says "Talesin," "The church has lost its influence; men no longer allow themselves to be guided." Behold the appearance of the cloven foot. Uninquiring faith in all that is taught by the church is what "Talesin" demands. Virtually he says,—"Truth is valuable; but how know you what is truth? There may be errors in belief, and meaningless formalities, growing stronger with time, until devotion forgets its lawful object; but, for the sake of church unity, hold your peace and suffer." So a Roman Catholic would argue; and he is the only one who could do so with any show of consistency, for, giving implicit credence to every article of his church's faith, he dares not demur. Opposition to this slavishness is the very soul of Protestantism. Had our forefathers been of "Talesin's" mind, the Church of England would have had no existence. He grants that never before was there such an amount of apparent religion and morality in the world as at present, but boldly asserts that it is all theoretic. Will he allow us to differ from him in this? By what means has the great change been brought about that characterizes this century from the last? "Talesin" thinks it an hypocrisy. *Prima facie* the world is better. Mere assertions do not prove the contrary. He instances the letters written by officers in India, and because their excusable indignation finds vent in rough words he thinks it a proof of national depravity. "Talesin" forgets that everything is more open now than formerly. Had there been cheap postage and an equal number of newspapers, there might have been as many apparently sanguinary thoughts brought before the public eye fifty years ago as there is now.

"Talesin's" grand error is in misapprehending what is meant

by Christ's church. He seems to know nothing of that unseen Spirit which connects the truly penitent in heart, whatever may be their creed. The broken and contrite heart naked before the Allseeing, healed and dedicated a temple unto him ; none of this is understood by "Taliesin." Sombre gothic edifices with gloomy aisles, and a church ritual impressing the soul with awe, but imparting nothing of confidence and love, are what he admires, and he has a profound horror of all those "unsightly piles yeilded chapels." Does he know that in these buildings assemble every sabbath day millions of his countrymen to worship God, and that it is in such piles that Binney and Parsons, and Harris and Newton, preach or have preached ? We are led to think by "Taliesin's" article that he never entered one of these chapels. The description given of the preaching generally heard there is incorrect, as applied to a very large majority of dissenters' sermons. The practice of preaching extemporaneously demands more fluency of speech, and induces greater energy of expression, than can accompany read discourses. I dare assert, without fear of contradiction, that you might attend nine-tenths of the dissenting chapels in the country for twelve months, without ever hearing a word spoken against other sects. On the other hand, there is seldom a prayer offered by a dissenting minister in which the words heading this article are not said. Says "Taliesin," "They never make appeals to the conscience ; they never speak individually to men's hearts, making the listener to understand, 'Thou art the man !'" Surely these words might more strictly be applied to many clergymen whose portrait is so well given in some well-known lines by Cowper.

If earnest, faithful preaching is to be found in the country, it is in dissenting pulpits. According to Bacon, the surest way to prevent seditions, is to take away the matter of them. Will "Taliesin" apply the remark ? There are many things in the Established Church that I admire ; there is also much with which I do not agree. Formality is painful to me. I prefer the zeal of dissenters to the august repose of the church. "Taliesin" and I differ ; but why should we slay each other ? We agree in one thing ; that is, our estimate of what religion is. God forbid that I should be uncharitable, but I do think there are more unconverted ministers in the Establishment than amongst dissenters. Are all the reports of fox-hunting and horse-racing parsons untrue, and libels on the church ? I know a village in which the last two vicars were men of no apparent piety. Over one of them the grave has but recently closed, so I will say nothing of him. His predecessor was accustomed to sit the whole of the day in a public-house, and drink whatever his parishioners would pay for. Is it any wonder that the people became depraved, and that a visitor, passing the church, said truly :—

"An old church, with a new steeple,
A drunken priest, and wicked people ?"

Philosophy.

IS MIND NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO MATTER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN attempting to support the affirmative side of this great question, we have adduced a few remarks from a construction which, in our estimation, embodies the same meaning as the original proposition, though rendered somewhat different, *viz.*, Whether mind be the cause or effect of matter? In the affirmative, by "Nemo," sufficient evidence is shown, that mind possesses powers which are not possessed, and cannot be produced, by matter, and that fact has not been refuted in the slightest, by the following article in the negative; indeed, the whole argument of that article, endeavouring to reconcile the opposition, employs the oft repeated fallacy of proving connection to be causation. But H. V. M. overlooks the grand emanation of the subject, and disputes the point, as if matter had to contend with the mind, merely after its connection with the body, which is reducing the question down to a convenience not at all consistent with the main design of the proposition. We believe mind to be opposed to matter, inasmuch as it was originally derived from a source which, at its divine command, created all things; and, as its superiority was then so signally displayed, so has it been since, though on a much smaller scale. If, upon examination of these two natures, we find one possessing qualities superior to that of the other, we take it to be an illogical inference to pronounce them unique. The brain is produced from the same material as the body, and differs from it in construction only, having been framed essentially as the receptacle for the mind; it is organized in a highly complicated and mysterious manner, and, as observed, so beautifully does it unite with the body, that a mutual sympathy exists between them in everything. But surely this is not sufficiently conclusive to contend for no opposition. Does not nature abound with illustrations in which bodies possessing different properties are reciprocally affected when combined? Take the steam engine, for instance: when the steam is shut off the machine is powerless; break the machine, and the steam as a design is destroyed. Such a case, we think, is analogous to the one in question. What are the faculties of sight, sound, and feeling, but so many servants administering to the mind? Are not their respective capacities each exercised in conveying to the mind those things which are at once dissolved into ideas, and, if it be necessary, to render them practical? Is

not the body, like a ready servant, at once put in motion for executing them? Such is the superiority of the mind over the body; and is not the same superiority manifested towards the material world? Are not the elements of matter at the command of man, to turn to the best account he may? and what are the whole circle of sciences, but the advantages of fruit so reaped? And though, in its present disunited state, it has not sufficient power to overthrow mountains, and force the currents of oceans, nevertheless the power of that vast Mind from whence it emanated could even now, at its pleasure, sink the whole world into that vast chaos from whence it came? It has also been asserted, that the mind of man is not that of the child. This we deny, as the distinction between them merely consists in the stage of development arrived at by the mind, according to the use made of the senses. If such was not the case, how is it that we possess such distinct recollections of the events transpired in our childhood? Again, can we adduce from the most wonderful organization of matter an inference in accordance with reason to maintain that matter came into existence by the power of its own inherent nature? Mind creates, matter produces; but the production of matter is owing to the will of the mind: for such reasons, and many others which might have been adduced, we think it is obvious that they are necessarily opposed.

JUNO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HOWEVER incongruous it may appear to my opponents to unite that which is generally presumed to be immaterial with that which is material, I feel convinced that mind is produced by matter, and in no way opposed to it. Unfortunately, I have not the means of consulting the works of any of the great writers who have written on subjects bearing on the question at issue; and I am therefore compelled to argue from mere personal experience and observation alone. In investigating this subject, I think it prudent, first, to define, as far as I am able, what I comprehend by the terms (1) *life*, (2) *matter*, and (3) *mind*; and, after showing the relations they bear to each other, and the mode in which mind is produced, I will, to the best of my ability, substantiate the negative opinion which I entertain, viz., that mind is in its nature, origin, and destinies purely worldly and material.

(1) *Life* is a subtle essence, the real nature of which man is incapable of conceiving; and being spiritual, we know it cannot be matter. It pervades all animated nature, and in its wide acceptance means simply animation.

(2) *Matter* means the substantial portion of the universe, and is that upon which life and mind subsist. (3) *Mind* is neither

spiritual nor material. I believe it to be dependent on both, and the link which joins the one to the other; and, being produced by matter, viz., the result of the action of material objects on the perceptive faculties of man, I think it cannot necessarily be opposed to matter. With regard to the relationship which life bears to matter, we all know that, under present circumstances, life could not exist without substance; yet we believe life capable of existence without matter hereafter, and will exist when matter has been dissolved. The relationship which life bears to mind is this: life gives existence to man, who is endowed with sensitive and contemplative organs: when he receives existence these organs are merely animated; but when acted upon by matter, they become sensitive, and sensations and thought are produced, and the mind is formed. By degrees it grows, and is built up by external objects.

Having shown, as far as I am able, what I understand by the words life, matter, and mind, I now proceed to confute the assertions of "Nemo," who evidently confounds *life* and *mind*. It is right to point out the sophistry of what has been said by him, as by so doing I hope we will be able to come to a more correct judgment on the subject. I shall, therefore, analyze his statements, and make such observations upon his remarks as I may think necessary. We can only argue this question from analogy and hypothesis; we are incapable of adducing satisfactory evidence, either pro or con; and all being liable to form erroneous opinions (mine, possibly, being egregiously absurd), I am sure my adversaries will pardon me if any of my statements may appear inconsistent, particularly as I am thrown on individual resources for information on the subject under notice.

J. A. D. has defined mind as "the meditative power or principle which enables us to reason on material objects." I will add to this by stating, that mind is the *result of the action of material objects on the sensorium, and consequently entirely dependent on the senses*. Mind, then, being produced by matter, how is it possible that the one should necessarily be opposed to the other? "Nemo" says, "Man unites in his own person *mind and matter*." With all deference to his superior judgment, I submit that man unites in his person three things—*life, matter, and mind*; and this separating mind from life bears importantly on the subject under consideration. I avow that life is spiritual, matter worldly, and *mind, being the result of the action of matter on life, is worldly also*. In favour of the opinion that mind and life are different in their natures, I cite the fact of their not being coeval; and that life exists when mind does not, as in the case of an infant or an idiot. I will give my friends my ideas as to the reason why life exists when mind does not. Man at his birth, as I have before observed, is endowed with a subtle essence, called life, which gives nothing more than existence. He

is also endowed with organs capable of receiving sensations from, and contemplating on, outward objects. These organs are useless until they come in contact with matter; when they are placed in juxtaposition with it, thought is formed, and, by intercourse with the material, mind is produced. As life rolls on, the perceptive faculties are impaired—the organs wear out—mind fades, and, by degrees, is entirely lost. And why is this? It is because, by the body's decay, its organs become unfitted to receive impressions from external objects, and mind, therefore, cannot exist—while life, I believe, may have being when all the senses are extinct.

Again, to show that mind is not identical with life, and cannot be thoroughly united with it, there is the fact that *life*, once lost, as regards mortality, is lost for ever; whereas *mind* may be lost half-a-dozen times, and yet be repeatedly regained, as in the case of a lunatic. If the foregoing assertions are correct (as I candidly believe them to be), mind cannot be opposed to matter in its nature, as "Nemo" supposes. If mind is opposed to matter, wherefore is it that man cannot conceive anything which is thoroughly spiritual? I think mind must necessarily be associated with the material. My opponents of course believe mind is spiritual, and capable of thinking of the spiritual; but let them *define* one spiritual thought, excepting life,—and even that cannot be *defined*. The highest use of mind is to define to our fellow men our sensations and contemplations, our ideas; and what can we define but that which we have gleaned from matter? What is a spirit? A phantom. And what is a phantom? It possesses a certain degree of ethereal materialism (if I may use the expression), or it could not be conceived.

And pray how do we paint our *supposed* spiritual ideas, when we do so,—in colours or in words? Do we not paint them from the material? Do we not give them mortal shapes and attributes? How can we conceive ghosts and goblins, save by giving them aerial forms from the material? We cannot idealize nothingness, which, I have reason to believe, is that which is by some called spirituality. "Nemo" observes, "If mind is not matter, it must be one and the same thing." I deny that matter and mind is one and the same thing, any more than that fire (which proceeds from matter) and matter is one and the same thing. I assert that mind is so associated with matter, that it cannot be separated from it.

As to the intellectual and moral powers, which "Nemo" attributes to man, what are they? They are powers given by matter, by man to man. These powers are the truths gathered from contact with the material. They are not the productions of one mind, but they are the gatherings of many. To negative "Nemo's" opinion, I cannot do better than quote the words of H. V. M., "Man, passing from the surprise of a first thought

to the reverie of curiosity, *formed* a chain of *reasoning* which clearly shows that all his ideas and modes of existence have been gradually acquired and augmented, one by one, slowly or swiftly, as circumstances have deterred or favoured." Intellectuality and morality is built up by the material, otherwise these powers would be universally inherent in every man. They can only be acquired by intercourse with the world. Let a man be confined solitarily in a room for the first twenty years of his life, and see what a pretty specimen he would be of morality or intellectuality. No; life, I think, is acted upon by matter, as flowers are acted upon by light; the gorgeous hues would remain dead without the action of the sun's rays—so would the mind remain dormant, without the action of matter on life.

And what is the power of *abstraction* composed of, to which "Nemo" refers? He has urged a few facts in support of this power, and says, "From what forms do our abstract terms come? as holiness, justice, virtue, &c. For, admitting them to have been formed *originally* from material objects, yet the abstracting them from the material proves that mind must have an innate and independent power." The answer that I make to these observations is that which "Nemo" appears to admit, viz., that the words referred to have their *origin* in material objects; and as to the power of abstraction, I think the words cannot be so abstracted as not to be associated with the material. Whether the mind has "an innate and independent power," as "Nemo" believes it has, I cannot say; but I infer that the innate power alluded to is nothing more than the result of the previous action of matter on the senses. As to the nature of the sensibility of man's organs, we are entirely ignorant; but whatever innate power the organs possess, they do not possess mind, though they possess the power of gleaning it from matter.

"Nemo" goes on to show that mind has a "*creative*" faculty. I admit it, but say that this faculty has its *origin* in external matter. To support his assertions as to this power he quotes the following:—

"What tho' my soul fantastic measures trod
O'er *faery* fields, or mourn'd along the gloom
Of pathless woods, or, down the craggy steep
Hurl'd headlong, swam with pain the mantl'd pool?

* * * *

Her ceaseless flight, tho' devious, speaks her nature
Of *subtler essence* than the trodden clod."

The whole of the ideas in the above are associated with the material, as necessarily all our ideas are. The substantives "soul," "fairy," "essence," "air," &c., are all more or less material, otherwise they could not be conceived. It is unnecessary for me to give an example of this; I ask any one to deny the truth of what I assert. The *progressive* power which

"Nemo" gives to mind to a great extent goes to prove my case. "The mind admits of growth and development; of decline and extinction. Without the necessary material conditions to call it into exercise, it in all probability would remain undeveloped, undisplayed, unused, and unknown." If this power of progress is not derived from the material world, the mind must have been as powerful at the creation as it is now.

As to *memory*, it is caused by a deep impression received by the senses from external objects. Memory cannot refer to anything but that which has previously had relation to matter. "Nemo" writes, "The power of mind to leave present forms of matter to go back to the past, proves mind to be something in its nature independent of matter." How can memory prove the "independence of mind from matter," when memory itself entirely depends on what has had existence in a material form?

The *moral* and *religious* element which exists in man's mind, and the inherent belief in the existence of a God, is, after all, the result of the teachings of mankind. The same observation applies to man's conscience. What is morality with one race of men is immorality with another; what appears religion to one person seems infidelity to his neighbour; and we find that all nations in their original or savage state worship matter and are idolaters, giving attributes to matter which we give to spirit or life. "Nemo" says, "Again, whence comes all the moral evil which exists? Not from matter, certainly, for matter never has broken, and never can break, the laws by which it is governed." However absurd to some it may seem, I must say that moral evil is originated by matter, and cannot be supported without matter. If moral evil is not worldly and material, then it is spiritual, and will exist when matter has been dissolved. All the dissension, pain, and misery which exist have their root in matter, and spring from it.

With reference to the *origin* of mind, "Nemo" having thought proper to quote passages from Scripture, I claim the right of stating my opinions as to the meaning of those quotations. He says, "But we read that after God had 'formed man out of the dust of the ground,' yet something more than this was necessary, for the mind of man did not exist till God '*breathed into his nostrils the breath of life*, and man became a *living soul*.' We see, then, clearly, how widely opposed in its origin mind is to matter; being, indeed, nothing less than a direct emanation from the *eternal mind* of the Deity." I differ entirely from "Nemo" when he infers that God breathed *mind* into man's nostrils—and that is plainly "Nemo's" impression. It was *life*, I think, that was breathed into man, and not *mind*—mind was the necessary production of matter on the organs which were made sensitive by life. Again, were mind a direct emanation from the eternal mind of the Deity, it must form part of the Deity, and be capable of comprehending the nature of the Deity, or its powers must

have been limited by its great Author. That it is in the power of the Giver of all to place limits on our knowledge (or mind), no one will be so impious as to deny; if admitted, then the Supreme Being was capable of forming mind so as to be necessarily opposed to matter, or so uniting mind with matter that the former could not exist without the latter. I believe, from the account given in Genesis, that after the universe was completed, man was formed with organs adapted to work in conjunction with matter, and then the Creator breathed life, and man became a living soul, but not an immediate thinking one, thought being afterwards produced by his contact with matter.

I will now consider the immediate and ultimate destinies which "Nemo" says mind possesses over matter. I admit that mind has immediate destinies, but they are wound up in matter, and are merely the "ups and downs" of the world through life's contact with matter. Who can say what mind will be ultimately? How can we bring the future to bear on the question under consideration? "What can we reason but from what we know?" Every man has his opinion as to his soul's destiny, but every man has not an "innate consciousness that he is destined for immortality." The "innate consciousness" referred to is the result of the teachings of others; it is not inherent in our natures; it is *fancy* converted into superstitious *belief*.

The foregoing remarks, in my humble opinion, do not interfere with the divine truths of religion. I believe that everything is possible to the great God that has formed me; that if he so wills it, this soul shall soon "be liberated from the gross impediments with which it is surrounded;" that the being which pervades this mortal form shall hereafter be remodelled for spirituality, and doomed to soar in realms of eternal bliss; and that the time is approaching when the impure mind which I now possess "shall pass away, and leave not a wreck behind."

London.

CHESCO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

IN answering this question in the negative, the duty devolves on us of disproving what has been advanced in the affirmative. Accurate definitions of the terms of the debate are essential to correct deductions. The writer of Affirmative Article I. admits this, but fails to produce such definitions. But inasmuch as reasoning from incomplete premises, when carried fully out, must, of necessity, by the *reductio ad absurdum* method, lead to such conclusions as shall clearly show the fallacy of the assumed definitions, we will, previous to detailed investigation of "Nemo's" premises, endeavour to show their inconsistency by means of the conclusions which may be logically deduced from them. "Nemo's" idea of mind and matter resolves itself into the conveniently comprehensive, but very indefinite expression, "that matter is not mind, and that mind is not matter." This fundamental proposition—to the proof of which, from differences

in their nature, origin, and destinies, the greater part of the article is devoted—"Nemo" considers as an antecedent to the inevitable conclusion that matter and mind must be opposed. In the syllogistic form his argument runs thus:—Things which are different are opposed: mind and matter are different; *ergo*, mind and matter are opposed. That we are not misrepresenting our opponent's argument will be evident from the following quotation from his article:—"If mind is not opposed to matter, it must be one and the same thing; . . . the very attempt to define mind, as distinguished from matter, clearly assumes that it has a separate existence, and is, *therefore*, opposed to it." "Nemo's" whole argument rests on the assumed identity of difference and opposition; a proposition so obviously fallacious, that, but for the positiveness with which it is assumed, we should have to apologise for occupying the reader's attention with a refutation. If difference is opposition, all things that differ must necessarily be opposed. As no two things are identical, all things are different; therefore, all things are opposed. But opposition implies the existence of a contrary power, which we name agreement. Opposition is the negation of agreement, and therefore dependent on it for existence. If all things are opposed, none can agree, and agreement cannot exist. But some things do agree, and are, therefore, not opposed. Hence all things are opposed, and some things are not opposed, which is manifestly absurd and impossible. Therefore difference does not necessitate opposition. For though all things are different, some things do agree, which is reasonable and possible.

"Nemo" admits that the question "tacitly assumes the existence of matter as such;" that is, an existence independent of mind's existence. But if this be admitted in the question, and separate existence be the same as opposition, then the question is a nullity, a question containing its own answer, an insult to both reader and writer of which we cannot believe the editors to be guilty. To produce instances of things that differ from each other, but are not opposed, would be a needless imposition on the reader's patience; and sufficient reasons have been adduced to indicate that things opposed are not so *because* they are different. We will proceed to investigate some of the details of our opponent's argument.

"Nemo" has a passing allusion to the fact, "that some eminent persons have denied the existence of matter, and asserted that the whole universe existed only as idea." This is accompanied by the sneering remark, that this theory and the doubt of one's own existence are "about equally easy to prove." This is no argument at all. For, as every student of metaphysics is aware, self-existence is incapable of proof. Descartes' celebrated fundamental proposition,—*ego cogito, ergo sum*, being, as a logical deduction, incomplete. Absolute proof of either the existence or non-existence of matter is equally impossible. But the prepon-

derance of evidence will be found, on investigation, to favour the theory which "Nemo" treats so lightly. We have no absolute knowledge of matter. All we know is but an *idea* of it, obtained by means of the impressions of our senses. We have sensations of form, extension, colour, &c., which give us an idea, which we name matter. We have manifestly no other real knowledge of matter than the idea which these sensations produce. This theory is simple enough, and is applicable to the phenomenon matter. But the theory which would claim for matter more than an ideal existence, is much more complex, and, indeed, more difficult to receive, when really understood; for it requires the mind to *assume* the existence of a *substratum* to the impressions we receive, a something more than our perceptions give us any sensation of, and, even to conceive which, requires an abstraction and power of mind seldom possessed by those who claim for matter an absolute existence. The common objection to the ideal theory is founded on a misconception of it. Thus we are told, if matter does not exist, to walk over a precipice. The results of such an action are in no way evidence of the existence of matter. They show that we have certain sensations, and that these sensations are produced in conformity with certain rules or laws which invariably regulate their production: but the point at issue still remains unsettled,—is there a substantial existence to the idea we have of these sensations? We would wish it to be distinctly understood that we by no means deny the existence of matter "as such." We merely affirm that such existence is purely hypothetical, having not the least support from our actual experience, and requiring, for its conception, an abstract effort of the imagination. Matter may exist "as such," but we have no proof or evidence that it does. Our actual knowledge of matter is limited to an idea compounded of experienced sensations. But we have no sense which conveys to our mind the impression of existence. Sight gives us the sensations of form, extension, colour, &c., but not of existence;—the faculty of feeling imparts the impression of form, extension, solidity, &c., but not of existence; and so on does each sense convey some sensations, but never that of existence; the mind alone originates that. Existence is a theoretical *substratum* to the idea which mind has obtained by sensation. In defining matter we are obviously bound to a consideration of what we *know* only, and cannot introduce what we may happen to think. Now we only know matter as indicated by sensation; that is, we know it approximately, and not absolutely; we have only an idea of it. Matter is, therefore, as far as it can be defined, a *mental idea*. We do not positively assert that matter has no absolute existence; we merely state that we can be only conscious of it as having ideal existence. In this, as in every other discussion involving the term matter, we must confine our attention to it as known, that is, as an idea of the mind. Matter is, then, as far as our real

knowledge of it can indicate, dependent on mind. This does not mean that matter is mind: for it is quite possible for any one thing to be dependent on another without necessarily being identical with that other. But "Nemo," in asserting "that matter is not mind," considers as implied that matter is not dependent on mind; a very gratuitous assumption, and as a deduction illogical.

Though excluding from the sphere of debate the "ETERNAL MIND," "Nemo" considers it included in the term mind. He limits the question to the human mind on the ground of a further extension of the inquiry being "as unnecessary as it would be impious." We should think, however, that what is "unnecessary" and "impious" has been already performed, by "Nemo" including the Creator under the term employed to designate one of the departments of creation. Though it is possible to conceive mind capable of creating matter, yet to suppose mind capable of creating mind is as absurd and unreasonable as to think matter could create matter. It is obvious that nothing can be self-creative; this would, however, be the case were mind the creation of mind. Hence, to term the Creator mind is either highly irreverent or an unwarrantable abuse of language. The Creator must necessarily be infinitely superior to matter, mind, or any other phase of creative manifestation; and it is on this ground—and not because included in the terms of debate, but "unnecessary" and "impious" to discuss—that we are not called upon to consider whether matter be opposed to its Creator.

Our remarks, that the present question of debate must be discussed with reference exclusively to matter as *known*, apply equally to mind. Mind is the perceiving principle, that *apprehends or experiences the idea matter, and reflects on the experienced idea*. This we *know*; but further, the opinion is entertained and firmly believed by many, that the mind possesses "*innate ideas*," certain abstract ideas entirely independent of experience. The conceptions of God, justice, virtue, &c., are cited as such. On the first enunciation of this theory it appears very plausible; for certainly we have ideas of God, justice, &c., though we have had no such sensational experiences. But when the subject is thoroughly analyzed, we think a fallacy will be detected, and that it will be found that *all* our ideas are derived, either directly by experience, or indirectly by reflection on experience. To take the idea of God as a specimen of the so-called "*innate ideas*." Its prevalence is universal; nations the most diverse in habits, customs, and language; the most different in intellectual capacity, living in every variety of clime, and opposed to each other in all other conceivable points, yet have this one idea in common. This surely appears to favour the theory of its being innate. But let us examine the nature of the idea. We think it will be found to be a universal fact, that this idea of God in its simplest form is that of the *Maker*. The intelligent

English child has his first conception of God as the Being who made all things; and the infant at the Sunday school is first asked, "Who made you?" And so it is in every case, that the primary idea of God is of Him as the Creator: and the "Fire-maker," "Rain-maker," "Earth-maker," "Wind-maker," &c., is the idea of God entertained by those uncivilized tribes who have not attained to a second mental product. Any higher idea of God as a wise, benevolent, and just Being, is a subsequent qualification added to this primary idea of Him as the Creator. Now the idea of a Maker is obviously dependent on the idea of something made; the idea of the Creator is the result of the mind's reflection on the experienced idea of creation. Such is the origin of the idea the mind forms of God. Further reflection on further experience extends the idea, by showing that the Creator must be intelligent and wise. The other attributes of the Creator are conceived by a similar mutual extension of experience and reflection. Would space permit, we might show how the other so-called "innate ideas" are all derived originally from matter. "Nemo" admits that ideas which the mind has the power of abstracting from experienced ideas have originated from "material objects," but calls ideas with such an origin "innate." This use of the word "innate" entirely removes the very distinctive meaning which is the peculiar characteristic of that term. The phrase "innate ideas," as used by Descartes and philosophers generally, is intended to indicate those ideas which have been considered as entirely distinct in their *origin* from experienced ideas. We have, we hope, satisfactorily pointed out that there are *no* such originated ideas; all being derived from experience, either directly, or by reflection indirectly. Hence our definition of mind must be that which receives experienced ideas (ideas of matter), and reflects thereon (thinks). Mind is the *perceptive and reflective principle*. Matter is the *perceived or experienced idea*. These two, matter and mind, are united, and form the compound man; and only in their present connection can we obtain that certain knowledge of them which can enable us to answer the question, whether the two are opposed. Hence the attempt of "Nemo" to show their difference in origin or destiny, even if successful, could not be depended on as an answer to the question. For instance, with reference to their destinies, the death of man is but the cessation of the faculty, till then possessed by the mind, of experiencing the idea matter. *Is* mind, &c.? not, *Was* or *will be* mind, &c.? is the subject of debate.

Our knowledge of matter as an idea of mind, and our knowledge of mind only, as connected with this idea, inevitably leads to the conclusion that *mind is not opposed to matter*; and further (which our negative position does not oblige us to show), that as far as we know them they are *necessarily connected*.

E. M., Jun.

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED
TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

AFTER the able article by "B. S.," it seems almost a work of supererogation for us to retrace the same ground; but the pioneer has so much to do in merely opening up the road, that he is oftentimes prevented from noticing the peculiar features of the soil, or the varied products for which the soil is suitable; and so it is with a discussion like the present, it is almost impossible to say all that can be said of a subject until the weakness or the strength of our adversaries have discovered the strength or weakness of our own side. And we think that it would have helped the reader to a more just conclusion had "B. S.," in his own inestimable manner, shown the distinctive features of the religious sects of India, and their bearings and influences upon the whole of Indian society. This point which he, as pioneer, has left almost unnoticed, we would attempt briefly to touch upon, because it seems to us to favour the view which we ourselves take of the question.

Its principal superstition or religion is Brahminism, so called either from its triune deity, Brahm, or from its priests, the Brahmins. Brahm is represented as boundless and formless, infinite in wisdom, in power, and in knowledge; he is only to be adored in his attributes of creation, preservation, destruction, and (associated with the last) reproduction. Brahma, the first in dignity, is the creator; Vishnu the preserver; Siva, or Mahadeva, the destroyer and reproducer; and these three form the trinity of Hindooism.

From the head of Brahma, the creator, sprang the first caste, the Brahmins, the priests and teachers to whom alone the sacred books are committed, and who represent the supreme wisdom.

From his arms sprang the second caste, the Chetri, or Kshetrya, who were to be the warriors and defenders of their sacred religion.

The third, or mercantile class, the Vaisya, sprang from his loins; and the fourth and lowest, or servile caste, the Soodra, sprang from his feet.

It is easy to see how such a system would operate, when intermarriages between the various castes were strictly prohibited; and even the vessels used by members of one caste must not be touched by another, at the risk of losing caste; this prevailing fear is so interwoven with the whole of Indian society, that no act can be separated from its influence. To show the bearings of caste, one authority says, "a Brahmin, whether learned or ignorant, is a powerful divinity; and though they may employ

themselves in all sorts of mean occupations, they must ever be honoured, for they are something transcendently divine." The same writer says, "The natural duty of the Soodra is servitude."*

"Castes," says another writer, "are hereditary distinctions, and well calculated for the object at which they were intended to aim; they exalt the dignity of the Brahmin tribe above all others, it matters not how situated, and portion out honour and reverence in exact proportion to the proximity to that favoured tribe."

Many books are prohibited to all but the Brahmins. Others are allowed to the Chettri; others to the Vaisya; but the Sudra are confined to hearing; and there are some which none may even hear but the first class. The distinction is known by the dress, by difference in the zennar or sacred thread, of which a Brahmin wears four, and puts them on at eight years of age; a Chettri three, from eleven years; and the Vaisya two, from twelve years. One of its most monstrous developments is Thuggism, which all the efforts of European laws and European civilization have not been able wholly to suppress. Thugs are professional murderers, lying in wait on the highways in India, supporting themselves on the plunder of the unsuspecting traveller, and offering their victims to KALI, patroness of indiscriminate and sanguinary destruction; and in this fearful sect there are regular degrees, rights, and privileges, and every man shared in the booty according to the rank he held in the gang.

And if anything were needed to show the predominant power of caste, do we not see it in the Suttie mounting the funeral pile of her departed lord, as well as in the Brahmin or Thug, or in the professional poisoner, or in that most horrible of all crimes—infanticide; where "the felon father receives the warm, palpitating body from its mother's hands, he has with awful unconcern deposited the precious charge in its early sepulchre, dug by his own hands; and instead of gazing with a father's rapture upon the new-born infant, he has concealed it from his view by covering its mangled form with the unconscious earth; and, to obliterate all traces of the deed, has trodden down the yielding soil, and strowed it over with green boughs, or covered it with verdant turf?"†

And so absorbed is each in his own caste, that he would not, even to save another from death, stretch out his hand to give him even a drop of cold water; but though thus prevented by caste, as we have seen, it will not prevent him from the commission of any crime, even of murder: and even a Brahmin does not scruple to encourage and defend falsehood, and even perjury; and justify them openly as virtues in the highest degree, when employed for the protection of their caste.

The influence of caste, however, which prevails in some form or another from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya mountains, is evidenced by the fact that though coolies will carry any load, how-

* Institutes of Menu.

† Caste and Christianity.

ever offensive, upon their head, if ordered to carry a man they will at once refuse, saying, that it is the business of another caste. The Rohillas will submit to be flogged within an inch of their lives with a leathern martingale, but to be struck with a whip or a cane would be an indelible disgrace. In Mysore there is a caste in which the mother amputates the middle finger up to the middle joint on the marriage of the eldest daughter.

The castes of India are so numerous, that our space would fail us were we to attempt to even enumerate them all. The land is infested with sturdy beggars, who unite the characteristics of jugglers, cut-throats, robbers, and saints. The Fakir and Bairagi, covered with filth and sores, still wander through India, and extort alms from the superstitious natives.

We have, we think, plainly shown the general influence which caste has in India now to connect it with the present revolt.

The history of the mutiny at first was generally ascribed to the greased cartridges; and it is said that the knowledge was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual way. The cartridges were made up by men of an inferior caste; and one day a Lascar asked a Brahmin Sepoy for a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot, which was refused. The Lascar, in return, taunted the sepoy with the fact that he was defiled every day by touching the cartridges smeared with cow's fat. The Hindoo, horror-struck, rushed to his comrades—it was found to be true. Conceiving themselves deceived and insulted by the Government, the news spread from rank to rank, and station to station, till the entire army was in a state of frenzy. There can be but little doubt if the history of the mutiny is carefully read, that, however the work of the revolt was aided by Mussulman intrigues and Oude money, caste was not merely the *catapaw*, but the ruling principle which made the work of disaffection easier. Sparks upon a rock die out harmless, but falling upon a thatched house an immediate conflagration is the result; so it is with India. Prophecy had pointed to the end of the conquerors' reign when a hundred years had transpired; and the priest-craft of caste pointed to the besmeared cartridges, and their defiled consciences took alarm; they saw in it an attempt to subvert the religion of their ancestors, and they no doubt believed it to be an act of religious duty not only to sacrifice to their vengeance the men, but the women and mother with the infant at the breast, and inaugurated a reign of such fiendish cruelty in the sacred name of religion, that we can heartily sympathize with those of our men who would retaliate by destroying at one blow caste and all its concomitant evils.

We think, from a calm review of all the features of the revolt, that the unanimous verdict of the readers of the *British Contraversionalist* will be that the ayes have the day, and we wait with somewhat of impatience to read B. S.'s summing up and reply.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.*

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART III.—THE CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES.

II. THE SUBSTANTIVE WITH THE ARTICLE—continued.

8. The article is repeated before every noun of a series, and before every adjective of a series, except when the nouns all mean the same individual, or when all the adjectives belong to the same substantive; as, *le cœur, l'esprit, les mœurs, tout gagne à culture; le feu, l'air, et l'eau semblaient s'être déclarés en guerre; on ne doit pas juger du bon ou du mauvais naturel d'une personne par les traits de son visage; l'ancien et le nouveau continent paraissent tous deux avoir été rongés par l'océan.* Here two dispositions are spoken of, and two continents.

9. But when the nouns belong to the same object, and are only different names for the same being, the article is *not* repeated; nor yet when the adjectives belong to one and the same substantive; as, *Alexandra, fils de Philippe, roi de Macédoine; on trouve des condors dans LES savanes ou prairies naturelles; LES collines ou petites montagnes y sont couvertes d'arbres toujours verts; quand nous voyageons, LES belles et fertiles plaines nous ennuient.* In this last example, to repeat the article, and say, *les belles et les fertiles plaines*, would mean *two sorts of plains*, while the writer evidently means *plains* that are at the same time *beautiful and fertile*.

But when there is in the construction of the sentence anything which serves to obviate ambiguity, the article may be omitted or not at pleasure: as, *Voltaire, LE digne, LE continué, LE passionné admirateur de Racine; LES autorités civiles et militaires.*

10. The article is also omitted before the number of a book, chapter, page, king, &c.; as, *commences au livre trois, chapitre quatre, François premier, George second, Richard trois, Henri quatre, Charles dix, Pie neuf.*

11. But the omission is most in use—

- (1) In proverbial phrases; as, *PAUVRETE' n'est pas VICE.*
- (2) In adverbial expressions; such as, *sans doute, avec raison, entre amis.*
- (3) In vivid description, and in the enumeration of different objects; as, *tombeaux, trônes, palais, tout périt, tout s'écroule.*
- (4) The article is always omitted after the preposition *EN*, without exception.

12. The partitive form of the article is used—

- (1) As an equivalent for *quelque* and *quelques*; as, *toujours la patrie a DES CHARMES pour nous*, our native land always has (some) charms for us.

* Continued from page 281, Vol. IV.

- (2) As an equivalent for the genitive (or possessive) case; as, *la perte DE LA bataille*, the loss of the battle; *les palais DU roi*, the palaces of the king.
13. But the article is dropped, and only the preposition *de* is retained—
- (1) Before a noun, preceded by an adjective; as, *pour DE bonnes raisons*, for certain good reasons; *proposons nous DE GRANDS EXEMPLES à imiter, plutôt que DE VAINS SYSTEMES à suivre*, let us set before ourselves great examples to be imitated, rather than vain theories to be followed.
- (2) To express the material of which anything is made, or to mark its character or origin; as, *une chaîne D'or*, a chain of gold; *un homme DE courage*, a man of courage; *l'âge DE raison*, manhood.
14. Sometimes the substantive, taken partitively, and the adjective before it, are so united in use, as to convey an idea of their own; as, *bon mot*, a witty saying; *petite-maison*, an asylum for lunatics, &c; in such cases, *du, de la, or des*, is used, according to No. 12.
15. Also, when the latter noun is rendered definite by any word or words that may follow it, then (according to No. 1) the article must be used: thus, "*j'ai lu un grand nombre de fables*" is correct, while "*fables*" is undefined; but if I mention the author, the article must be inserted, "*j'ai lu un grand nombre DES fables d'Ésope*."
16. In negative expressions, *de* is to be used, unless the latter substantive is defined or described; as, "*cet homme n'a pas de sentiments*;" "*Madame je n'ai point des sentiments si bas*."
- Let the student compare the following sentences:—*Je ne vous ferai pas de reproches frivoles*; and, *Je ne vous ferai pas des reproches frivoles*. The former means, *I shall not reproach you*; all reproaches would be vain: the second means, *My reproaches will be just and severe*. If the idea is decidedly negative, use *de* only; as, "*je ne connais pas d'hommes désœuvrés que ne s'ennuient*, where the author intimates that *all idle persons weary themselves*."
17. So in questions to which an affirmative answer is expected, the article is to be used; as, "*N'avez-vous pas lu des oraisons?*" that is, "*Vous avez lu des oraisons n'est ce pas?*" But "*N'avez-vous pas lu d'oraisons?*" intimates that "*I am afraid you have not*."

III. THE SUBSTANTIVE WITH THE ADJECTIVE.

18. The adjective takes the gender and number of the substantive or pronoun which it qualifies; as—

"Il est sur ce rivage une race flétrie,
Une race étrangère au sein de sa patrie."

"There is upon this shore a branded race,
A race repelled as strangers from their country's breast."

19. Adjectives which qualify several singular substantives are put in the plural, and in the masculine plural when the substantives are of different genders; as, "*Je tâche de rendre heureux ma femme, mon enfant, et même mon chien*." "*Dans la Laponie, la rence, le genièvre, et la mousse font seuls la verdure de l'été*."

Harmony requires that the adjective which qualifies two substantives of different gender should stand nearer to the masculine; as, "*L'orgueil aveugle*"

se suppose une *grandeur* et un *mérite parfaits*." "Une *application* et un *travail* continuel font surmonter bien des obstacles."

20. The adjective, after two or more substantives, agrees with the last only—

- (1.) When the substantives are pretty nearly synonymous; as, "Sully parlait à Henri IV. avec une franchise, une sincérité, aussi honorable pour le roi que pour le ministre." "Alexandre s'annonça par un courage, une bravoure supérieure à son âge."
- (2.) When the last one is intended particularly to claim attention; as, "Le fer, le bandeau, la flamme est toute prête." "Il m'avait fait perdre en un instant l'attention, et l'estime publique."
- (3.) When the substantives are connected by the conjunction *ou*; as, "Un courage ou une prudence étonnante." "Dès qu'un enfant a un penchant ou une répugnance marquée, il faut lui obéir." "From the time that (as soon as) a child has a decided inclination or repugnance, it is necessary to obey it (to be guided by it)."

In this case the adjective is often put in the plural; as, "Les Samoièdes se nourrissent de chair ou de poisson *crus*." "On demande un homme ou une femme *agés*."

21. But the adjectives *nu*, naked; *demi*, half; *excepté*, except or excepted; *supposé*, suppose or supposed, are invariable, when they precede the substantive, and agree with it when they follow it; as, "*Il était nu-tête et nu-jambes*." "He was bareheaded and barelegged." "*Il suivait pieds nus*." "He followed barefoot." "*Partout, dans le desert, la terre est nue, sèche, et aride*." "*Saint Louis porta la couronne d'épines, nu-pieds, nu-tête, depuis le bois de Vincennes jusqu'à Notre Dame*." "*Je n'aime ni les demi-vengances ni les demi-fripons*." "*On ne gouverne pas une nation par des demi-mesures*." "*Si les demi-lumières éloignent de la religion, les lumières complètes y ramènent*." "*Un demi-heure*." "*Hier à dix heures et demie, le roi déclara*," &c. "Excepté ces personnes," except those persons; "*ces personnes exceptées*," those persons excepted.

Nu, used figuratively or accompanied by the article, follows the general rule; as, "*La nue propriété des biens*." "The bare property of the goods" (without the use or benefit of them).

DEMI is employed as a substantive, and forms its plural regularly; as, "*Cette montre sonne les demies*." "This watch strikes the half-hours." "*La demie est sonnée*." "The half-hour has been struck."

22. *FEU*, deceased, agrees with its substantive, *when it stands next to it*, otherwise not; as, "*feu la reine*," "*la feue reine*," the late queen; "*feu ma mère*," "*ma feue mère*."

23. In English, we commonly say, "the first and second stages," "the Latin and Greek languages." For this there is some show of reason in some phrases of Latin authors, though it is, perhaps, indefensible, except by these examples. The French language does not admit such expressions at all; it requires that the substantive should be in the singular; as, "*Le premier et le second ETAGE*." "*LA LANGUE Romaine et la Grecque*." "*Les lecteurs seraient charmés de voir la comparaison de quelques scènes de LA PIEDRE GREGQUE, de LA LATINE, de LA FRANÇAISE, et de L'ANGLAISE*."

24. When two adjectives are placed together, and one of them qualifies the other, as *châtain clair*, bright chestnut colour, they are not subject to variation; as, "*des cheveux châtain clair*," "light chestnut hair."

25. When substantives are used as adjectives, they are invariable; as, "*Le colibri à gorge CARMIN a quatre pouces et demi de longueur.*" "The red-throated serpent is four inches and a half long." "*Les couleurs du grand casque sont AURORE.*" "The colours of the great helmet are yellow."

26. Some adjectives require to be followed by certain prepositions, and others by different ones; as, *Il est affable avec tous, fidèle a ses amis, et chéri de sa famille.*

Consequently, when two adjectives require different prepositions, they must not be employed in the same clause. "*Ce père est utile et chéri de sa famille,*" is not proper language. It should be, "*Ce père est utile a sa famille et en est chéri,*" or better still, "*Ce père est utile et cher à sa famille.*"

27. *Numeral Adjectives.* UN, *one* (used also as an indefinite article) takes a feminine form, UNE, with a feminine substantive. When employed to denote the figure or the number *one*, it is subject to no variation; as, *Trois UN de suite font cent onze en chiffres arabes.* Three *ones* in succession make a hundred and eleven in Arabic figures. It is sometimes used in the plural *uns, unes*, as in the phrase, *les uns les autres, les unes les autres, one another*, implying several persons.

UN is the only numeral adjective that is united to the tens by means of the conjunction ET; as, *vingt ET UN*, twenty-one; *trente ET UN*, thirty-one; and so on up to *soixante ET UN*. Beyond that, UN is joined to the larger number with a hyphen; as, *quatre-vingt-un*, eighty-one. *SOIXANTE ET DIX*, for seventy is the only case besides in which *et* is used. *Seventy-one* is *soixante-onze*; *seventy-two*, *soixante-douze*; and so on.

We say in English, *one of my books*, and *a book of mine*, indifferently; but in French, the first only is allowable: *un de mes livres*.

28. VINGT and CENT take a plural form when they are multiplied by another number; but if they are followed by a third, they are not altered; as, *quatre-VINGTS soldats*, eighty soldiers; *quatre-VINGT cinq soldats*, eighty-five soldiers; *l'homme ne vit pas aujourd'hui au delà de quatre-VINGTS ans*; *il vivait autrefois plus de TROIS CENTs ans*. Man does not now live above fourscore years; formerly he used to live more than three hundred years. *Adam a vécu NEUF CENT TRENTE ans*.

When VINGT and CENT are used as ordinal numbers, they do not take a plural form; as, *numéro DEUX CENT*, number 200; *l'an CINQ CENT*, the year 500.

29. MILLE takes the form MIL, ONLY IN DATES RECKONED FROM THE CHRISTIAN ERA. The present year, 1858, is *l'an MIL huit cent cinquante huit*. The year of the deluge is, *MILLE six cent cinquante six de la création*, or *deux MILLE trois cent quarante huit avant l'ère chrétienne*.

30. The ordinal numbers, *premier*, first, *second*, second, have feminine forms, *première* and *seconde*. None of the rest take any change for gender. Subject to this limitation, ordinal numbers agree in gender and number with their substantives; as, *les PREMIERS hommes*; *la SECONDE irruption des Gaulois*; *la TROISIÈME fois*.

31. In naming the position of any person or thing with respect to a series, though it is not wrong to use the ordinal numbers in reference to *chapters*, *books*, and other things, it is more common to use the cardinal for higher terms than the second, as, *le QUATRIÈME chapitre*, or *chapitre QUATRIÈME*, or *chapitre QUATRE*. With the names of sovereigns, we begin with *premier* and *second*, but afterwards take the cardinal numbers; as, *George TROIS*, *Henri HUIT*, *Guillaume QUATRE*, *Louis QUATORZE*.

32. To express the dimensions of any object, we may use either a substantive or an adjective; thus, in speaking of the height of a wall, we may either say, *ce mur est haut de dix pieds*, or, *ce mur a dix pieds de hauteur*, answering to our English expressions, "This wall is ten feet high," and "This wall has a height of ten feet."

33. Rectangular dimensions, which are expressed in English by the preposition *by*, are translated by the use of *sur*, as, *un plancher de quinze pieds de large sur dix-huit et demi de long*, a floor fifteen feet by eighteen and a half.

LESSONS IN MATHEMATICS.

QUESTIONS (*continued*).

XXXI. At an election three candidates stood, and 1000 votes were polled. The second candidate on the poll had twenty votes more than the third; but if the first had only polled the same number of votes as the second, and the same number of votes had been polled, the third candidate would have been at the head of the poll by 10 majority. How many votes were polled by each?

XXXII. By the last census, the population of Great Britain was found to be about 18,844,000, the parts employed in agriculture, and trade and manufactures, were respectively 1,499,000 and 3,110,000. How much per cent. of the whole population was each of these classes?

XXXIII. A labourer's wages are 9s. 8d. per week, how much does he receive for 11 weeks' work? Assuming that there are 58,240,000 acres of land in the United Kingdom, how many square miles of land does it contain? Note, 640 acres make 1 square mile.

XXXIV. In Great Britain, the population of which is computed at 18,526,880, $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the population exercise the elective franchise: determine the number of electors. What per centage of the whole population of Great Britain is the population of Scotland, 2,620,180?

XXXV. If the whole revenue of the country (£50,000,000) were paid as interest on the national debt (£760,000,000), how much per cent. would it give? Find the interest on £7,650 10s. for five years, at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., simple interest.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

XXV. He loses £14 1s. 9d. His income, after the reduction, is £183 2s. 9d.

XXVI. 148 yards cost £35 3s.

XXVII. (1) $\frac{11}{13}\frac{8}{100}$. (2) $7\frac{3}{100}$ of an inch.

XXVIII. £3,520,000.

XXIX. (1) 5·67. (2) ·3794733.

XXX. 6.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

178. "Crabbe" wishes to know whose are the best editions of Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, Dryden?

179. Would the Editor please inform "Studens," whether the under-noted colleges publish calendars; and if so, by whom are they published, and at what price?—King's College, London; University of Durham; St. David's College, Lampeter; St. Bees' College; Cuddesdon Theological College; Universities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, and St. Andrew's.

180. Can any of your readers oblige by giving me any information as to the age of some ancient woodcut prints, coloured, by (Frederic de Wit, excudit, some prints spell it Widt), and what country the above person is supposed to be a native of. The description of No. 2 is Masole, a sepulchre of the king of Caria in Great Asia, &c. No. 3. The pyramids upon the burial places of the kings of Egypt, &c. No. 4. The Walls of Babilon, of the Queen Semiramis, the mother of Ninus, built on the shore of the Ufrates, &c. No. 5. The Fores Tower, of marble, made of Ptolemæus Filadelf, for a fire-baken for the seamen, &c. No. 7. Being the last, I beg to copy in full, spelt exactly as in print; also each print is copied in three other languages. OLIMPIUS, the image of Jupiter in his temple in Achaya, in a place called Olimpus, situate between the towns Elide and Pisa, was framed of small peeces of perphir stone or purple marble, but of a perfect stature, and so large that men seem'd to bee but krowes in comparison; *Phidias*, the most ingenious carver of images was the framer thereof; the Olimpik games, instituted by Hercules in honour of the said image,

were five years with wrostitling, and other pastimes exercised there?—J. T.

181. I should be greatly obliged if any of your readers would furnish a list of manuals or treatises bearing on the routine and practice of an accountant; also, of a property and commission agent, stating the relative merits of the best in each line from individual knowledge. Will you kindly find a place for this inquiry in your next number, and favour me with the replies (if any); as the information might also prove very useful to others in like business, if they were to appear in your "Inquirer" section. Trusting this to your well-known disposition to oblige others.—J. H. L.

182. Would the Editor, or some of the readers of the *British Controversialist*, inform "Theologian" which are the best commentaries (both ancient and modern) on the Bible, as a whole; on the New Testament; and on detached portions of Scripture; also, some of the best dissenting commentaries?

183. What is the easiest and altogether the best work for SELF-INSTRUCTION in English composition?—T. B. J.

184. We read in the newspapers somewhat as follows:—"On the 2nd of March, an open scholarship in Pembroke College, Oxford, will be filled up by examination. Applicants to call on Dr. Jeune (master), with testimonials, &c., on or before the 1st of the month." Making allowances for alterations of dates, names, &c., the same announcement has appeared several times before. Now, will you please to inform me in the next number of the *British Controversialist*, (1) whether candidates must belong to one or other of our public schools; and (2) if not,

from whom must testimonials, &c., as required, be obtained? Also, (3) where can we get information as to examinations, subjects, &c.? and, (4) would you say something as to the mode of proceeding for obtaining them, and how one can gain information with regard to them? I am exceedingly obliged for your kind attention to my suggestion.—THETA.

185. What steps must be taken to become a member of the Royal College of Preceptors? Would it be too much to ask you to reply by post? If so, perhaps you will kindly reply in the next number of the *Controversialist*.—S. B.

186. Can any of your readers inform me where I am most likely to procure copies of the works of the Greek and Latin Commentators on Aristotle and Plato, including the works of the schoolmen, down to the period of the revival of letters?—PHILOFONUS.

187. In the second volume of the

new series of the *Controversialist*, page 145, is a note concerning a book entitled "The Progress of Being," by the Rev. D. Thomas. Can you inform me of the name of the publisher, and price of the book?—MEGA.

188. Any contributor or reader of the *British Controversialist*, who will kindly mention through its pages the principal publications which advocate the affirmative side, and those which advocate the negative side of the following question, viz.—"Are the lower animals possessed of reason?" "Are the planets inhabited?" will highly oblige.—QUILL.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

176. When either a pianoforte (second hand), or an harmonium (new), can be obtained at the low price of £5. I should think such a work as that required by W. T., is not to be obtained, or even required.—J. J. G.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

St. Bartholomew's Working Men's Institute, Gray's Inn Road.—The Half-yearly General Meeting of the Discussion Class of the above Institute was held on the 2nd ult., Mr. A. H. Crowther in the chair. The hon. sec. (Mr. Peter Preedy), read the report, from which it appears that the class had held twenty-three meetings during the half-year, and that there had been an attendance of 751 members and strangers, showing an average of more than thirty-two persons present at each meeting.

After the election of a committee for the half-year, votes of thanks were passed to the retiring committee, to the honorary secretary, and to the chairman, who returned thanks, and the meeting separated.

The class meets every Saturday evening at half-past eight o'clock, and presents great advantages to all debaters

residing in the neighbourhood, strangers being allowed to take part in the debates.

Dudley Young Men's Religious and Literary Society.—The second annual soiree of this Society, was held on Monday, the 28th of December, 1857, in the Lancasterian schoolroom, Stafford-street. The room, which was very tastefully decorated by the members of the society with evergreens, mottoes, &c., was completely crowded, nearly 700 persons being present. After tea, the president of the society, R. H. Smith, Esq. (manager of the Dudley branch of the Birmingham Bank), was called to the chair. In an able speech he expressed the deep interest he felt in any movement calculated to improve and enlighten the intellects of young men, and urged upon all present the obligations they were under to support

the society he had then the honour of presiding over. The late secretary, Mr. J. W. C. Johnson, then read the report of the society's operations during the past year; that throughout the year meetings had been held regularly once a-week, at which essays on popular subjects had been delivered by members of the society. Several public lectures had also been delivered by ministers of the town and neighbourhood; a class for the study of grammar was also in existence, which met once a fortnight, and arrangements had been made for a class for the study of mental philosophy, to be conducted by the Rev. D. K. Shoebotham, on his own voluntary suggestion, to commence on Monday evening, January 11, 1858.

After the report was concluded, a very choice and appropriate programme of vocal and instrumental music was commenced by the performance of Handel's "Grand Overture."

During the evening, addresses were delivered by the Rev. J. Davies, M.A., M. A. Dimbleby, one of the founders of the society, and Messrs. Percy, Brownhill, Rawlings, and Paxfield, members of this society.

After votes of thanks had been awarded to the ladies, for their kind attendance at the tea-tables, to the singers and musicians for their gratuitous services, and to the president, the meeting was dissolved, all persons, apparently, highly gratified.

T. H. F., *Hon. Sec.*

West Hartlepool Literary and Mechanics' Institution.—The ninth anniversary of this institution (the fifth of the opening of the Athenæum) was held on Monday, the 25th January, in the Assembly Room of the Athenæum, the principal public building of the town. Tea, as on former occasions, was provided by the lady-friends of the institute in West Hartlepool, and upwards of 650 ticket-holders partook of the repast, about 120 persons of both sexes having been refused admission,

owing to the crowded state of the room. The tables, &c., having been removed, the chair was taken by Ralph Ward Jackson, Esq., the president of the institution, who, after a few preliminary remarks, called upon the secretary, Mr. W. W. Brunton, to read the annual report, which stated that the institution continues to increase in prosperity,—the present number of members being 300. There are 1,650 volumes of books available for circulation, the general issue of which, during the past year, has been unprecedentedly large. Ten lectures were delivered during the year by various gentlemen (Mr. George Dawson, Mr. G. Linnæus Banks, &c.), and were very well attended. A large room in the Athenæum has been appropriated to the use of classes, on the books of which there are 180 pupils, with a nightly average of 120, comprising pupils of both sexes of from 10 to 30 years of age. Considerable additions have been made to the museum of the institution, and a suitable room, also in the Athenæum, has been provided for the specimens. The institution continues in union with the Society of Arts, an examination in connexion with which it is proposed shortly to hold, and also with the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes. After the report was read, Mr. William Taylor, secretary of the Middlesborough Mechanics' Institute, spoke at considerable length, and in the course of his speech said:—"Other matters referred to in the report strikingly illustrated the zeal and perseverance of the committee of the institution; but the most pleasing and important feature which next arrested his attention was the *classes*; for, however well the reading-room and lectures were attended, and however much books were circulated and read, it was when they came to establish classes for practical instruction that you realized the sterling value of Mechanics' Institutes, the good influences they were calculated to bring to bear directly on the intelli-

gence of the rising generation. This fact was becoming more and more known and acted upon; and the West Hartlepool Institute was following the example of the largest and best institutions in the country in giving especial and marked attention to the formation of these classes." The speaker then went on to recommend the local examinations in connexion with the Society of Arts.

Mr. Barnett Blake, of Leeds, lecturer to the Yorkshire Union of Mechanics' Institutes, in a lengthy and eloquent address, recommended the claims of the Union, and especially urged young men to take advantage of the facilities for mental improvement offered by the institutes associated with it. He congratulated the institution on the progress they had attained, especially in their organisation of classes for apprentice education—a progress which, he said, gave promise that West Hartlepool would be worthy in the intelligence it reared in its midst, of the intelligence which originated the harbour and town of West Hartlepool as a new emporium of commerce, and of the great commercial future which lay before them.

The Rev. H. Bedford Hall, West Hartlepool, followed in a humorous address on the "Independence of the Working Classes."

The Rev. Canon W. Knight (R.C.), Hartlepool, was next called upon, and directed his observations to the importance of availing oneself of all the facilities offered by mechanics' and other institutions for mental improvement.

George Linneus Banks, Esq., then addressed the meeting in an eloquent and characteristic speech. Votes of thanks were proposed to the committee by Mr. G. L. Banks, and responded to by Mr. Samuel Bastow; and a similar compliment moved by Mr. W. C. Ward Jackson was subsequently paid to the ladies who provided the tables. The enthusiasm of the audience, in respect

of the latter, finding vent in several rounds of hearty cheers.

A vote of thanks to the President was afterwards proposed, in highly eulogistic terms, by Mr. Barnett Blake. After an exuberant demonstration of loyalty in favour of the royal bride and bridegroom of the day, the proceedings were brought to a close with the National Anthem, the audience standing and joining in the chorus.

This was one of the most successful of the anniversaries of this institution, —the large hall of the Athenæum being crowded, 750 to 800 persons were present. The meeting was favoured during the proceedings with the singing of a number of glees and madrigals by the musical class of the institute, under the leadership of, and with excellent piano-forte accompaniments by, Mr. T. J. Taylor.—T. P. T.

Faversham Mutual Improvement Society.—The members and friends of this Society held their third annual soirée on Tuesday, the 23rd ult. The rooms were tastefully decorated with ever-greens and banners, and every arrangement was made that could conduce to the comfort and pleasure of the company. At six o'clock about 200 persons sat down to tea, after which the number was increased to nearly 300. The entertainment was of an *instructive* as well as of an amusing character, the committee being determined to keep the object of the Society full in view. And it was in accordance with this determination, that the President, in his opening address, dwelt principally upon the "Agencies by which the Institution seeks to diffuse light and truth, to battle with ignorance and prejudice, and to allure men from the pursuit of that which is degrading and false." He stated that "for the accomplishment of this noble work, classes for reading and debating had been formed, lectures were frequently delivered, and a good library continually poured forth streams of the purest water for the

promotion of mental fertility." In the course of the evening Mr. Cowper delivered a most interesting address on "The first crusade." It was evident that the greatest care and diligence had been exercised in its production. Mr. Monk also delivered an address upon "Natural History," which was listened to with marked attention; and the diagrams with which he illustrated his subject were most pleasing and accurate. Messrs. Kirby, Holloway, and Orgrin delighted the company with their recitations; and the entertainment was enlivened with a selection of vocal and instrumental music, by amateurs and professionals. Concerning this Institution, it may be remarked, that it was originated some five years since by a few young men who were accustomed to meet for debating and mutual instruction. It has marched onward, and though often-times opposed by storms of furious opposition and foolish prejudices, has gained a position of respectability and influence. With upwards of 300 members, it now continues its progress, constantly making valuable additions to its library, and introducing the most talented lecturers into the neighbourhood. During the present season, Messrs. Applebee and Grose-Smith, Mrs. Balfour, and Rev. J. B. Owen, are amongst those who have been engaged by this Institution, the success of which affords encouragement to those who ardently seek the intellectual elevation of the masses.

St. Bartholomew's Working Men's Literary Institute.—The annual meeting of this Institute was held at the Society's house, Gray's Inn Road, on Wednesday evening, the 10th of February. The Right Hon. Lord Calthorpe in the chair. Mr. Alfred H. Crowther, the Honorary Secretary, read the Annual Report, which showed that the Institute had considerably improved during the past year, while the average number of members per quarter amounted to 224. The sub-

scription, having been found insufficient, had been raised from 2s. to 2s. 6d. per quarter. Throughout the year a course of lectures had been delivered, the attendance being generally very good. Great improvement had taken place in the library, both in the number of readers and the circulation of the books. Classes for the study of French, music, English grammar, writing, arithmetic, and elocution, and two classes for debate, from which great benefit had been derived by the members. The establishment of additional classes was contemplated for the ensuing year. Marked improvement had been made in the reading room, and the number of papers, periodicals, &c., had been increased to upwards of forty. The Report, in conclusion, called upon the friends of education generally, and particularly the wealthier inhabitants of the neighbourhood, to assist the Institute by becoming honorary members; to the working classes it appealed for their hearty and undivided support; and urged the necessity of vigorous exertions to make the Society self-supporting. Lord Calthorpe, amidst loud applause, stated that it was two years since he had presided at their annual meeting, and he was pleased to find that during that interval it had made remarkable progress. His lordship, in an impressive address, alluded to the opportunities for mental improvement which had been afforded by numerous instructive lectures, and earnestly desired that all who were not members would assist the Society by coming forward and putting down their names. His lordship was followed by the Rev. Edward Garbett, M.A., President, and several other speakers, who severally enlarged upon the benefits to be derived from joining this and similar associations, and exhorted the working classes to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the commencement of a new quarter, to partake of the advantages offered by the Society

for improving and elevating their mental and moral condition. A cordial vote of thanks was accorded to the chairman for his kindness in presiding, and his lordship having responded, the meeting broke up.

Banbridge Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society held its fourth anniversary on Thursday, the 18th inst., in the Church School House. The Rev. Wm. Metge, curate of Seapatrick, one of the Vice-presidents of the Institution, occupied the chair. The room was beautifully decorated with evergreens and banners, having appropriate mottoes, such as "Excelsior," "Hope," and on one of the flags was depicted the harp, round tower, and wolf dog, emblematic of Ireland. After an excellent tea, the Secretary gave an encouraging account of the Society for the last six months, and stated that there had been delivered during that period ten essays; and further, that three discussions had taken place. The following is a list of the best essays:—Mr. John Bam-

brick, on "Liberty;" Mr. Wm. Deems, on "Popular Education;" Mr. A. Black on "Knowledge;" Mr. James Nelson, on "Mechanism;" Mr. R. Linn, on "Banbridge and its neighbourhood;" and Mr. J. McCormick, on "The qualifications necessary for a young man in business." The three debates were as follows:—"Whether is jealousy or love the stronger passion?" "Whether has England or Ireland produced the greatest men in ancient and modern times?" and "Whether is the life of the tradesman or farmer the more desirable?" Several of the members then addressed the meeting on topics having a special reference to the progress of the Society since it was established. There seemed to be a greater determination on the part of the members, to persevere in the important object contemplated—individual and mutual improvement. A vote of thanks having been passed to the chairman, and the national anthem sung, the meeting separated.

A MEMBER.

ACQUAINTANCE.—Three days of uninterrupted company in a vehicle, will make you better acquainted with another, than one hour's conversation with him every day for three years.—*Lavater.*

A RESERVED MAN is in continual conflict with the social part of his nature, and even grudges himself the laugh into which he is sometimes betrayed.—*Shenstone.*

COSTLY FOLLOWERS are not to be liked; lest while a man maketh his train longer, he make his wings shorter.—*Lord Bacon.*

SIMPLICITY is the great friend to nature; and if I would be proud of anything in this silly world, it should be of this honest alliance.—*Sterne's Sermons.*

DOCTRINE OF PASSIVE OBEDIENCE.—The doctrine of passive obedience is so repugnant to the genuine feelings of human nature, that it can never be completely acted on. A secret dread that popular vengeance will awake, and Nature assert her rights, imposes a restraint which the most determined despotism is not able to shake off. The rude reason of the multitude may be perplexed; but the sentiments of the heart are not easily perverted.—*Robert Hall.*

LITERARY NOTICES.

Lord Palmerston is announced as the chairman at the forthcoming annual dinner of the Literary Fund, on the 5th of May.

Sir R. I. Murchison, P.R.G.S., receives the Fellows of the Geographical Society on Wednesday evening next, in Belgrave Square.

At a sale of autographs concluded at the auction rooms of Messrs. Puttick and Simpson, on Tuesday, the following lots were disposed of, amongst others:—Roger Ascham, tutor to Queen Elizabeth and Lady Jane Grey. Autograph receipt, signed, "3 Julii, 1557, R. for my fee dewe at Midsomer last, the sum of six pounds, thirten shillings, fourpenns," 4*l*.—[A note in the catalogue refers to this paper and another lot (282) mentioned hereafter, as forming part of the mass of state documents recklessly sold by government officials a few years ago for waste paper, at the rate of 4*l*. per ton. These two leaves, it will be seen, produced 10*l*. 6*s*. It is not long since that a single leaf from this source was sold, by the same auctioneers, for near 30*l*.]

The following extract from the Emperor's pamphlet shows how much free discussion is dreaded in France:—"There is a coffee-house near Temple-bar, in London, where the question to be discussed in the evening is announced in the morning. The public are invited to take part in the discussion. This coffee-house is called *Discussion Forum*. People eat and drink there, and at the same time talk politics. A man, paid by the proprietor, presides and directs the debates. In the month of November the following order of the day was publicly posted—'*Is Regicide permitted under certain Circumstances?*' The question was publicly discussed."

Mr. Wolff, Lord Malmesbury's new private secretary, has special connection with literature. In the first place, he is the son of the Rev. Dr. Wolff, the missionary, of Bokhara fame; and in

the next place, he is the author of a sketchy work on Corsica, and of a novel called "*Blendelle*," which created much whispering and blushing in London drawing-rooms some five or six seasons back.

Earl Stanhope has been elected Lord Rector of Marischal College, Aberdeen, by a majority over Lord Kinnaird, and Mr. Stirling, of Keir, one of the Rector's Assessors.

It is announced in the *Gazette*, that Her Majesty has granted to the University of Sydney the power of conferring academic distinctions, and that they are to be entitled to rank and precedence in the United Kingdom.

The *Athenaeum* states that "Mr. Thornbury, author of '*Art and Nature*,' has in progress a life of Turner, Mr. Ruskin having assisted him with the MSS. and note-books of that great painter."

An autograph signature of Götz von Berlichingen was sold among Professor Bielitz's collection at Leipzig, for twenty-two thalers (3*l*. 3*s*.) At the same sale an autograph of Martin Luther was sold for twenty thalers (3*l*.) and a few groschen.

Before the late Ministry went out, the new charter of the University of London was issued. All graduates of a certain standing will be incorporated, and summoned at least once a year to meet in Convocation. The chief powers of Convocation will be to declare its opinion upon any matter relating to the university. The Senate will continue the governing body, subject to the influence of the expressed opinion of Convocation. In future no new charter can be accepted, nor can any charter be surrendered, without the consent of Convocation. It is understood that in any forthcoming Reform Bill the university will be admitted to the elective franchise.

M. Du Casse, editor of the correspondence between King Joseph and Napoleon I., is preparing for publication

the memoirs and letters of Prince Eugène Beauharnais. The first volume is in the press.

Signor Buonarroti, the late Minister of Public Instruction in Tuscany, is said to have been the last male descendant of Michael Angelo.

There are thirty-four candidates for the dignity of F.R.S.

The Oxford Examinations for the A. A. degree are fixed to take place in London this year.

Manchester, through its corporation, has expressed itself in favour of the Oxford Examination Scheme.

Some unpublished poems by Gianozzo Sachteti and by Dante have been discovered in Florence.

Dr. Livingstone has started from Liverpool for the river Zambesi, in the Pearl screw steamer.

Thomas Gar, of Trent, the historian of the Tyrol, has discovered a MS., in the castle of Thein, which is very important in elucidating the history of Tyrol in the fourteenth century. There are nearly 800 letters relating to the thirty years' war, which disclose many particulars about Wallenstein's undertakings and death.

Among many rumours boding change and novelty in the metropolitan press, we hear of yet another cheap illustrated weekly paper. The organiser in this case is a well-known newspaper projector, who lately owned a cheap periodical which attained a circulation almost fabulous, and who is now the possessor of one of the most extensively-circulated of our cheap publications.

In 1856 no less than 1,859 printed works appeared in Holland, for a population of only three millions. Of these 349 were theological; 265 upon philology and literary history; 188 school books; 138 upon political economy; 112 historical; 52 on natural philosophy; 25 on mathematics; 48 on jurisprudence; 17 on metaphysics; of *belles lettres* there were only 142, of which only 57 were novels. There are 150 newspapers in Holland, and 60

monthly and semi-monthly periodicals. There are 900 publishers and booksellers, 287 printers, and 134 paper factories.

"The life and memoirs of General Field-Marshal Radetzky," by General Heller, will be brought out shortly in Stuttgart, and are to be translated into French and Italian.

The Society of Arts is agitating the question of another Great Exhibition. The *Times* has pronounced against the scheme; but, as the *Athenæum* has said "it shall be," the gentlemen in John-street may yet hold up their heads hopefully. The great public will content itself with asking the question, *Cui bono?* and as it is not proposed that it shall take place before 1861, there is plenty of time to answer. We do not wish to prejudge a scheme of this kind hastily, and especially when even the propositions upon which it is to be based are indefinite and unexplained; but, as far as our information goes, we have no good opinion of its feasibility.

Mr. Thackeray presided at the annual dinner of the Royal General Theatrical Fund, at the Freemasons' Tavern, on the 29th.

It is stated that M. de Lamartine is in difficulties, and is resorting to his favourite *ruse* of parting with "his ancestral estates." Some friends of the poet have proposed to put them up to lottery, and the inspired victim to difficulties has expressed his satisfaction with the idea. He states that for the last nine years he has been labouring hard to clear himself of his pecuniary embarrassments, but without being able to accomplish that object, and that his anxiety to pay those to whom he is indebted has alone determined him to part with property to which he is so much attached. This is all very well, and may excite pity in the bosoms of all who do not know the system of unbounded extravagance and pretentious vanity which characterises every act of the poet's life.

The Rhetoric of Controversy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

"Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance; new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion; and though it be not yet current by the public stamp, yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine."—*John Locke*.

CONTROVERSY is not a merely logical process. "True wisdom," saith my Lord Shaftesbury, "comes more from the heart than from the head." To the same effect is the assertion made by Jeremy Taylor, that "every man understands by his affections more than by his reason." There is "a grandeur in the beatings of the heart" which no theorist dare despise, however remorseless the logic by which his thoughts may be elaborated, and his tenets fixed. This homage to feeling manifestly shows that rhetoric is as needful as logic in the maintenance of truth and the demolition of error, *i. e.*, in controversy.

The Socratic *dialectic* involved two processes, viz.—(1) accurate thinking; (2) accurate expression. It was an inquiry pursued by persons who took counsel together for the discovery of the truth—an investigatory dialogue—"the right use of reason" combined with and exhibited by "the right use of language." Controversy is the modern daughter of the Socratic dialectic. Logic is the instrument by which true knowledge is gained; rhetoric is the art of giving it true and adequate expression. The one gives *form*, the other *manifestation* to thought. Controversy is that mode of disciplinary thought, by which from two or more seemingly or really contradictory or contrary thoughts, the true, *i. e.*, the conformable to reason, experience, or fact, is discovered. It depends upon the clear and irrefragable principles of *conditioned*, *i. e.*, logical, thought, of which the supreme canon is, *Thought must be consistent*, but the analyzed expression of which may be more explicitly given in the three following laws, viz.:—

1. *Ideas* must not be combined in an act of judgment in any form or mode that is or may be inconsistent with the relations implied in or expressed regarding them, or the objects of which they are representative.
2. *Terms* must not be combined in any form of proposition

which is, or may be, inconsistent with the signification implied or expressed in the proposition founded on in the given act of reasoning.

3. *Propositions* must not be combined in any syllogistic or other process in any relation that is or may be inconsistent with the signification, implied or expressed in those propositions, in the order in, and the topic upon, which they are at the time employed.

The above laws are not only regulative, but prohibitory; they express the insuperable conditions of thinking, and give the only modes in which the mind can acquire the conviction of the not-impossible, the possible, the probable, the true in thought, the real in being. Cognition, whether intuitive or rational, must conform to this necessity of non-contradiction, of self-consistency, of reasonable congruity in, and of, thought.

Were the soul a pure intellectual essence, the mere presentation or representation of any thought or opinion elaborated in accordance with these laws would be, in the very nature of things, sufficient to excite attention, produce belief, and cause conviction. Actuality and ideality would be *one*; being and thought would be mutually reflective; and truth and thought would be identical. But man is no mere and sole intelligense; he is besides, if not even above that, an emotive being. The function of emotion in the economy of the human soul is manifold—it may prefer, invite, hold apart, dislike, or revolt from any sensation or form of activity. Its power is genetic and inborn, though capable, to some extent, of culture, training, and restraint. To excite or cause *any* change in the tendency, course, aims, objects, activity, or exercise of emotion, is to *persuade*—for persuasion is the production of *emotive* acquiescence. Now, rhetoric is the art of considering, discovering, and rightly using all the possible means of producing persuasion, *i. e.*, emotional activity and impulse, inherent in, belonging to, or resulting from, any idea, thought, opinion, or doctrine. The *aim* of rhetoric is to persuade; but it is not always the *duty* of the rhetorician, *as a man*, to persuade. Let it be granted, however, that controversy exists, or is demanded, or seems advisable, it must be evident that mere logic will not effect the persuasion of any mind, but that rhetoric must be employed as an auxiliary strategic power to stir the activities of feeling, and call into consentaneous excitement the intellectual and emotive capacities of the soul. To show how this may be best effected is the purpose of this paper on "The Rhetoric of Controversy."

Logic convinces, rhetoric persuades. The intellect submits to the one, the emotions succumb to the other. Logic may be exercised and exerted in the closet of one's own thoughts in the very retirements of the soul; rhetoric cannot, still less can controversy, be conducted in the privacy of a single mind. The

processes of controversy are adverse and combative, antagonistic and contestative. A *thesis*—thought, opinion, sentiment, doctrine, &c., is posited or given; one attacks, another defends; one insists and enforces, the other resists and opposes; one denies, another proves; one distinguishes, another criticizes the distinctions made, and, if possible, impugns them: thus objections and responses multiply, hit, neutralize, and overturn each other. Controversy is gladiatorial and athletic, a strife of cultured power, an exertion of art, skill, thought, tact, wisdom, and regulated argumentation. In all this definition nothing but the logical characteristics appear; and yet do we not all know that the true master of the fence of debate never brandishes “the sword of sharpness”—logic—blatantly and boastfully, but conceals the weapon he employs by that art which hides the logician’s art—rhetoric? In the calm exordium wherein the passions are lulled to sleep, gently soothed and opiated, and tenderly led to peaceful attention; in the seizure of some common theme on which men’s minds are usually made up, or the exposure of some ordinary fallacy, the art of the rhetorician is exerted, as well as in the dashing and paradoxical, the explicative and deprecativè, the judicious or the personal reflections which are interspersed among the syllogistic processes of thought, and in the pointed movements of the argument.

Rhetoric purposely subdues and subordinates itself; voluntarily abnegates itself, and withdraws from notice and observation. It never flaunts, and flirts, and flares in the broadways of thought, or obtrudes itself in the high road of an argument; but it companions soberly, quietly, unintrusively, wherever the controversy leads, and works its spells unboastingly. Nor is there any essential, absolute, or necessary dishonesty in so using the arts by which persuasion becomes possible. We know that our passions too frequently and commonly drag, draw, entice, or tempt us into wrong; if any power can lead, train, or excite them to do right, it is proper and advisable to use it—watchfully, of course,—for that which can influence may do so either for good or evil, and we should anxiously endeavour to bring its suggestions on the side of the right, the true, and the holy. The art itself is not immoral, although it may be employed in traitorous complicity with passion against the best interests of our own souls. Everything has two sides, at least, and so has rhetoric. As water or air is tasteless and scentless, yet may be compounded with pleasant or bitter, wholesome or injurious, so is the art of persuasion. It is because it may be so admixed and employed, that teaching regarding the best and most advisable methods of use in controversy becomes necessary, and is about to be essayed, for the first time, articulately in the subjoined pages. In the earnest but humble hope that these remarks may be useful in the reading, study, and reflection of the readers

of this magazine, with whose progress in knowledge and truth so many of the writer's fondest thoughts are inwoven, they are given: so let them be read and studied. Now let us proceed.

Rhetoric is the science and art of persuasion.

Persuasion is the production of emotive activity.

Emotive activity influences thought, and thought influences emotive activity. Their action is reciprocal.

Controversy is a conflict of reasoning.

Reasoning is correctly regulated thought.

Regulated thought is impossible wherever there exists unregulated, untrained, self-excited, and directed passion or emotive activity.

Rhetoric teaches us how to regulate, govern, influence, affect, excite, and train the emotions through the activization of thought.

In all thought, more or less, emotive influence works and interacts, as in all emotion thought acts, and either co-operates or opposes.

In all conflicts of reasoning, therefore, thought and emotion must be interactive and consentaneously influenceive.

Hence controversy, though ostensibly merely a logical exertation and strife, is latently also a rhetorical antagonism and gladiatorship.

Latent causes are not always the least powerful and efficacious in the production of change and the phenomena of progress; and hence we may infer that the rhetorical arts may not be altogether valueless in the conduct of controversy; nay, rather may we not conclude, may be most powerful in working out the consentaneous change of thought and feeling which it seeks to produce and excite.

The possibility mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be regarded as amounting to a high degree of probability, if we reflect that the real and manifest objects of any discourse attract the chief notice, while the latent qualities and aims thereof are frequently unremarked; yet in so far as they form part of that which affects and impresses the mind, they demand recognition, if our knowledge is to be complete and accurate, and if we are to be fully prepared for using, or truly ready for guarding against, the undue influence of their agencies.

One other observation may here be made, namely, the latent qualities, properties, influenceive agencies, &c., of anything whatever, as they are the most difficult of detection, are often also the most interesting and important; *e. g.*, the ordinary properties of matter are easily recognized and learned, but the latent qualities which it possesses, do they not claim the sedulous and constant study of myriads of minds bent on unriddling their uses and gauging their effects? If it be important and thrillingly interesting to detect the secret qualities of matter, and the

mysterious agencies by which one sort or portion affects another how much more transcendent should be the tension of the soul, as it seeks to determine the different modifying forces, whose varied action, reaction, interaction, and counteraction, affect the passions, and place the rule and government of other minds at the disposal of him who can wield the sceptre of power in the very citadel of the will, through the marshalled hosts of arguments, led and excited by Rhetoric as their commander-in-chief?

That the passions or emotions are strongly stirred in controversy is all but proverbial, and therefore we may well believe that rhetorical suggestiveness is frequently at work in arranging the forms, processes, and expressions of those thoughts which are employed when, by discussion, any subject is proposed to be, —as they are always in this serial,—

“Set in all lights by many minds,
To close the interests of all.”

In our farther remarks we shall presume the honesty and sincerity of the controversialist, and give such advice upon the rhetorical conduct of debate as may aid him in carrying on those investigative contests with advantage, interest, and likelihood of success. We advise no use of sophistication, trickery, or fraud; we counsel only the whetting of the blade of discussion by the highest art, and the employment of the right modes of conducting the warfare of thought. No one thinks of dancing or fencing without attention to the “use and wont” of others; why should the nobler instrument—the tongue or pen—require less culture, and receive less care?

Posit in your own mind a distinct, clear, and comprehensive statement of the topic to be debated; decide upon the opinion you hold on the subject; and then reflect in what manner that decision of yours is likely to affect the minds of others before whom you are to treat the question;—if antagonism, you must prepare to soothe; if indifference, you must endeavour to rouse, excite, and urge; if partizanship, you must mollify and appease; and in general you will require to employ such means as may turn the motives which influence the will into the grooves in which you desire they should run and convey it.

I. *ANTAGONISM* may result from (1) conservative ignorance; (2) self-interest; (3) wounded vanity; (4) excited pride; (5) fear of singularity; (6) reverence for the past; (7) fear for the future; (8) bigoted adherence to an early learned creed, &c.

To soothe *antagonism*, a fair, candid, open, honest, and plain-dealing statement, suave, gentle, pleasant, and sparkling, will often be sufficient. The love of fair play will incline the hearers' ears to listen and their hearts to receive. When this is inefficacious, it may be requisite to use other means; *e. g.*,—

a. In *conservative ignorance* impart knowledge in a clear and

explicit form, excite fear, warn of danger, show the policy of change, and especially of the propriety of accepting a less change, lest a greater may be demanded, and all the floods of innovation be let loose upon society.

b. In *self-interest*, explain the true nature of moral responsibility, the impossibility of that and self-interest ever being long advantageously at variance, the need of carefully avoiding the incurring of great dangers for the sake of small, especially if wrongful, gains, and generally the advisability of acting in harmony with the true and holy forms of conduct which receive the homage of man and the praise of God.

c. In *wounded vanity*, carefully distinguish between the essentials and the accidentals of human praiseworthiness; stimulate to the acquisition of the former, advise the forsaking of the latter, indicate the true sources of honour, the harmony of the opinions you commend, with genuine self-respect and the goodwill and opinion of others, and call upon the individual, or individuals, to waive for a higher renown their present opposition and dislike.

d. In *excited pride* endeavour to allay the irritation by emollient phrases, by showing that misunderstanding lies at the root of the excitement, by proving that in the matter of real, personal importance the gain will be on the side which you adopt, advise, and contend for, and by pointing out that the retention of error and the constant disparagement of truth are not contributive to an honest pride or essential greatness of character.

e. In *fear of singularity*, dispute, if possible, the need for isolation and peculiar formalisms; lightly ridicule a constant adherence and invariable deference to ordinary modes of life and thought; enlarge upon the need of singularity in the maintenance, furtherance, management, or production of anything new or strange; and remark that, in reality, all men love to be singular, *i. e.*, noticeable, and distinguished for some trait of character, quality, attribute, or power.

f. Where *reverence for the past* exists, show the great laws of progress, the gradual evolution of the present from the foregone, and the intimate relationship between that proposed and that existent; or describe the errors of the past, enlarge on the woes that were born in its womb, brought into distressful being, and sustained in destructive energy; teach the urgency of change, and discrown, if possible, the reigning superstition regarding the good old times.

g. Dispel *fear for the future* by exciting hope; by demonstrating the general acquiescence of the future in the decrees of the past; by enforcing the duty of aiding in the removal of the evils under which we suffer, for the sake of those who may follow us, and save them from the endurance of the calamities that afflict us.

h. As regards a *bigoted adherence* to any opinion, &c., show

that the keen and unreasoning holding of effate creeds, &c., has been productive of evil; that an honest man is not so often *consistent as persistent*, and more frequently assistant than resistant; that all forms of stubbornness are fraught with danger, disorder, and distress; and call into play as many of the genial and social emotions as may be possible in the circumstances.

Other forms of antagonism, if any, may be treated similarly.

II. INDIFFERENCE is frequently a consequence of (1) ignorance, (2) stolidity, (3) expansive feeling, (4) love of ease, (5) inattention.

Indifference is that condition of the mind in which the *will* is neither influenced, moved, or inclined to accept or reject any given decision or thought as its own, but is equally ready to assent to, or set itself in opposition to, either. What is called indifference should rather be denominated indeterminateness. The great object to be aimed at in the contest with indifferentism is to rouse, excite, and agitate the soul, to encourage it to regard the given thought in such aspects as may urge, stimulate, and incline the will to forsake its neutrality, and choose between the ideas presented for its acceptance in debate that which seems to it most nearly allied to its own feeling or interest. This may of course be effected in a variety of ways. Suasion, persuasion, and dissuasion may all be employed—the weapons of mental warfare must be all bright and ready for, and in the day of use.

a. In indifference arising from *ignorance*, plain and clear instructions, honestly and earnestly set before the mind, are generally enough to effect the desired purpose. To *instruct* rightly, we must excite interest, procure attention, and secure conceptive activity. This can only be done by loving, repeated, skilful adaptation of the ideas placed before the mind to the state in which that mind is found, and must be effected gradually, if it is to be done wisely, surely, and well.

b. *Stolidity* implies not only real but natural ignorance; it requires much care and watchfulness. To open the avenues into the soul of the stolid is a labour seldom attempted even by those whom the sacredest of duties call to the trial thereof. There are a few instincts so universal in their operation, that even the most stupid are not beyond their range; there are a few experiences so essentially obtrusive in our present state of being, that none can escape being touched by them;—taking *these* as the start-points of thought, and working in through the narrow channels thence passing to the mind, even the stolid may be roused, and made to feel that there are higher things than instinct, holier gratifications than those of the appetites, grander visions than can flash from animal feelings, or present themselves to bodily organs, and joys more heart-entrancing than all the delights of sense exercised in endless multiplication. If these can be brought—

"Moving and delicate and full of life,
Into the eye and prospect of the soul,"

the work will be accomplished, stolidity will be vanquished, and passive ignorance, or natural imbecility arising from unexerted power, be hurtled forth from its dwelling or den in the human though semi-unconscious soul.

c. Expansiveness of feeling is often as fatal to the genuine reception of truth as semi-vital inertia. The lynx-eyed Fuller saw this, and said of it: "I perceive there is in the world a good nature, falsely so called, as being nothing but a facile and flexible disposition—wax for every impression. What others are so bold as to beg, they are so bashful as not to deny. Such osiers can never make beams to bear stress in church or state. I cannot conceive how he can be a friend to any who is a friend to all and the worst foe to himself." The overcoming of this interminable variability of opinion and flighty unsettlement is a highly difficult task. It must be taken fiercely and energetically by the beard, and marched into Coventry. There must be no parley or hesitation:—

"Begin betimes. Occasion's bald behind.
Stop not thine opportunity, for fear too late
Thou seek'st for much, but canst not compass it"—

is the only suitable text for this. Urge determination; press resolve; flash up with fury and lash with scorpion ridicule the see-saw fickleness of mind which is so manifested. Throw mountain-loads and hail-storms of reproach down on the unballasted soul to steady and fix its keel; or blow upon it the whole tempest of satire, to make it cast anchor, while the chart is to be consulted which is to show the one path of safety. Commiseration for such dilly-dallying is gross sin. It must be compelled to shrink and shrivel if it will not grow into one carle stalk; but prune it well, that it may have a fair chance; cut deep, and spare not; if growth result, well; if not, it is the fault of the original plant or the error of the early culture, and so not yours.

d. Love of ease is a woefully common and every-day kind of love. The universe is not an Apragopolis or City of Indolence. The law of the world is explained by Solomon in the saying, that "the desire of the slothful killeth him." Swinnoek truly asserts there is no pattern either in heaven or hell of "an idle person." The love of ease wars against the great condition of life—work. It scruples and hesitates, and makes a virtue of doubt, modestly affects incapability, condemns rashness, counsels time, patience, and *future* inquiry, and is the advocate of a "more convenient season." With its use earnestness of love, of denunciation, and of hate, in their order and degree, as may be needful. Destroy by importunity the peace, rest, and quiet it values highest, until, like another unjust judge, it determines, lest, by "continual coming," it be wearied.

e. Inattention must be deafened with clamour, or roused by smart strokes. The flash and flicker of novelty may attract it; the impingement of paradox may quicken it; or the continuous iteration of impressions may at last secure a degree of notice which, being gained, may be improved on.

III. *PARTIZANSHIP* signifies over-zeal. Over-earnestness defeats its own aim. The opponent believes all arguments requiring strongly garrisoned expletives as being weak points. The confident never boast; the distrustful are ever bawling to others to behold their impregnability, that they may save themselves from attack. This is foolhardiness. We should not go into battle till we have endued ourselves in the completest armour of perdurable truth which our fondest concern for the success of her cause can dictate. We do not disapprove of that undying energy of soul which braves, and bears, and works, and waits, and ventures; but we do censure rash and inconsiderate peddling and meddling with important controversies, unless we have greatness of soul sufficient to subject our own pride or vanity to defeat rather than to expose the cause we espouse to defeat or contumelious rejection, through our vain or proud holding to the vantage ground, while unable to wield with knightly skill and prowess the tools of fence, offence, and defence. To gauge our own power, as well as our earnest conviction, is as requisite as to have a soul "in arms and eager for the fray." Din is not victory; zeal is not wisdom; "knowledge"—not the capacity of noise—"is power."

Partizanship can only be cured in our own souls by patient and honest thought; in others, soothing ideas must be presented, and calm expressions be employed. Space does not suffice us for an analysis.

The general elements which we should carry with us into debate are good-humoured calmness, earnest yet modest faith in our own rectitude of faith and conduct, deliberate and concise speech, conciliatory goodwill, kindness for all that is loveable, with so much of satire, wit, and eloquence as may season and flavour but not overheat the whole.

On this the ninth birthday of your magazine, dear reader, we have thought it advisable to say these words on a topic new, in its present form at least, to literature. We believe you will have read with patience what we have written with anxiety. If we have written aught amiss, pardon us; if we have in anything spoken acceptably and usefully, adopt and practise it. After so many years of honest and true companionship, you will not judge the writer harshly, though, with waning power, he may have failed to express so well as he might have done, and, excusing us, will with love's blindness lay the blame on "Circumstances—that unspiritual god," who bends so many, and so often breaks them too. Let our "welcome" and "goodbye" be lovingly spoken.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM OBSTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN bringing this debate to a conclusion, we have to lament that business engagements prevent us from doing that justice to our reply that we should have wished. We have been called upon unexpectedly, and are unable to give more than a cursory glance at the arguments brought forward by our adversaries. We have been so ably supported, that our deficiency will not be of so much consequence as it otherwise would have been.

The question hinges on the one point, whether sectarianism does, or does not, introduce the elements of discord into the Christian world? "B. S." admits this, but denies point blank that the various sections of Christians are either necessarily or actually "hostile" to each other. His assertion has been followed up by the whole of the writers on the negative side; but they have failed to prove the truth of their views. They have attempted to show that the evils which spring from sectarianism are not *necessarily* connected therewith. They would wish us to believe that sectarianism *might* exist without the attendant evils of which we have complained. With this we have nothing to do. Even as a tree is judged by its fruits, so must we judge of sectarianism from what it has done, and is doing; the future lies in the regions of probability, and is entirely beyond the present question. Our opponents might argue very skilfully that war is not cruel, because at some future period soldiers might go forth to battle armed with wooden swords and bulletless rifles. They view sectarianism in a light of their own, forgetting what it really is. The lion is generally considered to be a ferocious beast of prey. They would tell us, however, that such is not the case, because the time will come when "the lion shall lie down side by side with the lamb;" that, therefore, the lion is not *necessarily* and *naturally* ferocious, its ferocity being only an accidental attribute. Their minds seem to be in a very confused state, for they can come to no definite conclusion as to what are the characteristics of sectarianism. "The public avowal of the freedom of the mind in matters pertaining to religion," diversity of opinion, right of private judgment, and a host of other things, all become by some literary legerdemain sectarianism. "A. G. A."

informs us that "true sectarianism involves no feeling of enmity, evolves no feeling but love. What is *generally understood, in conventional usage*, by sectarianism, is exactly the opposite; it is a feeling of universal hatred, of envy at every church, except some one in particular," &c. What an admission, "A. G. A.!" Why, you have destroyed your own case. In debating any subject, it is surely necessary to take the signification of the various terms from the construction put upon them by conventional usage; otherwise, if it be admissible to set up some far-fetched meaning, instead of the one generally received, our discussion would be interminable. Sectarianism, according to "J. T. N., is "difference of opinion, variety, that is all." This sage definition bears its own condemnation on its face. Sectarianism *allows of no diversity of opinion*. Are not the members of one sect bound by the creed of that sect? Are they not ready to peril the very existence of other denominations who differ from them in their insane attempt at the promulgation of their own particular views? Toleration, right of judgment, indeed! Are the members of *any* sect allowed to follow the dictates of their own consciences? Are they not rather compelled to interpret the Bible in accordance with the interpretation of it laid down by their chiefs?

The leader of the sectarian advocates has produced such an article, that any remarks of ours would be superfluous. It is illogical and vague in the extreme. The unsanctified prejudices by which individual orthodoxy and heterodoxy magnifies its own idiosyncrasy, and pushes it into greater prominence than the fundamentals of its creed, making a shibboleth the *sine quâ non* of religious faith and practice, the passport to the empyrean, rather than the simple faith "which is in Jesus," is not sectarianism at all! The sectary and the orthodox equally deplore this. Such being the case, we have nothing more to say; only, unfortunately, we are compelled to consider the sectary referred to as a purely imaginative character.

Our principal opponent is "B. S.:" we are deeply sensible of his controversial skill and argumentative power. We cannot, therefore, but feel our own insignificance, when forced to join issue with him in combat. In the present debate, however, we think he does not manifest his usual logical acuteness. "Is it *impossible* for a Lutheran to feel brotherly affection for a Calvinist? Does it strike one as *unnatural*, to find the representatives of half a dozen different denominations charitably met together on the platform of a Bible Society meeting?" asks he. We agree with him, that "the questions are sufficient to raise a smile." But in what respect? That anyone, generally so careful in his attacks, should thus expose himself so unguardedly. There is certainly nothing *impossible* in a Lutheran feeling brotherly love for a Calvinist; but it is undeniably *rare* for a

sectarian-imbued individual to have such a feeling. "B. S." will perhaps recollect the *brotherly love* that existed between the founders of the two sects. The opprobrious epithets that Luther bestowed upon Calvin were, I suppose, evidences of his *brotherly love*? It requires too great a stretch of fancy for us to arrive at such a very charitable belief. Again: if there be nothing uncommon in the fact of half a dozen denominations being represented on one platform, why so constantly refer to the good such societies do by drawing together men of different sects and shades of belief, and causing them to lay aside for a brief space their general hostility?

Sectarianism had no existence until a comparatively late period, according to "B. S." It is not so, however. Difference of opinion must necessarily exist amongst men who are differently endowed, physically and mentally. We cannot all think alike. But when the boundary of calm investigation is passed, and we enter upon the regions of vain disputations, and uncharitable denunciations and invectives, then we have *sectarianism*. And this sectarianism was as rampant in the early ages of the Christian church as it is now. The arguments of "B. S.," brought forward as they are upon this assumption of the late origin of sectarianism, are, therefore, of no weight. Before leaving "B. S.," we must, however, in our own defence, refer to two portions of his article, which refer to our character as a controversial writer. We have been accused of speaking too strongly; we have yet to learn that "B. S." is in the habit of doing otherwise. We feel deeply, and we have spoken strongly. It may be that we have suffered ourselves from the prevalence of sectarian animosity, and have almost been driven to view Christianity unfavourably in our blindness, confounding the actions of professing Christians with the result of Christianity. We have certainly not dealt in "battered thunder,"* and if we have used such terms as "meeting houses," "unsightly piles, y'clept chapels," we have ample authority for so doing. We meant nothing offensive by the term "meeting house." The time was, we believe, when Dissenters gloried in their "meeting houses;" but now it would appear they have got above that sort of thing—now they must be called churches. Indeed, so great is the rage after churches, that all our *finest* Dissenting edifices are designated after church precedents. They even go so far as to have turrets and towers, where there are no bells to place in them. We are called upon to mention the names of "populous villages which have been destroyed, otherwise than by siege, or the necessities of war," in India. It would be useless to do so; of course, the *necessities of war* would act as a plea sufficiently justifiable in the eyes of such as "B. S.;" even though a village were razed to the ground, simply for having

* Festus.

sheltered a runaway mutineer. We leave the matter to our readers. Was not the cry universal that Delhi should not have one stone left upon another, as a mark, forsooth, of our just punishment?*

What a bright luminary has suddenly burst upon the readers of the *Controversialist*, in the person of "J. T. N!" He lays bare our shortcomings with a ruthless hand. "In plain English, 'Taliesin' is wrong, *as usual* (there's an important piece of information for you—we feel the cut deeply); in his desperate hurry he altogether overlooks one or two important facts, and these facts we now wish to urge against him." After this, we naturally expected something very important and conclusive was coming; when, lo! the first "important fact" is, "that sectarianism is a necessity, arising out of the fundamental principle of the Protestant church, that every man has a right in all spiritual matters to follow the dictates of his own conscience." If such be the case, Protestantism cannot last; it carries the seeds of dissolution with it. The end to which it must arrive is that of universal sectarianism, when each man becomes the originator of a creed which he is bound to defend against all comers. We are told in the Bible, that in the millennial days there will be universal peace; but how can there be peace when no two men can be found to agree on any religious topic?

Sectaries are likened to soldiers; and their "place is to obey, to fight right on." Very efficient soldiers must they be, who in their onward struggle can turn to give a thrust here, and a blow there, at their fellow warriors. How can they expect to gain the victory, when they quarrel amongst themselves as to which battalion is most deserving of supremacy? Would it not seem more sensible to cast aside their petty jealousies, and act unanimously? What hope should we have of an army, where each regiment would only act according to the views of its particular chief? Would Sebastopol ever have fallen, if every captain

* In a former note, Vol. V., p. 216, "B. S." writes thus:—"Bishop is arrayed against bishop, clique against clique, while infidelity is spreading her baneful poison through the popular mind. Popery trembles on her throne; Presbyterianism has lately been rent as by an earthquake; Methodism is vainly trying to stifle the fires of dissension which rage within; Protestant Episcopalianism is heaving with convulsive throes, and her sons are waging a civil war, where every man's hand is raised against his brother. Mournful spectacle! 'If we love one another, God dwelleth in us;' has He then left us to ourselves? When will men learn not to call anything unclean, and to throw off the NARROW-MINDEDNESS of *that spirit which has been the bane of the church in every age*," &c., &c.? What is this spirit but exclusive sectarianism? How, then, can we reconcile the views enumerated by "B. S.," then, with those he has now favoured us in the last number of the present volume of the *Controversialist*?

had been allowed to follow his own particular line of conduct, regardless of what was going on around him?

According to Clement, the existence of sectarianism is an argument in favour of Christianity! For if Christians had been all one sect, how plausible would have been the charge of collusion and conspiracy to deceive! We are thus not to consider universality of belief as any evidence of truth!

He tells us, that "though differing upon many minor doctrines and practical duties, there may yet be agreement upon all the essential truths of Christianity." And in another place—"Some worship Christ as divine, and look upon his death as their vicarious sacrifice; others simply admire him as a man, and imitate his example." And this, "Clement," you call argument!

With "R. T. G." we have little to say. We like the spirit in which his article is written. Such views, if oftener expressed, would do much to remove the evils of sectarianism. He accuses us, however, of an "illiberal, sectarian spirit;" because the most importable article in some sectarian creeds we stated to be "hatred towards the Church of England, and the primary object of their political influence, to compass the destruction of Church and State." In an article contained in a not very old number of the *Eclectic Review*, on "AGGRESSIVE NONCONFORMITY, INVOLVED IN PREACHING THE GOSPEL," we have the following specimen of love for the Church of England:—

"That SOME SOULS, *perhaps* many, have been reclaimed to holiness by the agency of a church which deliberately tramples upon one of Christ's laws, is only one more illustration, added to the ten thousand of others, of his exuberant mercy, which will sometimes break through all the obstructions of our disobedience, to accomplish his ever benevolent designs." We leave this to speak for itself.

Exception has been taken to my remarks as to the theoretic character of the religion and morality of the present day. I do not say it is *hypocrisy*; it may be, and often is that; or it may be, as I intended, simply mistaken feeling. Everything now must be reduced to the teachings of reason. We are not to believe anything we cannot perfectly understand; each is to work out his own creed. What comes of this but a great want of that REVERENCE for things "holy and divine" which characterized the religion of old? I have often watched the simple devotions of the peasants in Catholic lands. No doubt they are very ignorant, and very much to be pitied. They are priest-ridden, and all that sort of thing, of which we hear so much. And yet at times I have thought I would prefer their state of mind, their religious feeling, to the cold matter-of-fact worship of the reasonistic school. It is true, amongst our numerous

sects we find a great deal of outward religion of a certain sort, but it is too often of the cold, uncharitable, exclusive kind. The highest attribute of true religion is wanting. We hear plenty of religious talk, but it is too commonly merely descriptive of inward feeling and individual revelations. Anything that does not come within our own form of belief we can look down upon and sneer at as only religious people can. The Dissenter pities the formalism of the Church of England; the latitudinarian pities the dissenting Methodist and Baptist in his turn; and so on it goes. *There is too much looking abroad, and too little self-examination.*

We must now bring our remarks to a conclusion. Crude they are, we know; we have been obliged to write straight on, without stopping very carefully to revise, for time will not stay his onward course at our will. Hoping that the time will soon arrive when Christians will forget all their petty rivalries, and remember only that they are all journeying to that land of rest in heaven, where reigneth universal joy and peace, we close our article.

We bid our readers farewell, and desire, if aught we have said appear uncharitable, that they will attribute it to haste, not design. Our time is so fully occupied, that we fear we shall not be able so frequently as hitherto to take part in future debates; we therefore hope that our failings will be forgotten, and the right hand of fellowship be refused us by none. Farewell!

TALIESIN.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE great danger attendant on all religious controversy is the liability to indulge in bitterness of spirit, and the inclination to party rancour. *British Controversialists*, of all writers, should aim to be free from these evils, and seek truth for the love of it, regardless of the consequences to which it may lead them, knowing that the God of truth will invariably guide the prayerful, self-diffident seeker in the path of purity, love, and wisdom:—in the path of purity, because his motives are pure, even as God is pure—of love, because he has the love of God in his heart, and therefore loves the brethren; “perfect love casteth out fear;”—and of wisdom, because “the only wise God, our Saviour,” is his councillor, and his divine exemplar.

“Tahesin,” p. 10, says, “Christians are men who are professedly followers of Christ”—to this we say, Christians are true followers of Christ,—not simply *professing to be*—but, *being followers of Christ*; he further implies, that *such professors*, joined together in any paramount, organized body, are by right authorized to give doctrine and discipline, faith and practice, *to all who are Christians*; and to protest against or dissent from such paramount organization of professors, or their

acts and doctrines, is a crime against Christ, his church and cause. Such is the bold thesis he has advocated in his usual dashing style. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise, that we should be found in the lists against him. We believe in the essential unity of the church of Christ on earth, not in the union of so many persons in one visible organization; but in that unity of faith, which is held by all sincere believers of the inspiration of God's word. If such could be collected together into one or more visible congregations, their faith and practice would be morally authoritative, as a reflection of the mind and will of God; but they neither individually nor collectively possess any authority of themselves; it is God's word, as manifested in a living, tangible form in their words and works, which becomes the moral authority, commanding obedience, from all who wish to be saved, to the prophet, priest, and king—Christ Jesus. Protest and dissent from such faith and practice would be obstructive to Christianity, as it would be in reality will-worship opposed to God-worship. It is not this *ideal* of Christian faith and life which is referred to in our present question, but the so-called Christianity of this working-day world of ours; the soiled, spotted, and polluted Christianity of conflicting churches.

A visible, material unity of the church of Christ on earth, in one body corporate, we believe never was intended by the divine author of Christianity, and, consequently, never can be realized by our efforts. The constitution of the human mind, and the influence of man's physical condition upon his mind, must be very different indeed to what they are now, and have been, since history has recorded the acts and workings of humanity, to render such a corporate unity possible.

The great arguments of our opponents appear to be—the great difference existing in speculative theology, in discipline and ceremonial observances, the animosity, hatred, and strife engendered by these differences, and the inconsistencies of professing Christians. All "Christian" sects believe in the necessities to salvation, and the points of difference are in every case more or less immaterial; are, in fact, mere additions made by man in his vain wisdom to the simplicity of the gospel. Which shall we say is the true church? which the corporate body qualified to demand from us unequivocal acceptance, as the only authoritative unity in doctrine, faith, and practice? Surely no sincere Christian will have the temerity to demand that such authority should be conceded to him; and if no individual can conscientiously say, *I am a perfect Christian*, no aggregation of such units can make a corporation of perfect Christianity; hence, no perfect Christian authority can be had in living reality, the Word of God alone is the perfect authority on earth. This is an objective fact; Christianity is a subjective truth, living in the individual Christian, and is the only form in which as men

we can realize its existence. Christ himself is the only perfect exhibition of objective Christianity, having subjective vitality and authority. He is not of the earth, earthy, but of the heaven, heavenly; hence is seen the utter impossibility of creating by human efforts a perfect authoritative corporate unity, to bind the consciences of men on earth. If, then, we see perfect unity is by natural necessity an impossibility, how then can we conclude that differences of opinion, on the outworks of Christianity, are capable of undermining the foundations of Christianity itself? How shall we be able to say that those differences, which are inevitable necessities of our imperfect nature, are obstructions to Christianity in the sense to which our opponents give these words in the present debate? Of course, all the imperfections of human nature are truly obstructive to Christianity; but would a corporate unity make our natural imperfections less obstructive to Christianity? We believe not; for in our estimation they would aggravate the evil.

All the affirmative writers upon this question appear to consider *bigotry* and *sectarianism* as synonyms; their error in this respect is easily recognized. Bigotry denies to others the right of private judgment on concerns of paramount importance to man; it imposes a stereotyped creed upon all; and lends to a self-constituted organization the judgments and consciences of all men; hence, must be constantly and fearfully obstructive to Christianity. In this respect it is wholly different from sectarianism, which, while claiming for itself the right to worship God according to its view of the intention of God's own word, concedes to all others equal rights and equal liberty; esteeming every sincere and conscientious believer in God's word, whose practice is consistent, as worthy of respect and love. The sectary may wish his brother could see eye to eye with him in all religious matters; but his *sectarianism forbids him to impose authoritatively* any dogma or discipline; his means of persuasion are not legal rules, fines and penalties, pains and persecutions; but the "law of love," and kindly entreaty. It may be true that bigotry is found united with sectarianism, and in such union produces its proper result; but, in justice, bigotry should receive all the merit of this, and sectarianism be freed from the scandalous imputation. Is it not the principle of sectarianism which caused the division between the Eastern and Western church, the Greek and Roman church? Is it not sectarianism which caused the Protestant schism? and the cause of dissent, is not that also the principle of sectarianism? Shall we brand with infamy the great and glorious men who have in past ages risked their lives, and this world's goods, in obedience to God's word, and their honest convictions of truth? Shall we say they, by their divisions, schisms, protests, and dissidence, have obstructed Christianity? Shall we, in our nineteenth cen-

tury-bombast, cloud the memory of the great and good, who have fought the good fight of civil and religious liberty with conscientious integrity, and won so gloriously the battle of freedom for us? O, ungrateful one! Sink into thine own littleness of heart and mind, and be for ever dumb, if thou canst not make better return for the benefits thy forefathers have shed their life's blood to obtain!

"G. A. H. E.," with the model he has set up for imitation, may unitedly carp and cavil at sectarianism; but have they not with their friends formed themselves into a sect—perhaps not inaptly designated by the term universalists—universal in their bigotry against all who do not pronounce their Shibboleth? The low ribaldry in which this writer has indulged is self-condemnatory, and further criticism thereon is needless. The remarks of "Edgar" are only repetitions of the previous writer's arguments upon his own side, and are, therefore, already fully answered.

The writer with the *long* signature *says*, that sectarianism is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. Our previous remarks show the true sectary, be he Protestant or Dissenter, is the best Christian; and he who is the best Christian must really be the best exhibition of the spirit and letter of the Gospel. On a former occasion we have (Vol. V., pp. 215, 380) expressed our views as to the *ecclesia*, and we now affirm, that as to church government and disciplinary authority in matters touching religious faith, the *ecclesia* has no power to bind the consciences of individuals, and we appeal to reason and revelation for the confirmation of our views. Were we to believe otherwise, we must, if sincere, become *Papists*, and concede to the Pope infallibility, and to the clergy, power to decree creeds, rites, and ceremonies. Such is an inevitable consequence, and there is no possibility of finding a halting place between sectarian liberty of conscience and the supremacy of the Pope and his clergy. The lives and deaths of the glorious army of martyr-reformers present vivid proofs of the truth of our allegation.

We have thus written freely and fully our views; we believe we have shown good reason for "the faith that is in us" upon this question; and while mindful of the example of the Bereans, recorded for our imitation in the Holy Scriptures, who searched if the things they heard were true, we offer the right hand of fellowship to all who "name the name of Christ," and with all sincerity and love pray that the grace of God may be with all them who love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and truth.

Birmingham.

L'OUVRIER.

Philosophy.

IS MIND NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO MATTER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It is difficult to discover the direct meaning of this question. The opener of the debate leaves us quite in the dark. He enters into no explanation of his terms. He is remarkably brief, almost securing success to his side of the controversy by ambiguity. From a careful perusal of his short article, we learn that he does not argue against the immateriality of mind. When he speaks of it as a principle, he regards it as an existence not material. He employs the expression, "development of the mental faculty," and considers this effected by its communication with sensible objects. He further tells us that the material universe seems to impress the loftiest *functions* of thought upon the human mind, which he styles devoid of all material embodiment.

Such language as this leads us to the conclusion that J. A. D. is not contending for the immateriality of the mind, but only maintains that matter is necessary for its exercise. He will grant the separate existence of mind as a spiritual entity, endowed with mighty powers, which can only be developed by exercise upon sensible, external objects.

Now, against this opinion we will not for a moment stand. We are of the same opinion with this writer. We should, therefore, have remained silent upon this question, but for the appearance of the article of "Chesco."

This last writer has given us a production which, now it is in print, we think he himself will find difficult to comprehend. We certainly cannot refrain from conveying our thanks to him for his mysterious definitions of "life," "matter," and "mind." We need not enter into a criticism of these productions of an etherealized soul. We have enough to engage our pen in the remaining portions of the article.

The great mistake of "Chesco" is in confounding mind with the faculties of mind. Before he penned his paragraphs, he should have learnt what men mean when they speak of matter and mind. They have for a long time been regarded as distinct entities, and for good reasons. The powers of mind, such as perception, reflection, reason, memory, abstraction; powers which no form nor extent of matter can be found in possession of; powers, the sole properties of the thinking principle; powers

which give life and animation to the corporeal frame;—these powers are a standing proof of the mind's distinct existence. They may require the presence, the recognition of matter to give them exercise: they may remain for ever dormant in a body devoid of sensation; yet here begins and ends their dependence upon matter. "When knowledge (by means of the senses) has once been acquired, it is retained and recalled at pleasure; and mind exercises its various functions without any dependence upon impressions from the external world. That which has long ceased to exist is still distinctly before it, or is recalled, after having been long forgotten, in a manner even still more wonderful; and scenes, deeds, or beings, which never existed, are called up in long and harmonious succession, invested with all the characters of truth, and all the vividness of present existence. The mind remembers, conceives, combines, and reasons; it loves, and fears, and hopes, in the total absence of any impression from without that can influence, in the smallest degree, these emotions; and we have the fullest conviction that (owing to the faculty of memory) it would continue to exercise the same functions in undiminished activity, though all material things were at once annihilated."* Accepting "Chesco's" definitions of mind and matter, how can we argue against him? because he at once defines mind as not opposed to matter. This is a convenient mode of argument, one much in use among the scoffers of religious and secular truth. But his readers, or, at least, the majority of them, must see through this thin veil of sophistry, thrown with such artistic skill over the form of truth.

Let us dispel some of these literary illusions, for they are nothing more. We do not argue about words, but about ideas. On page 168, we find mind defined as "the result of the action of the material objects on the sensorium." Now, what can be the meaning of this? Are the images of external objects fixed upon the brain, like the picture is fixed in the art of photography? Surely, they would so soon crowd upon each other, that our ideas would then be a confusion of intermingling forms. "Mind, then, being produced by matter." This is the first intimation we have had of the power of matter to create! We hitherto understood that matter was "dead;" that it was "inert." Surely there is at last something new under the sun! "Chesco" should institute a new school of physical philosophy. If in line 5, page 169, we found printed "exercised" in the place of "produced," "Chesco" would have atoned for every fault. The first paragraph on this page contains a splendid specimen of logic. Because mind is not life, therefore it must be material!

* "Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers, and the Investigation of Truth." By the late John Abercrombie, M.D., Oxon. and Edinburgh. Fourteenth Edition.

It is true that in all our conceptions of spiritual existence, such as "angels," or "ghosts," we give them the form, the appearance of the material. This, however, only proves what "Chesco's" opponents do not deny, that the mind can only comprehend what it learns from its connection with matter. A purely spiritual existence has never been the object of our senses. Until we see or feel, or in any way recognize, an immaterial existence, we cannot form an idea of one which is not of bodily shape. Because mind cannot be separated from it, does not prove it to be unopposed to matter. Besides, mind, at death, will be separated from this material body, and from "material forms and attributes." Almost at the bottom of this page of rudely assembled words and ideas, we are informed that "the powers of the mind" are given to man by matter, and that they are the *truths* gathered from the contact with the material. We envy that man who, amid this confusion of ideas, can fathom the writer's meaning. Does he know it himself? In page 170, we learn the sensibility of man's organs. We never before heard that they possessed any amount of sensibility. At page 171, memory is defined as caused by "a deep impression." Upon what? The sensible organs? At page 172, we have mind allied to knowledge. So that throughout this rambling article we have so many contradictory definitions of mind, that it is almost impossible for us to believe that the writer was aware of the rotatory flights of his own pen. Surely mind must be opposed to matter, or matter to mind, else how came it to pass that "Chesco's" pen would not obey his will?

All the mistakes of this writer have originated from his misconception of the idea of mind. He has mistaken the mental powers, which indicate the existence of mind, for the mind itself. Now, the existence of a power requires the presence of a being in which that power resides. We find certain powers possessed by every man, which are not to be found associated with any quantity of matter on the face of the globe. We have sufficient evidence to prove that they are not resident in the body. No harm to the body, no loss of any of its members, affects or impairs their efficacy. A blow on the brain will sometimes injure them. But then the brain is the channel of communication between the mind and external objects; consequently, when it is injured, impressions are not fully nor perfectly conveyed to the mind. These powers, then, exist in no material object. The inevitable conclusion is that they reside in an essence which is not material, and, for the sake of convenience, we call that essence mind.

Upon the nature of this conscious essence we can only speculate. "The term, matter, is a name which we apply to a certain combination of properties, or to certain substances which are solid, extended, and divisible, and which are known to us only by these properties. The term, mind, in the same manner.

is a name which we apply to a 'certain combination of functions, or to a certain power which we feel within, which thinks, and wills, and reasons, and is known to us only by these functions.' The former we know only by our senses, the latter only by our consciousness. In regard to their essence or occult qualities, we know quite as little about matter as we do about mind; and in as far as our utmost conception of them extends, we have no ground for believing that they have anything in common."

Here let us introduce a few facts which tend to disprove the notion that the brain is the seat of mind. They are extracted from Dr. Abercrombie's learned yet explicit work.* He mentions the case of a lady "half of whose brain was reduced to a mass of disease, but who retained all her faculties to the last, except that there was an imperfection of vision, and had been enjoying herself at a convivial party in the house of a friend a few hours before her death." "A man mentioned by Dr. Ferriar, who died of an affection of the brain, retained all his faculties entire till the very moment of death, which was sudden; on examining the head, 'the whole right hemisphere, that is, one half of the brain, was found destroyed' by suppuration. In a similar case, recorded by Diemerbroeck, half a pound of matter was found in the brain; and in one by Dr. Heberden, there was half a pound of water. A man mentioned by Mr. O'Halloran suffered such an injury of the head that a large portion of the bone was removed on the right side, and extensive suppuration having taken place, there was discharged, at each dressing, through the opening, an immense quantity of matter, mixed with large masses of the substance of the brain. This went on for seventeen days, and it appears that nearly one-half of the brain was thrown out, mixed with the matter; yet the man retained all his intellectual faculties to the very moment of dissolution, and through the whole course of the disease his mind maintained uniform tranquillity. Mr. Marshall relates of a man who died with a pound of water in his brain, after having been long in a state of idiocy, but who, a very short time before his death, became perfectly rational."

Facts like these discountenance the doctrine of materialism, and compel thoughtful persons to the exercise of caution in the formation of opinions concerning mind and mental phenomena.

The strongest argument for the existence of mind apart from matter is the consciousness of every man. We feel an inward conviction that there is within us a thinking being, whose connection with the earthly tenement is mysterious. We are conscious of the distinct existence of mind, though we confess that its faculties find exercise in the objects of sense conveyed through the senses from without. Locke compares it to a closet shut from light, with only some openings left to let in external visible resemblances of things without. Would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be

* Abercrombie, "On the Intellectual Powers."

found on occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sense and the ideas of them. The body may be likened to a camera obscura, the senses being so many lenses through which the rays of truth may pass, and produce upon the mind pictures (of ideas and propositions), as pictures of external objects are made upon the surfaces of prepared papers which may be placed in the camera. These similes will convey only an approximate idea of the mind, its nature and relation to the body, since our ignorance of mind prevents us finding suitable objects to bring into comparison with it. However, they serve to show what is our idea of mind.

If "Chesco" will conform to the general belief of mind, he will take our side of the argument. If he maintains his own ideas of that existence, he should give it another name. All men's ideas are of matter and mind, body and spirit. They recognise each by the properties of each. If, however, it can in any way be proved that there is no such thing as mind, in the general acceptance of the word, we must resort to the difficulty of expunging the idea of it from the thinking principle. This many of us will refuse to do, being as convinced of the existence of mind distinct from matter as of the existence of the body.

If matter raises in us a material structure of mind, as "Chesco" argues it does, where is the skilful anatomist who can point out its situation in the body to us? If it be material, it must be the object of our senses. Where are we to find it?

"Who can say what mind will be ultimately?" Oh, "Chesco," read thou the Scriptures! What say they? Is it not to be said at the last day, when time is no more, when eternity has commenced its ceaseless onflowing—is it not at that awful moment to be said, "He that is filthy"—filthy in thoughts as well as deeds—"let him be filthy still; he that is holy, let him be holy still"? Think not an impure mind will ever "pass away."

It will be evident to our fellow readers that "E. M., Jun.," has misunderstood the force of the question debated. We are not greatly astonished at his error, as it is the result of the ambiguous wording of the question. Much of his article is wholly irrelevant to the debate, and will receive its meed of attention. He tells us that matter is dependent on mind, and that mind is dependent on matter. What would be the ultimate result of such a reciprocal dependence, if it existed, the imagination cannot conceive. He seems to think that because matter cannot create matter, mind cannot give existence to mind. Does he not know that mind has a creative power, which matter has not? Has he forgotten the omnipotence of the Creator?

"Nemo's" article must be admired for its logical arrangement. The whole is an accumulative proof of the distinct existences of mind, which is all he contends for, and which would seem to be doubted by the form of the question.

Stepney.

CLIO.

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE close of the present debate now calls upon us for a review of the subject, and of the articles which have appeared in connection with it. Strictly speaking, we have no *reply* to make, for the simple reason that there is nothing to reply to, unless we diverge from the question, and follow our antagonists into merely collateral topics. Our opponents have been beforehand with us:—

“For they’ve all committed suicide,
To save themselves from slaughter.”

G. A. H. E. remarks, “I incline to the belief that of all things *caste has conducted least* to the present crisis; but that the cause or causes of the revolt is or are of a far different character.” This sentence is perfectly compatible with the affirmative side of the debate, and utterly irreconcilable with the negative side. The question is not whether caste has been the cause or the instrument, the origin or the means, nor whether it has conducted most or conducted least, but simply whether it has “conducted to the present revolt?” The next *felo-de-se* is “Theta.” This writer summarizes his views thus:—“Caste is confessedly *not* the conducting cause of the revolt, but Mussulman intrigues and Oude money; caste is but the catpaw” (p. 84). This is, in substance, the view we put forth at the commencement of the debate, *viz.*, that caste afforded “a common material for mutiny,” which had been employed by Mohammedan conspirators and Oude plotters. The definition of catpaw, in a large Johnson’s dictionary which happens to lie within arm’s length as we write, and which we have just turned to out of curiosity, is, “an *instrument* employed by another.” Lastly, we have the assertion of J. E. P., “That caste has not conducted to the present revolt in India is demonstrably evident from two things, *viz.*—1st. The perfect unanimity in the ranks of the mutineers; and, 2nd. The general character of the rebellion” (p. 127). These “two things,” however, afterwards appear to be *one* and the *same* thing; for we find the general character of the rebellion described as the “combining, as by common consent and instinct, to effect their purpose.” Now, if there be one fact in connection with the mutiny more patent to the whole world than all others, it is the utter want of unanimity and “common consent” among the mutineers. They mutinied piecemeal, they fight piecemeal, and they have to be put down piecemeal. All their proceedings are

fractional. Unity of action, of purpose, or of defence, is utterly unknown. The course of the mutiny reminds us continually of the expression of despair uttered by the hero of Leigh Hunt's essay on the "Graces of Pig Driving," "He'll run up *all manner* of streets." Regiment after regiment temporized and wavered, in some cases for weeks and months; in other instances, regiments maintained the strictest fidelity, and fought side by side with our own troops for a time, though they eventually joined in the revolt. It is utterly preposterous and absurd to talk of unanimity amongst the mutineers. J. E. P. might as rationally ask us to believe that the mutiny itself is a mere myth, a cunningly devised fable. Yet it is on this extraordinary denial of the whole facts of the case that his solitary argument is grounded. He professedly attempts to convince the world of the truth of a given proposition by basing his reasoning on a flat contradiction of their common sense!

"In truth, he has an easy way
To prove his theory right;
For to convince you 'blue is grey,'
He starts with 'black is white.'"

The ordinary province of a reply, therefore, is not open to us; but it may be both interesting and useful to examine the articles of our opponents a little more in detail, for the sake of investigating the cause and nature of those argumentative perplexities which have issued in such untoward acts of logical self-immolation. We shall thus both throw further light upon the subject of discussion, and gain some additional hints for our guidance in that great and noble life-labour—"the search after truth." It is a plain path which has no cross-roads—the wayfarer cannot easily get wrong if he uses his common sense. And so, in argument, it is a simple matter to arrive at the truth, if there are no cross roads of fallacy to mislead us; a pure syllogism is as obvious as an axiom; is, in fact, in its essence nothing more or less than an axiom. But the difficulty is to arrive at this point; to free the premises from every lurking fallacy, and to connect them in true logical sequence. In order to do this, we require a patient and careful training of the mental powers, which can only be obtained by constant practice and observant experience, and by investigating both our own errors and those of others, so far as to ascertain their nature, and to make them serve as buoys and beacons for future service. By pursuing this course we shall most surely reason aright, and attain to an increasingly exact knowledge of the truth, so far as it is within the reach of finite minds. *Absolute* truth, and consequent perfect unanimity of opinion in all particulars, we may rest assured will never exist in the world. All reasoning depends, more or less, on the exercise of the judgment; and our minds are so far differently constituted, that it is

impossible for them always to agree in striking the balance of those probabilities which frequently form the sole means for the exercise of the judgment. The impression made by a given fact will vary with different persons, however admirably their judgment may have been cultivated and trained. Absolute truth is probably the sole prerogative of Deity. *In him, and by him, and through him all things exist*; he therefore sees all things as they are; to him all absolute truth must be an ever-present intuition. To us all things present themselves as *phenomena*—appearances; the truth within our grasp is therefore, generally speaking, *relative*—the result of a *comparison*, or act of judgment. To apply these thoughts to our present subject, let us consider what degree of truth is attainable or necessary. Can we ascertain the *exact* influence of caste in connection with the Indian mutiny? Can we hope to reason out the *absolute truth* of the matter? Can we prove, without doubt, what was the origin, what were the causes, and what were the objects of the Sepoy revolt? Can we trace every means used, and every influence brought to bear, in furtherance of the plot? Can we lay our hand on every link in the chain of events, and point out its precise connection with all the others? It requires not a moment's consideration to see that it is utterly impossible for us to do these things. And yet, until all this has been done, it is obviously impossible to say that caste has not, in any way, conduced to the revolt. In a strict point of view, therefore, the negative side of the debate is an utterly untenable position. We pointed briefly to this fact in our former article (*vide* p. 29). And yet our opponents have calmly passed by it, without troubling themselves even to notice it. Hence we learn the secret of their suicidal admissions. They never even apprehended the exact nature of the proposition before them, or the consequences which it strictly involved.

We might have insisted on these points at the outset of the debate; but we presumed that a slight hint would be sufficient to lead our opponents to state the exact nature of the position they intended to occupy. But instead of any such course, our opponents have plunged head over heels into all the complexities of Indian politics and history, with no other result, and apparently no other design, than to make "chaos worse confounded." They just enact a sort of intellectual game of blindman's buff, shutting their eyes, groping about wildly in the dark, and concluding that whatever they happen to lay hands upon is the whole and sole truth of the matter. Thus G. A. H. E. comes across Miss Martineau's "History" and Mr. Campbell's pamphlet, and anon we hear the jubilant cry, "Eureka, eureka!" He delineates the Sepoy—"Lo! here is a Sepoy; a terrible Turk, and a villanous scoundrel to boot." What then? He recounts the catalogue of Indian mutinies—"Lo! these are the horrible crimes that he's done." The demonstration is held

complete, and we are left to the conclusion that Sepoys mutiny for the same reason that Irishmen are said to break each others' heads at a fair, "just for the love of the thing." J. E. P. reasons in a similar manner, though with a different result. We are not referred to histories and pamphlets; J. E. P. has a "knowledge of native character acquired during a residence among them." He testifies that which he has seen. It is the Englishman now who becomes a "spectacle to man and angels." If the Sepoy has a fault, it is a too meek endurance of the "galling yoke." Meerut, Lucknow, Delhi, and Cawnpore should be classed with Thermopylae and Marathon, with Sempach and Morgarten, as battle-fields of liberty. Havelock is but another Suwaroff, and the Nana Sahib is one in heart and aim with Kosciusko, Tell, and Washington. Let us delineate the Englishman according to J. E. P.'s testimony. He is a "murderer," "burglar," and "violator of treaties" (p. 128); an "oppressor" (p. 126). He is guilty of "duplicity," "cupidity," and "infamous cruelties" (p. 128); of employing "tortures," and of "conduct" of the "most revolting nature" (p. 126). His insolence leads him to treat the natives with "utter contempt," and his meanness induces him "to lower the pay" of the faithful, much-enduring Sepoys (p. 128). Need we add more? Alas! his tyranny reaches the sanctities of home, and interferes with the laws of marriage and of adoption. The poor Hindoos may no longer burn their widows, nor are they allowed to beggar and disinherit their children for the heinous offence of becoming Christians (p. 128). Surely against such a wretch as the Englishman in India the very stones would rise up, if Sepoys were quiet. Caste has no share in the mutiny. It is but a noble struggle against oppression. It is the sublime spectacle of a mercenary soldiery, touched by the woes of their bleeding country, casting away the hire of the oppressor, and uprearing the standard of national freedom. The Sepoys are Indian Thrasybulae, struggling to expel the foreign tyrants; they may fail now, but the memory of their heroic deeds shall inspire successive generations, until liberty triumphs, and India is free. Then shall the world applaud, and Sepoy heroism be celebrated in immortal song. We admire strong argument and powerful language, but venture to suggest to J. E. P. that exaggeration is not strength. Such a vehement and unconnected tirade as he has put forth strongly reminds us of Mr. Sydney Dobell's personification of tyranny, which—

"Without an arm to seize, a leg to stand,
Headless came onward, manifold and one,
Like a dishevelled legion."

J. E. P. may not be quite as spasmodic and unintelligible as the

poet, but there is something akin between his Anglo-Indian sketches and the allegorical monstrosity.

The article of "Theta" affords a third variety of reasoning. Englishmen are now no longer ferocious and truculent oppressors. Their characteristic is not villainy, but "folly." The natives have been "trusted and honoured," and regarded as "men whom it is a sin to doubt," and "a still greater sin to punish" (p. 84). They have been "treated with marked indulgence," "pampered and petted" (p. 83). The English government has been marked by so much "imbecility," "temporizing," and "conciliation," and has so completely lowered itself to the Hindoo level, as to incur their contempt, while its occasional exactions and severities have engendered disaffection and hate. In a word, "Theta" maintains that the whole history and mystery of the matter is, that we have made the Indians into spoilt children, who rebel against us after the fashion of spoilt children. There is some truth at the bottom of this reasoning. No unbiassed and honourable man can deny that there is much to regret in the Anglo-Indian history, and much to condemn. Our rule has been tinctured in some instances with injustice and wrong, and throughout we have failed to act up to our responsibilities, and to assert our moral superiority as a Christian nation. But in every respect our rule has been a progressively improving one. In point of oppression, there is no comparison between it and the sway of the native princes; and in regard to truckling to superstition, the practice of Indian government has not lagged far behind the theories of English thinkers. Sydney Smith exerted all his influence to shut out missionary efforts from India. Of his honesty, his talents, his humanity, and his morality, none can honourably doubt, yet he argued in favour of conciliating Hindoo prejudices, and the mass of the nation believed with him. It would be harsh judgment *now* to condemn the East India Company for not rising to higher views than were held by the leaders of English opinion. Before this mutiny broke out, we had a Governor-General in Calcutta subscribing to Christian missions, and a numerous band of devoted labourers of all sects preaching Christianity with the full consent of Government. If we subsidize heathen temples through mistaken policy, we have founded Government colleges. If we pandered in days past to all the enormities of Hindooism, we have in later days forbidden infanticide and the horrors of the suttees. If we had a Warren Hastings last century, we have a Sir John Lawrence now. The government of the East India Company has been open to reproach, without doubt; but were its wrongs *purposed*, or the result of error and of the influences and circumstances of the time? Let one fact speak for the animus of that body. In 1818 Mr. Mill published his great and standard work on Indian history. His censure of the Company's rule was free

and unsparing; his work to this day is the storehouse whence the tooth and nail assailants of the East India Company draw the materials for their diatribes. Was Mr. Mill cried down, or contemptuously disdained as a literary meddler? No. In the spring of 1819 he was solicited (though personally unknown and without interest) to join the Company's service, and, on consenting, was placed at the head of the correspondence department in the revenue branch of administration. In the course of time he was promoted to the headship of Indian general correspondence. In Parliamentary phraseology, he was first made Chancellor of the Exchequer, and finally Prime Minister to the East India Company, and thus became the executive instrument for carrying into effect those philosophic principles of government which formed his life study. And now his son, John Stuart Mill, one of the first thinkers of the day, occupies one of the most important positions in the East India House. These facts at least prove that when "a more excellent way" was shown, the East India Company was willing to adopt and to pursue it.

We have thus far digressed to illustrate our views on English rule in India, because there is a considerable substratum of truth in the remarks of "Theta," if we apply them rather to the history of the past than to that of the present. It is only in this way that we can do justice, and yet show the *non sequitur* of this writer's reasoning. His remarks fall wide of the mark. The mutiny ought, according to this theory, to have happened long ago. He puts forward a plausible cause, but unfortunately for his credit, when in full operation this cause did *not* bring about a general mutiny, and now that it has almost ceased to operate, the mutiny has burst forth with unexampled fury. Nor is this all. If we granted the applicability of "Theta's" reasoning, it would only establish the ultimate cause of the mutiny, and point out the *fons et origo mali*. Suppose it were asked, Did Puritanism conduce to the overthrow of the English monarchy in the seventeenth century?—would it not be mere evasion to trace the dethronement of Charles I. to his civil tyranny? Doubtless the revolution arose out of civil oppression; but assuredly the armies of the Long Parliament and the soldiers of Cromwell would not have played the part they did, had they not been fired by the religious enthusiasm which resulted from their Puritan principles. Humanly speaking, we may feel assured that if there had been no League and Solemn Covenant in Scotland, and no Puritanism in England, Charles I. would not have wholly lost either life or crown. Just in the same way, "Theta's" reasoning, if granted, would evade, and not answer, the question in debate. He has himself ludicrously illustrated the inconsequence of his argument; for, after arguing on our misgovernment of India, he suddenly turns round, and in the three closing lines of his article attributes the mutiny to utterly different causes, viz., "Musul-

man intrigues, and Oude money." And then, by way of crowning all, again shifts his ground, and sums up the history of the mutiny by telling us that "caste is the catspaw," i. e., instrument or machinery, and "Hindoo subtlety the guiding hand" or prime cause.

We have now called the attention of our readers to the extraordinary character of the negative articles. The writers wage internecine warfare with each other, and lay violent hands on themselves. Nay, if we pass over all self-contradictions, and by turns grant to each writer his pet argument, it leaves the real topic of debate just where it was. Grant G. A. H. E. his view of the Sepoy character; has the secret, debasing influence of caste had no conducting influence in making and in keeping them what they are? Grant J. E. P. that English rule in India has been as "revolting," "horrible," and "infamous," as he would have it appear; how can we account for a mercenary soldiery so suddenly exhibiting all the virtues of patriotism? Is it not natural to attribute the cause to caste—to a jealous fear that we were about to outrage the last relic of freedom which our previous oppression had spared? Said we not well that our worthy friends have apparently thought fit to engage in an argumentative blindman's buff? Their reasoning never once reaches the subject, and their association of ideas presents as extraordinary a medley as the Irishman's reasons for liking Munster:—

"For there St. Patrick planted turf,
And plenty of the praties;
With pigs galore, *ma gra, ma store,*
And cabbages, and — ladies."

And all this arises from the want of *clearness of thought*, and the absence of any attempt to define the terms they use, or the proposition they would maintain. A minute's consideration of the one word, "conduced," would have saved them from three-fourths of their perplexities. Would they ever dream of using it, in ordinary conversation, as synonymous with "caused"? Would they tell us that a fall from a scaffold "conducted to the death" of a man who was killed on the spot by the accident? Who does not know that to *conduce* is to promote an end in *conjunction* with *other* causes, or by facilitating their action—in a word, to be concerned in bringing about a given result?

The same evil of indefinite thinking is to be seen in our opponents' management of their own arguments. G. A. H. E. remarks that mutiny is no new thing: "it would seem to be an inherent principle of the soldier;" a "nuisance," the "reason why" of which is "not apparent." To illustrate these sage remarks, he gives us a catalogue of mutinies, and then, as in utter bewilderment, exclaims—"But to the question." What on earth is the use of history, unless it is to teach us the "reason why," and

the law which governs the repeated occurrence of such events as mutinies. Had G. A. H. E. examined instead of cataloguing mutinies, he might have gained a clue to the true solution of the Indian revolt. So, if J. E. P. had attempted to place his own theory clearly before his mind, he would have seen the incongruity and absurdity of supposing that the Sepoys, who have been our instruments in committing "murder and burglary," should revolt against those crimes—that the only men who had escaped our "infamous" oppression should be the very men to rebel against it.

We shall now briefly notice the criticisms made on our former article. "Theta" (p. 83) stumbles at our denominating the episode of the greased cartridges a "pretext." What a naive confession of utter ignorance of human nature! Did he ever know one instance in a score where an excuse had no connection with the truth? The mere association of ideas inevitably leads a man to frame pretexts more or less tintured with truth; to mislead or impose by means of a *particular falsehood*, compounded with a good deal of *general truth*. Titus Oates's Popish plot was a falsehood. Few could or did believe in the whole of its details, but it became the *pretext* for an outbreak of national frenzy against the Papists. Would "Theta" maintain that the plot was a truth, or else that the frenzy had nothing to do with Popery? It is not less absurd to maintain that if the outcry about the cartridges was a pretext, then caste had nothing to do with the mutiny. Then, forsooth, he maintains that if our view of the *object* of the mutiny is correct, caste cannot have *conduced* to bring about the mutiny. He might as rationally say, that if the object of agriculture is the production of food, it is impossible that high profits should lead men to become farmers; or that, if the object of a standing army is national security, it is impossible that men should enlist for any personal or subordinate motives. We now turn to the criticisms of J. E. P. (p. 125.) We had "written hastily," he remarks, for the theory "propounded" at p. 23 "is contradicted at p. 27." Unfortunately for the credit of his critical acumen, there happens to be no theory propounded at p. 23, but simply a general *coup-d'œil* of the subject, preparatory to an attempt to investigate a probable theory. In that page we remarked that, at a first glance, the mutiny is "apparently without law or purpose;" that a frenzied thirst for blood, &c., . . . seem to be not merely "its characteristics, but almost its sole aim and purpose, and that "one theory alone seems to account" for the phenomena of the revolt. And then we added, in the very next sentence, that the truth of such an explanation is "beyond conception." This guarded sketching of appearances, and decisive condemnation of their trustworthiness, is what J. E. P. calls propounding a theory. In p. 23 we took a *prima facie* and general survey, pointing out its strange contra-

dictions ; in the following pages we endeavoured to group these appearances under explanatory heads, and by this means we arrived at the probable theory of explanation stated in p. 27. This may seem an out of the way proceeding to J. E. P. He would doubtless start with conclusions, and make facts square therewith as they best might. We prefer to start with the facts, and to elicit an explanation of their apparent contradictions. Again, we are accused of inconsistent boldness at p. 23, and modesty at p. 24. The inconsistency is that of admitting the danger and difficulty of reasoning from premises which we had just shown to be full of apparent contradictions and of perplexity. It needs no remark to vindicate such an admission.

J. E. P. next objects to the sentiments of our note, p. 25, and represents them as irreconcilable with our statement of the feelings and conduct of the mutineers. We have already (*vide supra*, pp. 220, 221,) illustrated our views of the British government in India to some further extent. It would be very easy to show that, with all its defects, the sway of English power has been immeasurably happier for the natives than if they had remained under native rule. Exactly 119 years ago, Nadir Shah held possession of Delhi for thirty-seven days, and in that time, according to history, laid a contribution of thirty millions sterling on the inhabitants, and let loose his infuriated soldiery, who slaughtered 100,000 human beings. Parallel that fact by anything in the history of English conquest, and then we may begin to reason on the subject. In the terrible words of Cicero, the native princes of India had but one theory—“*Nihil cogitabant nisi cædem, nisi incendia, nisi rapinas,*” and but one practice—“*excisionem, inflammationem, eversionem, vastitatem, omnibus tecis atque agris intulerunt.*” This subject, however, is beyond the province of the present debate. The other objection, as to the irreconcilableness of our sentiments with the ferocious conduct of the mutineers, admits of a simple reply—“The law of kindness and the principle of gratitude” are *not* “universally recognized,” even in civilized and Christian England, much less among worshippers of Juggernaut. We cannot expect to find gratitude among men whose religion is one of terror, of cruelty, and of superstition,—among men who reward conjugal love with a funeral pyre,—among men who will swing with hooks through their flesh, stand on their heads between five scorching fires, distort their limbs, bury themselves up to the neck, chain themselves for life to the trunk of a tree, cast their helpless children to the sharks of the Ganges, or drown themselves in its sacred waters.* We cannot reason on the effect of the law of kindness on people who show such a fiendishness of malice as to “throw

* *Vide* Mill's “India,” vol. i. pp. 300—400. Not having the work at hand, I am unable to give the exact reference.

themselves down wells, or drink poison, for the slightest reasons, *in order that their blood may lie at their enemy's door*" (Bishop Heber). But it were waste of time to enlarge. The whole matter is summed up in a verse which J. E. P. may study with advantage:—

"Thus it is with common natures,
Treat too kindly, they rebel;
Be as rough as nutmeg-graters,
And the rogues obey you well."

We humoured the Sepoys at the expense of discipline. We yielded to the degrading and mutinous principle of caste in Bengal, and we have paid dearly for the folly. We were wiser in Madras, and have reaped the benefit of that wisdom, in the fidelity and service of its army.

Differing, as we do, from the precise views of our coadjutors in this debate, it would be an act of injustice, and might be misinterpreted as a want of courtesy and good feeling, if we made no allusion to their exceedingly able and well reasoned articles. We would impress on the readers that the affirmative articles are not antagonistic. Considered in relation to the broad question in debate, they are consentaneous and agreed. They all unite in asserting the evil effect of caste, in maintaining its active influence in the production of the Indian mutiny. They differ only in respect to the exact part which it has played in the fearful drama. They are all *relatively* true; and, as we endeavoured to show in the early part of this article, relative truth is all that we can demand in such a case. With "Alpha" and "Omega" caste is really the beginning and the end, the first and the last, of the mutiny; all other plots, intrigues, and motives are accretions only. With H. V. M. caste is but traced evidently throughout the revolt, and it is, therefore, needless to assign its exact relation thereto. With ourselves caste is the *sine qua non* of the mutiny—the material for, and means of, mutiny—the condition precedent which made it possible. These differences, to borrow an astronomical phrase, are but the mental parallax of the subject. We are unable to coincide with "Alpha" and "Omega" on this subordinate and minor point; but, at the same time, we admit that they have made out so strong a case in favour of their view, that we feel bound to state summarily the reasons for still holding to our former opinions. First. There appears to us to be three insuperable difficulties in believing that the mutiny arose in direct defence of caste; 1. The want of plan or unanimity among the mutineers betraying the fact that the organization of the revolt was exterior to, and without, the army; 2. The general absence of the usual characteristics of *religious* outbreaks; 3. The utter non-sympathy of the population generally*

* J. E. P. denies this, but we care not to controvert his denial since we are

with the mutineers. It is almost impossible to conceive that a mercenary soldiery should mutiny directly in defence of a national superstition, and yet meet with nothing but apathy and opposition from the masses around them. Secondly, We think the additional evidence, which has come to light since the opening article was penned, tends to confirm the view we then took of the *origin and aim* of the mutiny. The "wretchedly reported" trial of the ex-king of Delhi affords a remarkable corroboration of our view. The *Delhi Gazette*, as quoted in English papers, tells us, that "on the sixth day the translation of a letter, dated the 24th of March, addressed to the late Mr. Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the North-West Provinces, was read, disclosing the fact that, as far back as a year and a half ago, secret emissaries were sent by the King of Delhi to Persia, through the agency of one Mahomed Hussun Uskheree, the object of which was evidently to obtain assistance to complete the overthrow of British power in India. The perusal of the letter, which bears both the *Delhi* and *Agra post mark*, excited considerable sensation in court." We might add many other supporting facts, but space forbids, and we are not anxious to dwell on a point not directly in debate.

In conclusion, caste is irreconcilable with military discipline; it keeps up a chronic state of disaffection, preparing the way for mutinies without end. It is debasing and degrading to its adherents, and places a barrier of contempt and deception between the English officers and the Brahmin privates. It acts as a secret society, binding the high-caste Sepoys together in a confederacy, which naturally supplies the means of corruption from without and of conspiracy from within. It becomes a pretext for demands, a cloke for treachery, and a constant source of jealousy and danger. It makes punishment a dangerous insult, and reward a mere matter of due, in the eyes of men who esteem themselves sacred and privileged by birth. It is corrupting and deadening to every moral feeling, and destructive to all the higher powers of human nature. It precludes all appeal to the reason. In a national army it would raise an *imperium in imperio* utterly incompatible with good service or true safety; in a mercenary army it makes fidelity a mere accident. It is the true secret of Hindoo degradation, treachery, and ferocity; the key to that terrible continuity of horrors and barbarities, of bloodshed and woe, which constitutes the history of India. Like a deadly upas tree, it overshadows that golden land, from its central palm groves to its coral strand—from the snow-crowned heights and flower-decked sides of the Himalayas to the perfumed forests of perennial verdure in Travancore—distilling curses where nature has lavished all the affluence of her

assured that *none* will agree with him. We commend to his notice the middle paragraph of p. 79.

gifts and glories. Under that deadly shade English power thought to repose, and the blighting poison for a moment seemed to have almost withered its might. Thank God, and, under him, that English Gideon, the noble Havelock (now, alas ! no more), those scarce less heroic chiefs whose names ring through the land, and our valiant soldiery, the bloodstained record of the great Indian mutiny is all but closed. May the lesson it teaches be learned and practised. Caste must, for England's sake and for India's sake, be discouraged and undermined by the whole future policy of Government. A thousand agencies are at work for this end ; let all be strengthened, countenanced, and supported, while no violence is done. We claim toleration, even for the Brahmin and for caste ; but we also demand every facility and every moral aid for a pure morality and a heaven-sent faith. Let science unveil the falsities of superstition ; let humanity claim her rights against the cruelties of fanaticism ; let Christianity be upheld and honoured as England's faith, which none may wrong or insult, but which shall henceforth have free course to exert its divine energy and power. Thus, without tyranny or violence on our part, caste will dwindle in influence, till its power is broken and its bondslaves spurn its yoke. India then shall brighten like her own priceless gems, till she shines out the richest jewel in Britain's diadem of glory, and one more great advance shall be made towards that " golden year," sung of by the noblest poet of our own age, when bloodshed and strife shall cease—

" And universal peace

Lie like a shaft of light across the land,
And like a lane of beams athwart the sea."

B. S.

JUSTICE.—To do justice, and to give birth to the persuasion that justice is done, are two very different things, which, if possible, ought to be united ; the latter object cannot always be successfully accomplished, but the attempt should never be neglected.

—*Lord Langdale.*

PHILOSOPHY.—

Philosophy consists not

In airy schemes, or idle speculation ;
The rule and conduct of all social life
Is her great province. Not in lonely cells
Obscure she lurks, but holds her heavenly light
To senates and to kings, to guide their councils,
And teach them to reform and bless mankind.
All policy but hers is false and rotten ;
All valour not conducted by her precepts
Is a destroying fury sent from hell,
To plague unhappy man, and ruin nations.—*Thomson.*

Social Economy.

IS AN UNLIMITED BANK ISSUE BENEFICIAL TO COMMERCE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

A MORE opportune time could not have been selected to discuss this important question,—at the conclusion of the greatest monetary crisis that is within the recollection of any person, or, perhaps, that is recorded in the history of any country. It has affected both Europe and America. It came suddenly, without being anticipated; it struck most deadly amongst the wealthy; tumbled down those that rolled in wealth, and those that lived by fraud and cheating; the honest as well as the dishonest merchant. It has caused a sad havoc in the mercantile community.

We shall endeavour to prove that an *unlimited* Bank issue is beneficial to commerce, and that its *limitation* has been the *cause* of this panic. We all know that the Bank Charter Act of 1844 is the restrictive power placed on the Bank of England to prevent it issuing a greater amount of notes than it has actually of coin and bullion in its coffers, and of money advanced to the Government. And the act goes further,—it restricts the Bank from issuing notes for a less sum than £5, which we think a great evil, and a great inconvenience. We must attribute to this iniquitous act the increasing and the feeding of the recent crisis. The greater the drain on the gold of the Bank, the lesser the circulation of its notes; for the act provides that, as the gold and bullion decreases in its coffers, in proportion its circulation of notes must also be circumscribed to the extent of the decrease of the gold. Thus, for instance, the gold decreased between July and November last about £5,000,000, and the notes decreased £5,000,000. In like manner, between July and November, 1855, the gold decreased £6,000,000, or from £18,000,000 to £12,000,000; and the notes issued decreased from £30,000,000 to £24,500,000. Instead of keeping trade quietly and steadily progressing, as our opponents say it does, it has quite a different effect. It causes great fluctuations in the money market. As soon as the Directors of the Bank find that there is a great call on them for gold, and are restricted with regard to their paper currency, they are obliged—are compelled, all through this act,—to rise the rate of discount, which has, invariably, a bad effect both on the money and produce markets of the country. The holder of stock, who must sell at the time, must do so at a very great sacrifice. The

merchant, also, whose business, perhaps, only pays him three and four per cent., must borrow at the rate of five and six, and even eight and ten per cent., must suffer greatly from a system which causes such fluctuations. And we are not afraid to say, that it is a great *injustice* to the Bank and the country to restrict them from issuing as many notes as they think proper and expedient. It is not solely a matter of justice, but a matter of *trust*. Any merchant of repute will receive credit; his notes are available for a certain period, and to any amount he may choose to draw; but in the case of the Bank of England it is not so,—they are compelled and are limited to a certain quantity of notes; and for the amount they wish to issue, they are bound to have an equal amount of gold to pay it off on demand. We contend that this act *distrusts* the Governor and Company of the Bank of England. It has no confidence in it that it is capable of managing its own affairs. Surely they know best what will be good for them and the country at large. The exigency of the times is far better to dictate to them than an Act of Parliament. It precludes them from acting as any other merchant or trader would do under similar circumstances.

The Bank of England (as we previously remarked) is forbidden to issue any notes for less a sum than £5. The act that placed this restriction was passed in 1826, and endorsed by the act of 1844. This limitation to a certain sum is, to say the least of it, most inconvenient; we find daily the want of notes for one, two, or three pounds, for transmission by post; for persons are obliged to use something for their accommodation. And what is the commodity that is sought to make up the deficiency? Why notes are made of postage-stamps and of money-orders. This speaks for itself; it tells us that restricting the Bank to the amount of its issue is not only inconvenient, but injurious to the trade and commerce of the country. What is the objection that our opponents raise against issuing notes for smaller sums than five pounds? They have nothing to say, but that it would cause a greater amount of forgery than it does at present; that these notes could be made with greater facility; that the boon of having one pound notes would be far worse than the want we feel for them now. A more erroneous argument could not have been chosen. How is it that a one pound note is easier of imitation than a five or a hundred pound note? For the life of us, we cannot see it; and further, we have very strong reasons to bring forward to refute this. We seldom hear of a Scotch or an Irish one pound note being forged. In the name of common sense and reason, an English one pound note would not be a jot easier to imitate than an Irish one. These notes are of inestimable value to Scotland and Ireland. Why not give the same advantage and privilege to the Englishman and the Welshman? Treat them equally. Give the Bank of England the same

privilege as is given to Scotch and Irish banks. We must say that this limitation is a source of great complaint, and should, in our opinion, be swept away as soon as possible.

Having laid before the reader the principal features of this act, and its most unwarrantable restrictions to an unlimited Bank issue, we shall give our reasons against it, and trust we shall be able to convince the readers of the *British Controversialist* that it is extremely injurious to commerce; that it should be abrogated, and that as speedily as possible.

We have two objections to it. First,—It is a check on the trade of the country; it prevents the development of commercial pursuits to the extent an unlimited issue would permit. For during the late (I think we can speak of it now as gone) panic, we perceived in what an awkward position, in what a strait the Governor and Company of the Bank of England were placed. Demands for money continually; gold decreasing, and notes, of course, lessening, as the gold decreased; the rate of discount rising from five to six, seven, eight, and even ten per cent. Banks, in consequence of this, stopping payment; merchants of high standing and integrity compelled to succumb to the tide that was carrying them to destruction, borrowing, at first, at a ruinous rate, and in the end unable to borrow at any rate at all. And the Bank of England, if it did not actually, virtually stopped. It rose its rate of discount so high, and was so cautious to whom it advanced money (in fact, it would not—*could not*—discount any bills if they were not of the very first class; nor would it advance money to any but to those of unquestionable solidity, and to those who had money there at call) so hardly pressed was it, that it was compelled to do this to save itself from suspension. And what was the remedy? *Nothing less than the suspension* of the act of 1844. This was the only remedy that could be applied. And this is our second objection to the act. Had this been its first suspension, we might have felt a greater regard towards it, but such is not the case; for within the short space of ten years it had to be *twice* suspended. It was only passed in 1844, and in 1847, three years after its passing, it had to be suspended. Our business could not be carried on with it; the then panic could not be subsided while this act was in force; and ministers were obliged, upon their own authority (without the sanction of Parliament), to take an unusual and most dangerous course to alleviate the sufferings of the country, or rather were obliged to *remove the instrument* that caused the suffering, and trade immediately assumed its wonted course. Ten years elapsed, and the same game had to be played over again; for we find that in December, 1857, the same thing had to be done; the same impediment had to be removed in 1857 as was removed in 1847; and now we are reaping the benefit of it. In less than six weeks after the suspension of the act, discount

was reduced from ten to five per cent.,—just the half of what it was in November, previous to its suspension. Surely such indisputable facts as these are sufficient to convince any unprejudiced mind that a limited Bank issue is extremely injurious to trade; and will at once perceive that an act, which has been twice suspended, is not fit to be left on the statute book. It should be repealed, and that as soon as possible. No other act would have been permitted to disgrace our code of laws, after undergoing such mortifying disapproval, and such unmistakeable condemnation. Will its most sanguine defenders again venture to say a word in its favour? Will any of our statesmen attempt to vindicate such an unworthy thing? We hope not; and we sincerely trust that it will not see another winter, but that it shall be written over it, at the end of the forthcoming session of Parliament, *Mene tekeli*.

We shall now glance over "Philaethes'" article in your number for January, and will reply to some of the arguments which he has brought forward to prove a negative; but we do think that he has sadly fallen short of the mark to prove that which he attempts to do.

This sentence strikes us as requiring a few words of comment: "It will be found to mean an immediate temporary depreciation of the medium of exchange, an unnatural rise in prices, an unhealthy extension of trade and commerce, to be speedily followed by a sudden return to the old standard of value, a rapid fall in prices, a sudden collapse of commerce and of credit. In one word, we believe an unlimited Bank issue means ruin," page 41. This is the very thing that is in existence under the present favorite act of "Philaethes." Could prices be more fluctuating? Could the rate of discount be more uncertain? Could it rise and fall more rapidly than it has done recently? Could the stock market be more changeable? No one will for a moment venture to say that things could be worse than they have been recently. Greater changes could not have taken place; and we are as confident in our opinion as "Philaethes" is in his, that the limited Bank issue is the cause of it; and will content ourselves by referring him to recent events to confirm what we say. Another:—"There can, therefore, be no real scarcity of money, owing to the limited supply of gold," &c., p. 42. Let the reader read this passage carefully. The panic was more severely felt in Hamburg than in any other country, where there is not, nor ever has existed, bank notes or paper currency of any sort. This is a proof that gold is not sufficient for the purposes of trade during a panic, or at any other period; and where gold is the only money of a country, that country must suffer dreadfully when it cannot have gold from another, where it is blocked up; but when paper money is in circulation to an unlimited extent, that will and must check any panic.

"But an unlimited Bank issue is no new idea. It has been put into practice, and signally failed," &c., p. 42. I shall request the reader to refer to this passage, as it will occupy too much space for me to transcribe it.

"Philaethes" has no doubt but that the enormous issue of Bank notes brought about the commercial convulsion of 1837; and is of the same opinion as to America, during the crisis of 1857. Perhaps he will permit us to say what *we* think of it. What was (which is borne out by facts) the *actual* cause of the panics? For example, the issue of notes in New York is not excessive, "for all the banks there, with a capital of about £13,000,000, only issue notes (including small notes) to the amount of less than £2,000,000; while the Bank of England, with a capital, including the Rest, of £17,000,000, issues now £23,000,000, or, in proportion to capital, about eight times as large an amount of notes as the banks of New York;"* there does not appear to be anything excessive in this; but the cause of the panic there was the run upon the Banks by the depositors, "and the law of the States prohibiting the Banks from issuing the amount of notes which the business of the country required." *This was the cause of the panic, and not the excessive issuing of notes, as "Philaethes" would have it.*

We must refrain from saying anything more in reference to his paper, as we have already occupied too much space, and will leave the rest in the hands of others. And we trust that we shall be able to prove that an "unlimited Bank issue is beneficial to commerce."

IVAN MADOG.

* See *Illustrated London News* for November 7th, 1857.

ECONOMY.—All to whom want is terrible, upon whatever principle, ought to think themselves obliged to learn the sage maxims of our parsimonious ancestors, and attain the salutary art of contracting expense; for without economy none can be rich, and with it few can be poor. The mere power of saving what is already in our hands must be of easy acquisition to every mind; and as the example of Lord Bacon may show that the highest intellect cannot safely neglect it, a thousand instances every day prove that the humblest may practise it with success.—*Rambler*.

CONVERSATION.—I would establish but one great general rule in conversation, which is this, that men should not talk to please themselves, but those that hear them. This would make them consider whether what they speak be worth hearing; whether there be either wit or sense in what they are about to say; and whether it be adapted to the time when, the place where, and the person to whom, it is spoken.—*Steele*.

The Reviewer.

ESSAYS AND REMAINS OF THE REV. ROBERT ALFRED VAUGHAN.

Edited, with a Memoir, by the REV. ROBERT VAUGHAN,
D.D. Two vols., 14s. London: John W. Parker & Son.

DEATH is life's most solemn and significant event. It is always surrounded with mystery, and often shrouded in gloom. It is said to be the most certain fact in our future history, and yet it is the one we least love to contemplate. Youth seldom anticipates it, and age rarely welcomes it. But come when and to whom it may, it is calculated to rouse reflection, and excite regret; and especially so when it seizes upon the young, the cultured, and the wise. Yet even when it thus comes, and comes without any mitigating circumstances, there appears to be a principle living and operative in the hearts of some men, that has power to deprive the grim visitant of half his terrors, and even to robe him with radiance, and crown him with glory.

These thoughts have been suggested by the character of the work mentioned at the commencement of this paper, which contains a record of the life, and a selection from the literary "remains," of Robert Alfred Vaughan, a young man who was endowed with a most genial nature, who had enjoyed the most generous culture, and was possessed of talents of the highest and noblest order. It was natural that one so gifted, and so full of promise, should excite the hopes of thoughtful men, who anticipated for him a lengthened course of eminent usefulness; but, alas! these hopes were doomed to be disappointed, for the object of them manifested unmistakeable symptoms of consumption, and fell a victim to that disease at the early age of thirty-four. Melancholy as such an event seemed to survivors, it was not so to him. With all the instinctive love of life strong within him, with high and holy objects before him, and the richest social blessings around him, he was enabled to contemplate an early death with much of trustful complacency, and to feel—to use his own words—that "to have dying fairly *over*—*behind*, not *before*, and life's trial ended happily, would be bliss indeed."

Dr. Vaughan, in his brief but judicious "Memoir," gives us a deeply interesting sketch of his son's career. The outer facts of his life were few, but his mental experiences are most valuable and suggestive.

Robert Alfred Vaughan was born in the year 1823, and his early education was superintended by his father. When thir-

teen years of age, he entered the school of University College, London, possessing a knowledge of Latin, Greek, and mathematics, creditable to him for his years, and with a measure of culture and of general information, unusual at his age. His love of reading was early manifested. "While quite a child," Dr. Vaughan says, "he often sat at my feet for considerable intervals, with his book on his knee; he intent on his work, and I on mine. On one of these occasions, I remember him suddenly looking up, and saying, 'Papa, I think I *must* be a literary man!' 'Do you, Al,' was my reply. 'What makes you think so?' 'Because,' said he, 'I remember being within the sound of the scratching of your pen almost as long as I can remember anything.'" With such predilections, we are not surprised to learn, that when he passed from the classes of the school to those of the college, he at once took a respectable position among his fellow-students, which he ever maintained. He matriculated early, and in 1842, when still under twenty years of age, he took his B.A. degree, with honours in classics.

With a mind of the highest poetical capability, and endowed with the keenest perception for external beauty, and the spiritual illustrative power of common things, it is not surprising that he early manifested a passion for poetry, and that it never ceased to exercise the greatest influence over him. In 1844, while only in his twenty-first year, he published a small volume of poetry, of considerable merit, entitled, *The Witch of Endor, and other Poems*; and he subsequently composed many pieces, which contain passages of great beauty and force. But the stern realities of life now demanded his attention, and he had to discharge the important duty of choosing a profession. His taste disposed him to look in more than one direction. The artists' and the barristers' lives were successively presented to him, and were successively declined, and that of the Christian minister and author resolutely accepted. He then entered as a student of Lancashire Independent College, and afterwards became a student in the university of Halle, where he listened to the lectures of Professor Müller, and enjoyed the friendship of Professor Tholuck. During these periods of his life, he appears to have passed through fiery ordeals of doubt, and alternating seasons of light and shadow; but they all ultimately seem to have had a beneficial influence upon him, and to have resulted in deepening his convictions, and strengthening his character. Soon after his return to England, Mr. Vaughan became assistant minister with that eminent preacher, the Rev. William Jay, of Bath; he subsequently removed to Birmingham, where, for six years, he sustained the interest of an important congregation, till his failing health compelled him to leave a town in which he had made many friends, without a single enemy.

It was while a student at Lancashire College, that Mr.

Vaughan composed his first article for the *British Quarterly Review*. Among Dr. Vaughan's books, was a copy of Delarue's edition of the works of Origen, and the son commenced the study of those stately folios, with the intention of writing a review article on the life and works of that great man. In this he was eminently successful; for he produced an essay, which Sir James Stephen declared to be full of sound learning, highly wrought up, without any tawdry ornament, and continually progressing from one firm and weighty reason to another; adding, "If I had been told that the writer of it was a grandfather, I should have wondered only that the old gentleman had retained so much spirit." This article was followed, at somewhat lengthened intervals, with others on Schleiermacher and Savonarola; both of which were the result of considerable research, and were characterized by brilliancy of thought, and force of expression. The success of his efforts in this direction secured their constant repetition, and he became a regular and most valuable contributor to the *British Quarterly Review*. He was not, however, satisfied with his attainments; but was ever aspiring after greater excellence, and constantly labouring to secure it. About this time he writes in his Diary:—

"I am striving towards an historic style—a narrative that shall mark great phases with a kind of philosophic comprehensiveness, with a selection of vivid detail, grouped chiefly about the great men and real action of the drama—a biographic representative summary of main features; if possible, giving the generalizations in some illustrative or emblematic form, dwelling on individual conflicts, hopes, fears, or dramatic situations, poetically coloured. Remembering as minor rules:—

- "1. To demand as little as possible of the reader.
- "2. To avoid the abstract, and seek the concrete.
- "3. To characterize by some epithet, when possible, names and places, that they may convey some image to the reader.
- "4. To aid memory by antithesis and point—repeating foregoing words.
- "5. Having no sentence too full of ideas. To detain the reader over an idea or illustration, giving it in a succession of sentences, each complete, rather than an involved metaphor, or half-metaphor, half-simile."

In 1849, Mr. Vaughan conceived the idea of writing something on mysticism, ancient and modern. It was a subject in which he felt a deep interest; it grew rapidly under his hands, and ultimately resulted in the publication of his "*Hours with the Mystics*," in two vols. This was his largest and most valuable work, and it is one that will convey his name to future generations, and be an enduring monument of his learning and piety.

The last days of Mr. Vaughan would have been unusually calm and peaceful, but for the ruffling influence of personal illness and relative trials. And even with these he was happily free from anxious fears and dark forebodings. As his physical

strength decreased, his trust in God increased; and only a short time before his death, when reminded of the goodness of God, he replied with emphasis—"Yes, God is very good." He soon afterwards, with much calmness of manner, said, "This is very like dying." The rest was silence, and the end peace.

The record of such a life, and such labours as these, must of necessity be full of interest, and fraught with instruction; and having, in perusing this work, felt its stimulating influence ourselves, we cordially recommend it to the notice of our readers. It ought to find a place in the library of every Young Men's Association and Mutual Improvement Society in the kingdom. Let but the principles and motives that actuated our poet-preacher influence and mould the characters of our young men, and they, without egotism, will be able to exclaim with the departed one—

"In youth we stand upon the mountain brow,
Look on life's valley rough and rent below,
One hour of stillness, while we think on *how*,
Then steeled with forethought, down to deeds we go,
Burning to fell the hundred-handed foe.
Ay! we are sons of an Olympian seed,—
Vain waits the world to vanquish us with woe,
Still shall we smile in battle, though we bleed,—
Whate'er may be the end, divine shall be the deed."

FAMILIAR OBJECTS.—If we are not struck with astonishment and admiration at the sight of man, it is merely the effect of habit, which renders the most wonderful objects familiar. Hence it is that the human figure, even the face, excites not the attention of the vulgar.—*Sulzer*.

DISSIMULATION.—Nothing can be more unjust or ungenerous, than to play upon the belief of a harmless person; to make him suffer for his good opinion, and fare the worse for thinking me an honest man.

PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION.—As we ought not to make the gratification of our external senses the main end of life, so neither ought we to indulge our taste for the more refined pleasures, those called the pleasures of the imagination, without some bounds. The cultivation of a taste for propriety, beauty, and sublimity, in objects natural or artificial, particularly for the pleasures of music, painting, and poetry, is very proper in younger life; as it serves to draw off the attention from gross animal gratifications, and to bring us a step further into intellectual life, so as to lay a foundation for higher attainments. But if we stop here and devote our whole time and all our faculties to these objects, we shall certainly fall short of the proper end of life.—*Priestley*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

189. Can you inform me the way of proceeding to obtain the degree, Doctor in Music (Mus. Doc.); also, to obtain a studentship in the Royal Academy of Music (R. A. M.)?—J. J. G.

190. How can I obtain the position of Fellow or Associate of the Society of Antiquaries?—J. J. G.

191. *Télémaque* very kindly answered "Alpha's" inquiries on the Indian Civil Service. Would he, or any other subscriber, favour me with answers to the following questions on the Home Civil Service. (1) As to the nature and extent of the examination to be passed for admission to the service? (2) Where and when the examinations are held? (3) The salaries which an individual passing the examinations would have the prospect of obtaining? The subscriber has heard of a work called "A Guide to the Civil Service." If the work gives answers to these questions, and other information, please inform him of the price and publisher.—J. D.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

168. J. H. may obtain that which will answer the purpose of a "Common Place Book," or "Index Rerum," at any stationer's shop; but books specially prepared for the purpose, with alphabetic pages, may be had at about 8s. 6d. each, from Mr. B. L. Green, Paternoster-row. Several interesting articles on this subject will be found in the third volume of the first series of this work.—A.

171. R. J. will find the information he seeks in the *British Controversialist* for 1851, under the head of "Latin without a Master."—C.

174. "Harrison" will find much interesting information on the history of

India in Lord Macaulay's brilliant essays on Lord Clive and Warren Hastings. Mill's "History of India" is a standard work; it is now being republished in ten volumes, price 5s. each. "Our Eastern Empire," published by Griffith and Farren, is an interesting book for the young. There is also a "History of India, during the Hindoo and Mahomedan Periods," by the Hon. M. Elphinstone, but I have not seen it. It is published by Murray.—J.

183. The best work on "Composition," for a self-tutor, we should think, is a pamphlet entitled, "Composition and Elocution," by Samuel Neil, Esq. The price is 1s.; the publishers, Messrs. Houlston and Wright, 65, Paternoster-row.—J. J. G.

Without knowing the exact position and acquirements of T. B. J. it is difficult to say which work on English Composition will be best for him. He will find Cornwell's "Young Composer; or, Progressive Exercises in English Composition," price 1s. 6d., a useful elementary book; and the same remark will apply to Chambers's "English Grammar and Composition," price 2s. 6d. He cannot, however, do better than study the five chapters on the "Essentials of English Grammar and Composition," which he will find in the *British Controversialist* for 1855. There is also an excellent article on the subject in the volume for 1850. He will then do well to obtain and study either of the following works, Graham's "Art of Composition," or "Irving's Elements of English Composition."—A. J. C.

185. I beg to state, for the information of your correspondent, that the principal of a large private endowed grammar or proprietary school can be

elected a Member of the Royal College of Preceptors on the recommendation and signature of two members, provided the person desiring such honour has held office, or been established, three years. Parties not included under the above head can only become members by passing the necessary examinations (for associate, member, licentiate, or fellow), which are held at the rooms of the College, Queen-square, Bloomsbury, London, in the month of June of each year.—E. J. T. P.

187. In answer to your inquirer, "Mega," concerning "The Progress of Being," I beg to inform him that it is published by Ward and Co., 27, Paternoster-row, price 2s. 6d.; and having derived considerable advantage from its perusal, I most cordially recommend it to his notice. There is also another work, uniform with the above, by the same author, entitled, "The Crisis of Being," equally worthy of perusal.—F. B. B.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Worcester Mechanics' Institute.—The annual soirée, in connection with this institute, took place in the Music Hall, Worcester, on Monday evening, April 19, and was attended by a very fashionable and numerous assembly. The society has been established for about eighteen months, and has between 200 and 300 members. Hitherto its operations have been attended with considerable success. There were present:—The Very Rev. the Dean of Worcester (who occupied the chair), Lord Ward, Sir E. H. A. Lechmere, Bart., J. Slaney Pakington, Esq., Josiah Stallard, Esq. (Mayor of Worcester), Herbert New, Esq. (Mayor of Evesham), F. H. Galton, Esq., Rev. Canon Wood, Rev. Richard Cattley, Mr. W. Smith, of Evesham, &c. J. S. Pakington, Esq. delivered the opening address, and observed that all now admitted that Mechanics' Institutes formed an essential part of our national education, and that they, in fact, had been brought into existence to fill up the gap which hitherto had been felt to exist between the days of boyhood, and the more advanced years of life. He said, facts warranted them in con-

sidering the Worcester Society as one of the best in the kingdom, and as a model which other similar societies in the country would do well in many respects to copy. He dwelt on the importance of such institutions being rendered self-supporting, and urged the necessity of an accession of honorary members. Proceeding to the subject of the lectures, he complained of their sometimes diffuse and disconnected character; and said that, although amusement in connection with such societies was very desirable, yet that they ought to take special care that this feature was not overdone. Such institutions had their legitimate effect in counteracting the effect of the beer-shops and gin-shops, and he was happy in saying that this society had to some extent had this effect in Worcester. He suggested monthly instead of annual soirées, and then adverted to the necessity of forming evening and female classes. After alluding to the great good which was being effected by similar institutes at Huddersfield, and in the north, he urged the desirability of forming a general union of mechanics' institutes throughout the kingdom.

H. New, Esq., Mayor of Evesham, as representing the Evesham Institution, which he said he believed was the oldest in that county, having been in existence about twenty years, addressed the assembly at some length in support of a general union of mechanics' institutes throughout the kingdom. He said there was a great educational movement going on in the country, of which the working men were invited to avail themselves; and added that it only remained for working men to claim the mental culture within their grasp, to elevate themselves socially and morally.

F. H. Galton, Esq., the President of the Bromsgrove Institution, lamented the early age at which children in this country were taken from school, and said this lack of early education could only be counteracted by such institutions as the one in connection with which they were met. He quite agreed that the great end of such institutions was an educational one; but still he had much faith in the efficacy of amusement, combined with instruction. He liked to see their members engaged in cricket, draughts, &c.

Mr. Giles, a working man, and one of the committee, delivered a very amusing and clever speech.

J. S. Pakington, Esq., proposed, "That in order to increase the efficiency of our local Mechanics' Institute, it is desirable to establish a union of Worcestershire Educational Institutions, similar to those in some other counties."

This was seconded by Josiah Stalard, Esq., and carried unanimously.

Sir E. H. A. Lechmere, in a brief speech, proposed a vote of thanks to J. S. Pakington, Esq., for his address. Sir Edmund dwelt on the evils of the public house; said he looked upon such institutes as the antidote to the bane; advocated amusements in connection with them, and a weekly half-holiday.

Mr. W. Smith, the secretary to the Evesham Institution, in seconding the

proposition, said he was deputed to give in their adhesion to the proposed union.

J. S. Pakington, Esq., returned thanks.

Lord Ward, in proposing a vote of thanks to the Very Rev. the Dean, for presiding, delivered an effective address.

The vote was seconded by Mr. Street, and having been carried, was acknowledged by the Dean, and the proceedings then terminated.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.—A social meeting, in connection with this society, took place at the Odd Fellows' Hall, on Tuesday evening, April 20. About 150 of the members and friends sat down to an excellent tea. The chair was afterwards taken by Mr. J. A. Cooper, who delivered an appropriate opening address. Amongst the subsequent proceedings were an essay on "Indifference to Religion Criminal and Dangerous," by Mr. S. Draper; and an address on "The Advantages of Mutual Improvement Societies," by Mr. H. Hallam; an essay on "Logic and Logicians," by Mr. G. Waas; an essay on "Youth and Old Age," by Mr. J. Lear; recitations by Messrs. Sims, Neale, and Taylor; and a poetical composition by Mr. J. Ellis.

Chief Circulating Library.—The half-yearly meeting of the Debating Club was held on Monday evening, March 29th, in the side-room of the Weavers' Hall, Mr. Wm. Anderson in the chair. The report of the Circulating Library was submitted, and gave great satisfaction. It showed a considerable balance in hand, and it was calculated that upwards of 1,800 volumes had been circulated during the last half-year. It is now ten years since this society was established. It would be impossible to calculate the good they have done in awakening a spirit of inquiry among the young men of the district by their discussion, and of spreading among them the blessings of a refined literature by means of their

excellent library. The library is open for exchanging books on the evenings of Saturday, between the hours of eight and nine o'clock; and the debating club meets every Monday night, at eight o'clock, for the discussion of

important subjects, in their rooms under the Weavers' Hall, where the public are always invited to attend and judge for themselves of the advantages of such an institution.—JAMES M'NAB.

LITERARY NOTICES.

We are glad to say that Government has granted the new charter to the University of London. The great point of this reform is, the throwing open of academical honours to every man willing to brave the necessary examinations. This is the best step education has taken since Lord Brougham, and his friends, first pronounced against the close guilds of learning—and founded London University as a protest and an experiment.

Government has also consented to sanction a new degree—a doctorship of science. London University will very soon be able to grant the new degree; and we presume Oxford and Cambridge—especially Cambridge—will, in due time, follow the good example.

With the present year a new literary journal commenced its career at Moscow, under the title of the *Athenæum*.

Mr. G. Smith has received the chair of Modern History at Oxford; and Signor Arrivabene has been named Professor of Italian Language and Literature to London University College.

Professor Rogers, author of the "Eclipse of Faith," &c., has resigned his tutorship in Spring Hill College, Birmingham, to become successor of Dr. Vaughan, in Lancashire Independent College, Manchester.

The joint winner of the Simpson mathematical £60 prize at King's College, Aberdeen, was Mr. Donald Robertson. Mr. Robertson (says the *Banff Journal*) has, up to the last six months, worked all the summer at farm labour, earning thereby sufficient to enable him to attend the college classes during the winter.

The Prince de Joinville is about to publish his voyages and scientific observations. The work is said to be in the press.

The obituary of the month contains the name of Mr. J. H. Barrow, author of "Emir Maleck," and other works of fiction, and formerly editor of the "Mirror of Parliament," a series of parliamentary reports, which shared for a time the popularity of "Hansard," as a book of political reference.

A person of the name of Mioche, who followed the modest calling of a baker at Clermont Ferrand, in Auvergne, has just died. He was a zealous numismatist, and that science is indebted to him for having explored, with great minuteness, various battlefields of the Romans and the ancient Gauls, and having thereby brought to light a considerable number of curious medals and coins. He was in frequent communication with numismatic societies of England, Germany, and Italy.

On the 3rd of the present month will take place, at Augsburg, an auction of scarce and valuable antiquarian xylographic and typographic varieties. Amongst them is the "Apocalypse," with woodcuts, printed by the rubber, a method adopted previous to the invention of printing with moveable types; and the "Canticum Canticorum," and the "Ars Memorandi per Figuram Evangelistarum." There are seven books printed on parchment, the "Catholicon," from Guttenberg's press in 1460; Fust's "Cicero," of 1465; and the "Missale Ratisbonense," of Pfeil, in Bamberg. There is also the first Latin Bible printed on paper, known as the "Mazarine Bible," a copy of which at the Hibbert's sale fetched as much as £215.

The Logic of Public Speaking.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

"Ease is not the result of negligence, but the perfection of art."—*Paley*.

IN a recent article in the "Quarterly Review" on the subject of Public Speaking, the following remark occurs, viz., "There are few persons of fair abilities who might not attain to the power of expressing good sense and useful knowledge in clear, flowing, and agreeable language." The writer, however, contents himself with the utterance of mere generalities, places no grand exposition of the method by which this power is attainable, and reaches no farther than the presentation of such commonplace platitudes, as follow, to the notice and for the instruction of his readers:—"The greatest talents, like the *richest* soil, only yields its choicest fruits to persevering tillage;" "the idle may dream over the fancied possession of intuitive powers, which they never display. Those who enter the arena, and engage in the contest, know that *strength* cannot be put forth without *strenuous* exertion, nor skill be manifested without assiduous practice;"—and then closes with the simple observation that, "the real improvement required is, that the men who have entirely neglected the art [of Public Speaking] should endeavour to repair a deficiency, which deprives their knowledge of its utility by destroying its charm." So far well; but if the reader exclaims, "Tell me, gentle critic, tell me where" instruction in this divine art may be had? the oracle is dumb.

On one or two former occasions we have found what are by courtesy denominated the higher organs of literature singularly deficient in the scientific and practical treatment of the art of expression; and have done our best to supplement their defects by placing before our readers the knowledge they have failed in presenting; or adding to their teaching what seemed to us requisite to fit it to become available in the culture of the minds of those whom we are privileged to address. Nor do we now feel either scruple or hesitancy in taking our starting-point from our elder brother of the press, while we pass on to show by what means the dissipated "repairs" may be effected, and the results of the deprecated neglect be most readily exiled from among thinking, studious, and earnest men. With this intent we take up our pen to indite a paper on the *Logic of Public Speaking*.

"That man," says Cicero, "may be called an orator who, what-

ever topic comes before him that requires elucidation by speech, can descant upon it judiciously, formally, elegantly, and, by memory, shedding over all the graces of delivery."* The same great Roman orator observes, that, "it is better to speak plainly, provided it be done judiciously, than to think ever so acutely in silence; for thought is confined to the person elaborating it; while public speaking embraces and operates upon all those with whom we may in any way associate."† From these two sentences we shall endeavour to draw forth a definition of oratorical public speaking—

" L' eloquence,
Cet grand art des Romains, cette auguste science
D' embellir la raison, de forcer les esprits."

Public speaking is the manly, modest, clear, earnest, judicious expression of thought, on any given subject, in the presence of many, for the purpose of influencing them in their decisions upon the matter under deliberation; *Eloquence* adds feeling and ingenuity to the above-mentioned qualities; while *Oratory* conjoins thereto the fire of passion, the premeditation of art, the full, flowing, copious utterance of cultured skill, acquired information, practical art, ready tact, and disciplined energy.

It is our belief that in all these forms of manifesting thought, by words spoken in public, much more lies within the true and right province of *tuition* than *intuition*. We assume the teachability of public speaking; not because we believe that teaching will make a finished and perfected orator, whether inherent power exists in the student or no, but because we are firmly convinced that it will regulate, exercise, train, control, restrain, and direct the exertions of whatever power it possesses, so as most certainly, effectively, and elegantly, to produce the ends aimed at in public speaking. Animated by these opinions, we purpose to impart such advice regarding the logical requisites of success in popular oratorical address as, being honestly practised, cannot fail, we think, in effecting considerable improvement in the power of public speaking in those who labour for the attainment of this noble agency for moving men.

"The use of public speaking," says Quintilian, "is to express whatever you think so as to communicate *that* to your auditory. . . . Words were invented for the explanation of thought; so that their greatest use is to utter our sentiments with the most telling effect, and bring the audience to favour what we advocate."‡ They ought, therefore, not only to strike, but please and captivate. When the clearly arranged, carefully planned, and elegantly expressed thought of a speaker is projected into the midst of the unsorted and vague ideas which lie upheaped in the hearer's

* "De Oratore," I. xv.

† "De Officiis," I. xlv.

‡ "Institutiones," VIII., proemium 12.

mind, it cannot fail to overpower resistance and conciliate favour, if due care be taken to prevent the passions from placing false weights in the scales of just thinking, or tilting the beam in the wantonness of their power. This preparedness for operating in a particular manner in attaining the desired end is always in the power of the speaker, and he has herein one great and valuable privilege over the hearer,—and that advantage Logic is chiefly employed in elaborating.

Logic teaches us to relate, explain, prove, disprove. So far, then, as these elements enter into a popular address, Logic is the prime minister of thought; but when we proceed to excite, enflame, rouse, agitate, and persuade, Rhetoric assumes the chieftancy, and Logic relapses into an underling, holding office during the ministry of another. Logic plans and fashions the materials which Rhetoric employs. Deliberation, demonstration, judgment, &c.,—so far as these are employed or implied in public speaking, there must be an exertion of the ratiocinative faculty, and, consequently, a need for watching well that its operations are performed with due and proper attention to the scientific teachings on which efficiency depends. The orator does not find his utterance impeded; because he must conform to the established usages of grammar while speaking; neither will he find any disadvantage arising from a thorough and constant employment of thought shaped, moulded, and arranged according to the laws which regulate the reason. Logic restrains, but it is from the wandering of thought in paths incapable of leading to the truth. Rhetoric trammels the mind, but it does so, that in the wild enthusiasm of perfect uncontrolledness it may not dash on in a manner alien to the attainment of its wishes. The well-trained steed obeys the bridle only that it may display more graceful action, than if, flowing away in natural wildness, it gave heed to no law but its own untutored instinct and will, its own unconstructed energy, and untamed force and fancy.

The spirit and grace, the fire and strength, the animation and flow of a thinker's mind, are benefited by the concentration and skill which results from culture. The trained and practised billiard-player has greater delicacy of touch, tact, and readiness of hand, than he who trusts to the momentary exertion of thought and feeling; the skilled musician does not find the effectiveness of his performance lessened by the days devoted to the acquisition of a mastery over voice or instrument; the *athlete* is not regardless of rules, experiences, and guides; but reads himself up in the practice of those scientific teachings which lead to success during the exerted activities in which he exhibits his art; the chessman "gives up his days and his nights" to the study of "moves" and "takes," and in all these the utility of scientific training, followed by duly regulated practice, is admitted. Yet men will tell you that the motions of the mind, subtle and intri-

cate as they are, require an acquaintance with no theories of persuasion to excite or stir them, but that the plain and palpable course to pursue is this: when you think, speak what you think, just as you think it. It is easier, according to this notion, to play with or upon the passions and intellects of men than to move the men on a chess-board, finger the keys of a pianoforte, hit the cue at a billiard-table, or use the dodges of the "fancy," the skill of the fencer, the agility of the gymnast, the dexterity of the dancer, or the "cunning" of the good hand at cards or *roulette*.

Not to debate the question, however, do we now write; so we must proceed to our series of instructions, leaving the burden of proof or of disproof upon those who have fairly exerted themselves according to the directions given, and succeeded or failed — *Revenions*.

Public speaking having been defined as the utterance of persuasive thought, and Logic being regarded as the architect of discourse, "the Logic of Public Speaking" will signify a compendium of the laws of reasoning, in so far as they are active in the structure of discourse.

Discourse is the communication of thought by words to individuals, companies, or assemblies, what Dryden calls "the banquet of the mind."

The laws of reasoning are those inherent regulative principles in submission to, or in accordance with, which the process of thought is gone through, if it be rightly done. These may be of two kinds, viz., (1) *necessary*, or those without which no use of the understanding would be possible; (2) *contingent*, or those without which no *determinate* use would be possible. The former are summed up in Syllogistic Logic; the latter can only be known when their *end* is determined, *i. e.*, they are special adaptations of the former to the effectuation of some given purpose, or the prosecution of some particular study.

To discourse in public is a *special* use of the power of speech, and as such may have a set of laws arranged applicable to the objects at which it aims. This is what we are about to attempt.

All discourse is more or less *dialectic*, that is, passing *from* one or more thoughts to another thought or other thoughts deduced from it or them, *i. e.*, reasoned thought.

Discourse, or reasoned thought, must consist, then, of at least three parts (1), the stated thoughts; (2) the process of reasoning; (3) the conclusion. These parts, and any others to be effectively placed before the mind, must be planned.

Invention is requisite to decide upon the topics most appropriate to the accomplishment of the end in view.

The *logical* rules of Invention are these: 1, Use no premises except such as fully and fairly bear out the argument sought to be proven; or when this is impossible, 2, build together the topics of thought in such a way as to give the widest possible

form of conclusion ; 3, adopt such items of proof as may most readily permit the intended inference ; 4, where opposite items exist, shew their inapplicability, or inappositeness, and thus extrude them from a part in the settlement of the question, or, at least, shew the greater pertinence of those which you decide upon employing ; 5, put the stated thoughts as nearly as possible in the form according to which they will yield the widest and surest grounds to the inferences to be deduced from them. That the logical demands on invention may be satisfied, the premised thoughts should be true, rightly stated, and so placed, as to allow the mind to pass most readily from these to the reasoning founded on them, or rather so arranged as to necessitate the passage of thought from the given topics of discourse to the opinion sought to be established as the *end* of the speech.

Arrangement or *disposition* is the technical term for the putting of the materials, of which a discourse is to be composed, into the form in which they will be most effective, *i. e.*, fitted to impart the clearest knowledge, to enable it to be most easily remembered, and most easily explained. Ideas may be excellent in themselves, and be most pertinent to the subject, yet if they are presented to the mind of the hearer in a confused and disorderly heap, unshapen, or misshapen by the thinker's mind, their effect will be materially invalidated, and their force and impressiveness will certainly be weakened.

The following regulations may be given : (1) Thoughts should succeed each other in accordance with the laws of association, and the sequences they most readily seek. If possible, however, strength and variety may be often imparted by arranging the ideas to be expressed so as to agree with and touch upon each of the sequences which association yields. (2) Arguments not tending strongly to the confirmation of the consequence desired should be avoided ; and (3) Such arguments as are likely to displace those of greater weight and graver importance ought either to be altogether omitted, or lightly treated.

The *parts* of a discourse are usually given as six, *viz.*, exordium, narration, proposition, confirmation, refutation, and peroration ; but our own opinion is that, as a general rule, three parts are quite enough, *viz.*, (1) preparative ; (2) argumentative ; and (3) hortative.

As the signification and purpose of the six technical terms above-mentioned may be found in all books of rhetorical instruction, we shall confine ourselves to those terms which we have now adopted as sufficient for all usual purposes.

1. *Preparative*. In this division, in general (1), The *terms* are defined or explained ; (2) The *question*, or topic of discourse, is stated, distinguished, and limited ; (3) The *order* and *aim* of the investigation are laid down and marked out.

In this the intensest endeavour should be made to be pleasing, natural, perspicuous, truthful, short, pointed, and plain; not unadorned by well-chosen words and figurative phrases, but free from over-ornament, and the "purple light" of passion.

Terms should be defined concisely, clearly, adequately; having the whole sphere of thought embraced in it distinctly marked out, and the sum of its contents precisely given.

The *question* should be as free from ambiguity, as direct in its statement, as full in its meaning, yet as concise in its expressions, as possible. The *order* should be symmetrical, *i. e.*, based upon one plan. This may be either founded on the idea of—1, time; 2, place; 3, causation; 4, inference; 5, analogy.

The *aim* should be tangible, settled, and unical; even when arguing in the form of the dilemma, *our* purpose should be single and clear. The expression should be calm, deliberate, easy, and attractive.

II. *Argumentative.* In this portion of a discourse the view of the topic to be taken ought, in general, to be indicated; afterwards—1, The special points of consideration ought to be stated, distinguished, and separately propounded and treated. In doing so, endeavour (*a*) to make use of clear language, explicitly expressed; (*b*), to arrange the statements so as to flow freely and naturally from the *preparative part*; (*c*), to mention with precision the differences to be insisted upon, and the resemblances which, though plausibly capable of being regarded as contained in the terms employed, are yet, in reality, seeming—not genuine; (*d*) to keep each *item* fairly and fully apart—either in statement or reasoning—from each other, so as to avoid uncertainty, confusion, misapprehension, or error.

2, These (special) points should be laid before the mind in such an order as to lead the thoughts (or at least prepare them), on the decision of one, to be more ready to yield to and admit the others. This may be done by a proper attention to *method*.

True philosophical method is *threefold*, *viz.*, 1, hypothetically synthetic; 2, analytical; 3, theoretically synthetic.

Hypothetical synthesis is the assumption of the mind regarding the causes or reasons of any phenomenon, &c., in the early stages of its inquiries, and is the result of the innate activity of the thinking mind. Its chief use is to be directive, and exhaustive of all possible modes of thought. It is not to be rested in, trusted, or accepted as true, in itself; it is rather to be regarded as the outgrowth of the constructive faculty of man; "a power or spirit of the intellect pervaded all that it does," and laying before it a pathway whereon it may proceed in its exertions after discoveries, doctrines, truths, &c. Aristotle says, truly, "that we ought to see well what demonstration [or kind of proof] *suits* each particular subject." It is the province of hypothetical syn-

thesis to show us this. If the mind be bold, it is a hazardous and insecure roadway to truth, and should be trodden with care, caution, prudence, and restraint.

Analysis is the investigative process by which the mind, ranging over the pathways laid down or marked out by hypothesis, strives to examine each point of the way in the double light of fact and reason, that it may determine whether that which is sought may be found thereon or thereby. It is a conjunct energy of faith and will, working together in the search for certainty. *Faith*, however, postulates that the *truth* be given as the genuine product of investigation, and shall accord with the realities of things; whereas *will* is anxious that the truth shall accord with that already determined by the mind, and wishes to throw the influence of its power into our perceptions, that the triumph may be on its side. Hence a woeful liability to error, needful to be strictly guarded against.

Theoretical synthesis is the satisfied survey of the soul, of the whole field of observation traversed. Plato somewhere says, that philosophic thought is a perpetual conversation between the soul and the objects around it. The forth-putting of thought of this kind yields, as its result, if rightly exercised, a power of looking upon the facts, reasonings, &c., about any matter as a whole—proven, known, and true. Hypothetical synthesis, with a succeeding analysis, will in all probability give, as its last word, false thought. *Analysis*, unregulated by hypothesis, will be wild and bewildering, and, unless finally surveyed in the calm light of synthesis again, and transformed into theory, it will be incomplete and inutile. No truth is isolated and individual; all thought is interrelated; a true method will lay thoughts, when spoken, before the eye of the soul in that mode which will most readily suffer these relations to be seen, observed, and attended to.

This may be best done by considering the object of discourse. If it is descriptive, narrative, &c., the right method will be either (1) simultaneous; (2) successive; or (3) distributive. If it is ratiocinative or argumentative, the right method will be (4) logical.

- (1) Simultaneous, in time, place, order, suggestion, &c.
- (2) Successive, in time, place, order, associative sequence, &c.
- (3) Distributive, in (a) dividing a whole, in thought, into its parts; (b) uniting a number of less wholes into a greater in thought.
- (4) Logical method will observe the following laws. (a) Let the thoughts presented exhaust the subject in one given point of view. (b) Let each sub-thought express or imply a less area of thought than the original subject. (c) Let the different thoughts presented be distinct from each other: but (d) Let them not be unnecessarily numerous. In reasoning, adhere strictly, though

not formally, to the requirements of the syllogism in premises, arrangement, and conclusion.

3, The different arguments should follow closely the order of statement and exposition; not given at random, but well-knit, and touching distinctly and definitely upon the matter under thought.

4, The arguments should be mutually corroborative, and should lead readily from the more general to the more decisive.

5, Everything vague, superfluous, or doubtful should be carefully expunged from a discourse, because it embarrasses the mind, makes the subject unmanageable, opens a way to objections, and throws a shadow of distrust over the inquirer's mind.

6, Possible objections should be fairly, fully, freely, and candidly stated, their force honestly estimated, and, as far as lies in the speaker, be argued against, and not evaded.

7, Care should be used in showing that the limitation of the mind ought not to be employed as an objection to anything advanced, except in so far as it may be overcome, and in distinguishing between subordinate or analogical and essential argument.

8, Only that should be contended for which shall, as definitely as possible, prove the opinions advanced.

9, Where objections are numerous, sum up with a detail of their comparative number, weight, &c., and liability to denial.

III. *Hortative.* This branch does not directly fall under the title given to the present paper, viz., "The Logic of Public Speaking." There are one or two points, however, which may be noticed as, in a manner, falling under this head, viz., No hortation should be employed which is not founded upon feelings which are naturally excited by the reasoning employed, or that would contradict (or imply an opposite course of thought to) any opinion advanced in the course of the former parts, or would be inconsistent with the general purpose, manner, tone, &c., of the foregoing divisions of the discourse. The remainder of this department of the subject would fall to be considered—and may at some future time be so—under the heading, "The Rhetoric of Public Speaking." Meanwhile, we hope the above-given thoughts may be found as useful by our readers as they were written in the hope of being. In all speech aim after the attainment of victory for *Truth*, not *Self*.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL
BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE
MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM
PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"If a man die, shall he live again? all the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come."—Job xiv. 14.

"Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth."—John v. 28, 29.

IN an age distinguished, like the present, for its mental activity and restless inquiry into every dogmatic point of belief, it is well that the sincere and earnest inquirer after truth should have ample opportunity for sifting evidence, weighing every argument, and so proving "all things," that he may intelligently "hold fast that which is good"—being fully assured that the superstructure of his faith has, for its foundation, not the uncertain sands of doubt, but the solid rock of eternal truth. It is for this and similar reasons that we hail the debates on the present and kindred questions, assured that free discussion is one of the best means to forward the holy cause of truth, remove doubts, silence the cavils of objectors, and confirm the faith of believers; and aware, as we are, that the reception of the doctrine of the resurrection of the human body has been often hindered by the repeated objections of sceptics, drawn from the discoveries of modern science. The source of argument during the present debate is limited by the nature of the subject itself, and the words of the question. Our inquiry will, therefore, be confined to ascertaining "what saith the Scriptures" concerning the resurrection of the body. Our desire is to learn the import of their language; and to them alone we shall appeal, as being the sole and sufficient depository of all the knowledge we can at present hope to attain on this important question.

The resurrection of the body is eminently a revealed doctrine, "and is one of the great articles of the Christian religion. So far from its being known to those ancients who enjoyed no revelation, their happiest conjecture was the supposition that in the state after the present, one of its constituents, ensuring the highest felicity, was being 'without any bodies;'" and thus,

when the Apostle preached the doctrine of the resurrection to the philosophers at Athens, they were astonished at its novelty; some said the Apostle "seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods, because he preached unto them Jesus and the Anastasis;" and, on its being further expounded to them, others mocked, as though it was too foolish an idea to be worthy of a thought (Acts xvii. 18, 32). Pliny, in accordance with the opinion of most heathen writers, classes amongst the impossible things, which even God cannot perform "to call back the dead to life;" while Celsus, the great opponent of primitive Christianity, calls the hope of the resurrection "the hope of worms, a very filthy and abominable as well as impossible thing; it is that which God neither can nor will do, being base, and contrary to nature." Thus has it been thought by many men in all ages to be "a thing incredible that God should raise the dead." Even when the light of Revelation has been enjoyed, it is often doubted by professed Christians, and nowhere do we find the contrary positively asserted except in the Scriptures, or other writings founded thereon. In answering the present question in the affirmative, we notice—

I. That the Scriptures represent death as a state of sleep.

Throughout the Bible, filled as it is with vivid and striking analogies of the future, drawn from the present state, we find this idea of death as a state in many respects similar to that in which the body is during the hours of repose; and this, probably, for the several reasons that sleep is the state of rest to the body, deep sleep, like death, is a state in which the mind is unconscious; and, for a further reason, that from death there will be an awakening on the resurrection morn, similar to that experienced after sleep. In the historical books of Israel and Judah it is recorded of one and another of the departed kings, that "he slept with his fathers, and was buried in the city of David." The Psalmist expresses the same idea, and his hope, when he says, "I shall be satisfied when I awaken with thy likeness" (Psa. xvii. 15), evidently referring to the awakening after death in the spiritual and bodily likeness of his Redeemer. So also in Dan. xii. 2 we are informed that "many of them that *sleep* in the dust of the earth shall *awake*." In the New Testament we find a similar mode of speaking of death. When Jesus was in the Ruler's house, he said of his dead daughter, "She is not dead, but *sleepeth*" (Matt. ix. 24); and to his disciples, of Lazarus he said, "Our friend Lazarus *sleepeth*" (John xi. 11), not meaning literally that they were not really dead, but rather affirming that, though the body was dead, the spirit still lived, and would be raised again. It is recorded of the first martyr, Stephen, that "he fell *asleep*" (Acts vii. 60); and St. Paul speaks of the saints as those "which are fallen *asleep* in Christ" (1 Cor. xv. 18, 20; 1 Thess. iv. 14). As sleep is the state in

which the body takes its rest after the toils of the day, so we find it is written of those who work for Christ here and "die in the Lord," that they "rest from their labours" (Rev. xv. 13). From these and similar passages of Holy Writ we infer that death is to be understood as being, in these respects, a state similar to sleep, and that we should hope in a joyful awakening therefrom with as much confidence as we do when we prepare to take our rest in slumber. If these passages do not teach that there will be an awakening from death, even as there is from sleep, the illustrations we have referred to are vain.

II. The Scriptures represent the germ of the resurrection body as proceeding from that which is laid in the grave.

If nothing is to be derived from the grave, or the body laid therein, why does the Bible so often speak of a resurrection of the dead from the grave? What purpose can the use of such language serve, but to mislead the reader in his conceptions of an important subject? or how are we to understand such passages as that in St. John's Gospel, where Christ solemnly affirms, that "the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear" the voice of the Son of man, "and shall come forth?" Here *all* the dead are described as being in their graves, though many may have turned to their native dust, and long perished from human view. God, by his omniscience, we may safely infer, still sees them, can gather their remains, and restore them to life at the appointed time. The "grave" and the "sea" shall give up their dead at the call of Omnipotence (Rev. xx. 13). The resurrection of Christ from the dead, which ensures the resurrection of his followers, is affirmed by the Apostle to be the great doctrine of Christianity in determining our future happiness; for "if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is not Christ risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain; ye are yet in your sins." But we believe that Jesus died and rose again, and thus, by his own power, gained a victory over death and the grave, giving us an assurance that as He has risen, so must all his followers, yea, all mankind. "But now is Christ risen, and become the firstfruits of them that slept. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." There is to be order, regularity in this. "Every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterwards them that are Christ's at his coming" (1 Cor. xv. 23); for those, we are told by the same Apostle elsewhere, "that sleep in Jesus will God bring with him," and "the dead in Christ shall rise first" (1 Thess. iv. 14—16). Considering the stupendous nature of the resurrection, and its apparent contrariety to the order of nature, some object, and will ask, "How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" This old objection of the Corinthians was completely answered by the Apostle, by the illustration

of a grain of wheat sown in the earth ; it decays, but from a minute grain there springs forth as out of the corrupted seed the renovated vegetable, full of life and vigour. So also with the resurrection body, "that which is sown is not quickened, except it die ;" and we sow not that "which shall be, but bare grain, perchance wheat, or some other grain : but God giveth to it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body ; so also is the resurrection of the dead" (1 Cor. xv. 35-38). This leads us to remark—

III. That the resurrection body will be very different from that which is laid in the grave, though still possessing a specific and individual identity.

Carrying out his illustration and argument, the Apostle proceeds to establish this position, "All flesh is not the same flesh;" and as there is a specific difference between the flesh of man, birds, beasts, and fishes, so, also, he argues there will be a great difference between the present and the future body. It will possess its own specific characteristics: "it is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." What is the precise difference between a "natural" and a "spiritual" body we cannot tell; but we are assured that the "glory" of the latter will far surpass that of the former; for while the one is subject to pain, disease, and death, the other will flourish in immortal youth, impervious to all change, whether the result of chemical or mechanical agencies; and doubtless one element in the happiness of the blessed will be their freedom from "pain" (Rev. xxi. 4).

As the resurrection body will bear a specific nature, so also, by implication, we may infer there will be also individual identity, according to that same great law of fixed diversity to which the Apostle refers, and on which he bases his argument as to men, birds, beasts, and fishes, and which we see does here on earth extend to individuals, and by which each may, by their own natural peculiarities, be distinguished one from another with ease and precision. So, also, by fair implication, we may assume that individual peculiarities will exist in the resurrection body, the organization of which will be far more glorious, exquisite, and wonderful than the present.* That a great change will take place upon the bodies of all the living at the time of the resurrection, equivalent to that change from mortality to immortality, corruptibility to incorruptibility, which is affirmed of the dead, is also evident from several passages of Scripture. Job, in the passage we have quoted, expresses his confidence, "in hope," waiting till his "change come." "Behold," says St. Paul, "I

* See Hitchcock's "Lectures on Peculiar Phenomena of the Four Seasons."

shew you a mystery ; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump : for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality ;" for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God ; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." (1 Cor. xv. 50—53). The living, it would appear from a similar passage in another of the same Apostle's epistles, are also to be witnesses of the resurrection before their own change. "We which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep ;" but the "dead in Christ shall rise first ;" and "then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air." (1 Thess. iv. 15—17.) The resurrection body will also resemble the glorious body of Christ ; "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working of that mighty power by which he is able even to subdue all things unto himself" (Phil. iii. 21).

IV. The resurrection will be effected by the immediate operation of Divine power.

It is the sole prerogative of Omnipotence to create ; so, also, it is His to make alive. That the restoration of the dead to life is not beyond the power of the Almighty, is evident from many passages of Scripture, and from the fact that He has restored the dead to life in the times that are past. To doubt this were to doubt facts, the truth of which is as much established as any other historical facts. In answer to the prayers of his servant Elijah, God restored the dead to life ; and afterwards wrought a similar miracle at the sepulchre of Elisha. Ezekiel's vision of the resurrection of dry bones was also intended to announce the same infinite Omnipotence. Our Saviour, during his lifetime, several times exerted this power, to convince the Jews that he was sent from God ; and the same testimony was vouchsafed to the Apostles, after his ascension, in attestation of their divine commission. But the greatest and grandest exhibition of this Omnipotence is to take place at the end of time, when the Son of man shall appear in the clouds of heaven with "great glory ;" then shall the dead hear his voice, and rise from their graves at the "sound of the trumpet, and the voice of the archangel." Such is the pomp and glory which will usher in the resurrection morn, when all nations shall be restored to life by the power of the Almighty.

V. It remains for us to notice, very briefly, the chief objection that is generally urged against our views of this subject.

Chemists tell us that the bodies of men, like those of other organized beings, are composed of various elements of matter ; oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, lime, &c., united in their

several proportions, and that these elements are taken up into the system in the food we eat and the air we breathe; that by the natural waste of the human frame every particle of it is several times renewed during lifetime, and that at death it is resolved into its original elements in the earth and atmosphere; so that a man's body is frequently changed, even while he lives; and when he dies, its primordial elements are taken up by other absorbents, or even by living creatures, and may again go to form other human bodies. It is asked, if this be the case, how can it be possible that every man at the resurrection shall again have his own body, seeing that the particles of which it was composed may be scattered throughout the world, or have entered into the formation of other bodies? We reply, that however difficult and impossible such a work may appear to us, it is not so to the Almighty, who can preserve unto every man that identical body which he possessed at his death through the many changes it may pass; and, when He shall will it, He can again reanimate the dead body in all the freshness and vigour of immortal life. Further, we reply, it is not necessary for personal, corporeal identity, that there should be an absolute identity of particles in the resurrection body with the one laid in the grave, since sameness of chemical composition and the same peculiarity of form and structure are all that is essential to secure individual bodily identity. This is the case now during life. In the instance of any man whom we may know, the body he now possesses will doubtless be renewed in every particle before ten years have elapsed, if his life should be so prolonged, but his identity will still be the same, because his body is composed of the same kinds of elementary matter, combined in the same proportion, and exhibiting the same peculiarity of form and structure; and in the case of persons afflicted with a lingering disease, subject to the same bodily pains; and thus are we at no great loss in identifying the individual person even after ten, twenty, or more years have elapsed since last seeing him, and though he may have travelled to the antipodes, and there have obtained those several elements, the combination of which go to form his whole system. If this be a correct idea of what constitutes bodily identity, it will meet, most satisfactorily, the famous objection to the scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the body, that the particles of which the human body here consists often enter into the composition of several bodies. The Bible, as we have shown, teaches that the germ of the resurrection body proceeds from the natural body that is laid in the grave, and which germ may not, for anything we know, contain a thousandth part of the original particles of that body; but that infinitesimal, minute portion of man, though far too small for human vision, with all its wonderful aids to descry, is seen and watched over by Omniscience, and preserved by Omnipotence

in the grave, or wherever it may be carried, unconnected with everything else, ready, at the word of the Almighty, to awake into life, and form the nucleus of that spiritual body, which, as we have seen, will doubtless be very different in nature and organization to the natural body from which it springs, though still presenting such a similarity of form and organization as shall retain individual peculiarities, and secure personal identity.

In conclusion, we now leave this question in the hands of our readers for their calm consideration, with the remark, that when the grave closes upon our friends and those we hold dear unto us, the comforting assurance of another meeting is much enhanced by the belief of our view of this doctrine. It is with the "sure and certain hope of a joyful resurrection" that we deposit their bodies in the grave, believing that He who first framed and imparted life unto them watches over their dust, and will again restore them far more glorious and beautiful, endowed with incorruption and immortality, with "death swallowed up in victory!"

Ashton-under-Lyne.

CLEMENT.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THAT there will be a resurrection of the dead at the last day, is a truth which few, we presume, are disposed to controvert, since it has been admitted by great and learned men in all ages, that as "virtue is not always rewarded and vice punished in this world, therefore there must be a future life of rewards and punishments, where the good will meet with their due reward, and the wicked their full punishment;" and, indeed, if the Scriptures are to be accepted as a basis of belief at all, there are most definite and conclusive assertions of the fact recorded.

The poet Cowper speaks of—

"Hasting to a grave, yet doomed to rise."

Another poet asks,—

"Is this life all? Ask of the patriot brave,
Who dares to die, but dares not bow to wrong.
Is all his prospect bounded by the grave?
Does he ne'er hear a faintly-echoed song,
Chanted by angels, hid from mortal view,
To carry consolation to the true?"

A third says:—

"The soul uneasy, and confined from home,
Rests and expatiates in a life to come."

A fourth affirms:—

"The last loud trumpet's wondrous sound
Shall through the rending tombs rebound,
And wake the nations under ground."

And the immortal Shakespeare declares that—

"The dread of *something* after death
Makes us rather bear the ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of."

But as to the condition in which we shall be raised from the grave—the structure we shall assume—

“When we have shuffled off this mortal coil”—

the form in which we shall inhabit—

“That undiscover’d country, from whose bourne
No traveller returns”—

the shape in which we shall “appear before the judgment seat of Christ”—whether in our present bodies or otherwise—on this there prevails a difference of opinion.

It is the received idea of anatomists and philosophers—those whose business it is more especially to inquire into and solve these difficulties—that from the first moment to the last of our existence, we are continually changing. That our bodies, and the whole system of our organization, are constantly and incessantly, slowly but surely, undergoing an alteration; that, to use the words of Cuvier, “all the individual component particles of a living body are in a state of perpetual mutation. While this movement continues, the body in which it is carried on is living; when this movement ceases, to return no more, the body dies, and the elements which compose it become immediately subject to their ordinary chemical affinities; they are no longer restrained from separating, and the dissolution of the late living body follows with greater or less rapidity.”

From a careful study of the present subject, we have arrived at the conclusion that the Scriptures *do not* teach that there will be a resurrection in which any of the materials of the present body will form part of the future one; and we now proceed to submit evidence in support of our statement.

To notice, first, the proofs presented by the occurrences of every-day life.

It has been shown, and we make no doubt, it is admitted, that when buried, our bodies, in process of time, return to dust. Now, it is well known, that in populous places throughout England generally, the old burying-grounds attached to the places of worship, and more particularly in connection with parish churches, are literally crammed to excess with graves; and that, until the recent Government order for the closing of certain burial places (such as I have described) came into operation, the same ground has been repeatedly turned over; that in digging a fresh grave, the previous occupant has been—I do not say wantonly, but unavoidably—disturbed; his bones have been dug up, his dust has been cast to the winds, and his ashes have fled, “no marble tells us whither.” Sometimes the scattered fragments have been again interred, though, indeed, without an appropriate receptacle, without any covering (much less classification), and have gradually wasted away, until absorbed by the earth which contained them, which, in its turn, has grown grass and other herbage, that has been eaten by sheep, which

may not unfrequently be seen living among the graves. Or, to borrow the more lucid language of the great dramatist:—

“Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander, till we find it stopping a bung-hole? As thus:—

Alexander died, Alexander was buried, Alexander returned to dust; the dust is earth; of earth we make loam;

And why of that loam, whereto he was converted, might they not stop a beer barrel?”

Or—

“Imperious Cæsar, dead, and turn'd to clay,
Might stop a hole, to keep the wind away.”

May we not learn, then, from this, “to what base uses we may return?” May I not hesitate to believe “that these identical parts which now constitute my body will, after dissolution, again be collected and reanimated, to form the same identical being?” Are we not, therefore, justified in returning a negative answer to the question heading this paper?

Turning, secondly, to Scripture, we decidedly agree with Locke, when he says, “In the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Christian faith) I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the ‘resurrection of the dead,’ and the ‘resurrection from the dead,’ in many places; but I do not remember any place where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember, in any place of the New Testament, where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of, any such expression as ‘the resurrection of the body,’ much less ‘of the same body.’”

If we examine the different passages which bear upon the point, and notice the various commentaries thereupon, it will, we conceive, materially strengthen the affirmation already made.

St. Paul distinctly states (1 Cor. xv. 51—53), “We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.” Upon which Ryle remarks, “At that instant the dead bodies of the saints shall be raised up to a glorious and immortal constitution, and those that are then alive shall be transformed into the same brightness and immortality.”

Again, it is said (Phil. iii. 20, 21), “Our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body,”—“that,” as Irenæus saith, “it may be transformed from a mortal and corruptible into an immortal and incorruptible body.”

So the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 49), “As we have borne the

image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." And further, speaking allegorically (1 Cor. xv. 42—44), "It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." And finally, by way of dissipating any remaining doubt, the Apostle adds (1 Cor. xv. 35—38), "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him"—which Locke sums up thus:—"If the body that is put in the earth is not the body which shall be, then the body that is put in the grave is not that (*i. e.*, the same body that shall be)."

"In like manner," observes the Rev. John Brown, of Hadlington, the talented author of the "Self-Interpreting" Bible, "the wisdom and power of God operate in the resurrection of the dead, particularly the saints, rendering their bodies fit companions for their souls in the glorified state. In this world their bodies are frail, mortal, and, by death, subjected to putrefaction; but they shall be raised free from all corruptibility, dissolution, or decay, and rendered immortal, never more to die. In this world they are mean, contemptible, liable to deformity and defilement; and feeble and weak, liable to sickness, pain, weariness, fainting, and death; incapable of defending themselves from surrounding evils, and, being laid in the grave, become loathsome carcases, an easy prey to the weakest worm; but they shall be raised beautiful, glorious, and shining as the sun or stars, and with such vigour, health, and strength as will enable them to keep pace with their glorified souls in every operation. In this world they must be maintained by food, sleep, and air, as the bodies of brutes, and in the grave they are quite destitute of sensation; but in the resurrection the Holy Ghost dwelling in them shall so refine them, as to make them need no animal refreshment, and render them inexpressibly light and active."

Moreover, we have the words of the Saviour (Matt. xxii. 30), "In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven;" and Barnes, in reference to these words, speaks thus:—"That is, in the manner of their intercourse; in regard to marriage, and the mode of their existence. Luke adds, that they shall be 'equal to the angels;' that is, they shall be elevated above the circumstances of mortality, and live in a manner, and in a kind of intercourse, equal to the angels."

"Thus heavenward all things tend; for all were once
Perfect, and all must be at length restored."

Bilston.

G. A. H. E.

Philosophy.

IS MIND NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO MATTER?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

Few subjects have received a larger share of attention than the one before us; and, perhaps, on no subject has so much thought been expended with so little satisfactory result. Some of the greatest thinkers have employed their pens on this subject, yet its nature is such, that they have left it but little clearer than they found it. Nothing, indeed, can more singularly illustrate the difficult nature of the question, than the fact, that the result of deep thought and reading on the subject is rather to induce uncertainty than to remove it. To arrive at a conclusion free from doubts, is not given to men: some can undoubtedly go farther than others; but all must stop, and stop very far short of a full and satisfactory solution. The extent to which a person may go, will depend on the way in which the subject is treated; as it is a very easy thing for a writer to confound himself, by trying to demonstrate that which is not demonstrable, or to mislead himself and his readers, by running off to points which have no real or necessary connection with the subject. It is, therefore, of the highest importance, that we should keep before us an exact view of the real subject of dispute, that we may not waste time and space on proving that which is not essential, or endeavouring to prove that which is above our comprehension.

In opening this debate, we stated that it was the duty of an affirmist to prove that mind is opposed to matter. Now the most casual observer must see that this embraces three questions, viz., What is mind? What is matter? and, What is meant by their being opposed? On the different opinions we form on these points depends the answer we give to the question. Strict definitions of mind and matter cannot, however, be given without assuming the point which it is our duty to prove; and we beg our readers to observe, that as in our former article, so in this, we shall *intentionally* "fail to produce" definitions, which are in the nature of the case inadmissible.

Our use of the terms "mind" and "matter," has been objected to on various grounds. It will be necessary for us to answer these objections before proceeding with our subject. First, then, as to the word "mind,"—"Ohesco" asserts that we have confounded it with life, and he devotes a large part of his article to prove the

difference between mind and life. Now the first thing which strikes us on reading this article, is the reckless and indefinite use of the term "life;" as if the word had but one meaning, and that meaning the most obvious one. Without wishing to detain the attention of our readers on unnecessary points, we remark that by *life* "Chesco" appears to mean mere animal life. If so, and if the distinction between the terms "life" and "mind" is as important as he represents it, why did not "Chesco" point out where we "evidently confound" the two? All that he advances to prove his assertion is the affirmation, that "man unites in his own person the two things about which we are now concerned." "But" says "Chesco," "man unites in his own person three things, mind, matter, and life." In reply to this, all we can say is, that we never denied it. We did not say that man was of two parts only, but merely that he united in himself mind and matter; and surely "Chesco" will not deny this.

In designating the Creator by the term "mind," we have, it is said, committed an act of impiety. Our readers will see at a glance, that the impiety or otherwise of this depends on the meaning we attach to the term "mind." If by it we mean a property of matter, we admit, with E. M., that such a designation would be impious; but if by it we mean intelligence, we see nothing impious in speaking of the Creator as an *Infinite Intelligence*: and however absurd it may be to suppose matter to be self-creative, yet that an infinite and omnipotent intelligence is able to create finite intelligences in "his own image," is a proposition in which we fail to discover any absurdity whatever.

Again, in assuming the absolute existence of matter, we have, in E. M.'s opinion, reduced the question to a nullity. In other words, if the question assumes the absolute existence of matter, it must be "a question containing its own answer, an insult both to the reader and writer." Now, that the question assumed the *separate existence* of mind and matter, we did not affirm; and E. M. is mistaken in supposing that the question could not assume the actual existence of matter, without assuming its existence independent of mind. The truth is, a person in answering this question must assume the real and absolute existence of either mind or matter; for as the universe must evidently consist of either mind or matter, or of both, in denying the real existence of one of these, a person must assume the real existence of the other. Hence the inconsistency of E. M., who, while he denies the actual existence of mind, as an essence, is very much inclined to deny the existence of matter also! What can be more absurd than to contend that mind is but the *effect* or *production* of matter, and yet the assertion, that matter is only "an idea of the mind"? so that, as mind is produced by matter, it is of course produced *by one of its own ideas*! What, under such circumstances, the universe can consist of, E. M. has not thought necessary to inform us.

As "Chesco" has attempted to define these terms, it will be well for us, in passing, to notice these supposed definitions. "Life," he says, "is a subtle essence, the real nature of which, man is incapable of conceiving; and being spiritual, we know it cannot be matter." Now, what are we to understand by this? What is an "essence"? and what does he mean by saying that life is "spiritual"? According to "Chesco," we can conceive of nothing thoroughly spiritual; how then does he know that it is spiritual? and how can he prove that it cannot be matter? Truly, 'tis a "*subtle essence*;" and happy must he be who can define that, "the real nature of which, man is incapable of conceiving!" Matter is, according to "Chesco," the *substantial* part of the universe. Now if the word substantial means anything, it evidently means *material*, so that the amount of "Chesco's" definitions comes just to this, that life is *animation*, matter is the *material* portion of the universe, while mind is simply "neither one nor t'other." Such are the grand conclusions of "Chesco's" "superior judgment!"

In our views of the *opposition* of mind and matter, we have, it is said, confounded *difference* with *opposition*. Our "whole argument lies in the assumed identity of difference and opposition." In the passage from which this is taken, E. M. has fairly puzzled himself, and, we fear, puzzled his readers, by confounding difference of *properties* with difference of *nature*. That such is the case will appear, if our readers will examine his specimen of the "*reductio ad absurdum* method," in which, by the *indiscriminate use* of difference of properties and difference of essence, he has arrived at the following conclusion—"therefore difference does not necessitate opposition." Now, the truth is, we never asserted or contended that mere difference of the *properties* of things *did* necessitate opposition; but if difference in *essence* be not opposition, will E. M. inform us what is? "Opposition," E. M. says, "is the negation of agreement;" or, in other words, when we say that two things are opposed to each other, we mean that they have nothing in common, for if they had anything in common, they must evidently so far agree. In endeavouring to prove, then, that mind is opposed to matter, we have only to show they have nothing in common: and in like manner, in asserting that they are not opposed, it is the duty of our opponents to prove that they do possess something in common. Now, *what power or property have they proved to belong in common to mind and matter?* To show that they are connected goes for nothing, for this fails to prove that there is anything in common between them.

The theory propounded by our opponents is, "that mind is the *result of the action of material objects* on the sensorium," or "the necessary result of a particular organization," and to doubt this is as absurd, H. V. M. tells us, as to doubt that sound is the

necessary result of a particular concussion of the air. This theory they endeavour to support, by showing the connection existing between the brain and the development of the mind. "If mind," they ask, "is a something apart from, and independent of the brain, why should a blow on the head derange or destroy it?" &c. In this theory they evidently mistake the development, or manifestation of the mind, for the mind itself; in asserting that a blow on the head will destroy mind—that mind may be lost half a dozen times, and yet be repeatedly regained—that mind fades, and by degrees is entirely lost—and that mind is capable of extinction, all they can prove is, that the *manifestation* of mind may be destroyed, or interfered with; but this is no proof whatever that mind itself is destroyed. How can they prove, for instance, that an infant has really no mind? or that a lunatic has *actually lost* his mind? All we can say is, that in the one case mind is not developed; while in the other, its manifestation is destroyed or impaired by disease of the organs, through which it communicates with the material world. Again, in the case supposed by J. A. D. and "Chesco," of a man shut out from all intercourse with the material world, if mind is merely the result of the "action of matter on life," it is evident that mind could not exist; whereas, all that can be truly said is, that so far as we can judge of such a case, the mind would to a great extent, if not entirely, remain undeveloped; but to assert that it would not exist, is absurd. That the non-development of the mind is no proof of its non-existence, is so plain, that our opponents, notwithstanding its utter inconsistency with their theory, have pointedly admitted it. "Thus," H. V. M. says, "without the necessary material conditions to call it (the mind) into exercise, it in all probability would *remain* undeveloped, undisplayed, unused, and unknown." Again, "Without these auxiliaries, the mind would, doubtless, *remain* in embryo." To this "Chesco" agrees, and says, "So would the mind *remain dormant*, without the action of matter on life." Mark here the absurd inconsistency of our opponents; mind, according to them, is the action of matter on life, and without this action, of course mind could not exist; yet they repeatedly assert, that without it the mind would *remain* dormant and undeveloped; or, in other words, would "*remain* in embryo," though it existed not!

We endeavoured, in our former article, to show that certain powers existed in mind, independently of material objects; and "Chesco," to confute this, devotes a large portion of his article. The greater part of his objections consists of positive denials, unsupported by any show of reasoning. In replying, as briefly as possible, to these objections, we would first beg our readers to observe that "Chesco" admits the existence of these powers. The powers of *thought and reason* he, indeed, could not deny,

and he has prudently passed it over in significant silence. The powers of *memory* and *creation* he admits, but shows them to be intimately connected with the material, which of course does not affect the fact of their existence. The *progressive* power, he says, goes a great way to prove his case; in what manner it does, this does not exactly appear; unless he means that it proves mind to be capable of decline and extinction! As to the power of *abstraction*, he *thinks* it cannot exist,—without, however, in any way substantiating his opinion; but this is of little importance, for one thing is clear, our opponents admit the existence of certain powers in the mind. The state of the case is, therefore, this, if the mind possesses these powers, does it possess them in common with any other property of matter? if not, there is, at least so far, no agreement; and as opposition is the “negation of agreement,” the mind is evidently so far opposed to any property of matter. Again, the belief in the existence of a God and man’s conscience are, our opponent affirms, the result of the teachings of mankind; but he has not even attempted to prove this. That they are not the result of teaching or mere “fancy,” would require but little effort to prove; this, however, is quite unnecessary, for even if they were, “Chesco” could not point out any other production of matter which has thus been taught to distinguish between right and wrong, or to believe in the existence of a God. The very fact that mind is capable of receiving teachings on these points, proves conclusively, that it is immensely superior, and so far opposed to matter. The *moral evil* existing in the world is, “Chesco” asserts, the effect of matter—“if not, it is spiritual, and will exist when matter has been dissolved.” Unfortunately for this opinion, the Bible assures us that moral evil originated among disembodied spirits; and as, for aught we know, it may have originated before matter was formed, the assertion that it came from matter is an absurdity. Besides, does “Chesco” mean to deny that moral evil will exist when matter has been dissolved?

With reference to the origin of mind, when it is said that “God breathed into man’s nostrils the breath of life, and he became a living soul,” all that is meant, “Chesco says, is that God merely breathed animal life into man. If this were the case, why was it necessary for God to breathe life into man any more than into the inferior (or rather the *other*) animals? And if “mind were the *necessary* production of matter on the organs which were made sensitive by life,” how was it that the *other animals* did not start from the same point as man, and reach the same eminence of thought, reason, and supremacy over the material world? Again, if God only breathed life, and not mind, into man, how could man be made in the “image of God,” any more than *other animals*? Although we have not “Chesco” at our elbow to correct our “impressions” as to the meaning of this

phrase, yet how a creature with merely animal life—without a mind, consequently without responsibility—and differing only from other animals by walking upon two legs instead of four, could be said to be made in the “image of God,” we must leave “Chesco” and his friends to determine.

Before leaving the question of the origin of mind, we must notice a theory of our opponents, which has an important bearing on the question at last. “Man, originally a savage, must have learned from repeated trials the use of his organs. Successive generations must have invented, and refined upon, the means of subsistence; and the understanding, at liberty to disengage itself from the wants of nature, must have risen to the complicated art of comparing ideas, digesting reasonings, and seizing upon abstract similitudes; in short, passing from the surprise of a first thought (we are not told where this came from) to the reverie of curiosity, he formed a chain of reasoning; clearly showing that all his ideas, notions, and modes of existence have been gradually acquired and augmented, one by one, slowly or swiftly, as circumstances have favoured or deterred.” One little addition is, however, requisite, to make this theory complete: thus H. V. M. should have written—“Man, originally savage, *and wearing a tail*, must have learned,” &c, and it would become a very fair outline of the notable theory propounded long ago by Lord Monboddó. Between this absurd theory and the question before us there does not appear, at the first glance, to be much connection, but a little attention will show that there is one, both intimate and necessary. For, if man possesses nothing but what he has gleaned from matter, he must originally have been, not only “savage,” but on a level with the beasts of the field. If he possessed no power of thought, he could not have had the power of speech, and could not have been a social nor responsible creature; and if we admit this, we shall find little difficulty in supposing him to have had a monkey’s face and appendage, and other trifles which enter into Lord Monboddó’s theory. If, therefore, the position of our opponents is true, his lordship’s theory must be true also. Now, this theory is so inconsistent, has been so generally rejected, and is moreover so clearly opposed to the plainest declarations of Scripture, that it is quite unnecessary for us to trouble our readers with a refutation. If, then, our opponents’ position involves consequences so absurd, the only conclusion to which we can come is, that mind must have been originally something more than the mere production of matter.

The immediate *destiny* of mind, to triumph and reign over matter, our opponents have not attempted to deny. Now this power evidently shows its superiority to matter; and this at least goes a great way to prove them opposed. For as “Juno” remarks, “If, upon examination of these two natures, we find

one possessing qualities superior to the other, we take it to be an illogical inference to pronounce them unique." And with respect to the ultimate destiny of mind, we "*can* say what the mind will be ultimately," at least, so far as to say that it will live for ever. For although "Chesco" denies that every man has an innate consciousness of his immortal destiny, yet that the soul is immortal, was a conclusion to which even the unassisted reason of the heathen philosophers irresistibly led them. Thus Cicero, for example, writes—"Seeing that the mind possesses such activity, so great a remembrance of past things, such penetration into the future, so many arts, such sciences, and so many discoveries, I feel, and am fully persuaded, *that the nature, which contains in itself these things, cannot be mortal!*"—a deduction at least as logical as any our opponents have furnished. Again, when we see that this belief or consciousness is universal, being held in common by the barbarous and the civilized, the ignorant and the enlightened, the debased and the intellectual, to affirm that it is a mere "*fancy*," is a proposition which "Chesco" has shown his wisdom in not attempting to prove. But we have clearer proof of our position than this; for, though "Chesco" has not favoured us with his "*opinions as to the meaning*" of certain passages of Scripture, which treat of the soul's destiny, that the soul is immortal is a truth which lies at the very foundation of all Christianity.

The question of the origin and destinies of mind cannot, in the opinion of E. M., be "*depended on for an answer to the question.*" If by this he means an answer in accordance with his theory, he is certainly correct; for there is not a point in the inquiry more fatal to our opponents' position; and hence their silence and evasiveness here. In respect to the origin of mind, it is clear that their theory will not explain the position man now holds in relation to the inferior animals; for, if man originally possessed nothing more than other animals, *whence comes his present superiority?* To answer this question, they are obliged to admit the existence in man of a "*kind of vivifying element,*" or "*perceptive faculty,*" upon which matter could act; and as the action of material objects afterwards, from this element elicited the powers of thought, it is evident that this element could have been nothing more or less than *an incipient or undeveloped mind.* And as to the destinies of mind, it is evident that mind must be either an essence or a property; and if it were a mere property of matter, to say that it could continue to exist after the dissolution of matter, is to say that a property could exist without an essence; or in other words, that a thing could be and not be at the same time. If, therefore, mind will exist after the dissolution of matter, it must be a separate essence, and is, therefore, opposed to matter.

Before we take leave of E. M., we would beg to suggest the

propriety of his being at least correct in his quotations from an opponent's article. Thus he writes—"Nemo" admits that the ideas, which the mind has the power of abstracting from experienced ideas, have originated in matter; but calls ideas with such an origin, innate." Now to say that these ideas have originated in matter, and yet are innate in the mind, is an inconsistency of which we certainly were not guilty. Indeed, the expression "innate ideas" does not occur once in our article; nor did we assert their existence: what we observed was, that though certain abstract ideas are formed from matter, yet the power to form those ideas was innate in the mind.

There is, moreover, one point of the controversy on which our opponents are silent; that is, man's connection with disembodied spirits. That disembodied spirits exist, is so firmly believed by mankind, and so clearly taught in the Bible, that we need not attempt its proof. Moreover, that these spirits have nothing in common with matter, and are therefore opposed to it, is a proposition which few will care to deny, and none be able to disprove; while that man does possess something in common with them, is proved by the fact that they are responsible beings, and are all under the moral government of God. If, then, there is opposition between angelic spirits and matter, and if there is no opposition between angelic spirits and the mind of man, it follows, as a logical and inevitable conclusion, that man's mind is opposed to matter.

We will, in conclusion, briefly submit the whole question to the judgment of our readers, and leave them to decide upon it. The question, Is mind opposed to matter? assumes the actual existence of matter. Our opponent tell us that "matter is, as far as our real knowledge of it can indicate, dependent on mind." And again, "All we know is but an idea of it." But the fact is, that we do know something more than this, for we know that *there must be something external to produce those ideas in the mind*, and this *something external* is evidently the "substratum," which E. M. affirms to be only "theoretical." Again, if by the expression "dependent on mind," he means that matter is dependent on mind for its apprehension or experience, then the assertion amounts just to this, that matter could not be apprehended without some mind to apprehend or experience it. In this sense, even the Creator himself is "dependent on mind." But if, on the other hand, E. M. means that matter is dependent on mind for its existence, then matter must be dependent for its existence on one of its own effects or productions! So that if it remains a question whether mind is or is not opposed to matter, it cannot be a question, whether matter has an actual existence; since, whether we conclude mind to be a property of matter, or a separate essence, we necessarily assume, that matter has a real existence. Starting, then, from this point, the question

is simply, whether mind is a property or production of matter, or a separate essence? That matter is the only essence in the universe, no one will assert; and we have already alluded to the existence of disembodied spirits. And no one will assert that these spirits are the production of matter, or that there is any agreement between them and matter; and as opposition is the "negation of agreement," they certainly are opposed to matter. Admitting, then, the existence of these two opposed essences, if the mind of man be not opposed to one of them, it must necessarily be opposed to the other. The question then is, to which of these two natures can the mind of man claim agreement? On the one hand we have dead, inert matter, subject, with its properties and effects, to laws imposed on it by its Creator; without the least power to break through those laws; incapable of intelligently glorifying God; and even that part of it which seems to be animated possessing no power of continued progression, but merely reaching a certain point, beyond which it cannot pass, and then declining and decaying. On the other hand, there are angelic beings, high intelligences, capable of rendering to their Creator intelligent service, adoration, and love: responsible beings, subject to the moral laws of God, yet free agents, and possessing a power to break those laws; with powers of indefinite, if not unlimited, progression in knowledge, and "considered in relation to their Creator, like those mathematical lines, which may draw nearer to another to all eternity, without a possibility of touching it."

Since, then, man's mind must belong to one of these opposed natures, in order to show that it is opposed to one, we have only to show that it is not opposed to the other. And since opposition is the "negation of agreement," if any agreement exists between man's mind and one of these two, there can be no opposition between them; and the mind of man must, therefore, *necessarily be opposed to the other.*

Reader! with which of these natures does man's mind agree?
NEMO.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

I must confess that I do not see the force of the word "necessarily," as existing in the above question. The nature of mind must be either material or the contrary, so that I am at a loss to understand the meaning of the term alluded to.

To imagine that mere matter, in any form, can perform the offices of that which we term mind, is absurd, and such an idea is, and always will be, without a tithe of proof, and it is the belief of none who will candidly survey the absurdities which flow from it. Now, I am no materialist, and in taking the negative side of this question, I only wish to demonstrate that the vivifying element within us "must" come in contact with matter

before it can assume the functions of mind. I have said that our ideas are limited to the consideration of material objects, and I do maintain that this circumstance alone is a standing proof that nature is requisite for the production of mind, *i. e.*, for the development or mutation of the vivifying element.

Now, supposing that mind was entirely independent of matter, how is it that we are unable to conceive? If our minds are altogether distinct from anything material, why are all our thoughts bounded by the sights surrounding our bodies? Why cannot we soar above them? I think, therefore, that the origin of mind (vivifying element) is undoubtedly spiritual, but that the nature of mind, or mind itself, is certainly material.

The mistake of confounding mind with life has already been noticed. The soul is the seat of life, both in man and the inferior animals, a soul being common to all living creatures, and not having the slightest identity with mind.

In answer, then, to "Nemo," I say that the fact of the mind being the meditative power does not, for the reasons given, make its connection with matter appear improbable. He admits that the mind is, to a certain extent, dependent upon it; and what I have now said may perhaps convince him that the power which we now possess is entirely dependent upon, and restricted by, the objects surrounding us. I quite agree with him that matter gives employment to thought, and also that thought is not an inherent property of matter; but I do not agree with him when he says that, granting the inherency of thought in matter, "the same combinations of the latter must produce the same powers of thought in every mind submitted to their action," because the powers of the mind are developed according to the activity and energy of the owner, and the various faculties are under his control, and both kind and degree of intellect depend upon him, that is, on his will, for their appearance. It is quite true, that two minds may be subjected to the same material influences, and that the thoughts of each shall be very different; but it is also true that there exists in every nation a characteristic tendency, proving that the ideas and desires of a people generally are one, and depend upon material influences.

When I say that matter gives employment to thought, I in no wise deny that thought generally is effected by the combination of the vivifying element with matter. It may be that the vivifying power of an infant is converted into mind when it first beholds external objects. This is certainly the case, if any degree of any kind of thought takes place, and when thought does for the first time ensue, at that moment the mind is formed. Thus the action is twofold, matter not only forming the mind, but constantly presenting itself as the basis of consideration. The formation of the mind, or, rather, its complete development, is progressive; external nature is always ready to help us when we

consider its wonders, so that, while enlarging the mind by eliciting our thoughts, it at the same time presents itself for our consideration. It is constantly said that the study of nature, language, &c., "enlarges" the mind: I reason backwards, and argue that thought of material things forms it.

"Nemo" is certainly wrong in saying that mind possesses a creative faculty. The mind cannot create, or, what is the same thing, conceive; and as for appealing to fiction, in confirmation of such statement, I will undertake to say that everything to be met with, throughout the whole range of imaginative literature, is either a combination or a dissection; and that, as for creating, it is no less absurd to suppose it possible to create matter, which philosophers know to be an impossibility. With regard to the destinies of mind, I can quite imagine that the impression of heavenly objects upon our present or a superior vivifying principle would effect every necessary change. "Nemo" should bear in mind that we have nothing here to do with the question of the immortality of the soul; the only question bearing upon the future is that of the state of the mind, and I think that the perfection of our minds in the future will be proportional to the superior influence to which they are subject.

The brain is the receptacle of the mind. Yet it does not follow that, because material, its inhabitant is of the same nature. When I call the mind material, I by no means wish to signify that it is a natural body, but merely that it is the result of the action of inert matter upon essence or spirit. I cannot, then, exactly subscribe to the addition given to my definition by "Chesco." To meet my views, he must substitute for sensorium the term, "vivifying element." The latter part of the sentence may remain as it is, inasmuch as sight, being a sense, and an evoker of thought or mind, it follows that the latter is dependent upon it. Thus "Chesco" is wrong in saying that mind is the result of the action of matter upon life. I do not, of course, limit the production of mind to the sense of sight, although sight is, no doubt, most frequently the cause of its formation. An infant's mind may be formed by sound, smell, or even taste: the sense of feeling may also give birth to it.

Thought, or reflection, is the one and only property of the human mind, and therefore identical with it; therefore, so long as we are capable of reflecting, we may simply believe ourselves to be God's superior creatures, and unhesitatingly quote the much celebrated aphorism, *cogito; ergo sum.* J. A. D.

DISTRESS.—Nothing so powerfully calls home the mind as distress: the tense fibre then relaxes,—the soul retires to itself, sits pensive and susceptible of right impressions. If we have a friend, 'tis then we think of him; if a benefactor, at that moment all his kindness presses upon our minds.—*Sterne's Sermons.*

History.

HAS THE PRESERVATION OF CASTE CONDUCTED TO THE PRESENT REVOLT IN INDIA?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN conformity with the privilege accorded to us as one of the openers of this debate, we avail ourselves of the opportunity to add a few observations on this important matter; and though our remarks may not be considered *strictly* relevant to the point at issue, we must plead the general interest of the question, for any digression we may make.

Confident as we felt in the hypothesis upon which we at first ventured, we are the more confirmed in the correctness of our views, since our opponents have not attempted a refutation of them. When we consider, however, the great dearth of reliable information, and the scantiness of the materials from which to form an accurate opinion, together with the almost bewildering catalogue of incidents adduced as causes of the recent unparalleled crisis in India, we confess we are not surprised that our arguments should remain unanswered. "The promiscuous messing in the gaoles, the proceedings of missionaries, the annexation of Oude, the prejudices of the Sepoys against foreign service (*i. e.*, against the only service for which they were wanted), the introduction of the new rifle and its cartridges, the system of promotion in the native ranks, and the abolition of the old relations between Europeans and the people of the country, have all been repeatedly propounded and discussed, as causes chargeable with the consequences we have so lately witnessed."

In the face, then, of such a confused state of things, and such conflicting statements, we think it would be unfair to require our friends to subscribe to any proposition that is not supported by evidence.

To recapitulate what we have previously stated would be mere waste of time and space, and we shall, therefore, simply endeavour to strengthen our former evidence, by pointing to what in our judgment did conduce "to the present revolt in India."

Those of our readers, who are in the habit of perusing the public papers, must have perceived the growing tendency to believe that the flagrant annexation of Oude was the cause of the outbreak of public feeling in India; and we doubt not the people of England generally are acquainted with the fact, that numerous petitions presented to the Government, and even proprietors of East India Stock, advocate the restoration of Oude

to its rightful owners ; and also that several M.P.s, and other influential public men, have lately become convinced of the iniquity of the proceedings relative thereto, and frequently express a desire to see Oude once more in the possession of its legitimate sovereign.

Though the consideration of British rule in India is "not only insipid, but positively distasteful," it is impossible to shut our eyes to the actual truth. "The people of India," says Macaulay, "when we subdued them, were ten times as numerous as the Americans whom the Spaniards vanquished, and were at the same time quite as highly civilized as the victorious Spaniards. They had reared cities larger and fairer than Saragossa or Toledo, and buildings more beautiful and costly than the cathedral of Seville. They could show bankers richer than the richest firms of Barcelona or Cadiz, viceroys whose splendour far surpassed that of Ferdinand the Catholic, myriads of cavalry, and long trains of artillery, which would have astonished the great captain."

"In discharging the duties of a foster mother to Canada and Australia, we have made it our aim to transplant into them those habits and principles and institutions, which have formed the basis of our own greatness. We have given them a popular government, an excellent judicial code, large facilities for trade, a liberal system of education ; and last, not least, we have done what we could to secure also the transplantation of our religion ; believing that, if it had not been for the latter element, the energy of the Anglo-Saxon character, though developed in its highest intensity, would never have made our eldest foster child—the commonwealth of the American Union—the second power among the nations."

But with respect for India, in the words of the poet Cowper, we may ask :—

"Hast thou, though suckled at fair freedom's breast,
Exported slav'ry to the conquer'd East?
Pull'd down the tyrants India serv'd with dread,
And rais'd thyself, a greater, in his stead?
Gone thither arm'd and hungry, return'd full,
Fed from the richest veins of the mogul,
A despot big with pow'r, obtain'd by wealth,
And that obtain'd by rapine and by stealth?
With Asiatic vices stored thy mind,
But left their virtues and thine own behind?"

We must confess that this has been our policy towards India. We introduced an aggressive and despotic system of government to commence with. We encouraged the trade in opium. We purposely neglected the cultivation of cotton, for the raising of which every facility existed ; we attempted to starve the

people into submission, and we have "restricted, as much as possible, public enterprises which necessitated settling in the land." We permitted the introduction of Christianity, and then dismissed from our service the native converts who embraced it. We sent first a Governor-General, who ruled with "a rod of iron;" and then an imbecile, who, relaxing the stern decrees of his inflexible predecessor, and truckling to supposed prejudice and manifest insolence, sanctioned the exercise of milder regulations; thus betraying errors in legislation, of which the Sepoy, when the opportunity occurred, naturally took advantage.

We come now to speak of that opportunity; and in so doing, we cannot do better than quote the account given by the author of the pamphlet, entitled, "The Mutiny of the Bengal Army; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier." The brief, and yet truthful manner in which the infamous proceedings, which characterized the annexation of Oude are related, commends itself so much to our judgment, and his opinions so thoroughly harmonize with those we have formed from the perusal of Indian history, that we doubt not we shall be excused for making the following lengthy extract:—

"Of all the considerable native states with which we had come in contact," says the writer referred to, "the province of Oude (or Oudt), was the only one which had maintained its independence intact. Immediately contiguous to our own possessions, inhabited by a mixed population of Hindoos and Mahomedans, from which our army was principally recruited, the kingdom of Oude had remained for upwards of half a century firm in its alliance to the British Government. During the height of our reverses in Afghanistan, that friendship had never wavered. So firm, indeed, was the attachment to, or the perception of the power of British arms, that the kings of Oude had more than once, in the season of our distress, accommodated our Government with loans to a considerable amount, in repayment of which we, to our shame be it said, compelled them to receive accessions of territory alike useless to both parties. We were, therefore, under considerable obligations to the court of Lucknow." Besides, "the king of Oude was the sole remaining independent Mahomedan sovereign in India; as such, he commanded the veneration and regard of all the members of the Mussulman persuasion. To strike him down, then, would excite a general feeling of discontent amongst a very numerous and powerful class of our subjects; men of whom the cavalry regiments were chiefly composed, and who supplied at least two hundred bayonets to each regiment of native infantry. From his territories, indeed, our army was almost entirely recruited. The Hindoo and Mahomedan Sepoy alike came from Oude; he transmitted all his savings to his relatives in that country; and it is a remarkable fact, that not a single instance has been known of a

Sepoy settling down after the completion of his service in our provinces : he has invariably proceeded to Oude, to invest his little fortune in land. Col. Sleeman, for many years our agent at the court of Lucknow, and one of the ablest men who ever held that appointment, was so well aware of this fact, that he lost no opportunity of impressing upon Government his conviction, that the annexation of Oude would produce disaffection in the native army; principally, because it would transfer the family of the Sepoy from the operation of the regal regulations and justice of the King of Oude to our own civil courts.

"But Colonel Sleeman died, and Sir James Outram reigned in his stead. New councillors, aware of Lord Dalhousie's mania for annexation, succeeded the tried statesman who had hitherto so successfully administered the affairs of our empire on a contrary principle, and in an evil hour Lord Dalhousie decided upon seizing Oude. He resolved to do it, too, in a manner the most offensive and the most irritating to the large Mahomedan population of India, and the most prejudicial to our own character for truth and honour. He secretly collected troops, entered the kingdom of Oude like a thief in the night, marched the British force directly upon Lucknow, and then, with the capital of Oude virtually in his own hands, gave the first intimation to the King of Oude of his impending fate. Wajid Ali, of course, was unable to resist, and Oude became from that moment a province of the British empire.

"It is impossible to describe the mixed feelings of indignation and hatred which pervaded the whole Mussulman population of India, when they heard of this deed. Naturally treacherous themselves, they yet had an instinctive admiration for honest and faithful dealing, and they had hitherto placed implicit confidence in the word of an Englishman. When, however, they learned the story of the annexation, the juggle by which the King of Oude had been done out of his dominions, their hearts filled with rage and a desire for revenge.

"The King of Oude having been, as stated, summarily deprived of his kingdom, determined to appeal to the Parliament and people of England for redress. Accordingly, in the month of April, 1856, he came down to Calcutta, and took up his abode at Garden Reach, attended by his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, and several followers. The Queen-mother, his brother, and one of his sons, proceeded to England, in the month of May following, in order effectually to prosecute the schemes on which he had resolved for the recovery of his kingdom. They set out, in fact, not with any hope on their part, or on the part of the king and his advisers, that their mission would be successful, but in order to convey to the people of England the impression that he had no hope but in their justice and mercy, in order to remove attention from the vast design he had formed—to upset at one

blow the British rule in India. Agents were also despatched, well supplied with money, to every station in India; these men were directed to prepare the native army for an immediate rise, and to adopt every possible means to bring about the revolt without the cognizance of the authorities.

"The King of Ouda was well served. The whole army succumbed to his influence; a very considerable portion of the large police force came into his plans; and even where his agents were unsuccessful, in not one instance were they betrayed.

"An alliance was at the same time entered into with the King of Delhi, who entered heart and soul into the plot, and it was finally determined that throughout the Bengal presidency, from Calcutta to Peshawar, there should be a simultaneous rising on one day, in which the life of no Christian should be spared. The month of August, 1857, by which time it was hoped the Queen-mother would have left England, was fixed upon for the outbreak." The rest is too well known to need narration.

Owing to ignorance of the details on the part of some of the regiments, the grand explosion took place rather earlier than was intended. Ere August came round, the whole of the Bengal army had risen, the yells of infuriated mutineers, the shrieks of helpless multitudes, the smoking and blazing barracks and houses, had for two whole months presented scenes too horrible for description.

We therefore once again submit that "the preservation of caste" *did not* conduce "to the present revolt in India," but that the cause was what we have indicated; and leaving the subject, we must endorse the opinion of the *Times*:—"If there is a single point in this matter which can be looked upon as established, it is the *perfectly natural character* of the whole catastrophe. The wonder is not, that the mine exploded, but that it did not explode before."

Bilaton.

G. A. H. E.

GOOSEQUILL.—The fangs of a bear, and the tusks of a wild boar, do not bite worse, and make deeper gashes, than a goose-quill sometimes: no, not even the badger himself, who is said to be so tenacious of his bite, that he will not give over his hold, till he feels his teeth meet, and the bones crack.—*Howell.*

POLEMICAL DIVINES.—The dispute about religion, and the practice of it, seldom go together.—*Young.*

AFFECTION.—It appears unaccountable that our teachers generally have directed their instructions to the head, with very little attention to the heart. From Aristotle down to Locke, books without number have been composed for cultivating and improving the understanding; but few, in proportion, for cultivating and improving the affections.—*Lord Kaimes.*

The Essayist.

POETRY AND POETS.

MANY wilfully misunderstand, others witlessly misinterpret, that "writing on the wall" which we call poetry. Amid the confusion of tongues are voices heard, that cease not to ask, "What is poetry?" and many are the replies proffered by men who seek to defend that which they know not, and describe that they have seen only in dreams.

To chain a spirit or seize a shadow—to trap a sunbeam or impale a cloud—were easier than, with rule and line, with preamble, assertion, and deduction, to clothe the genius of poesy with uninspired words, and say, "These are thy limits."

It is difficult to speak of that which is not passive in our hands; which, great in its own right, becomes greater with every new phase of life. As the world, with its burden of souls, grows richer, so with it grows the genius of poetry. It courses alike through the hidden veins of the mighty earth, and mantles with beauty its brightening face. Where a sunbeam strays, or a dewdrop glistens—where a fern leaf is fossilized, or a diamond hid—where a seaweed waves with the flowing tide, or a dolphin dives, or a coral spreads—where a city smokes, and faces grow pale with earnest thought—where an old man sits in the gloaming of life, or a child prattles away life's happy morn—where men meet face to face and heart to heart in friendship's sacristy, or in solitude converse with memory and practise faith—in earth and air, in sea and sky, in mind or in matter, wherever beauty is, there always sits poesy, singing her loves, tinting every shadow with an outer edge of glory, binding rainbow hopes around darkest despair, brightening our days, lightening our nights, and doubling our joys.

Often known, but seldom acknowledged, this is what poetry does for the world.

A poet, as the word denotes, is a creator; certainly NOT a creator of "somethings" out of "airy nothings," but a creator or inventor of new forms of thought, those forms being based upon something revealed or something apprehended—a mantle of melody enrobing, and the spirit of truth, beauty, and love inspiring the whole.

Few men are true poets, although many suppose themselves to be such. He who would sing to the world hymns for her gladness, psalms for her praises, sonnets for her loves, and epics for her daring—this man, ere his song will thrill, or his

music elate, must be a master of his own and the hearts of his fellows. He must know what keys to touch when he would fill the earth with echoes, and what chords to sweep when he would soothe one isolated soul; must make the sorrows of others his own, and so their joys; must taste the bitterness of their disappointments, and rejoice in their successes; must pity the oppressed, and scorn the oppressor; must weep with the mourner, and bear the pall that covers the dead; must laugh and be merry with the merriest, wearing a garland of gladness for the lighthearted and the gay. He must draw sweet water from the well of "the past," and bring dewdrops of "promise" from the dawning "future." Hope must be his sister, Beauty his bride, Love—fellow-love—his brother, and Truth his guide. He must, in fact, be a *true man*—as unlike a devil as possible, and as like a God as may be.

There are few such. Those few are poets.

The poet holds his harp firmly, and sings to its music sweetly; now a requiem, and now a ballad—now a heroic, and again an epic strain—now a gentle sighing ripple on the air, anon a swelling symphony—now a faint utterance of song, and now a burst of weird, wild melody.

Study may polish, but never can *create* poetry.

To speak of men and things in measured feet and well accented tones; to fit together, with precise exactitude, words that with a jingling consonance please the ear, but thrill not the soul, is not to write true poetry.

To contemplate nature, treasuring her glories in the halls of memory, and hoarding her teachings in the chancel of the soul, is not to become a poet. Dr. Johnson thought otherwise, and of all learned poetry, his was most learnedly miserable. Rhymesters think otherwise, and the commonplaces of life, and not a few of her holy things, are for ever being painted with nerveless hand and unfrenzied touch.

Nature and art, memory and hope, just interpretations of men and things, and earnest yearnings for better men and better things,—these are the substrata of the poet's soul. Over all, binding the whole in a firm but gentle embrace, and ever soaring heavenward, is a spirit, and its name is Love.

Love is pure, purifying all that it may touch. Love mates with the beautiful and the true. Love promises to quench perdition's fires, and christianize the world. Love, one day, shall light up the vaulted sky with the rays of a star called Liberty, and again earth shall be Edenized, and innocence enthroned.

Love sits in the high heaven, and sends, now and then, a bright beam into the waiting heart of some stray earthborn, and a fire is lighted; the shrine becomes a poet—the flame is poetry.

If we trace the gradual influence of poetry on the successive generations of mankind—embracing Palestine, Greece, Rome,

Persia, Italy, Germany, and Britain in our survey—we will find that its mission ever has been to exalt virtue, praise heroism, extol goodness, and establish truth; and, though often clouded with the gross alloy of sin and passion, this has not only been its mission, but its acknowledged achievement.

Poetry is no mere rhapsody—no idle dream. It does not unfit the student for the battle of life, but rather, if rightly studied, will nerve him for that struggle with the Apollyon of Mammon, and the evil spirit of “self,” which no mortal may escape.

It is no ethereal mysticism, no soul-deluding mirage, no gilded cheat, “by fancy wrought.” It is a great power, but one that never crushes. Poetry wins its empire in the soul; it may not usurp.

It enters “life” by that little wicket in the thick wall of worldliness called sympathy. It smiles when clouds are densest, and wraps around the dark forms that fear conjures so often robes of cloth of gold. It clings to the agitated world as a fair-faced, golden-haired, simple-souled child clings to her warrior father, twining the arms of innocence around the neck of strife. It lifts the mind to the topmost pinnacle of wisdom’s temple, from whence it may look *down* to earth, and *up* to heaven. Truly it is no dreamland. It is the garden of the soul’s delights; and it is no stretch of fancy or of imagination to say that a day *will* come when purity, beauty, truth, and love, having undisputed sway where now pride, passion, duplicity, and hate usurp, all men shall be poets. The minstrel’s harp shall melodiously whisper of other themes than war and conquest. “Peace on earth” shall be the burden of its most enraptured strain.

F. G.

SERVILITY.—There is nothing to me more irksome than to hear weak and servile people repeat with admiration every silly speech that falls from a person of mere rank and fortune. The nonsense grows more nauseous through the medium of their admiration, and shows the venality of vulgar tempers, which can consider fortune as the goddess of wit.—*Shenstone*.

ABUSE OF NAMES.—It is by giving fair names to foul actions, that those who would start at real vice are led to practise its lessons, under the disguise of virtue.—*Scott*.

RIGHTS are inherent in the people, but kings and princes have none. The people stand in need of neither charters nor precedents to prove theirs, nor professional men to interpret them. They exist with every man, in every country, and in all countries alike, the despotic as well as the free; though they may not be equally easy to be recovered in all.—*Marquis of Lansdowne*.

THE PEOPLE.—It is the people which composes the human species. All which is not the people is of so little consequence that it is not worth the trouble of counting.—*Rousseau*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

192. Would some reader of the *British Controversialist* be so kind as to inform me where I could procure or get to purchase the following books (with prices)?—1, A copy of a Grammar by William Cobbett, to teach the French language, published about the year 1819; 2, A copy of the easiest and best self-educating Grammar of the English Language, now or recently published; and, 3, A copy of the best Arithmetic, particularly one which treats very fully and distinctly on Fractions and other intricate accounts.—J. N. A.

193. In your last literary notices of the *Controversialist*, it is stated that the University of London has "thrown open academical honours to every man willing to brave the necessary examinations." Will you be good enough to state in your next number, whether *degrees* are thus thrown open—for example, Can I obtain a B.A. degree *without* having to attend lectures for two years, as has been the case heretofore? As an interested party in this movement, a little explanation would oblige.—J. J.

194. Can you furnish me with any information as to the qualifications necessary for obtaining the degree of Associate of Arts (A. A.), and the mode of proceeding in the matter?—J. G. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

175. On the subject of the Five-mile Act, Pyle says:—"The crowning piece of folly which the majority in the Church of England committed under the Stuarts, was procuring the Act of Uniformity to be enacted in 1662. Within a year no less than 2,000 clergymen resigned their livings rather

than accept its terms. The Oxford (or Five-mile) Act, of 1665, forbade the unhappy ministers to live within five miles of any corporate town, or of any place where they had formerly preached."—S. E.

182. "Theologian" has set us a task, of the magnitude of which he has no conception. To furnish him with the required information would exceed our utmost limits; but he will probably be satisfied with the following list, which might be extended *ad libitum*. The principal works on the BIBLE are the Commentaries of Calvin and Beza; Arnold, Adam Clarke, Calmet, Doddridge, Gill, Grotius, Hammond, Matthew Henry, Le Clerc, Lowth, Patrick, Scott, and Whitby. He may consult also *Poli Synopsis Criticorum*, and the *Scholia** of E. F. C. Rosenmüller. On the NEW TESTAMENT, Barnes's Notes, Guise's Paraphrase, Olshausen, and Tholuck.

Of *separate* commentaries on particular portions of the OLD TESTAMENT he may consult Ainsworth's Annotations, Grave's Lectures, Jamieson's Exposition, Kidder's Commentary, Parker's *Bibliotheca Biblica*, Robertson's *Clavis*, Schumann, Tiele, Tuch, &c., on the *Pentateuch*; Notes by George Bush, Maurer, and Rosenmüller, on *Joshua*; G. Bush's Notes on Book of *Judges*. Of the almost innumerable works on *Job*, he may consult Abbott's Paraphrase, Albert Barnes, Caryl's Exposit-

* "Commentary" is an attempt to embody the sentiments of scripture authors; while "translation" gives the words that are equivalent to those of the original. "Paraphrase" is a translation accompanied with additional and explanatory words, phrases, or sentences. "Scholia" are short notes, of the same significance as our "annotations."

tion, Chappelow's Commentary, Costard's Observations; Good's, Lee's, and Smith's Book of Job; Heath's Essay, Leigh's Annotations, and "Job and his Times," by Wemyss; Commentaries on the *Psalms*, by Ainsworth, Dimock, Hammond, Horne, and Merrick; Translations, with Notes, by Walford, and by Bush and Noyes (American). The works of Hengstenberg and Tholuck studied together are all that a student can desire: there are translations in English of both works. Bridges' Exposition is confined to 119th Psalm. Melancthon and Meroer, Hodgson, Hunt's Observations, Lawson's Exposition, and Bishop Patrick's Commentary, on the *Proverbs*. Dr. Wardlaw's Exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes; Gesenius on Isaiah; Hävernick on Ezekiel* and Daniel, &c. The best works are those that treat of Prophecy in general, e. g. Alexander's Connection of the Old and New Testament; Apthorp's Discourses, Brook's Elements of Interpretation, Davison's Discourses, Horne's Introduction, vols. ii. and iv. Hurd's Introduction to the Study of Prophecy, Sherlock's Discourses, and Dr. Pye Smith's Principles of Interpretation.

Of separate Commentaries on the NEW TESTAMENT the best are: Campbell on the Four Gospels; Olshausen on the first Three; Fritzsche on Mark; Kuinoel's Commentary on Luke, and Bornemann's Scholia; Beza, Calvin, Chrysostom, Lampa, Lücke, Dr. Shepherd (Notes) and Tholuck. De Wette is full of scepticism. In Dr. Bennett's Lectures on the Life of Christ, "Theologian" will find all that Dissenters could desire. Kuinoel's Commentary on the Acts, which is full and complete, and Meyer's Commentary. In Dr. Bennett's Lectures on the Acts he will find the opinions of Dissenters stated at length whenever required. The works of Professor Stuart and Dr. Tholuck are the best on *Romans*; but

Beza, Calvin, Chrysostom, Hugues Oltramare (French) and Olshausen among foreign authors; Cox (Horse Romanæ), Jones (Analysis), Taylor and Terrol (Paraphrases), Turner (Exegetical Notes), and Willet (Hexapla), among English authors, may be profitably consulted. On *Corinthians*, Billroth, Platt, Heydenreich, Krause, Olshausen, Pott and Rückert. On *Galatians*, Borger, Hermann, Luther, Rückert, Usteri and Winer. On *Ephesians*, Harless, Matthias and Rückert. On *Philippians*, Ferguson and Pearce. Of the large number of Continental authors, he may consult Rheinwald, Riliet (French) and M. H. Schotanus. On *Colossians*, Davenant's Exposition (translated by Allport), Bähr, Böhmer, Böttiger, Harless, Rückert, Steiger and Storr. On *Thessalonians*, Bp. Jewell and W. Solater (Expositions) J. A. Turretin, &c. Leo, Mack, Mosheim, &c. on *Timothy*; and Taylor on *Titus*. Atteral and Bishop Smalridge, Hagback and Hummel on *Philemon*. Kuinoel, Maclean, Dr. Owen, Prof. Stuart, and Tholuck (translation by Hamilton and Ryland) on *Habrews*. Dr. Kern and Manton on *James*; Erasmus, Leighton (1st Epistle only), and Macknight on *Peter*. On the three Epist. of *John*, Hawkins (Commentary), Lücke (translation given in Bib. Cabinet, vol. xv.) and Dr. Shepherd's Notes, may be consulted; and an endless number of works (of which none are satisfactory) on the Book of *Revelation*. "Theologian," however, may study the Commentaries of Lowman, Mede and Woodhouse; Faber's Sacred Calendar of Prophecy, Sir Isa. Newton's Observations, Bp. Newton's Remarks, Lücke, &c. Elliott's Horse Apocalyplices and Barnes's Notes on the Book of Revelation, are the most recent productions.

M. H.

191. "J.D." is informed that the examination necessary to be undergone to obtain an appointment in the Civil Service depends, in very great measure, upon the department in which it is

* Dr. Guthrie's "Gospel by Ezekiel" is a very popular work

sought. Arithmetic ranks highest, and this, with writing from dictation, is sufficient in some, while others require French, Latin, Bookkeeping by single and double entry, Geography, English History, &c. The examinations are held at Whitehall, London, several times in the year. The amount of salary is very varied—and this also depends on the appointment; the lowest is about £90 or £100 per year—some reach £300, £400, £500, and in some of the highest departments, £1,000, and a little more. There is a series of articles, entitled "The Civil Service," in the "London Journal" (140 and 141, Strand) for the month of February, 1858; and several numbers anterior and subsequent to that date, which give a great deal of information re-

specting each department, and, in fact, the whole are a *vade mecum*, and contain all that it is necessary to know, with but slight exception. Several works are published on the subject; one entitled, "A Complete Guide to Government Appointments and the Civil Service Examinations," by Mr. J. C. Hurst, price 2s. 6d. (London, Belfe Brothers, Aldersgate Street) J. D. would find very useful.—J. J. G.

193. J. J. is informed that the New Charter of the London University enables the Senate "to admit to degrees in Arts and Laws Candidates not proceeding from Institutions affiliated to the University"—*in other words, private students are allowed to graduate in Arts and Laws.*

L'OUVRIER.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Claremont Literary Association, Liverpool.—The members of this Association and their friends held their fourth annual soirée on Tuesday evening, 27th April, in the schoolrooms of Claremont Independent Chapel, Kirkdale. The Chairman, P. Marsh, Esq., president of the Society, in opening the proceedings after tea, remarked, that not only was this an alliance of young men in literary pursuits, but one for their improvement in the principles of true philosophy and Christianity. The report for the past session was read by the Secretary, Mr. M. Wm. Emery, from which it appeared there had been thirteen essays read, principally on subjects of natural philosophy, though there had been but one set discussion, that on "The Advantages of Direct Taxation." An address on "Breaking Up" was delivered by Mr. T. Nicholson, and one on "Cowper and his Poetry" by Mr. W. Edmonds. Papers were read by Mr. T. W. Dalton, on

the "Philosophy of Tea;" Mr. J. Rowland, on "Havelock;" and Mr. R. Boyle, on "The Pursuits of Young Men." Mr. W. B. Luckman recited "The Bashful Man," and joined with Messrs. G. Lingham, J. Tunstall, jun., and J. Marshall, in a humorous dialogue composed for the occasion, by members of the Society. Refreshments were liberally supplied during the evening, and the proceedings gave general satisfaction. The Association is in a prosperous condition, the members being earnest and hard working.

M. W. EMERY, Secretary
Stroud Baptist Young Men's Improvement Society.—The twelfth annual meeting of this Society was held in the Baptist Chapel, on Good Friday last. In spite of the inclemency of the weather, upwards of 300 members and friends sat down to tea; and after enjoying a bountiful repast, a public meeting was held, presided over by the Rev. William Yates, president of the

Society. The meeting having been commenced by an address from the Chairman, a report of the transactions of the Society was read by the Secretary, showing its present condition, and its hopes for the future. Two essays were then read, one "On the Progress of Popery," by Mr. Higgins, and the other, "On the Improvement of Con-

versation," by Mr. Turly. Several dialogues and pieces of poetry were then recited by Messrs. Browning, Carter, Davis, and Nichols; after which an address was given by Mr. Smith, on "The Influence which such a Meeting should have on the Minds of the Young."

LITERARY NOTICES.

On and after 5th June, "THE CRITIC" is to be issued weekly.

Two new illustrated penny weekly serials, viz., "*The Welcome Guest*" and "*The Guide*," were launched on May 1st.

THE SHAKESPEARE festival at Stratford-upon-Avon, was held 23rd April, under the presidency of Mr. Buckstone.

The Bampton Lectureship has been conferred this year on REV. G. RAWLINSON.

DR. WM. GREGORY, professor of chemistry in the university of Edinburgh, died on the 24th. He was the 17th professor of the same family.

The British Association meets this year in Leeds, on the 22nd September.

M. ANDRÉ VAN HASSALT, the Belgian poet, has had a prize of 5,000 francs bestowed on him by a government commission, for the best literary work issued in Belgium during the last quinquennium.

Those who have been interested by MR. NEIL's recent papers on DANTE and VICO, will read the following items gladly, viz., HARTWIG FLOTTE has published at Stuttgart an exquisite work on "The Life and Works of Dante;" and Professor VERICOUR, of Cork, has recently published a treatise on "The Life and Times of Dante." The Prince of Syracuse has nearly finished a white marble statue of Vico, which is to be erected in one of the chief squares of his native city—Naples.

Rules for the examination of persons not members of the University of Cambridge have lately been issued. The subjects include English Reading,

Writing from Dictation, Grammar, History; Arithmetic; Geography; Latin, Greek, French, German; Mathematics; the Natural Sciences; Drawing and Music. Fee 20s. Time 14th Dec. 1858.

RISTORI has been astonishing Paris in a new tragedy, "*Judith*," by a young Italian poet, *Giacometti*.

Professor ZIMMERMAN, of Berlin, is reported to be employed on "A History of Recent Italian Revolutions."

ROBERT STEPHEN RINTOUL, for 30 years managing editor of "*The Spectator*," a man of sterling truth, honesty, and talent, died, aged 71, on the 22nd April.

M. LOUIS A. PREVOST, tutor in French to Charles Dickens, &c., assistant in the British Museum library (Chinese department), and the most accomplished linguist of his day—having an acquaintance with 40 distinct languages—born at Troyes, 6th June, 1796, died in London 25th April.

PROUDHON's "*De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise*" has been seized by *Le Procureur Impérial* in France, and is prohibited. Prohibition in general intensifies temptation. Is it a wise policy?

ALEXANDRE DUMAS (*the great*) is about to take a trip to the land of the Pyramids.

Charles Dickens's "Readings" in London; Robert Bell's Lecture on "Shakespeare," at Bath; *W. C. Bonnet's* Lecture on "Song and Song Writers," at Greenwich; *Baron Macaulay's* inauguration as High Steward of Cambridge, are among the noticeable public

appearances of literary men during the month.

Let PATRICK E. DOVE instantly look to his laurels, and all England fear—the Emperor of the French is about to publish a “History of Rifles.” Will it date from the days of *Ham*?

ALBERT SMITH is about to set out to *China*, for fun for Cockneydom.

Madame IDA PFEIFFER is expected in London about the 12th instant; and JULES GERARD, the lion-slayer, has not been devoured by his enemies, but left Marseilles lately to try new victories in the tented field.

M. BRIZEAUX, a Bretonese poet, died in classic poverty, at Montpellier, in May.

The sister of Mrs. Hemans—MRS. W. H. OWEN—is to have an “*In memoriam*” stained glass window inserted for her in her husband’s church, in the parish of Tremerchion, near St. Asaph’s, Wales.

The Right Hon. B. Disraeli is about to edit a revised and annotated edition of his father’s works, for Messrs. Routledge.

“*The Literary Fund*” dinner was held under the presidency of ex-Premier PALMERSTON, on the 5th ult. The sum realized was nearly £1,000. What a pity even this paltry *alms* to literature cannot be got without division, enmity, and “all uncharitableness!”

It is proposed to erect a “Professorship of Economic Science and Statistics” in King’s College, London, in honour of the late MR. T. TOOKE, author of “*The History of Prices*.”

“Frederic Schiller and his Age,” is the title of an excellent work by DR. J. SCHERR, which is to be published 10th Nov. 1859, the centenary of the birthday of Germany’s greatest dramatist.

THE QUEEN has presented five statues to Oxford University—those, namely, of Bacon, Newton, Leibnitz, Oersted, and Galileo.

J. C. ADAMS, the *English* discoverer

of Neptune, has been inaugurated Professor of Mathematics in the University of St. Andrew’s, N. B.

R. M. MILNES has recently published another version of “*Hyperion*,” by John Keates. It is a matter *sub lite* whether this is the original, or a new trial at greater perfection.

Some poems by DR. DONNE have been discovered and printed by Sir J. Simeon.

A novel by the late SIR CHARLES NAPIER is to be published by Routledge.

The portraits usually given of ANDERSON are *now* said to be taken from the picture of Sir Andrew Fountain, and so mythic.

THE BRONTES have had an “*In memoriam*” mural tablet set up for them in Haworth Church.

The trustees of the National Portrait Gallery have recently become possessed, by donation or purchase, of the following “heads” of persons of historic mark, viz.—Sir Joshua Reynolds, painted by himself in early life; Sir Francis Burdett; Lord Chancellor Talbot; Nollekens; Sir Ralph Winwood; Cardinal Wolsey; William Pulteney; Earl of Bath; Ireton; Lord Clive; Mr. Windham; Theodore Hook; and Nell Gwynne. It is intended to throw the “gallery” open for public inspection shortly.

“*The Dublin University*” and THE DUBLIN UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE have quarrelled; the *Board* of the former is irate at the *editor* of the latter for admitting a telling paper on “Dublin University Reform,” and gave notice to the publishers of the University, who were also the publishers of *Maga*, that they must drop *one* connection. The alternative was chosen, and Messrs. Thom and Sons, Dublin, are now the publishers of the unfilialized pet of Oliver Yorke.

REV. J. S. MEMES, author of “*Life of Cowper*,” “*Life of Canova*,” and other learned and elegant works, died at Hamilton, in Scotland; on the 13th ult.

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ERRATA.

Page 72, Line 38, erase the word "Man."
 75, " 18, for "Christianity" read "Sectarianism."
 130, " 4, for "Affirmative Article II." read "Negative Article III."

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THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
LITERARY MAGAZINE :

ESTABLISHED FOR THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION
OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,

AND AS A MAGAZINE OF SELF-CULTURE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PREVALEBIT."

"I am one who would gladly be refuted, if I should say anything not true,—and would gladly refute another, should he say anything not true,—but would no less gladly be refuted, than refute. . . . Nothing, I conceive, is so great an evil as a false opinion of matters of moral concernment."—*Socrates*.

"I am convinced from long observation, that every truth, really interesting to mankind, is discovered more fully and more clearly by the investigation of inquirers whose ability, and perhaps motives to inquire, are various."—*Dr. Parr*.

VOLUME VI.—NEW SERIES.

LONDON:
HOULSTON AND WRIGHT,
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1858.

LONDON:

J. & W. RIDER, PRINTERS, 14, BARTHOLOMEW CLOSE, E.C.

PREFACE.

AT no previous period in the history of this country has there been in the public mind so wide-spread and deep a conviction of the importance of extended and liberal education, as exists at the present time. Mere elementary knowledge, and technical information, are now regarded as *means*, rather than *ends*; and generous culture—including mental training and moral discipline—is the great desideratum of the age. To supply this want, various movements have been commenced, numerous educational institutions have been established, and the operations of existing ones have been greatly extended and popularized. Yet, amidst all that is thus pleasing, it appears to us that the periodical press has not hitherto received its proper recognition as an educational agency. It is looked upon by many as a source of information and amusement, instead of being regarded as a power which “moves and moulds” the minds of men. It is forgotten that the serial is generally the successor of the teacher and the tutor; that it frequently carries on their work, and not merely sustains a love of learning, but often creates a taste for literary efforts and pursuits. That this has been pre-eminently the case with the *British Controversialist*, we have abundant evidence to prove; and this fact in itself constitutes a strong claim for public encouragement and support.

But we can take higher ground than this; for the special mission of this Magazine, as distinguished from that of all others, is to foster the formation of enlightened and truthful opinions on all great questions belonging to social economy, politics, philosophy, and religion. And this is done, not by the advocacy of any set of opinions, but by placing our friends in a position to weigh and examine all for themselves. To accomplish this, we summon into our arena, not the “controversial duellists,” to display their skill, or carry on their deadly strife, but we invite earnest and intelligent men, who honestly differ from each other in opinion, here to meet in friendly debate, setting forth their own views, and canvassing the views of others, while the reader is left calmly to draw his own inferences, and to form his own conclusions. By pursuing this simple plan, we have not only disseminated knowledge, but we have promoted the formation of enlightened thought and impartial opinion, and thus influenced the higher regions of humanity, and affected for good the fountain heads of life and conduct.

It was the custom of the old French nobility to hang up their escutcheons in the halls of those palaces where they had been liberally entertained with good cheer; and our readers seem to be acting on the same plan, from the numerous testimonials to usefulness which they are placing in the archives of this

Periodical. We have, during the last few weeks, received a large number of communications from all classes "and conditions of men," and the whole of these abound with the most encouraging expressions of gratitude for benefits derived from our literary labours. One friend writes:—"I am gratefully sensible of the lasting good I have derived from your excellent Magazine. Especially am I indebted to it for the anxiety for culture which has enabled me to attain a position to which, otherwise, I should have been a stranger." Another gentleman says:—"I am an old subscriber, and, as such, can bear testimony that some of my choicest truth-monads had their generating source in the thoughts that have graced your pages." One of our first subscribers writes:—"As I declared to some Sunday school teachers, a few weeks ago, and with whom my reading has given me some influence, 'to the *British Controversialist*, more than to any other source, do I attribute those habits and those intellectual and moral aspirations which have developed my faculties, and made me what I am.'" And a fourth friend declares:—"I do feel a deep interest in the Magazine, because of the advantages I have derived from it. I have lately been studying for the Christian ministry, and shall shortly take the pastoral charge of a congregation near this city. I am not ashamed to say that my present position is owing to the advice and sympathy I found in your Magazine." Another correspondent, after bearing testimony to the great good he has derived from our labour, adds:—"I look back with feelings of extreme gratitude to the *Controversialist*, and its able and earnest conductors, for their noble and continuous efforts to enlighten the minds, elevate the characters, and thereby increase the usefulness of the young men of our age. Not a few of these young men will, I am sure, heartily unite with me in saying to yourself, and the other proprietors and talented contributors,—'God speed you in your work!'"

With such spontaneous testimonials to the usefulness of this Serial before us, no wonder if we, as its Editors, forget the anxieties of the past in the results of the present, and yearn for a higher position, and a wider range of influence in the future. What the *Controversialist* has already proved itself to many, we hope it will become to multitudes; and we rejoice in the belief that the half-yearly volume, which we now complete, will be found fully to sustain the reputation of the preceding ones.

We cannot, however, allow this volume to go forth to the Public without a grateful recognition of the kindness of subscribers who are seeking to extend its circulation, and of the services of contributors who have laboured to increase its value. And now, while the unrelaxing spirit of duty is pointing us to the future, and bidding us to "go forward," we turn to all our friends, and solicit their continued companionship, their constant co-operation, and, if possible, their increased support.

C.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Epoch Men.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

ROGER BACON—EXPERIMENTALISM.

BACON. Men call me Bacon.

VANDERMAST. Lordly thou look'st, as if that thou wert learned;
Thy countenance, as if science held her seat
Between the circled arches of thy brow."

Robert Greene's "Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay," 1591.

"That proto-martyr of science in Christendom—Roger Bacon."

Samuel Brown.

"Roger Bacon, by far the truest philosopher of the middle ages."—*Hallam.*

"The Franciscan—Roger Bacon—stood alone in the thirteenth century, on account of his taste and genius for physics, optics, and astronomy."—*Cousin.*

"Look at the history of the lives of our great philosophers, and you will find that their progress has usually been a struggle against the prejudices of those by whom they were surrounded."—*Robert Hunt.*

EXPERIMENTALISM is the name of the act and art of *testing* thought, that it may become knowledge. Its first step is observation. Things, on being noticed, excite the activity of mind, and call into working the inner necessity of the soul—inquiry. The way at first is "dim and perilous." The apparent and accidental mingle so constantly with the real and the inherent—the enveloping and concomitant so frequently cause us to pass unheeded the essential and the central, that cognition is puzzled, and knowledge becomes difficult of attainment. To see what *is* rather than what *seems*, is the highest and noblest exercise of the intellective faculties. It may be—aye, it is—possible to construct fine systems of nature out of pure thought, excited by experience, but they will rarely bear the test of methodical investigation; *i. e.*, gradual, successive, and forethoughtful induction—the only true means by which transient external experiences can be seen, and known, and submitted to the

understanding. Thus only can the restless, shifting, changeful, and phenomenal become steady before the gaze of the soul, and reveal their secrets. The union of thought and action is the highest life; it yields also the most exalting and exalted truth. When the logic of pure thought harmonizes with and explains the phenomena of nature or mind, and the oft and properly tested phenomena of nature sustains and bears witness to the decisions of logic, then there is a certainty of truth; wherever there is an absence of either, there is a probability of error. *Facts*, even when rightly observed, are not truths; they only yield them; they are the words of a sentence which thought translates and embodies. Truth is shaped, moulded, evolved by the conjoint working of reason and fact. Phenomena projects a flowing stream of sensations into the mind—

"And when the stream
Which overflowed the mind has passed away,
A consciousness remains, that it has left
Deposited upon the silent shore
Of memory, images and precious thoughts."

The true meaning of facts is ascertained by experiment—by trying whether the thoughts supposed to represent them really do so in the very sense in which the mind conceives them. The systematized facts of experience and reason are science.

Science, like theology, has had its martyrs. Nor have they been the less truly sufferers for God and truth because they have striven to read the *first* volume of the Divine revelation, while others have pursued the study of the *second*. All truth is of God, and leads to Him. To know nature in her causes and her ends is to know God in one of his manifestations, and needs neither preclude nor supersede the Scripture, in which the soul must trust. Nature is no surly step-sister to the soul; she rather encourages and entices man to give full play to those

"Few traces
Of a diviner nature which look out
Through his corporeal baseness."

And as he feels "the need of linking some delight to knowledge," she makes all true cognition impart "a sense, a feeling that he loses not" the bliss of learning.

"Nature ne'er deserts the wise and pure;
No plot so narrow, be but nature there,
No waste so vacant, but may well employ
Each faculty of sense and keep the heart
Awake."

To such "fine issues" did she work in Bacon, to incline him to—
"A course of learning and ingenious studies."

Man's greatest hindrance to the acquisition of true knowledge

has been man. The unswerving pursuit of truth, though it is his highest calling, has seldom been man's favourite employment. Nor have those who devoted themselves to the thorough investigation of the true been often made the subjects of the world's homage or its love. The plight of humanity would have been woeful indeed had the sages of the olden time "ne'er eyed the fruit nor clomb the tree" of knowledge, that they might pluck thereof and give to their co-mates in life. To be the first who systematically taught and practised the active, watchful, and careful examination of nature by keen-eyed, curious, and determinate observation, or well-planned, accurately-adjusted experiment and precise and definite registration, is an honour of no mean kind. To this place Roger Bacon, though long misrepresented and uncared for, has now been found worthy of elevation; and it is the purpose of the following monograph to show the processes by which time and circumstance formed this man to become one of the marvels of his own age, and a worthy inheritor of the world's fame.

In the year 1214, Roger Bacon was born near Ilchester, an ancient town in Somersetshire, known as the *Ischalis* of the Romans. Of his boyhood we know, and can now learn, nothing. Most probably he was "set apart" for the Church from his infant years, as he seems to have been early so well educated as to receive admission to Oxford in his youth. His family was of yeomanry degree. Oxford was at this time, according to Hallam, "a school of great resort," "second only to Paris in the multitude of its students and the celebrity of its scholastic disputations." Anthony-a-Wood enthusiastically exclaims, regarding these "good old times" of his *Alma Mater*, "What university, I pray, can produce an invincible Hales [died 1246], an admirable Bacon, an excellent, well-grounded Middleton [died 1304], a subtle Scotus [1265—1308], an approved Burley, a resolute Baconthorpe [died 1346], a singular Ockham [died 1347], a solid and industrious Holcot, and a profound Bradwardin [died 1349], all which persons flourished within the compass of one century."* The chief teachers in Oxford were Franciscans (*i. e.*, followers of Francis of Assise [1182—1226], founder of a mendicant order of friars [1209], whose vows required poverty, submission, manual labour, study, and self-mortification. These orders of friars added greatly to the number of the Church, and to the intensity with which the scholastic philosophy was studied. The Franciscans did not lay so much stress, at their origin, upon their learning and philosophy, as on their sanctity, spirituality, and humility; but when the competition of orders became keener, they were fain to elaborate a *formula*

* Vol. i., p. 159, A.D. 1168. See Hallam's "Literature of Middle Ages," vol. i., p. 16.

of speculation too,* and more desirous of enlisting in their brotherhood as many of the rising thinkers of the day as they could. Bacon seems to have been early regarded as a person likely to bring renown to the order; and on his departure from Oxford to Paris—whose university, as we have stated before, was highly famed—he was recommended to a Franciscan convent as a residence. In Paris he applied himself diligently to the acquisition of all the attainable knowledge of his time, and distinguished himself so much as to have gained a doctor's degree at Paris before the completion of his twenty-sixth year—an honour which Oxford willingly and at once confirmed.

On his return, the consideration of the future would naturally suggest itself, and he would seek the best advice upon the subject. The Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Gros-tête [Greathead], a learned man, and author of a poem entitled "The Handlyng of Sinne," was his friend. As the University of Oxford was ecclesiastically subject to him, he counselled his entrance into the brotherhood of St. Francis, of which Gros-tête was himself a member. To this he agreed, and was accordingly admitted on taking the requisite vows. Just about this period (1244) the earliest known statute or charter of privileges granted to the University of Oxford as a corporate body was passed—usually quoted as "28 Hen. III. *Libertates concessæ Chancellario Universitatis Oxon.*" The chancellor or rector of the schools at that time derived his authority to teach from the Bishop of Lincoln, and we may suppose that through Gros-tête's influence Bacon received his appointment as a lecturer in Oxford.

To the duties of this lectureship he devoted himself most assiduously. His zeal, at first, procured him friends, celebrity, and honour. Belonging to that body "whose [to quote their own words, used in 1362] profession it is to possess no wealth," he was obliged to depend upon the liberality of friends for the means of carrying out his course of instruction; but the aristocracy of that time were, according to the testimony of Anthony-a-Wood—

"Moribus egregii, verbo vultuque venusti,
Ingenio pollent, consilioque vigent;"

and the enthusiasm for war engendered by the era of the Crusades had transferred itself to the encouragement of study. Hence deserving persons found patrons able and willing to assist not only in founding and endowing "colleges" and "halls," but in granting aid to scholars to gain books or acquire instruments. Bacon's genius inclined to truly realistic studies more than to the nominalism of mere syllogistics, and for the sake of pursuing these he required money as well as learning

* Read on this point a capital work, Maclean's "Monks and Monasteries." London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

and leisure. He looked upon the appearances presented to the senses by nature as "*parables*" intended to have their inner meaning read by the soul and transmuted into truth. To know when the mind had attained the right and true interpretation of any phenomenon or set of phenomena, the mind must have a test—that test must be constructed by the *intellect*, capable of being operated on by *nature*, and yet give intimations to the *senses*—be, in fact, *experiment*. "There are," says he, "*four* principal stumblingblocks in the way of knowledge—(1) authority, (2) habit, (3) appearances as they present themselves to the vulgar eye, and (4) concealment of ignorance, combined with ostentation of learning." He set about overcoming these by refraining from ostentation himself; by asking no belief in his dogmas without proof, by producing such proof as he could, he took away the *prestige* of vulgar conceptions of nature, changed the habits of thinkers, and repudiated authority. That the labours of this great man were not unappreciated we learn from the fact, that by the kindness of friends—despite of his Franciscan vow of poverty—he had been enabled in twenty years to expend in books, experiments, and instruments, no less than 2,000 French livres, a sum equivalent to £6,000 of our present money, but in effective value in purchases worth many times that amount. Such a contribution to the success of experimental philosophy in such an age deserves—indeed demands—special remark, and leads one to reflect how powerfully Bacon must have influenced his contemporaries to receive so significant a mark of their confidence, and such a tribute to his ability, as is implied in the placing of such a sum at his disposal.

During these twenty years of teaching and experimentation, gaining not applause and fame only, but substantial evidences of favour, Bacon must have seemed to his fellow-Franciscans a living testimony to their worthlessness. He had made himself intimately acquainted with the Hebrew, Arabic, and Greek languages. Indeed, he wrote a grammar of the latter tongue, which exists in MS. yet among his works, and he was a most accomplished mathematician at a time when most students of that science never crossed the *pons asinorum*. Logic, metaphysics, ethics, and theology he had minutely investigated, and had treated on many matters pertaining to these branches of thought with ability, acumen, and originality. Chronology and geography had met with an ardent student in him, and he wrote Latin, though not with high classicality, yet with an ease, grace, and perspicuity uncommon in his age. It was in the department of scientific research, however, that he specially vindicated his right to a name and place among the heirs of memory. Astronomy, astrology, medicine, alchemy, optics, magic, and physical science generally, received attention, augmentation, and illustration from the copious resources of the Ilchesterian friar. "So passionate an instinct had he for what is positive in science,

that in the department of nature he actually claimed an equal rank for *observation* with *reason*; a claim which was advanced again and achieved nearly four hundred years after by his more illustrious, but not more sagacious namesake, Francis Bacon, the liberator of the sciences.* "Roger Bacon distinctly and loudly proclaimed the rights of observation; and in truth, his whole school of experimentalists were the accredited and natural enemies of the scholastic wranglers."†

How, indeed, could it be otherwise? Monks, in too many cases, had canonized sloth; he had glorified industry. Spinning, spider-like, the meshes of disputation out of their own being, they could never advance beyond the circle of repetitive dogmatisms, while he toiled, and sweated, and dug into the deep quarries of fact, and with most revolutionary submission to the swart genius of labour, first watched, with meditative deference, the processes of nature, and then endeavoured to compel from her an articulate and trustworthy authentication of the conceptions which his soul had formed from the suggestions which phenomena excited in him. Honest, painstaking, and determined, he legislated *in thought* upon results, and thereafter set to work to bring forth from nature that obedience which he sought. Continued resistance did not daunt or intimidate him; it only made him doubtful of the accuracy of his own views, and caused him to relegate to the domain of re-investigation the determinations of his theoretic faculty concerning phenomena, their causes, operations, and effects. To the compiling, annotating, commenting authority-worshipping crowd who filled the cloisters of Franciscan convents, or waved their grey gowns within the precincts of collegiate halls, this devotion to high pursuits, this toilsome career, this unresting activity in the *search* after truth, and this self-denial of those enticing pleasures which interest other men, could scarcely fail to be distasteful, not to say detestable. Their blank idleness, or dull stagnation, or interminable labour after trivialities; their painful ponderosity of thrifless thought; their careless scorn of solemn aims and aspirations; and their distrustful or perplexed interpretations of nature, its phenomena, significance, and author, were put to shame, and virtually rebuked by the fierce energy and persevering striving with which he grappled with the mysteries and difficulties of investigation, and held to his purpose of informing himself, if possible, of the secrets, and processes, and ongoings of the universe. His supernatural consciousness of strength tacitly convicted them of cowardice or treachery—cowardice in failing bravely to dare all labour to gain truth, or treachery in surrendering the choicest and most gratifying right of humanity for the enjoyments of sloth, ease, pride, pomp, power, or momentary

* "Lectures and Essays," by Samuel Brown, vol. i., p. 161.

† *Ibid.*, p. 117.

glory. Hence it happened, as he says, that "both in science and in common life we see a thousand falsehoods for one truth." Men have hitherto neglected "to search, discover, and dissect and prove," and hence they do not and cannot learn or know the spirit's rapt communion with the verities of science, the joy of moral being, or the blest delight of holy feeling and religious thought.

The continuous sarcasm of a well-spent life excited hate and envy. Besides, he was the friend of Robert Grosstête, the superior prelate of the diocese, a man not only learned himself, but the liberal patron of a studious life in others. But though a brother of the order of St. Francis, bound by oath to ecclesiastical submission, Grosstête had hardily and stoutly opposed the aggressions, secret or open, of the Pope upon the rights and liberties of the British church, and had made himself conspicuous as a terrible resistant of the undue exertion of the fatherly power who held the headship of Christendom. This strong-nerved prelate would not suffer the installation of the boy-nephew of Pope Innocent IV. as a prebend of the diocese of Lincoln, and endured the wrath of his Holiness in the shape of excommunication. Yet for all this, Bacon's friendship did not halt, nor did his gratitude stop short at the command of his papal Holiness. Did he not, then, more than sympathize with him in his antagonism to the Pope; nay, did he not, in all probability, coincide in heart and soul with Grosstête in his abominable hostility to the Father of the church? Room for suspicion there certainly was; but Bacon soon gave more, for he bore testimony to the vileness of life and character of many of his co-freres, and accused them, in good, set, and plainly spoken terms, of practices excessively alien to the purposes of their order and the vows they had taken.

In 1253, when Bacon was verging on his fortieth year, Grosstête, his protector, patron, friend, and fellow-witness against the crimes and follies of his order, died. The hate entertained for his late friend was added to the envy which they felt towards himself, the brethren of his order became Bacon's chief foes. Another superior arose, who knew not Bacon, except as the exposé of the vices of his order, and as the object of malignity on account of his strange studies, singular learning, gigantic laboriousness, free speech, pecuniary gainings and spendings, wonderful reputation, admirable skill, and voluminous writings on all subjects, sacred, secular, and profane, if not, as it now began to be whispered, absolutely suggested by that wicked one who spell-binds the soul by jugglery, cheats the senses, mocks the resolves, and wraps up men's thoughts in the impervious veil of sorcery. What could such an official do, as an honest man bent on upholding the reputation of his order, except interdict the lectures of Bacon, prohibit the circulation of his writings, and zealously guard against the publicity of his inventions or discoveries?

The austerities of the order were then put in force, and fetters bound the body of this man of chainless mind. In his prison he was denied intercourse with any of his friends, and was frequently exposed to such privations as with difficulty to have escaped death from the combined effects of hunger and cold. He endured patiently, yet not hopelessly, the priestly persecution to which his love of science and of truth had made him captive, and continued to "bide his time" in trust and calmness.

Nor was it much to be wondered at that, in the thirteenth century, the person who could assert in the face of the highest authority in Christendom, that "we must not stick to what we hear and read, but must examine most strictly the opinions of our ancestors, that we may add what is lacking, and correct what is wrong, but with all modesty and consideration," should be regarded as a dangerous person; but when he added to this the grievous accusation of his age contained in these and other similar expressions, viz.,—"Men presume to teach before they have learnt." . . . "Appearances alone rule them, and they care not what they know, but what they *are thought* to know by a senseless multitude,"—what howling and gnashing of teeth and exhaustless rage was too little for the reprehension of the hardy man, who suffered from no glut of friendship? And so they gave him the firstfruits and fair sample of the scorn which saintly churchmen of the middle ages felt for truth, and all truth's worshippers. But he walked valiantly along under the guardianship of Captivity, keeping Meditation as his solitary friend, and being enriched by ripe and rich reflections on the observations he had made, and the experiences he had garnered in his soul during the days of his activity and freedom. Thus was he ready, when a better day dawned upon his fortune, to pour forth profusely the ideas, suggestions, and details which fill so marvellous a page in the literary and scientific annals of the century in which he lived, and could offer to a friendly pope, on brief notice, the *Opus Majus*—at once his defence and highest glory.

The ostensible charge preferred against him was the study of magic, probably coupled with a vague assertion of a violation of his vow of poverty, borne evidence to by his apparently extravagant expenditure in pursuing his experimental studies. In reply to the first, he issued his tractates, "Concerning the Wonderful Power of Art and Nature," and "Concerning the Secret Operations of Art and Nature, and the Absurdity of Magic." Regarding the second, St. Bonaventura, the seraphic doctor, who was then general of the Franciscans, having published an expository treatise on that portion of a friar's vow, intended, most probably, as an *indirect* condemnation of Bacon, we are informed by Vossius that he wrote a book, in which the reasonings of St. Bonaventura were controverted, thus *indirectly* also maintaining the rightfulness of his conduct in this matter, and

justifying himself before the jury of the learned of his time. The general ignorance of the clergy then was so great, that any rumour of devil-doings received instant credence, and Bacon shared the odium of a charge of magic with William of Auvergne and Albert the Great of his own era—an era in which Anthony-a-Wood characterizes the clergy as men who knew no property of the circle except that of keeping out the devil, and imagined that the angles of a triangle would wound religion. It is scarcely credible, however, that the acute minds who governed this order and the church could have failed to perceive that Experimentalism, by its appeal to reason as the ultimate judge of truth, was likely to undermine the entire fabric they had so painstakingly raised, and accepted of the popular rumour as the foundation of their charge, as a cloak for their deeper cause of detestation. He who gave it as his opinion that we must with all our strength, *prefer* reason to custom, and the *opinions* of the wise and good to the perceptions of the common herd, while he admonished his pupils and readers to hear freely "opinions contrary to established usage," could not but be a perilous friend or a terrible enemy. And the very fruits of Experimentalism would seem, or could be made to appear, as the very snares of Satan to allure the soul from her repose in the bosom of the church to self, thought, and natural investigations. Strong cause, therefore, for crushing, if possible, the first who ventured to step out of the harmless circle of scholasticism into the wider, freer region of phenomena and nature; seeking by reason, helped as best it might be, to unfold to the gaze of triumphant thought the true secrets which underlie the appearances around, and quieting the tumult and anxiety of thought by calling nature herself to bear witness to the accuracy of the deductions of reason. With such apprehensions as these, it is scarcely matter for wonder that even works bearing such titles as "Some Contributions to the Art of Chemistry," "The Mirror of Alchemy," "The Mathematical Mirror," &c., when written by a person of dubious orthodoxy, like Roger Bacon, were looked on with suspicion, and restrained from circulation. Had he not aided and abetted the resistance to the Pope by Robert Grosst te, defamed his order, controverted the opinions of his general? and did he not elevate reason above all other powers, and assert its supremacy in all investigations, while by his example, labours, and life, he brought discredit on others, by aiming at becoming more than they were willing to *work* to become? Let the church set its heel at once on the atrocious offender who ranks independence among the virtues, free thought among human duties, and reasoned experiment among the pleasures of life. So during part of the pontificate of Innocent IV., the whole of that of Alexander IV., and Urban IV., he was held "in durance vile," thinking, but in silence; reasoning, but constrained to keep to his own counsel; and building up a system of thought, but without the probability of

being able to bring it before his compeers, or bequeath it to posterity.

Such things could not remain unknown, nor could thinking minds avoid feeling interested in the man who was bearing the brunt of papal wrath, and the jealous guardianship of his order, that his thoughts might not be breathed upon the still, stagnant atmosphere of learning. An excellent and accomplished man, Cardinal Fulcodi, Bishop of Sabina, and Papal Legate in England, had heard of his life, thoughts, doings, sayings, and sufferings, and had expressed an earnest wish to see his inventions, and to become acquainted with his opinions. The prohibition, however, was imperative and unexceptional, and he was denied permission to hold intercourse with Bacon at all. Times changed, the papal chair became vacant, and Fulcodi was chosen to don the triple crown as Clement IV., in the very year of Dante's birth, 1265. Here was Bacon's opportunity; and though he had now crossed the middle arch of life, he set industriously to the production of a work in which he might concisely recite and explain his views, his theories, his experiments, and their results. In less than two years he had completed his *Opus Majus*, and it was conveyed direct to Clement IV., most probably by John Peckham, a metropolitan Franciscan, who afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury. Clement knew well the circumstances of Bacon, and had commanded him to send this exposition of his system to him, notwithstanding any restrictions of his superiors, and in the year 1267 it was in his hands. Such a fact could scarcely fail to quicken the pulse of the active authorities of his order, and so we find that, knowing well its real groundlessness, the charge of magical consorting with Satan was now exchanged for the ever ready one of heresy. A man who knew Bacon could not entertain such a charge for a moment, but it would surely go hard with the professors of sophistries if they could not, out of the hastily written production of their pope-favoured brother, squeeze so much as, if plausibly argued, might be construed into proof of heterodoxy in thought or expression. But things never came to this issue, for Clement IV. was called to the higher tribunal of God in the November of 1268. For nearly three years the contest for the occupancy of the chair distracted attention, and prevented a settlement of the question, though it did not diminish the rigorous exactness of the friars. But he retained his integrity, and went on with his studies and his writings, revising his *Opus Majus*, and no doubt preparing his defence for the time when trial should at last arrive. During ten years he received no open molestation, but immediately thereafter events took a turn adverse to Bacon, and the rancour of his brethren flamed out anew.

[We shall endeavour in our succeeding paper to complete our sketch of the strange Oxonian friar.]

Religion.

**DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL
BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE
MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM
PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?**

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"~~Do~~ not marvel at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all who are in the graves ~~shall~~ hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto ~~the~~ resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection ~~of~~ of damnation."—*John* v. 28, 29.

"How ~~are~~ the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? . . . God giveth ~~it~~ it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. . . . It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body."—*1 Cor.* xv. ~~5~~, 38, 44.

The doctrines of the Christian religion as developed in the Holy Scriptures evidence a wonderful harmony and perfect wisdom, which ~~ob~~ the cavil of the doubter and the philosophy of the learned ~~can~~ cannot invalidate. Doctrines even the most remote in their ultimate results have a direct bearing upon the everyday practicalities of Christian life. The doctrine now under consideration refers to the infinite futurity of man; but its moral influence upon the practice of his daily duties is apparent on the most cursory glance. The future well-being of his whole nature—body and spirit—depend in a great degree upon the extent to which the passions and propensities of his physical nature are controlled by that wisdom which is from above—by his submission, actively and passively, to the precept, "Be ye also pure, as your Father is pure."

The doctrine of the resurrection is freely and fully believed by all professing Christians. This, indeed, our present question fully implies; it is the manner, or rather the extent, of the resurrection that we have to consider, so far as it affects the individual man. We presume no one will be found to advocate the entire reappearance of man in another world as he now is. Such a reappearance, according to our present knowledge and capacity, is an impossibility; because the constitution of man's physical nature during his present existence manifests elemental decay, and consequent final dissolution, and, therefore, is contradictory to the plain declarations of Scripture, which prove the

future existence of man to be of infinite duration. It remains for us, then, to exhibit from the Scriptures the nature and certainty of the change by which the present man is continued in the future without his identity being destroyed in the process.

The apostle Paul, in elucidation of this subject, has left us a masterpiece of divine logic in 1 Cor. xv. He employs the similitude of rural life in the acts of sowing and reaping. He speaks of the seed sown and the fruit following, and by analogy affirms that in death man is sown "an animal body, having breath and animal life, that which is endued with faculties of sense, and has need of food, drink, and sleep for its support"—the "*soma psuchikon*" as opposed to the "*soma pneumatikon*," or spiritualized, glorified body with which it is raised to the nature and enjoyments pertaining to the spiritual world where henceforth it is to live, and move, and have its being. Here, then, we have the key to the whole mystery. That which constitutes the element of decay and dissolution is, by an act of divine power, converted into an undying existence. That this is not unreasonable nor opposed to the analogies in nature, we have abundant proof. The apostle has adduced the forcible fact of vegetable life and reproduction or continuance. That the seed is the germ—essence—the embryo—the microcosm—of the plant is indisputable; that the plant contains anything which did not exist latent in the seed is indisputable also—to suppose otherwise were an absurdity.

The animal world presents, if possible, more striking analogical facts. The chrysalis of to-day is the gaily-painted butterfly of to-morrow—both vegetable and animal life contrasting in the different stages of their existence most materially. Yet none presume to question the identity of the individual plant or animal. Why, then, should we for one moment question the identity of the animal body, with its wants and necessities, and the glorified spiritual body, with its joys and its privileges. We have a yet stronger analogy even in the earthly existence of man himself; and this analogy is twofold. Man in his state "*prenatus*" necessarily is the same man as the "*postnatus*" existence called child and man: the infant of a few hours is necessarily the same identity as the hoary-headed man of four-score and ten years. Yet philosophy tells us—and, as we believe, truly—there is not one material particle of the *prenatus* embryo—the infant or the youth—in the physical constitution of the hoary head as it descends into the valley of the shadow of death, but that a continued and uninterrupted change of increment and decay is constantly progressing, while the individual and moral identity is preserved in the most absolute completeness.

The moral aspect of the question is worthy of some consideration in forming a judgment. The body is now united with the

soul in the daily duties of life; the sins of omission and commission are frequently, if not universally, the result of mental emotion and physical action; the body is, to all intents and purposes, a partner and partaker in the joys and sorrows, the follies and vices of the soul. The Scriptures distinctly teach, that for all the words and actions of life man will be judged in the life to come. Who will dare impeach the Divine justice by justifying the negative of our present debate? What! shall God, infinitely wise and just, be made to punish the soul alone for theft, when the hands joined in the robbery? Shall the soul only be condemned to endless punishment for murder when "the feet were swift to shed blood," and the hands had wielded the sword of destruction? Is it not said, "he who taketh the sword, shall perish by the sword." Do we not, in our worldly concerns, inflict punishment for infractions of the laws upon the body and the soul? Is it not the aim of all human laws to produce mental anguish and bodily pain to delinquents? On the other hand, are not all rewards, present and prospective, productive of joy and pleasurable sensations both to body and soul? Can it, then, be reasonable to suppose that the soul only shall be the subject of future rewards or punishment? But the Scriptures emphatically affirm, that for all things done here MAN WILL BE JUDGED, and approved or condemned accordingly. Now, the soul is not man, neither is the body man, but that mysterious union of body and spirit, which, while we see, know, and feel to be ourselves, is not and cannot be comprehended by us in its nature and essential characteristics any more clearly than we can comprehend the being of God himself. It is man in his entirety who is to be rewarded or punished, not a part of man; the change must, then, of necessity be such as to continue the identity both of body and soul; but without the contingencies of decay and dissolution. The corruptible must put on incorruption, as the apostle expresses it. Decay, death, and dissolution are mere contingencies,—this is evident from the circumstances under which they were introduced into this world. Sin came in consequence of disobedience manifested in the overt act of our first parents, and death is the wages of sin—sin, the cause of death, the result. It was a something added to the former condition of the united body and soul which presented the punishment for sin in a tangible shape, daily and hourly before the sinner. The change by the resurrection will be restoration to a similar condition as to existence; for the Scriptures say, death came by one man, Adam; but everlasting life came by the God man, Christ Jesus—who, in his death and resurrection, is become the firstfruits of them that sleep in death; "for if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised;" and "if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." The Christian so heartily believes in the resurrection of the present body in a glorified state, that he can with confi-

dence say, with the apostle John, "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when He (Christ) shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is. And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as He is pure."—1 John iii. 2, 3.

In confirmation of our view of this question we adduce the following opinions of men, eminent for their piety as Christians, and for their learning as philologists; and first, we extract from the Rev. A. Barnes, on 1 Cor. xv. 39, 40:—"The argument here is, that there are many kinds of bodies; that all are not alike; that while they are bodies, yet they partake of different qualities, forms, and properties; and that therefore it is not absurd to suppose, that God may transform the human body into a different form, and cause it to be raised up with somewhat different properties in the future world. Why, the argument is, should it be regarded as impossible? Why is it to be held that the human body may not undergo a transformation, or that it will be absurd to suppose, that it may be different in some respects from what it is now? Is it not a matter of fact that there is a great variety of bodies even on the earth? The word flesh here is used to denote body, as it often is—1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 2; vii. 1; Phil. i. 22—24; Col. ii. 5; 1 Pet. iv. 6. The idea here is, that although all the bodies of animals may be composed essentially of the same elements, yet God has produced a wonderful variety in their organization, strength, beauty, colour, and place of abode, as the air, earth, and water. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose that the body that shall be raised shall be precisely like that which we have here. It is certainly possible that there may be as great a difference between that and our present body, as between the most perfect form of the human frame here, and the lowest reptile. It would still be a body, and there would be no absurdity in the transformation. The body of the worm, the chrysalis, and the butterfly, is the same. Yet how different the gaudy and gay butterfly from the creeping and offensive caterpillar? *So there may be a similar change in the body of the believer, and yet be still the same.* Of a sceptic on this subject we would ask, whether, if there had been a revelation of the changes which a caterpillar might undergo before it became a butterfly—a new species of existence adapted to a new element, requiring new food, and associated with new and other beings,—if he had never seen such a transformation, would it not be attended with all the difficulty which now encompasses the doctrine of the resurrection? The sceptic would no more have believed it on the authority of revelation than he will believe the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead: and no infidel can prove that the one is attended with more difficulty or absurdity than the other." Dr. Olshausen says, in his commentary on John v. 28, 29,

"The less is now surpassed by the greater: yea, even the universal resuscitation at the end of time is the work of the Son of God! That the Lord here refers to *physical* resurrection, is shown by the expression, '*en tois mnemeiois*,' as also by '*ekporousthai*,' and by the remark that the wicked will rise as well as the good. The '*agatha poiesantes*' are here, of course, righteous persons, as they are described, Matt. xxv. 34, &c., but distinguished from the '*akousantes*' (those who are regenerated through the Logos). Just in like manner in the Apocalypse, the priests of God and of Christ who have part in the first resurrection (xx. 5, 6) are distinguished from the dead, who are judged according to their works, among whom are righteous and unrighteous (xx. 13). To the one class of those who are judged the '*anastasis*' is the true '*zoe*,' while to the other it is only '*thanatos*' deuterous (Rev. xx. 14), *i.e.*, the entire loss of all higher life and being, and abandonment to perfect alienation from God. In the case of the latter, therefore, '*krisis*' appears as the absolute '*katakrisis*.' This passage is further remarkable, as the only one in the New Testament, besides Acts xxiv. 15, where the '*anastasis dikaion te kai adikon*' is spoken of, containing an express mention of the resurrection of the wicked. 1 Cor. xv., the resurrection appears only as a favour bestowed on believers; and Matt. xxv., Rev. xx., although the universal judgment of the world is the subject of discourse, nothing is said respecting the corporeal resurrection of the wicked. Meanwhile, in the passage, Matt. x. 28, the corporeal resurrection of the wicked is presupposed; and in the Old Testament, Dan. xii., the doctrine that the ungodly will rise again is distinctly taught." Dr. Kitto remarks, in his "Biblical Cyclopædia," vol. ii. p. 611, speaking of the resurrection of the body, "The manner in which this marvellous change shall be accomplished is necessarily beyond our present comprehension, and therefore the Scripture is content to illustrate it by figurative representations, or by proving the possibility and intelligibility of the leading facts. Some of the figurative descriptions occur in John v.; Matt. xxiv.; 1 Cor. xv. 52; 1 Thess. iv. 16; Phil. iii. 21. The image of a trumpet call, which is repeated in some of these texts, is taken from the Jewish custom of convening assemblies by sound of trumpet. The possibility of a resurrection is powerfully argued by Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 32, &c., by comparing it with events of common occurrence in the natural world (see also ver. 12—14, and compare Acts iv. 2). But although this body shall be so raised as to preserve its identity, it must yet undergo certain purifying changes to fit it for the kingdom of heaven, and to render it capable of immortality (1 Cor. xv. 35, &c.), so that it shall become a glorified body like that of Christ (ver. 49; Rom. vi. 9; Phil. iii. 21); and the bodies of those, whom the last day finds alive, will undergo a similar change without tasting death (1 Cor. xv. 51, 52; 2 Cor.

v. 4; 1 Thess. iv. 15, &c.; Phil. iii. 21). The extent of change consistent with personal identity is so great, that its limits have been variously estimated, and can never in this life be clearly defined. The plain language of Scripture seems to suggest that it will be so great, that the old body will have little more relation to the new one than the seed has to the plant. But that there is *no* analogy—that the new body will have *no* connection with, and no relation to the old; and that, in fact, the resurrection of the *body* is not a doctrine of Scripture—does not appear to us to have been satisfactorily proved by the latest writer on the subject (Bush, *Anastasis*, 1845); and we think so highly of his ingenuity and talent, as to believe that no one else is likely to succeed in an argument in which he has failed." To these opinions might be added those of Augustine, and in after times, Luther, Calvin, Lücke, and Tholuck, who all concur in the opinion that John v. 21, &c. embraces in the resurrection of the dead both body and soul.

Space admonishes us to conclude. We hope we have added a few thoughts to a grand and mysterious subject; it is our desire these thoughts may elucidate the truth, promote love and harmony among Christians, and give additional inducement to a holier, purer life. How far we have succeeded in this, while substantiating the affirmative of the question debated, we leave our readers to judge. Vale!

Birmingham.

L'OUVRIER.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away: so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more."—*Job* vii. 9.

"Cease then, and let me alone, that I may take comfort a little, before I go whence I SHALL NOT RETURN, even to the land of darkness and the shadow of death."—*Job* x. 20, 21.

In this enlightened age, possessing, as we do decidedly, increased facilities for acquiring information, it is lamentable to contemplate how tenaciously some adhere to the preconceived opinions of an hereditary faith, even after its anti-scriptural, absurd, and irrational character has been frequently demonstrated. Indeed, considering the growth of infidelity, which of late has been advancing at a somewhat rapid rate, it is certainly deserving of inquiry whether the cause is not attributable to the promulgation of doctrines that are utterly inconsistent with the "faith once delivered to the saints," and which, from the circumstance of their being opposed both to reason and common sense, may rather be regarded as excrescences, which scholastic controversies have attached to the system of Christianity, than its own legitimate offspring. However, be this as it may, the doctrine of the resurrection of the gross material body belongs to this class, and notwithstanding the number of passages which

"Clement" has adduced with a view to confirm it, not one has been produced which even once mentions this Babylonian doctrine. "Clement" is excusable for not having done so, for as the Scriptures are entirely destitute of one single passage respecting such a doctrine, he could not, of course, produce it. The doctrine adverted to is simply one of inference, and arises from a misapprehension of some few passages that are generally supposed to teach it. The principal of those which "Clement" has selected will be examined in the sequel. It is commonly acknowledged that the Christians who believed in "the resurrection of the body" received it from the Jews, and if so, it is pleasing to remark that they are now abandoning such an unscriptural and, consequently, untenable position; for when the Rev. Mr. Bayley inquired of a leading Rabbi resident at Prague, what was the prevailing idea now among liberal-minded Jews as to the resurrection of the earthly body? the Rabbi answered, "Oh, we don't believe a word of it, it never originated in Judaism; on the contrary, it was a corruption introduced from without;" he also proceeded to remark, "We believe that man continues to exist as a real man after death, but we totally discard the idea of dead bodies ever rising again." In vol. iv. page 51, Rollin says, "The resurrection of the body was unknown to the Pagans." Mr. Sykes, prebendary of Winchester, &c., says also that the phrase, "The resurrection of the body, or flesh," was never once met with in any public creed until A.D. 381, nor in any private one but that of Arius. The conclusion, therefore, appears irresistible, that the doctrine of "the resurrection of dead bodies" is of heathen origin, and consequently destitute of the slightest divine authority. It is not my intention to occupy your space by enlarging upon the physiological argument relative to the change which individuals undergo, and that from scalp to toe, every seven years; for if I were to do so, I could make it appear that the doctrine in question involves such a host of physical impossibilities, difficulties, and absurdities, as few perhaps imagine. Only fancy, for instance, a man who had attained to his seventieth year, and consequently at his tenth septennial remove from the period of infancy, what a monster he would be, as Mr. Hody observes, if the whole of the materials which had formed his various bodies were united into one! He would, to say the least be thirty or forty feet high, and bulky in proportion!! But "Clement," with the popular advocates of "the resurrection of the body," virtually abandons his untenable position; for, after stating the objection urged against "the resurrection of the body" after its original elements probably have been scattered throughout the world, he says, "The Almighty can" (yes, but there is no evidence that He *will*.) "again re-animate the dead body (mark that) in all the freshness and vigour of immortal life." After which, he goes on to state "that it is not necessary

for personal corporeal identity that there should be an absolute identity of particles in the resurrection body with the one that is laid in the grave." If this is not abandoning the doctrine of the resurrection of the same identical body, I know not what is. But, be this as it may, it is substantially the same that popular theology teaches, when it is asserted, "that our bodies will be changed." If they are changed, how can they be the same bodies? Is not this, I ask, a virtual repudiation of their own doctrine?

But admitting, for the sake of argument, that God *will* recall the scattered primordial elements which have contributed to the development of the bodies of the cannibals, for instance (though the Rev. J. Wesley says, "that only a portion of the human body nourishes"), be those "elements" oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, or lime, they will be material notwithstanding. If, however, they are not, it remains for "Clement" to prove by what peculiar process "matter" can be converted into "spirit," and how the physical organization of the cannibals which had been developed by the men they had eaten (a revolting idea, I admit) can themselves be perfect bodies after that which originally belonged to another is separated from them; and particularly as it is a universally admitted axiom that the same particles of matter cannot occupy two places at one and the same time. But what is the body? Of itself it is a conglomeration of insensible materials. Matter is divided by the chemists into inorganic and organic; the former is insensible, and, so far as regards the latter, M. Dumas, in his "Lectures on Chemistry," says, that of elementary bodies there are not more than ten or twelve at most from which general physiology borrows; and that of these ten or twelve bodies there are only four, viz., oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and azote, which constitute nearly the whole of the composition of living beings. The material body, therefore, is of itself insensible, since Dumas himself asserts that it is composed of the elementary bodies just stated, which are of course insensible. If, however, it appears sensible at all, it is because each of the innumerable parts which compose it is an envelope of some corresponding part of the spiritual body, for this is the only body that can be gifted with sensibility. What, then, is this spiritual body, soul, or spirit? No other than the man himself, and not that vague and indefinable something which popular theology teaches to be ether, vapour, or wind, totally destitute of either substance or form, and like the god that they ignorantly worship, and acknowledge to be "without body, parts, or passions," must inevitably be an absolute nonentity. If such be the opinion of the nominally orthodox respecting the human soul, well may they contend for the "resurrection of the body," to give it form and substance: not so, however, with us; we consider the soul of man as a perfectly substantial being, possessed of the human form, or, in other words as "a spiritual body" endowed with all the organs

that constitute the material one with which it is clothed while here. Thus the spirit alone receives life, and if the material body *seems* to live, it is because the spirit lives in all the parts which constitute this body; for the soul or spirit is the man himself, and the material body is merely the garment with which the Creator has covered it, according to the laws of order, to enable it to perform its functions in the natural world. The true man, therefore, or, what is the same thing, the organized spiritual body, rises from the grave or tenement of clay immediately after death, and enters the world of disembodied spirits, to enjoy an existence (if a good man here) infinitely superior to that in this. We do not, therefore, teach that the gross material body will be raised from the grave at some far distant day, because it is not only anti-scriptural and unphilosophical, but irrational and absurd.

I will now proceed to notice the principal passages quoted to establish the doctrine of "the resurrection of the body," and most readily acknowledge with "Clement" that the Scriptures of themselves are "the sole and sufficient depository of the knowledge" we require on this important subject, for both "life and immortality are brought to light through the Gospel." Allow me then, in the first place, to call upon "Clement" to prove the truth of his assertion, viz.:—"That the resurrection of the body is eminently a revealed doctrine, either in the Old or the New Testament."

He says also, that the passage of the Psalmist; "I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness," evidently refers to the awakening after death in the spiritual bodily likeness of his Redeemer. If, then, our spiritual bodies are to be like that of our Lord, what necessity is there for the scattered primordial elements that previously composed them? for surely it will not be contended that a body, composed of such materials as those, could penetrate stone walls, and so enter a room without opening the door! His next quotation is:—"Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth." Now, I always understood that the resurrection was to be universal; but according to this it is only to be a *partial* one, unless it can be proved that "many" mean all, to do which it would require a metamorphosis of the language. The passage, therefore, does not relate to the resurrection of "dead bodies," but is typical of a revival in the Israelitish nation, and return of the people to their own native land: or, in other words, a revival in the spirit; or rise of the soul from darkness to light. To sleep in the dust of the earth is, like being in the graves of Ezekiel, expressive of the miserable condition of Israel in Chaldaea. The "many of them" that would awake teaches that a great number would arise to their new nationality, and return to their own country, but not all.

The passages immediately succeeding what I have quoted, being irrelevant to the doctrine that "Clement" is contending for, I pass on to notice the solemn affirmation of our Divine Lord;

viz., "The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear the voice" of the Son of man, "and shall come forth." Now, this passage has no reference whatever to "the resurrection of the body," but relates to the spiritual resurrection and regeneration of man, and his final destination. For, as the celebrated Locke observes:—"Setting aside the evidently figurative style of the language, it is plain, from the strict grammatical construction of the passage, that the words 'all that are in the graves' cannot mean all dead bodies; for the words *pantes oi*, all they, are in the masculine gender, and thus cannot be made to refer to the word *somata*, bodies, which is of the neuter gender." Hence it is evident that "all they" that are "in the graves," and the "dead" who are to hear the Saviour's voice, are not dead bodies. The words do not refer to any *distant period*, when the supposed general rising is to take place; for our Lord Himself asserted, in a verse or two preceding, that "The hour is coming, and now is;" plainly showing, that the words He uttered were figurative, and that they would receive an immediate accomplishment.

The next passage is, "Them that sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." Now, if this refers to the resurrection, whence will God bring them but from heaven? It is not said, He will fetch them out of the ground, but that He "will bring them with him." They must, then, of course, have arisen from the dead, and this is strikingly confirmed by Luke, who says:—"Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he called the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, for he is not the God of the dead but of the living."

He next proceeds to quote the Corinthian objection which, if the question referred to the dead material body, and if the doctrine taught by the apostle had been the resuscitation of that body, might be paraphrased as follows:—"But some men will say, How are the dead bodies raised up, and with what bodies do the dead bodies come?" which would certainly be absurd. However, the answer returned was:—"That which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body which shall be," and is diametrically opposed to what "Clement" is advocating. Indeed, the majority of the passages he has quoted from the Epistle to the Corinthians is subversive of his view, as a few will suffice to show. He says, "That which is sown is not quickened, except it die;" and also admits that what is sown is NOT THAT BODY THAT SHALL BE, in direct opposition to his subsequent statement, viz., "that the very identical body which we possess at death will be reanimated." This latter sentiment the most superficial reader cannot fail to perceive is quite antagonistic to the one which precedes it. Well may it be said, that there is no consistency in error. If, therefore, we sow "not that body that shall be," it follows, as a natural consequence, that "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him.

and to every seed his own body," by which means is preserved a specific individual identity. If, again, as "Clement" has asserted, "there will be a great difference between the present and the future body," it is ridiculous to affirm, that "the very identical body" that was committed to the tomb "will be re-animated." He not only admits that "it is sown in corruption, and raised in incorruption," but what is still more subversive of the theory he advocates is, "that it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." Indeed, this is not all, for he actually proceeds to assert, in strict conformity with what I have advanced, "that the glory of the latter will far surpass that of the former." At the difference between the "natural" body and the "spiritual" one I have already hinted; so that I shall next proceed to remark, that the "mystery" the apostle spoke of had no reference whatever to "the resurrection of dead bodies," for if we sow not that which SHALL be, it is evident to all that "the very identical body which we possess at death" is not what he alludes to. This will appear still more manifest from his own declaration, "that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption."

His next passage, viz., "We which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord," &c., primarily refers to the Lord's second advent, and not to the resurrection of dead bodies; for it is distinctly declared, that "them that sleep in Jesus will God BRING WITH HIM," not will fetch them from the grave to meet Him. Or, as the celebrated Dr. Dwight asks, "Who are those whom God will bring with Christ? Certainly not the BODIES of the saints; on the contrary, the only answer that can be given is, that He will bring with Him "the spirits of just men made perfect." If, again, as "Clement" observes, "Christ is to CHANGE our vile bodies," it is absurd to contend that "they will be identically the same that we possessed at death;" for if, as before observed, our bodies are changed, how can they be the same? The meaning of the passage is, that the spiritual body we have will be an image of the Lord's Divine one, which even now is being fashioned within us by His regenerating energy.

Lazarus and others who were raised from the dead must each and all have died again, "for flesh and blood," as previously intimated, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God." The last of "Clement's" passages has not the slightest reference to the doctrine he advocates, but to the second advent. It is:—"When the Son of man shall appear in the clouds of heaven" (not those arising from the vapours of the earth), "the dead,"—in trespasses and sins—"shall hear"—if they will but obey—"His voice"—the precepts of His word—"and rise from their graves"—of ignorance and error through its instrumentality, and become not only living members of His church upon earth, but also happy subjects of His kingdom hereafter.

I may just remark in conclusion, that the passages in the book of *Ezekiel* are evidently figurative of "political resurrection," and are probably descriptive, in a higher sense, of the rise of the soul from spiritual death to heavenly bliss. For as our Lord says, "Awake thou that sleepest (in spiritual death), and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light."

As soon, therefore, as the absurd and ridiculous notion of the re-gathering of buried dust to be re-formed into bodies, instead of the glorious forms which the angels, or "spirits of just men made perfect," already possess, shall be utterly discarded, the tranquillizing assurance that death is nothing more than a continuation of life will be more universally acknowledged; and the joy of the departing Christian will enable him to say triumphantly with the apostle, "O grave, where is thy victory! O death, where is thy sting!"

Preston.

R. FOSTER.

PASSIONS.—While we labour to subdue our passions, we should take care not to extinguish them. Subduing our passions is disengaging ourselves from the world; to which, however, whilst we reside in it, we must always bear relation; and we may detach ourselves to such a degree as to pass a useless and insipid life, which we were not meant to do. Our existence here is at least one part of a system.—*Shenstone.*

HIGH STATION.—

Our hearts ne'er bow but to superior worth:

Nor ever fail of their allegiance there.

Fools, indeed, drop the man in their account,

And vote the mantle into majesty.

Shall man be proud to wear his livery,

And souls in ermine scorn a soul without?

Can place or lessen us or aggrandize?

Pigmy are pigmy still, though perched on Alps,

And pyramids are pyramids in vales;

Each man makes his own stature, builds himself,

Virtue alone outbuilds the pyramids;

Her monuments shall last when Egypt's fall.—*Young.*

YOUTH.—That glorious spring-time when every leaf of life is green, and the autumn of experience has not laid the withering tint of distrust upon one.—*S. Lover.*

FRIENDSHIP.—While the friendships of the good strengthen with age, the attachments of the profligate and base have the elements of ruin in their very foundation.—*S. Lover.*

TRUE HEROISM consists in becoming superior to the ills of life, in whatever shape they may challenge one to the combat.—*Napoleon.*

HOPE smiles on *Effort*.—*Ch. Bronte.*

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

DICKENS.—ARTICLE I.

BEFORE we enter upon a critical analysis of the writings of the two distinguished novelists whose merits we are called upon to judge, a few preliminary remarks upon the various phases Novels have at different periods assumed may not be out of place, nor uninteresting. Before the modern novel came into repute, two kinds of prose fiction prevailed. The first was the Romance, that dealt of chivalry and feats of arms; its heroes were knights in armour, and its heroines the queens of tournaments, or imprisoned damsels. This species was "laughed away" by Don Quixote, and was followed by a kind of maritime romance, which bore the same relation to voyages and travels, that its forerunner did to history. This class of works usually came under the then attractive titles of "Lives and Adventures," and gave rise to a satire not less famous, perhaps, than the one by Cervantes, in Swift's "Gulliver's Travels." The romance was the vehicle of fiction in a warlike age, when armour was worn as a toy, and war pursued as a diversion; and the pale of maritime adventure originated out of the discovery of the New World, and the voyages undertaken by Drake and others. But not till society had passed through the barbaric, haphazard chivalry of the middle ages, and the buccaneering restlessness of the succeeding ones, did fiction discover her legitimate object. As society became refined, the study of individual passions, the history of the human heart, and the incidents of every-day life, grew in importance, and became more interesting than onslaughts or encounters, than sieges or shipwrecks. The drama was the first to essay the portraiture of social character and social life; but a desire for ampler details and a minuter knowledge originated, encouraged, and upheld the novel, which has been aptly denominated "the Fiction of Memoir." Since then so rapid has been its growth, so popular has it become, that it is now not only a recognized but an important feature in our literature. Wherever we may go, the novel invites our attention, and confronts us at every point, whilst its author may be found in the same company, at the same dinner, on the same platform, as the millionaire, the titled, and the statesman, equally respected, honoured, and admired.*

* For a *résumé* of the origin, history, and progress of this department of literature, see page 230, the "Monthly Review," from January to April, inclusive, 1827.

To prose fiction, philosophy, history, and art are greatly indebted; and even religion herself cannot without ingratitude withhold her acknowledgment of its services. The political economist, the slavery abolitionist, and reformers, political, social, and religious, all employ it to spread their views, and propagate their principles. It is a medium easy of access, and at once popular and reductive. Thousands who would turn with disgust or aversion from the theological treatise, or political pamphlet, are frequently awakened to some new principle in polemics, or interested in some new theory in social science, by the influence of a well-told tale or novel. Nor must we lightly estimate the good thus done. By such means a taste for more substantial works is created, and the transition from the novelist to the historian, from the tale-teller to the essayist, is frequently as rapid as it is easy and natural. Of late it has become fashionable to couple Dickens and Thackeray when speaking of English novelists. People have come to view them as rivals, whilst they themselves seem to remain heedless or unconscious of the fact. Dickens has complimented Thackeray, and Thackeray in his turn has toasted Dickens, and all this apparently has been done heartily and spontaneously, as evidenced at the late banquet at the Royal Academy of Arts, where Thackeray humorously related an highly interesting episode in their joint career. How he, prior to making literature his profession, was enamoured with the arts, and had no inconsiderable pretensions as an artist. And how when Dickens (then very young) wanted one of his earlier works illustrated, he waited upon him with "two or three drawings, which," to use his own words, "strange to say, Dickens did not find suitable." It, however, has become so customary to think of the other when one is mentioned, to glide instinctively, as it were, into a comparison of their writings, that we were not surprised at seeing the present subject proposed for discussion. The great essentials necessary to make a successful novelist, in our opinion, are comprehensiveness, variety, inventiveness, plausibility, pathos, and plot. A novelist should be able to exhibit every phase of conduct or character with equal fidelity; to paint the beautiful as to describe the repulsive; to portray the dark as well as the cheering. Never clinging to one side only, or morbidly dwelling on one feature, he should give a happy admixture, wherein the sombre and false is introduced only to add effect to the beautiful and true, and make them more loved and admired. His aim should always be to give his readers more of pleasure than of pain, to furnish them with profit as well as pastime, and to make his work such that they shall close it with regret, and rise from its perusal grateful to its author, and ennobled in themselves; having a better opinion of their fellow men, and more sanguine hopes of the future. It is because I think Thackeray lacks this art, and is deficient of some of these

essentials in a greater degree than Dickens, that I am inclined to give the latter the palm, for which the former is no mean competitor. It has been derisively said of Dickens, that "he struck twelve all at once," so great was his success at starting. Like Byron, he retired almost unknown to bed, and rose, and found himself famous; but what is more, has hitherto remained so. Thackeray, on the contrary, has gradually grown in public estimation; step by step he has climbed fame's rugged acclivity, and now he is one of our most esteemed writers. Both Thackeray and Dickens have a rich vein of humour, that runs throughout their works. Dickens' "Sketches by Boz," will not suffer by contrast with "The Irish Sketch Book," by Thackeray; nor will his world-renowned "Pickwick Papers" lose any of their piquancy, when tested with the brightest gems from the best works of his talented contemporary. But how differently is the talent displayed. Thackeray's humour is as though it ran from a vinegar cruet, it does not incline you to a smile, so much as to a wry face; it makes one rather melancholy than merry, so severe, so sharp, so sour, and withal so sad, it is. His jokes are gives, and his wit is tinged with gall. Dickens' humour, on the contrary, is brimful of benevolence, his jokes are merry, and your laugh thereat is hearty. If he creates a jest, it is not at the expense of human error or human weakness, so much as our common blunders and kindred follies. He does not ape the cynic, nor play the censor in his mirth; but all is happy, genial, and appropriate. Again, they both detest deceit and hate humbug. Formality or parvenuism they unsparingly attack. "The Book of Snobs," and "Jeames's Diary" may speak for Thackeray, and the characteristic types of a class as portrayed in a "Pecksniff," and a "Chadband," may confidently be left to do the same for Dickens. Thackeray, barely humorous at first, has grown the fiercest of satirists, and the keenest of anatomists, *i. e.*, of human nature, especially of its weakest and most assailable points. His great power consists in dissection, and in that alone. As a story teller he is far from a match for Dickens. His plots are poorly constructed, barren of interest, and made subordinate to the author's love of satire, cynicism, and acerbity. Like some lynx-eyed detective, he is continually diving into the dark recesses of our nature, and dragging some poor, miserable offence to light, accusing us, by implication, of sins of which we had hitherto been held guiltless, and of which we ourselves had never dreamed. Mercilessly, if not recklessly, does he do this, as though by so doing he ensured our purification and cleanliness for ever, forgetful that suspicion has made more rogues than confidence ever trusted. Again, Dickens is superior to Thackeray in the art of delineating character. No writer of the present day has drawn so many, nor *individualized* them so ably, as Dickens. There is not one of them but has something about it that separates it from

the rest, and stamps it as an original creation; in short, the characters he has drawn are as diverse as they are numerous. As a contemporary has remarked, "Mr. Weller, junior, might tread upon the toe of Mr. Turveydrop, senior, and disgust him by his want of deportment; Mr. Uriah Heap might shoulder Sir Leicester Dedlock, and want room to cringe in apology; Mr. Harold Skimpole might be rudely aroused to the realities of life by encountering Ralph Nickleby, as a creditor; Captain Scuttle, without a chance of escape, might be confronted by Mrs. Mac-Stinger; Mr. Toots might be condemned to the yet severer trial of looking the lady of his affections in the face; and the result might be a series of circumstances agreeable to no one but Mr. Tapley;" in truth, their peculiarities are endless. Thackeray's characters have a sameness about them, a relationship between them, a family-likeness running through them all, forcibly reminding us of the Negro's comparison, "Jumbo and Sambo bery much alike, *specially Jumbo*." As though unable to step out of a beaten track, or to coin new images, we find Thackeray portraying much the same characters in the "Newcomes" as we did in "Esmond," and the same in the "Virginians" as we did in the "Newcomes." His friends may tell us, that this may spring from a love for them: we, on the contrary, believe that it arises from the author's self-distrust, and a conscious inability to succeed so well with new ones as with old ones. "It is in brief descriptive sketches, displaying a subtle, an almost terrible, knowledge of common humanity, in its dark recesses, in its most fallible points, that Thackeray so often startles and astonishes us." And the following passage taken from his "Newcomes" may be accepted as a bit of his satire:—"No people are so ready to give a man a bad name as his own kinsfolk; and having made him that present, they are ever most unwilling to take it back again. If they give him nothing else in the days of his difficulty, he may be sure of their pity, and that he is held up as an example to his cousins to avoid. If he loses his money, they call him poor fellow, and point morals out to him. If he falls among thieves, the respectable Pharisees of his race turn their heads aside, and leave him penniless and bleeding. They clap him upon the back kindly enough when he returns after shipwreck, with money in his pocket. How naturally Joseph's brothers made salaams to him, and admired him, and did him honour, when they found the poor outcast a prime minister, and worth ever so much money! Surely human nature is not much altered since the days of those primeval Jews. We would not thrust Joseph down a well, and sell him bodily, but if he has scrambled out of a well of his own digging, and got out of his early bondage into renown and credit, at least we applaud and respect him, and are proud of Joseph as a member of the family." That there is truth in this, we readily

admit; and the more readily, because we believe it applies only to particular cases, and not to general ones. Who of us has not seen the prodigal's return welcomed as heartily as the return of the thrifty and successful? On the other hand, we have yet to learn that it is wrong to congratulate the prudent, because we do not at all times assist the reckless and improvident. To be critical and censorious, it does not follow that we must be exceedingly talented or witty. The art of criticism is proverbially easy of attainment, and the cynic's growl is as readily acquired. But to be, in the main, just, accurate, and kindly in our observations, is a harder task, and requires abilities of a higher order than the one just alluded to. Linked with a keenness of perception, must be a love for humanity,—a love that while it mourns the errors of mankind, tolerates their frailties, and strives to win an erring brother back to virtue by the irresistible force of kindly words and kindly deeds. To do this, should be an author's ambition, for it certainly is a meritorious object. And one more worthy of our esteem than his, who makes humanity a target for his spleen, and finds a pleasure in deriding the weak, and degrading our common nature; who constantly points to the erring, and generalizes the blame, and who, because all are fallible, would lead us to conclude that all are worthless. As "nothing can so soon attract the unfortunate as real or seeming sympathy with their sorrows," so nothing will so readily reclaim the wrong-doer as gentle admonition and forbearance. It is in the humanizing tendency of his works that the *morale* of Dickens rises superior to his rivals. Dickens would win us to the good by gentleness and persuasion, by example and by precept. Thackeray scourges our errors, and chastises us without correction. According to his showing we are delinquents that deserve castigation, and he castigates us, and there leaves us, pleased with his performance, and thinks his task is completed, when, in truth, his duty is but half fulfilled. That Thackeray is great, it would ill become us to deny. That he is able, is no less true. To exalt Dickens, there is no need to disparage his contemporary. His claims to superiority are too securely founded to need the immolation of his friend's renown. At least, such is our opinion. For any decision that may be arrived at, must be regarded rather as the predilection of an individual, than the preference of a people. Though were popularity any true test, or safe criterion of ability, Thackeray must inevitably succumb to Dickens. Certainly, each of them has a numerous throng of admirers, who will stoutly maintain that "the man of their choice" is "the abler writer" of the two. There is an anecdote related of Garrick, that will serve to illustrate our meaning. Dodd showed Garrick his "*Beauties of Shakspeare*," and asked him what he thought of it? "Good, very good," said Garrick, "but where are the other seven volumes?" To him Shakspeare was all

beauty, and his works admitted of no such invidious selection. And so it will be in this case. The genius of fiction is so versatile, and the public taste so various, that what extorts the admiration of one, excites only the aversion of another.

Here we are content to close, and leave the decision with our readers. To have passed an opinion upon each of the two great writers' works, would have been a voluminous task; we have, therefore, dealt with general characteristics, and our verdict is, that Dickens is the abler writer; because we think his plots are better laid, his stories better told, his characters better drawn, and altogether have a better tendency than those of Thackeray.

Bilston.

H. V. M.

THACKERAY.—ARTICLE I.

COMPARISONS are odious, at least so tradition asserts, and perhaps, were we not so degenerately sceptical on the subject of legendary infallibility, so we should believe. We concede, that under some circumstances the adage seems well-timed; the flesh is weak, we grant it, and is naturally prone to vanity; we do not say to the contrary, quite the reverse; happily, it requires of us no great stretch of imagination to suppose that Monsieur Timo must embrace his flute with a nervous wriggle, whilst Mein Herr Das Buch is ravishing the public ear with the exquisite squeak of first violin. Comparisons, when they affect in any degree our delightful self-appreciations, are undeniably very odious and very disgusting indeed,—here is a case in proof of this assertion, furnished by that excellent pattern of chevaliers, the great Don Quixote himself. You remember, the first day he sat down to dinner with his friend, the Duchess, the colloquy about seats, and the tale told by that scapegrace of a squire, Sancho Panza, to settle the matter. Well, what think you the worthy knight chafed so prodigiously at—the tale? No; the moral. And why so? Why, because of the comparison hinted at, of course. Fancy, hinting to the admirable Crichton of a quality in common with any itinerant hedgeman; human forbearance could not submit to such an analogy. Even our friend Brown, the goldsmith (who is not a Newton in intellect either), draws a line of distinction, as legible as the red margin of his great ledger, between himself and little Jones, the barber, though they meet at the same tavern, drink out of the same pot, and smoke the same pipe together. In fact, every man prides himself on the possession of some one characteristic strictly his own; he has invaded the territories of thought, seized upon a waste patch of land, drained, weeded, and manured it, and now claims an indisputable right of ownership. A reference to title deeds irritates him. Begin to draw a line of comparison between his claim and that of some one else, and he directly cries out, "It isn't fair,—comparisons are odious." Perhaps this will be the case in the

subject we have to deal with. We propose dissecting the works (the leading features, at least, of those works) of two contemporary authors, questioning their tendency, and giving an humble opinion of the result. It is possible the respective admirers of the two gentlemen may say, "It isn't fair; there is such a difference in the conception, in the working out, in the *finale* of their writings, that no analogy can be properly formed of their genius in common,—a comparison would be as fruitless as unwise."

To this opinion, however, we must respectfully object. Particular comparisons, when used for certain ends—as, for instance, to eulogize an individual excellence in one man, by exhibiting a marked deficiency in another,—may be, and doubtless are, unjustifiable; inasmuch as the two men may follow such opposite pursuits, and have such different leanings, from physical and associative causes, as to render a limited and similar judgment of capacity and merit preposterous and impossible to conceive.

But this, it is obvious, cannot be the case with two men who follow the same calling, pretend to the same patronage, and thus live in friendly rivalry with each other. With such a competition under their eyes as this, the public naturally resolve themselves into a kind of jury, nod their heads at the various pros and cons on either side, as they may severally think fit to do, and claim to themselves the right of giving an agreed verdict at last.

Published works become public property; they are so far dissociated from their authors as to stand for accepted references. An author in his daily life may forswear and bemean himself, swindle his butcher, and thrash his wife and children, in fact, commit any of the atrocities ordinary flesh is capable of; but this takes away no tittle of the merit or demerit of those ideas he has given to the world. How very few good and learned books we should possess, if the irrefragable stipend of their reception was the stainless character and unblemished morality of their authors!—a truth shines out purely and beautifully a hundred years after the fallible being who wrote it has mouldered to dust: this is a good and wise dispensation, for it allows us to linger with never-ceasing admiration over the stores of knowledge bequeathed to us by men whose characters, when living, we could not have esteemed. It is, nevertheless, a happy addition to our enjoyment of an author, to know (so far as we can know) that he acts up, in his every-day, humdrum existence, to those theories of moral goodness inculcated in his writings; and this additional satisfaction we may unhesitatingly claim in the two writers whose respected names we now treat of.

Having thus endeavoured to show that it is by no means impossible to make a very just comparison in such a case as this; that it is perfectly compatible with English notions of "fair play" to do so; that also it is not the individuals, as members of the

general community, and; as such, exercising no more than ordinary privileges upon society, but the popular writers, the leaders of the tone of society, the literary caterers for the instruction and amusement of the public, we shall regard, we now proceed to the question itself:—Is Thackeray or Dickens the abler writer?

It must be rightly understood that the comparative expression, "abler," does not necessarily suppose the most studied phraseology, or the most humorous diction, or the pages replete with the most learned aphorisms and disquisitions, to be the turning points. Whatever Dr. Johnson may have said upon the subject; we are of opinion that a man may take part in a debate, or pen an article; without being open to the charge of unwarrantable presumption, when he is not clever at Latin, or quite at home with the Greeks. As we look upon it, it is the indirect influence writings have upon the public character which show most truly the value of an author. And our ideal of an *able* writer is *he* who produces works, the study of which is calculated to rouse the better feelings of our nature; and generate new ideas of good as heirlooms to posterity.

We think Mr. Thackeray's writings will do this in a greater degree than those of his contemporary, Mr. Dickens. We shall proceed to give a few reasons for so thinking.

Truth is not only stranger, it is stronger than fiction; the latter may tickle us mightily for a time (how have we not all with breathless interest followed the intrepid Gulliver in his travels, trembled for his safety amongst the Brobdingnagians, and shouted again at his repulse of the Lilliputian attack; how have we not charged, in imagination; with Don Quixote, at giants in the shape of windmills; and spirits of darkness under the transformation of sheep? Who is there amongst us can plead "not guilty" to a temporary insanity for the Thousand and one Nights?) but we are sceptical of its ultimate estimation. A brilliant display of wit and imagination enchants us, till such time sober reason steps in and inquires, "How much truth is there in this?" And then, unless it come through the investigation with *flying colours*, we are somewhat reluctant to rally again round the standard; we have the intuitive conviction it is a losing cause we are giving support to; it is natural we should fight shy, the influence that was before the guide of our actions has ceased to move us now; truth must and does prevail.

We consider Mr. Thackeray's writings to be more truthful than Mr. Dickens'.

Observe the different manner in which the two writers treat of character.

Mr. Dickens has been eulogized for, till it seems almost insanity to deny, his life-like powers of description; with all due deference, however, to those who have always seen fit to go with

the stream of popular opinion, we do emphatically deny the qualification alluded to as properly Mr. Dickens', when he uses it to portray every-day life. Just take up any of the bunch of oddities sprinkled through his pages, and compare them with the things and the men they are supposed to represent. See if you find them unmistakable photographs. We are compelled to confess to ourselves, that *generally* we find them caricatures only. Matter-of-fact license is outraged in the creation of a Mark Tapley. The vagaries of a Sam Weller would have been more in place in Moliere's comedies. Scapin has the credit at least of only making *crams* on the boards; we do not suppose he played pantaloons in the streets. The inconceivably credulous and romantic Mr. Pickwick himself is almost too much a *rara avis* to meet with much sympathy from us; however much we may laugh at him, truth compels us to say he was a little too fat, and a little too old to be entitled to assist in Romeo and Julietism, or lead a modern terra firma voyage of discovery after things in general; and as for Mrs. Gamp—well, well, the least we say of her the better, we might be betrayed into slandering the old woman, which would be a pity, considering how important it is to posterity for her temper to be perfectly equanimous and content whilst pursuing her vocation. A Mrs. Jellaby, a Pancks, an Affery, a Little Dorrit, occur to us; and what can we say of them *more*, than that as we write their names, we are filled with the old superstitious and the old pleasures which moved us so irresistibly when we first made their acquaintance? that we are more and more struck with the reality they embody in themselves, and the unreality they present to aught in our observances of life? that we more and more wonder at the vastness of that imagination which could create such figures from such inconceivable fac-similes?

In reading Mr. Thackeray, we have no such wonder as this; his style does not fascinate us so much as Mr. Dickens'—it improves us more; we throw aside the one, in ecstasies with the exuberant flow of humour displayed; we leave the other, seldom with laughter on the lip, generally with cogitation in the breast. Instinct seems to place before our eyes, on nearly every page Mr. Thackeray has put pen to, the *assurance*, that *this* is not invention; in fact, the great difference that forces itself upon us in the perusal of the two authors is, that the one writes novels, the other makes sketches; the one works up seldom-met-with peculiarities, and, with a fluent happiness of diction, gives them the effect of general possibility; the other, sitting quietly and calmly down, watches the world of people as they buzz along under his windows, jotting down hither and thither what he hears and sees of their doings, and this always naturally, always as we would wish him to do.

One of Mr. Thackeray's greatest charms consists in the friendly

relation he seems to bear to all his *dramatis personæ*; he is their chief confidant, he is their Mentor, and when, Telemachus like, they yield to youth's vagaries, when they wish to throw themselves into the waves because the syrens and sea-nymphs are calling them; then he gently holds them back, he shakes his head at them, chides them for their follies, points them a moral, but does not forget afterwards to smile a pleasant smile, and hold out a friendly hand, so that his dear protégés may not be "humphed."

There is, furthermore, one peculiarity (which constitutes almost a virtue in itself, so even and unimpassioned is it compared with other contemporaries—Mr. Dickens not always excepted) in Mr. Thackeray's writings; he never rails at the world because some one or two in it have refused to feed, clothe, and comfort their forlorn, pitiful heroes; he indulges in none of those bitter parentheses, rendered so dramatic by the proper insertion of a comma or interjection here and there. He is of opinion that life is not so bad as men are apt to describe it; there are plenty of flowers along the road side, if travellers will but look round about for them. Sol's cheering rays light up many a green glade and many a pleasant mound, though there are forests of trunks around, and forests of branches above them. There is an oasis in the desert at almost every pace, and no man need be thirsty long, if he will only open his eyes wide enough to break through the film of prejudice that covers and obacures the sight. Patience and hope is preached in his every page; he is no misanthrope himself, and discourages always despondency in others. Be courageous, is the moral of his books. "The world is a looking-glass, and gives back to every man the reflection of his own face;—frown at it, and it will in turn look sourly upon you; laugh at it and with it, and it is a jolly, kind companion." Then he leaves us our choice, they are both in our hands, let us take which we will.

In further comparing the two men, we discover one difference in their capabilities worthy of some little comments,—we refer to the conversational parts of their books.

Mr. Dickens is singularly unfortunate in this quality. His questions and replies, excepting when they expand themselves into soliloquies, are generally meaningless and uninteresting. If there was not a byplay always being carried on by the actors in the dialogues, we doubt much whether one could get through a long chapter without yawning. It is the little asides, the whispered confidences to the reader, the "moustache going up under the nose, and the nose coming down over the moustache," the altros, the shaking of the back wrists, the bottling up of the eyelids, the buttoning down of the waistcoat, which gives the humorous, inimitable touches to all he does. For the matter of what they say, his characters might almost as well be dumb; they use the

most abstruse expressions; in fact, seem to have but one object in view, and *that*, the strange one of mystifying their real meaning, by their explanation of it. Men and women of our acquaintance (unless under extraordinary influence, as for instance, the *sun*) are never betrayed into such talk; for the sake of proper understanding we should be sorry if they were.

The very reverse of all this characterizes Mr. Thackeray's *têtes à têtes*. He never uses affectation or mystery. Fluent speeches, such as could have been uttered by no one less practiced than an amateur showman or quack pillster, are not put in his heroes' lips. Rattling Harry Warrington talks about cock-fights and horse races like any Harry of the present day. Arthur Pendennis is not always polite; *naïve* young scapegrace, we like to read of Mr. Warrington and himself "rattling over the echoing flags towards the Temple, after one of their wild nights of carouse,—nights wild, but not wicked, for Pen.," says Mr. Thackeray, "was too lofty to stoop to a vulgar intrigue; he adored all women as superior spirits, from thinking of one who was so to him—his mother." The worldly cuteness of Becky Sharp, the vanities of big Joe Sedley, the whispered nothings of sweet darling Amelia, the hazarded sentences of snubbed, noble-hearted Will Dobbin, the simple, honest utterances of good Colonel Newcome, and the boisterous, high spirits of hopeful Clive; how very real they seem to us. Why, we can walk in the streets any day, and pick out of the crowd his portraiture. See, yonder, the pale-faced artist hurrying along with the canvas under his arm, trembling with impatience to reach his three-story room in a back street, to give life to the fanciful objects flitting before his vision. He passes by gay young bucks just fresh on town, with plenty of money in their pockets, and plenty of hot blood in their veins; they are lounging round the door of that pretty confectioner's, smoking their cigars, and twirling their canes, intent upon nothing but idleness, seeking for nothing but pleasure,—Enjoy, enjoy, enjoy, is their motto; "There is nothing like love; there is nothing like youth; there is nothing like beauty of your spring time." He passes by rags and *rouge*, filth and finery, poor-house coffins and gilded chariots; and every one is busy with some plan of his own, and jostling and joggling with Mammon for precedence; and, saving there were one or two sorrowful hearts turning now and then into some deserted corner to pray, we might cry out, This is all Vanity Fair.

It is not their outer life only Mr. Thackeray shows us, we could see that for ourselves; he acquaints us with their inner one; grief, remorse, envy, pride, hatred,—we see the workings of them all, and learn a new beauty and a new truth from their reflections.

Time, its value and its uses, its blunders and its miscalculations, is a landmark continually presented to our minds. We

see the folly and danger of easy self-persuasion. A credulity and carelessness which makes us "hangers-on" to procrastination is assaulted with a striking example all through his books. The wretched miser is leaning breathlessly over the heated crucible, his covetous soul transported with the chimera of transformation. To catch more acutely the hissing and bubbling, he places his ear closer to the pot; silly idiot, his eyes are turned from the venomous tongue ready to sting, he is bitten before he can draw back. The wine-cup is lifted to the lips of the merry rioters; ruby flashes, bright sparkles, generous vine-juice; the toast,—the toast; drink to drown sorrow, drink to drown ennui, drink to drown pain; a short life and a merry one! Here's to pleasure; here's to riches; here's to beauty. Alas! the goblet is but half emptied, and death is tapping softly at the door; quaking hearts, stricken souls, cringing worldsters, they push their shoulders against the pannels, and hold on for dear life. Ah! 'tis trouble in vain; the grim visitor is the strongest, he will come in.

Such is the moral; the tale is old, but (pity it is so) is always too true. It is Herod yielding an indulgent ear to impious adulations, whilst the worms are preparing for their feast. It is Belshazzar boasting of his treasures, when the hand-writing is on the wall. It is Hero indulging in foretaste of unchaste passions, when Leander is sinking 'neath the waves. It is Don Juan feasting over new conquests, with the spectral statue at his elbow.

Reflections such as these force themselves upon us when putting aside Mr. Thackeray's books. We see clearer that a lifetime of pleasure-seeking is not good for us. We see clearer it is not well to live always in the sunshine; a little cloud and a little shadow softens and relieves an object. Faith and endurance, resignation and contentment, are the true lessons of life.

Our confidence in the truthfulness of the ideas propagated in "Esmond," in "Pendennis," in "Vanity Fair," in "The New-comers," is entire. There is no *arrière pensée* of doubt or hesitation; no little stickling point which we are unable to reconcile with reason; no false alloy to lower the standard of the coin. Whether such can be said of Mr. Dickens's masterpieces so thoroughly, we are inclined to question. Someway, we are constrained to pause before some of the grave statements he advances. We wonder to ourselves, when he satirizes Mrs. Jellaby and her African mission, whether it is an individual case only that is aimed at, or whether rather the Samaritanism of christian duty is not the butt of attack. Surely, if it was Mrs. Jellaby alone, the time taken up in the portraiture was a loss to the writer, without being a benefit to the reader; it is neither well nor wise to drag everything that takes place behind the scenes to the footlights; there are some abuses decency and respect require us to throw a veil over. Law, trade, chancery, public schools, banks, religion, all come under the category of Mr.

Dickens's subjects; he has had a lash at each of them. We do not say, as some people have said, that the last named principle has been irreverently sneered at. We simply remark that it is not fair to pull down *even* an abuse, unless to build up a true principle in its place; and this we cannot believe Mr. Dickens strives for. His mission seems not to be to reconstruct.

It should be, in our opinion, the chief study of a public instructor to avoid inculcating exaggerated statements which may foster national discontent and want of confidence. How far Mr. Dickens regards this as a duty, we may inform ourselves by the perusal of his last published work; those parts particularly which refer to the whole science of government. The following extraordinary sentences will furnish an idea of the substance of them. In speaking of the house through which the business of the country passes, he says, "Whatever was required to be done, the Circumlocution Office was beforehand with all the public departments in the art of perceiving *how not to do it*." And, again, referring now more particularly to the members composing that House, "It is true, *how not to do it* was the great study and object of all public departments and professional politicians all round the Circumlocution Office." Now, if these assertions be true, we think it would be well for the people of this country, who ARE in the habit of placing SOME faith in the sagacity and good intentions of their representatives, to look into the matter, and see how far their confidence is betrayed, and their interests disregarded. And if they be not true (as any unprejudiced person may learn for himself, by comparing the social position of this country with that of any other, the political position of this country with that of any other, the tolerative position of this country with that of any other), if they be not true, then we are only left to wonder why Mr. Dickens has created a *libel*, the flippant, pithy way of putting which has made it sound so much like logic, and so much like fact, *which* it is improbable can have any good effect upon the mass, and is certain to have a bad effect upon that too numerous class of people who are always groaning about the superficiality of the present day, and who, with the sanction of such a man as Mr. Dickens to back them up, would be delighted past conception to propagate the croak that "Our politicians are all Barnacles; our Commons, a Circumlocution Office; our reform, a hoax; and everything, in fact, but the real '*How not to do it*,' a mere sham and pretence."

Mr. Thackeray exhibits a greater judgment in his choice of a subject to write upon than Mr. Dickens. Society is his choice, and it is a true one. Recognized habits, private institutions, business transactions, are too restricted and practical to be deduced to fictitious treatment. A man should have left the counting-house before he appears in the pages of a novel; whilst poring over his ledgers, or studying his briefs, his

thoughts and desires are confined to a particular circle; away from these he belongs to society at large, takes part in their pastimes and pursuits, and consequently is then most fitted for general observation. Mr. Thackeray seems to have discovered this, and hence his wise discrimination in portraying character. We read other novelists' books,—we study his.

All women should have his books on their tables. He is one of the few authors who do give to the gentler sex their true value. We can imagine nothing more beautiful than his delineation of Helen Pendennis' character, with her little jealousies, her petty schemes, her artless vanities, on the one hand; her sweet frankness, her serene purity, her exquisite devotion, on the other. The history of Arthur Pendennis and his mother is a masterpiece of invention; there is the most intense reality in it all. We see, starting out from the pages as we read, the mother bending over her son during his time of delirium; the mother devouring with love-filled eyes the book he has written; the mother tormenting herself and everybody about his supposed hard studies; the mother sighing and looking pale over some little forgetfulness of his; the mother breaking her heart every hour from suspicions which have led to their estrangement; the mother dying in his arms with a sublimity of reconciliation and trust impossible to describe. There is a tone of purity impressively affecting in these pages. With such a noble example in proof, we are prepared to believe what Mr. Thackeray afterwards tells us, viz., "That women are always sacrificing themselves, or somebody, for somebody else's sake."

We should like to comment more fully on the writings of Mr. Thackeray, as characterizing the past. No man has done more than himself to sweep away some of the odium that calumny had webbed round the names of the great men of the eighteenth century. All who love to refer to that period owe a debt of gratitude to the man who has thrown some sunlight over the memory of ascetic Swift; who has made us laugh and mourn together over the witty, the profligate Congreve; who has brought dear old Addison closer and closer to our hearts; and made us cling more fondly to the generous, good-for-nought, blustering, tender-hearted Steele; who has spoken so warmly of the great soul and kind nature of decrepid little Pope; and made us forget the reckless, thriftless vanity of Goldsmith, in admiration of his uniform good temper and pure, unsullied pages. Space, however, forbids us now pursuing the subject further; and, in conclusion we would say that, much as we may admire the wondrous flashes of genius which surround Mr. Dickens, and immortalize his pen, we are still none the less of opinion that in the truest and fullest sense of the word, Mr. Thackeray is the *abler* writer of the two.

JUSTITIA ET VERITAS.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.

Social Economy.

IS AN UNLIMITED BANK ISSUE BENEFICIAL TO COMMERCE?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE arguments of our opponents upon this question are of so unstable a nature, that we proceed to their refutation with confidence in our ability to do so conclusively. We confess to having laughed heartily at the difference between the promise implied in the opening of B. J.'s paper and the actual performance. He reminded us most forcibly of the old adage with regard to March; viz., "that it comes in like a lion, and goes out like a lamb." He rushes into the debate with all the impetuosity of an Arab, "taking the field single-handed, defying a world in arms, throwing down his gage to all comers." But very soon he is daunted by the difficulties which beset him, and, clapping spurs to his steed, he gallops out of the fray, trusting that some one more able than himself will take up the defence of an unlimited Bank issue. Certainly the cause has need of some other advocate; for we cannot find one single word in favour of the views he has undertaken to support. He attempts to show that the Bank Charter Act is a mistake, and that its advocates are guilty of absurdity; but not one blow does this gallant champion strike for "an unlimited Bank issue." He acknowledges that we have an overwhelming majority of authorities, consisting of "Chancellors of the Exchequer, financiers, bankers, and stockbrokers;" and to crown all, to consummate our triumph, we have the *Times*, the "Thunderer," on our side. In our opinion, this is no slight admission of the correctness of our views, and we thank B. J. for it. He, however, thinks that if we had followed our leader, the *Times*, we should still have been guilty of errors and inconsistencies. That we may have committed some blunders is probable; but can B. J. point them out? We shall see.

He goes on to remark, that it is a palpable absurdity to say, "that though the Bank may issue £14,000,000 more notes than they have specie, not only without injury, but with positive benefit to the trading community, and with enormous profit to themselves, and yet that another £2,000,000 would be suicidal and certain ruin. If there is to be any over-issue, why place any limit?" We will answer the last question first, though really the style of argument used scarcely merits notice. Is

not B. J. able to perceive that the Bank might be able to exceed the limits allowed by the Act of 1844 to a *small* extent, and yet retain the convertibility of the Bank note, whilst a large and unlimited over-issue must necessarily result in a suspension of specie payments? Does he not know that the pool which is supplied by a bubbling fountain will meet without impoverishment a limited demand upon its resources, whilst a large and unlimited demand will presently exhaust it to its very dregs?

But to return to the first part of the paragraph just quoted. We are not aware that it ever has been contended that though the Bank may issue £14,000,000 more notes than it possesses specie, with positive advantage, yet another £2,000,000 would be suicidal and certain ruin. We presume B. J. was led to make this remark because we condemned the temporary suspension of the Bank Charter Act during the late crisis. Our friend, B. S.,* for whose opinion we entertain sincere respect, differs with us upon this single point. Now, we cannot help thinking that he must have formed his opinion upon this matter more from the special and particular features exhibited therein, than upon the *principle* involved in the suspension itself. He looked at the limited extent of the over-issue; at its quick withdrawal; at the beneficial effect it produced—for we do not deny that it tended to inspire confidence in commercial circles, by leading them to believe that there would no longer be difficulty in obtaining accommodation;—and perhaps, also, he was influenced by the admirable caution and judgment displayed by the Bank Directors generally throughout the crisis. We would, however, ask, Did not the effect produced result from ignorance—an ignorance which B. S. deploras, and has done something towards removing—with regard to the true laws upon which the monetary system should be based? Had the public given the subject proper thought, they would have seen, as B. S. must see, that an artificial supply of paper currency unnaturally depreciates the value of the precious metals, and thus interferes with the law governing their distribution, which attracts them to those places where they are of most value. The danger to be apprehended from the late suspension of the Act was this; that the sudden expansion of the currency in this country might have caused *the value of the precious metals to fall below that which ruled in foreign countries*; so that, instead of their being attracted to, they would have been repelled from, our shores. Had this been the case, either the price of money must have been allowed to rise still higher than before, or a more extended Bank over-issue must have been adopted. The state of affairs

* This clever writer, whose article in mistake is headed "Affirmative," has supported our own view of the question. We are sure the readers of the *B. C.* feel indebted to him for his excellent contribution.

would then have been this; gold and silver leaving the country, paper money taking their place. The inevitable result must ultimately have been a suspension of cash payments—national bankruptcy.

But we do not rest here. We do not contend that the Bank may issue £14,000,000 more notes than it retains specie with advantage to the community. B. J. and "Ivan Madog" will, doubtless, be surprised to learn—for they do not seem to have contemplated the possibility of such a thing—that whilst believing the Bank Charter Act to have been a wise and beneficial measure, and to have been a grand step in advance of the laws which previously governed the currency, yet we consider that it was *but* a step in the right direction. We believe the Act of 1844 to be defective in the exception it has made in favour of the much-spoken-of £14,000,000 of notes to the principles which it has laid down with regard to the issue of notes generally. The fact is, we incline strongly to a *pure and simple metallic currency*. We believe that the only legitimate use of paper money is, to save the trouble and inconvenience that would arise were we compelled in all our commercial transactions to use the metals themselves as the actual media of exchange. It is both a false principle and a futile effort to endeavour to *increase the quantity, in value, of money*, by the issue of notes. As we have before shown, the only effect is to depreciate the purchasing power of the standard of value, in the first place, and, in times of social and political convulsions, to create panics and widespread ruin, by leading to great and sudden demands for the precious metals. Now, whilst freely admitting the ready convertibility of all the legal tender paper currency of this country, in all ordinary times, we would ask, What possible good purpose the issue of £14,000,000 notes in excess of the specie held can serve? Can it make money more plentiful? Can it make England more wealthy? Can it give her any advantage over foreign nations? We give a decided negative answer to these questions. On the other hand, whilst there is, as remarked by B. J., a *possibility* of the stoppage of specie payments, this over-issue greatly complicates the monetary system of the country, and imports into it a difficulty and intricacy quite foreign to its nature. To so artificial and abnormal a condition, indeed, is the monetary system of the world reduced by the avarice, the cunning, and the distress of nations during many centuries of unprincipled misrule, that that which should be very simple and clear has become so intricate and difficult, as to be considered almost beyond the capacity of ordinary intellects to understand. And so ignorance upon this very important subject is induced and perpetuated—an ignorance which, in times of difficulty, leads to those greatest of social disasters, commercial panics.

Well, then, let us return to first principles; let us base our

own monetary system on a simple and natural foundation; and, having set our own house in order, let us teach the true doctrines of this, as of other branches of political economy, to foreign nations.

But we should not rest satisfied with having placed our Bank paper issue upon a sound footing. The whole system of bills requires regulation. A vast amount of the trade of this country is carried on upon the principle of credit. Houses possessing a capital of a few thousands, by wholesale dealings in bills of exchange, enter into transactions amounting to millions. If the money market be easy, and their speculations turn out favourably, they gain enormous profits; if otherwise, ruin—not of themselves alone, but of all connected with them—follows necessarily. Is this the principle upon which the trade of this great country should be based?

As to the system of accommodation bills, that should at once be swept away by judicious penal enactments.

Again, as to the issuing of notes by private bankers. We believe this to be an error and an evil. We are not able to see that they serve any useful purpose which "Bank paper" will not equally or more perfectly effect. That they are the cause of much local distress upon a failure of any of the issuing banks is undeniable.

These, and other points, require to be carefully considered by the Legislature, before we can hope to obtain a sound monetary system and an unimpeachable currency.

But we must hasten on to the article of "Ivan Madog." This writer must surely be a very bold man, for he is "not afraid to say, that it is a great *injustice* to the Bank and the country to restrain them from issuing as many notes as they think proper and expedient." We recover breath, and read on:—"It is not solely a matter of justice, but a matter of *trust*. Any merchant of repute will receive credit; his notes are available for a certain period, and to any amount he may choose to draw." Our courage revives. Are the merchant's acceptances in fact available to any amount? It is quite *optional* with the parties with whom he has dealings, whether they be available to the extent of one farthing. And certainly if he accepts bills to a greater limit than his means and his credit will admit of, they become so much waste paper. But with the Bank how stands the case? Where is the *option* as to accepting *their* notes? *They are legal tender*, and *must* be taken in liquidation of your claim. "Ivan" says a limit to their issue is unjust. Presume an unlimited issue. There are, say, £50,000,000 notes in circulation, to meet which there is a reserve of only £10,000,000 of bullion; and yet you are *compelled* to accept this really worthless paper for your valuable consideration! On which side does the injustice lie now? If you will, *this* would be unjust towards the country.

We fear the bold "Ivan" is not wise, after all. He quarrels with the Act of 1844, because it restrains the Bank from issuing notes of a less value than £5. Probably "Ivan," when he receives a note, crumples it up, puts it in his pocket, and takes no further trouble or concern about it until he exchanges it away. But if he bear in mind that there is not a house of business in the country, having any pretensions to order in the conduct of its affairs, which does not enter the number and date of every note which comes into or goes out from the house, he will have some notion of the immense extra labour and expense which an issue of small notes would entail upon the mercantile and banking interests of the country. We mention this merely as an additional argument against the issue of £1 and £2 notes.

One of his chief objections to a "limited issue" is, that "it is a check on the trade of the country; it prevents the development of commercial pursuits to the extent an unlimited issue would permit" (p. 230). Quite true, "Ivan." But is it an *unhealthy* check? Does it *unnecessarily* prevent the development of commerce? Is the rate of production inadequate to the demand? Will you assert, in spite of the glorious enterprise of our merchants carrying British produce to every quarter of the globe; in spite of the gigantic undertakings of our engineers, exciting the wonder and envy of the world; will you, with such speaking facts as the *Leviathan* steam ship, the Atlantic Telegraph, the Menai Suspension Bridge, our splendid fleet of steam vessels, our magnificent docks, our own network of railways, and those on the Continent, constructed by British skill and *capital*; will you, in spite of these facts, assert that our trade, our commerce, our enterprise, are *unduly* checked and prevented from being fully developed by our limited Bank issue? We defy you to make good so untenable a position.

The criticism on our opening article (p. 31) is of little value, and calls for no extended remarks. We are the opponents of an *unlimited* Bank issue, not necessarily the advocates of a limited one, though of the two we of course prefer the latter. This is an answer to a great part of "Ivan's" article. He attempts to refute our assertion that there can be no real general scarcity of money owing to the limited supply of gold, by alluding to the fact of Hamburg having suffered severely during the late crisis. But this is uncandid of him; for so far from having ignored this fact, in our former paper we made special allusion to it, and showed why it was (*vide* p. 44). The argument proving the position to which "Ivan" demurs will be found in pp. 41, 42.

The last paragraph of his paper is an attempt to show that we were wrong in attributing the origin of the panic of 1857 to an excessive *paper* circulation. Now, it may be true that the *Bank notes* issued in "New York" may have been only to the extent

of £2,000,000; but was this all the *paper money* afloat in that State? Does that amount include the dollar notes of private individuals, of which there is an immense quantity circulating throughout the country? "Ivan" says, "the cause of the panic there was the run upon the Banks by the depositors." In our ignorance we regarded this as the *effect* rather than the *cause* of the panic.

To sum up the value of our opponent's proposition, "Ivan Madog," in the cognomen he has assumed, himself suggests that it is a "Vain Dogma."

In conclusion, we tender our acknowledgments to T. G. F. and B. S. for the powerful support they have rendered the negative view of this question. PHILALETHES.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

In our opening article on the above question, we resolved the whole matter into the question of confidence or no confidence in the Bank directors, and this position is conceded by the seconder on the negative side (T. G. F.), who admits, that for unlimited issue to prove of any advantage or support to trade it is absolutely necessary that the credit of the Bank should be unimpeachable. Now, as we were contending only for a Bank issue, the note is the representative of the sovereign, and the sovereign of the note, and therefore does not depreciate that which it merely represents, whereas the gold discoveries, by actually increasing the medium, tended to lower the standard.

The opponents of an unlimited issue seem to ignore the very principle for which we contend, namely, that if it is beneficial to issue notes to £14,475,000 on Government securities, it cannot but be beneficial to place in the hands of the Bank directors the power at their discretion of further increasing that issue, on the same or equally tangible and convertible security.

The act of 1844 confessedly failed in one out of the three objects which its originator had in view, and that one the most vital, viz., to prevent panic and confusion arising from severe and sudden contractions by making them gradual. So far as the act of 1844 related to the joint stock and private banks, we quite agree with it, and would even go further, believing that the power is a dangerous one to be placed in irresponsible hands, from the very fact that in times of pressure they would not and do not restrict the issue either to their means or to the value of the securities, but advance to the full limit assigned by law upon worthless or insufficient securities, and thereby prove in the end totally subversive of all that commercial morality which is the only substantial basis of commercial prosperity. The Western Bank is a case in point. The power has proved a bane, rather than a benefit, to commerce, and we are far from wishing to prove Peel's act a fallacy, save so far as he himself admitted it, but

we wish rather to prove, as we think experience and common sense do, that even its failure would be remedied by an extension of the principle, viz., to make the issue dependent upon money or its equivalent securities.

As "Ivan Madog" justly says, in the May number, "The Bank act is hurtful to commerce, by acting as a check to the trade of the country, and its fallacy is practically shown in having been *twice suspended*, owing to the panic it was ostensibly passed to prevent, and that bank the Bank of England, whose credit is unimpeachable." We take it that our position is established by this. His subsequent assertion, that the issue of bank notes is a positive injustice—"for if these notes were not in circulation, gold would be worth more, but as soon as they are put into circulation, it is depreciated in value,"—would apply with equal force to the discoveries of Australia and California, in fact more so, for a limited issue threw the country into the throes of commercial dissolution. The price of gold was raised to a fearful height, and everywhere merchants and bankers, some of the strictest probity, were involved in the common ruin. Trade was at a stand-still; thousands thrown out of employ, and from one end of the country to the other it was nothing but panic and distress,—the only persons benefited being the Bank directors.

The panic at Hamburg, to which both T. G. F. and Ivan Madog refer, proves, as the last named justly says, that paper money is the cure for a panic caused not by the want of credit or securities, but by the scarcity of gold; and we would refer the reader to the able article by Ivan Madog in further confirmation of our opinions, believing with him that they are supported by actual experience.

London.

B. J.

SOLITUDE.—

O sacred Solitude! divine retreat!
 Choice of the prudent! envy of the great!
 By thy pure stream, or in thy waving shade,
 We court fair Wisdom, that celestial maid;
 The genuine offspring of her loved embrace,
 (Strangers on earth!) are Innocence and Peace;
 There, from the ways of men laid safe on shore,
 We smile to hear the distant tempest roar:
 There, blessed with health, with business unperplex'd,
 This life we relish, and ensure the next.—*Young*.

CURIOSITY.—There are two kinds of curiosity. One arises from interest, which makes us desire to learn what will be useful to us; the other from pride, which makes us desirous to know what others are ignorant of.—*Roche foucault*.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

57. *Reporting*.—For valuable and practical information and advice on the subject of "Reporting," I would refer your correspondent to page 236, *British Controversialist*, 1851, where, I venture to believe, he will meet with all he can reasonably hope for, or even require.

Cities are constituted such by a granted charter of incorporation. The number in England is 25.

W. ORMOND.

191. *The Civil Service*.—Allow me to recommend to the notice of your correspondent, J. D. (and all others who are anxious to obtain an appointment under Government), a little work entitled "A Manual of Educational Requirements necessary for the Civil Service." This very valuable little book is published by Messrs. Groombridge, Paternoster-row, price 8d.—X.

192. *Elementary Works on English and French Grammar; Arithmetic*.—In answer to J. N. A.'s inquiry.

I. A copy of Cobbett's French Grammar can be obtained of E. Pearson, bookseller, 242, Blackfriars-road, London, S., 12mo., half-bound cloth, 2s. 9d.

II. The best grammar of the English language is perhaps "Morell's

Grammar;" Longman, 38, Paternoster-row, London, price 2s. 6d. From this most of the questions given at the Government examinations are set. Sullivan's is also a good one, price 1s.; the publisher probably the same as last, but do not know.

III. The best Arithmetic, and the one most suitable to the requirements of J. N. A., I think would be "Colenso," also published by Longman, price 4s. 6d. This is recommended by the Society of Arts.—"Tate," James publisher, price 1s. 6d., is also a good one.

If J. N. A. does not reside in London, and I could be of any service to him (through the *B. C.*) in obtaining any of these books for him, I will readily help him.—J. J. G.

194. *Information respecting the degree A.A.*—J. G. S. will find what he requires in a very full statement in the "Boys' Own Magazine," a monthly serial, price 2d., published by S. O. Beeton, Bouverie-street, London. The three numbers that contain the information are those for February, March, and April, 1858, which I should think could be obtained, postage free, for 7d. J. G. S. will find, I think, all he wants at this trifling cost, and I would certainly recommend him so to do.—J. J. G.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Kilmarnock—Clark Street Young Men's Improvement Association.—The third annual social meeting of this society was held in Mrs. Robertson's Temperance Hotel, on the evening of

Thursday, the 6th of May. Mr. Hugh Love, Vice-president, in the regretted absence of the Rev. John Campbell, President, occupied the chair. After invoking a blessing, the company, con-

sisting of the members, accompanied by lady partners, together with a few friends, were served with a very excellent tea. After this the Chairman rose, and expressed his regret at the unavoidable absence of their esteemed president, on whom he passed a high encomium; he then dwelt on the nature of the meeting contrasted with others, then proceeded to comment on the progress of the society, and concluded by appealing to the members individually to increased earnestness and perseverance. The annual report was read, which document showed considerable prosperity, both in numbers and intellectual capability. Two of the members, Messrs. McWhirter and Douglas, favoured the meeting with very able and pleasing addresses. Mr. McWhirter, whose subject was "Progression," with his wonted conciseness, gave a masterly address, displaying no superficial observation or surface thought. The subject chosen by Mr. Douglas was, "The Employment of Leisure Hours." Throughout the evening, the intervals were agreeably filled up with services of fruits, &c., together with songs, glees, and several lively airs on the concertina, by a few of the members. After votes of thanks to the Chairman, speakers, singers, ladies, the young men who played on the concertina, and Mrs. Robertson, for her seasonable attention, had been proposed, the meeting separated, all apparently well pleased with the proceedings.

Glasgow—*St. Vincent Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society*.—The first annual soirée of this society was held in the schoolroom of the Unitarian Chapel, upon the evening of the 30th of April, and was attended by seventy members and friends. After tea the Secretary gave a report of the nearly finished session, which showed that the efforts of the members to improve themselves had been very successful, and that a considerable amount of praiseworthy work had been performed. The address of the Chairman (the

Rev. H. W. Crosskey), which followed, remarked upon the edifying character of the subjects which had been discussed at the weekly meeting of the society, and the advantages of improvement in the performance of daily duties. During the evening, addresses upon "Mutual Improvement," by Mr. Charles Mc Gibbon, and upon "Religious Instruction," by Mr. John Chalmers, were received with satisfaction. Abundant supplies of fruit and confections were served, and the proceedings much enlivened by glees, songs, and recitations by various members. Upon the conclusion of the entertaining programme, a vote of thanks was awarded to the Chairman, and warmly responded to; after which the party separated, much gratified with their evening's enjoyment.—D. D. W., Secretary.

London—*Soubrielle Mutual Improvement Society*. This debating society has recently been formed, and is at present proceeding very prosperously. The first subject for discussion was, "Did the Egyptians Work Miracles?" which was opened by Mr. Foulle, who in great measure was the founder of the society. The subjects since treated of are, "Is our occupation of India Just?" by Mr. H. Johnson; "Was the Deluge Universal?" the opening essay by Mr. S. J. Goldsmith; "Is War under any circumstances Justifiable?" by the Secretary, Mr. C. W. Gordon; "What shall we Drink?" very ably treated in a well-written essay, by Mr. Missely. The next subject is that of "The American Revival—its causes, nature, and effects." The attendance has been very regular in numbers, and great interest is shown in the society, which promises to produce some able speakers.

British Corresponding Debating Society.—During the second section of this Society's operations, which has just terminated, the following subjects have been controversially considered:—"The Influence of Poetry: has it an elevating or debasing Tendency?" Mr.

B. Greenwood, of Stalybridge, among other remarks, contributed in diction which certainly would have done credit to one having had more opportunities for culture—intimated that “nineteen years in a cotton mill had not prevented him from forming some acquaintance with the massive sublimities of Byron, the refined and classical purity of Campbell, the thrilling harmonies of Burns; the deep, earnest heart-utterances of Critchley, Prince, and a host of other stars that glittered in the firmament of song;” and that such acquaintance had not allowed him to remain unconscious of the “refining, humanizing, and civilizing” powers of poetry in general. He had found, in the voluptuous outpourings of the muses,—“wild and vagrant as they might seem to those whose imaginations never soared beyond the dull routine of mere mechanical existence”—a power to “elevate men above the sordid selfishness of every-day life:” a power to banish care, “that canker of human happiness,” and create and cherish in its stead, a warm affection for (and consequently an earnest inclination to ape) the sublime. Mr. T. Caines, of Woolwich, despite the inestimable pleasures he had often experienced in ransacking the plains of Parnassus, could not write in very commendable terms upon the character of poetry. He allowed that it might do as an ingredient to make up the dishes of luxury, which garnish the tables of the rich, but denied that it merited any material consideration at the hands of the poor. As regarded its power to elevate, he admitted that it was capable of transporting us unto the regions of the ideal, but this he regarded as an idle intoxication, or a reckless forgetfulness of the real, a state of existence which would tend rather to degrade than elevate, especially them who had to help themselves. Other articles were contributed, both *pro* and *con.*, but they would not, in any way, alter the inferences which may be drawn from

the above. “The Turn which Competition will take.” Mr. E. L. Stephens, of Sheffield, still firm under the conviction, to which he gave such frequent expression during the last session, viz., “That the most speedy and effective means of amending the condition of the people, rested with the social rather than the political body,” conceived the most probable “turn which competition will take,” whenever the evils which accrue from it, as at present practised, are abolished, to be perceptible in the numerous co-operative establishments, which are daily springing up around us. He congratulated the working man upon the pleasant hopes which that probability would enable him to entertain. Mr. A. Dinmore, of Woolwich, was loath to dispute the likelihood of the present system of competition taking such a turn; but he could not refrain pointing out one or two disadvantages attendant upon co-operative provision movements, which he feared would be an impediment to their becoming general. “Why have Judaism and Christianity failed to produce pure Moralism?” The opponent in the last controversy attributed the failure in question to certain faults or impositions involved in the means employed. He contested that “a man could not be said to be truly moral when under command and obligation.” Mr. G. Marsden, of Everton, after endeavouring to controvert the assertion of Mr. Dinmore, met the question by signifying that “Judaism and Christianity had failed to produce pure moralism” universally, because the injunction laid down by them had not been universally adopted and carried forth. “What was the cause of the mutiny in India.” Mr. R. H. Holroyde, of Huddersfield, was aware that the Government of India had, for some time past, placed too much dependence upon the “caste,” and finding that they had often been warned of the danger attendant upon such unguarded confidence, he must annex to political neg-

ligence a material share in the origin of the recent outbreak; although he did not, at the same time, entirely exempt the delusive conduct of the "caste" themselves. Mr. E. L. Stephens thought the revolt more the result of social than political evils. "Operative Organizations: are they beneficial or injurious?" Mr. G. Marsden thought them the latter, inasmuch as they had a tendency to excite working men to make demands, which were unfair and unjust. They were productive of strikes which were, under almost any circumstances, detrimental to trade, and injurious to society at large. Mr. S. Caines insisted that Mr. M. took quite a one-sided view of the case. He

(Mr. C.) proceeded to analyze it more impartially, feeling, in conclusion, that he had amply refuted Mr. M.'s arguments, and made fully apparent the beneficial character of trade associations. Mr. E. L. Stephens also supported the value of union. In addition to the foregoing, several rather ingenious essays have been contributed for critical examination, amongst which may be more especially mentioned, "A Plan for Raising Seamstresses Wages," by Mr. E. L. Stephens; "Recollections of a Visit to the Art Treasures Exhibition," by Mr. B. Greenwood; and "Christ: the one great Act of his Life," by Mr. S. Caines.—B. Holroyde, president.

LITERARY NOTICES.

LOUIS PHILIPPE wrote a continuation of ANSELM's "Genealogical History of the Royal House, and the principal Dignitaries of the Crown of France," in three volumes. His MS. was stolen from Neuilly in 1848, but it has since been restored to his family by a decision in the Parisian law courts.

Slang is prohibited in French theatres by the ministers of State, and contributors to *Figaro* are chased beyond "the bourne from whence no traveller returns" by the *sabreurs* of the empire, for "chaffing" military subalterns; and yet, in Britain, Shakespeare is burlesqued, and *Punch* is welcomed both in martial and feminine circles.

THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY issued, during the year ending 30th April, 261 new publications. The total issues of the year amounted to 34,638,470, viz., nearly 14 million tracts, nearly 11 million books and periodicals, and nearly six million handbills. Subscriptions, &c. £8,186. Grants, £10,248. Total receipts, £88,730, being an increase of nearly £7,000 over the previous year.

D. G. WAKEFIELD, Esq., author of "The Art of Colonization," died recently.

In the "Athenæum," of 22nd ult., MR. M. T [*hackeray?*] continues the "Romance of a Portrait," and seemingly proves the impossibility of its being Addison—and gives his vote that it is Congreve. Even unintentionally "Congreve" is made "*The Double-dealer*."

The London of MILTON's time has just received illustration from the discovery and publication in *fac-simile* of the plan of London and Westminster in the period of the Civil War. We hope this new fact does not come too late to be of use to Professor MASSON, from whose "Life of Milton" so much is hoped.

Another "*Hamlet*" of 1604 has been found, and sold for upwards of £150. Professor MOMMSEN is reprinting an interperated edition of "*Romeo and Juliet*" of 1597 and 1599, for ease and instantaneousness of comparison.

The COUNT OF SYRACUSE, of whose statue of VICO we gave notice in our last, is the patron of a periodical entitled GIAMBATTISTA VICO. We have heard Messrs. W. & R. CHAMBERS have a new popular "Encyclopedia" in course of preparation for publication, which is expected to eclipse the "PENNY" of

famous memory—worthy of *Knight-hood*.

PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER has been chosen *fellow* of All Souls.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL received £54 worth of newspapers during his *unofficial* occupancy of a seat in the Cabinet, 1854, 1855.

The Hungarian *Somethur*, L. Bär-fay, died at Pesth recently, aged 61.

The professorship of Flemish Literature in the University of Ghent has been conferred on HENDRIC CONSCIENCE, the novelist.

DR. WINKER, the Bibliicist, died at Leipsic, 12th May, aged 69.

M. HAVAS, foreign intelligencer to all the Parisian and most of the French newspapers, died at Paris in May.

A "History of the Caliphs" is shortly to appear in Gotha, by Dr. Weil.

A subscription is being raised for behoof of the family of *Hogan*, the Irish sculptor.

The postman poet, EDWARD CAVERN, has a new vol. of poems *in the press*.

H. W. HERBERT, the "Frank Forester" of sporting authorship, committed suicide—on account of matrimonial *desagremens*—at Stevens House, Broadway, New York. He was 51 years of age, and the eldest son of the late Dean of Manchester.

PROFESSOR FARADAY, who recently refused the appointment to the Edinburgh University Chemical Chair, has been favoured by Her Majesty with a distinguishing mark of appreciation—viz., the presentation of a residence, furnished in the best style, at the royal lady's expense, at Hampton Court. PROFESSOR OWEN, the British Cuvier, enjoys a similar honour—and both deserve it.

It is said that "The Saturday Review" has been *bought up* by that colossal monopolist whom it was designed to *put down*—"The Times."

WM. AYERST, M.A., Caius Coll., Cambridge, has gained the *Morrisonian* prize for an essay on "The Internal

Evidence of the Antiquity and Inspiration of the Pentateuch," and the Rev. THOS. FOWLER, fellow of Lincoln Coll., Oxford, has had the *Dewey* Theological prize awarded to him for the best essay on "Predestination." The *Gaisford* prize for Greek prose was awarded to G. R. Luke, and that for Greek verse to R. Broughton, both of Balliol Coll., Oxford.

Barry Cornwall's daughter, ADELAIDE A. PROCTER, has issued a volume entitled "Legends and Lyrics," a book of verses sufficiently able to *make* a reputation—even within the lustre of her father's fame.

PROFESSOR AGASSIZ is to come from Boston, U.S., to Paris, to enter into oral and personal negotiations with Louis Napoleon concerning the acceptance of the directorship of the Museum of Natural History of the *Jardin des Plantes*. The ex-exile and present Emperor feels the want of the friendship of learning, talent, and genius.

HER VON BEAMUR, the historian of *Grecian Art*, is spoken of as the most likely successor of Professor Kügler.

The Danish novelist, STEEN STEENSEN BLICHER is to have a monument erected to his memory on Himmelberg, 550 feet above the sea-level—the loftiest point in Jutland.

EDWARD MOKON, the Poet's publisher, is dead.

CHARLES MACKAY has returned from America, and is about to deliver here his lectures on Poetry and Poets; before his departure he was entertained at dinner, and W. O. HOLMES (the autocrat of the breakfast table in the Atlantic monthly) read a complimentary poem.

CHARLES DICKENS, manly, honest, and indignant disclaimer of certain slanderous rumours regarding his private life, has met with the sympathy of his literary colleagues.

A MS. copy of DANTE'S *Commedia* written by the hand of PETRARCH, has just been discovered in Florence. This is surely the labour of love!

Epoch Men.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the "Art of Reasoning," &c., &c., &c.

ROGER BACON—EXPERIMENTALISM.

THOUGH it was chiefly as a wonder-worker that the fame of Roger Bacon spread and lingered in the minds of men, it is as a *thinker* that we feel most concern for him—as a helpful searcher out of the right way of attaining truth, and so enabling us—

"To fertilize our earthly root,
And make our branches lift a golden fruit
Into the bloom of heaven."

To prove that he was such, we shall endeavour to lay before our readers a succinct *resumé* of his *Opus Majus*. This will show better, we opine, than aught else, "what manner of man he was." This work—which, after remaining in manuscript in the Oxford library for nearly five centuries, was published in London so recently as 1733, under the editorial care of Dr. Samuel Jebb, a non-juring physician—is written in the form of a letter to the pope—Clement IV.—and consists of a series of discourses on the different topics to which the friar had directed his attention, and consequently repeats in many parts the same facts, reasonings, and expressions as we find in other works of his; thus proving that it is the most complete, authoritative, and authentic account of his philosophical studies, inventions, and system we can rely upon in seeking to cast into a few paragraphs such an abridgment of his ideas as may serve to make his position as an epoch man clear and indubitable, and, by so doing, fortify our own estimate by the best witness in the case—*himself*. In doing so, we shall follow, as nearly as we can, the course of thought and the method of treatment pursued in the work.

The *Opus Majus* begins with a few remarks upon the need of advancement in knowledge, the right of human reason to exert a strict regulating power over all thoughts submitted to it for belief, or as the motives to activity. Perfection is rare; to none has the capacity of knowing the true without admixture of error been given; it is the extreme of folly, therefore, to believe on the witnessing of one only; still more is it foolishness thrice-essenced to accept as verities the judgments of the passionate, ignorant, and hasty mob. *Commonness* of acceptance is no infallible sign of any opinion being true and right; neither is

antiquity. Science is the pyramid the ages build. The early thinkers have given currency to grave errors, which it is the duty of their after-comers to revise and correct. No thought should be banished beyond the control of reason, or set itself apart as superior and unique. Though the fathers of the church withdrew some subjects from investigation, they were incompetent, so far as jurisdiction went, to do any such thing rightly. They were men. Ill-will and false knowledge, as well as false reasoning, betrayed or deceived them. Science and religion are allies; units of one whole—wisdom. Both should be studied; one ought not to overmaster the other, neither ought one to succumb or enslave itself. Authority and reason are shown to coincide in the *possibility* of orthodoxified knowledge—the co-existence in one soul of “the true faith of a Christian” with the scientific acquirements of a sage.

These theoretical views being propounded and enforced, the details next receive his attention. The grammatical and mathematical sciences, as they were then understood, being those in which the chief deficiencies of his age were manifested, receive his special attention. The sacred books being written in Hebrew and Greek, their expounders require an extensive and accurate acquaintance with the genius, the vocables, and the phraseology of these languages; Latin, being the official language of the church, demands careful culture and sedulous regard. Scholastic philosophy—based, as it is, on the writings of Aristotle and the commentators of Arabia—can only nourish itself by feeding on the true and genuine fruits of the indigenous trees which they have respectively planted. He was himself a good and skilful linguist, and his work, here, often unwittingly reveals the sad state of scholarship in the church of the thirteenth century; as, for instance, where he, gravely, and in all seriousness, proposes that each bishop in consecrating a church should inscribe on its floor, as a proof of his learning, the letters of the Greek *alphabet*, or, at least, the three first letters, giving their value in notation at the same time. Bacon wrote a grammar of the Greek tongue, and his Latin style is easier, simpler, and more graphic than any other writer of his time. If we are not much mistaken in our opinion, Roger Bacon is, more than any other author, the man to whom ought to be traced the enrichment of the Saxon language by the introduction of Latin vocables. In his works, at least, most of our Latinisms appear in the significations which they retain in modern English. This can be asserted of no one more certainly than of the Oxonian friar, so far as we know; and if our judgment is right, it would prove that a mighty agency had been set in operation by Bacon in his remote age, which permeates human thought even now, and influences the world in all its tenderest interests. If to him we ascribe the initial influence by which Latino-Saxon passed into English, we

shall say little less than is his due—and yet how much is that! About a twentieth of the *Opus Majus* consists of the grammatical sections. In these grammatical books, too, ethics, logic, rhetoric, metaphysics, &c., receive notice, and sometimes discussion. Besides this, however, they receive admirable exemplification in his own writing. Of his style we have already spoken; of his reasoning we may remark, that it is almost always strictly and fairly syllogistic in the best sense; *i. e.*, in its formal exactitude of dependence of conclusions on premises. Of his opinions on “the Art of Reasoning,” the following is a fair specimen. There are two modes of investigation; *viz.*, argument and experiment. Argument closes and makes us close any doubtful matter, but does not assure—nor remove the doubt, so that the soul may rest in the beholding of the truth, unless it should get at that by the pathway of experience, since there are many who have arguments about knowable things, but because they have not experience, neglect those, and do not avoid the hurtful—not follow after the beneficial. If, indeed, any man who had never seen fire has proven by sufficient arguments what things fire burns, injures, and destroys, never, on account of this, can the mind of the hearer rest, nor would he avoid the fire before that he had laid his hand or some combustible article on the fire, in order that by experience he might prove what argument had taught; but experience being assumed, the mind is assured of the combustion, and rests in the shining of the truth which not argument satisfies, but experience. (*Opus Majus*, p. 446.)

These well-expressed opinions prove him to have been no mere quibbler or quillet-wizard, but a genuine and honest thinker—a despiser of mere authority, custom, prejudice, or art—a defender of the sovereignty of reason as the single judge of true and false, though not of *right* and *wrong*—a partisan of forethoughtful experience against the random mill-working of theoretic methods and artificial systems of logical thought. It is true that with all his might of mind, he did not remain exempt from errors in thought and practice. Who else has? Without these clearly entertained notions on reasoning, could he have been the father of experimentalism—as he was?

So far, then, we see that in his writings Bacon approves himself to be one—

“Not the utter fool of show—
Not absolutely formed to be the dupe
Of shallow plausibilities alone,”—

but wise and bold enough to take the foreseen perilous path of giving himself up to painful study and the patient search for lore—hidden in nature, though unfound in books.

In his remarks on mathematics, however, Bacon is greater and grander, more persistently original and brave, than anywhere.

This was the department in which there was the greatest danger, and this is the subject on which he displays the utmost daring. Here he gives full vent to his love of realism, and exhibits the fullest independence of thought. The utility and grandeur of mathematical science are proven by the fact that it is the postulate and prime principle of almost every department of knowledge, without the acceptance of which fruitful study is impossible; that it renders the solution of many questions in natural philosophy easy; and that it is highly advantageous to the theologian when he wishes to employ the principles of chronology in the explanation of Holy Writ. Some of the queries which mathematics is said by Bacon to be useful in solving may here be mentioned, as indicating the grasp of thought he took, and the width of vision he displayed; *e.g.*, Is matter infinite? Do bodies touch each other at one or many points? What is the form of the earth? Are there one earth, sun, and moon, or many? What is the cause of heat? &c. Mathematical science is the basis of astrology, medicine, geography, optics, &c. A treatise on perspective and on the multiplication of figures or appearances give indication of his acquaintance with spectacles, the principles of the microscope and the telescope, &c. In other portions of his work we find specific illustrations of the vast range of his investigations, the indefatigable persistency of his mind, and his far-stretching knowledge of the science, art, and literature of his era; but in the closing book of his *Opus Majus* he rises to the dignity of a true philosopher, and discourses with fluent ease and accurate logic upon the conditions of sciences, the principles of scientific investigation, and of the correlation of reasoning and experiment. The domain of theoretic thought and practical induction he clearly bounded off from each other. He added example to precept, and exercised, in presence of his cotemporaries, the methods he propounded. He discerned with true philosophic prescience the dim splendour of a future for which humanity was scarcely prepared, and with unswerving and unfaltering step walked on himself, and called upon his fellows to follow the method which lay before him in the unchronicled history of human aspiration, as full of success, glory, and good. In an age of mental torpor, he, in the might and energy of will, struggled to escape the endless multiplicity of mazes into which scholasticism had enticed all human inquiry, and attempted to look beyond the prescribed circles of enbhedged thought in which the soul was prisoned. In the midst of men unlearned and heedless of learning, he burned as a lamp, lustrous in a fog, and cast upon the dark surroundings of his age a light unpleasing, because revealing the oilless vessels of the foolish, who bore no light, and exclaimed that light was needless, if not absolutely injurious. Custom, authority, prejudice, and envy rained their heaviest upon his head, and persecution shot her

venomed fang into his soul. Yet did he stand dauntless and unfearing in the grasp of captivity, before the judgment-seat of the earthly vicegerent of Omnipotence, and plead his cause and that of science and truth in opposition to the cavils of slander and the haughty virulence of bigotry. For a time the upstored thunderbolts of prejudice were unlaunched, but they were only all the more effectively arranged in the quiver of the Franciscan monks, for being used when the hour and the opportunity came, that vindictive craft and cunning meanness might again freely wield the instruments for defending "things as they are." What better,

"After tempestuous hours, than deep repose?"

What more certain to succeed a calm than storm and danger?

So it was with Bacon. Gregory X. had too much in hand in the correction of discipline, the patching up of an alliance with the Greek church, the convoking and management of the Council of Lyons, the attempt to stir a new crusade, and in the settlement of the mode of electing popes, to be, in his brief rule, able to note and control the innovations of the scientific Franciscan. Pope Innocent V. had scarcely time to feel the tiara on his brow; still less had Adrian V.; and John, his successor, was little favoured by fate or fortune either. One year saw all these men chosen, crowned, and dead, as if some strange disease had lurked within the emblematic circlet that placed all things—save death—under the government of the inheritors of Peter. These successive brief glimpses of authority—scarcely exerted before laid down—weakened the papacy, and enabled the generals of the several orders to wax strong. Hence, in 1278, Jerome of Ascoli in the Marches, a bigoted and austere theologian, being vicar-general of the Franciscans and papal legate to the court of France, the members of the order deemed it a well-fitting time to attempt "to whip the offending Adam out" of their misguided brother. Informations having been duly lodged, a council of the brethren of St. Francis was called at Paris. To this Bacon was cited. He appeared. There seem to have been two accusations; or rather, an alternative indictment appears to have been prepared—1st. Innovation in thought, form, doctrine, and spirit; 2nd. The theoretical maintenance of astrological opinions and the practice of magic and incantations. Jerome sat at the head of the council board. Bacon, now sixty-four years old, bent with much study, yet resolute and untired in spirit, pleaded at the lower end. Those writings which he had issued in despite of the vow of obedience to his official superiors in the order—though at the request of a pope—were condemned; he was declared to be not only heterodox, but contumacious, and was sentenced to close incarceration. A confirmation of the proceedings of the Council of Paris was speedily

gained—for now the order could overawe its lord—from Pope Martin III., and Bacon's doom was sealed.

That the real object of the trial was to restrain and silence Bacon, not to give fair and free judgment upon the evidence adduced, we infer from the significant fact that the whole adjudication was completed without the then usual opportunity of retraction and repentance being given to the accused, a proceeding never omitted by the clement church, unless when acting on a foregone conclusion for the attainment of a predetermined end, which an offer of pardon on such conditions might disappoint or futilize. It had been decided upon that Bacon's free speech, free thought, and advocacy of the rights of reason and the legitimacy of experiment as a proof of truth or falsehood, made him dangerous; and with a show, without the reality, of a trial, they endeavoured, by the old and time-honoured expedient of imprisonment, to convince him of the policy of conformity. Bacon believed that he had been unjustly used; he exhausted every possible means of gaining his freedom; but the jealousy and galled pride of his order was too active and powerful; all his efforts were unavailing. Nicholas III. required, as Dante makes him confess, "to enrich his whelps;" to simonize and nepotize, and must not interfere with the enjoyments and wishes of those who wrapped him with "the mighty mantle," or waste his labour upon nicely-balanced questions about the good of the church and the personal inconvenience to *another*, occasioned by imprisonment for the good cause of its internal peace, security, and endurance. Martin IV. was too far sunk in the sensual gratifications of gluttony, too much occupied by the Sicilian Vespers and their results, too hotly interested in hunting from his throne Michael of Byzantium, to disquiet his soul about the discomforts of prison diet, discipline, and restrictions on free thought, or to interest himself in the distribution or exaction of just and honest dealing between the members of an order bound by laws of their own choosing, and approved of by former popes. Honorius IV. had the nepotizing vices of Nicholas III., and the excitement of an attempt to get up a crusade against the Arragonese in Sicily, to occupy him during his three years' reign. On his death, the intrigues of Jerome of Ascoli, Bacon's judge, resulted in his being invested with the purple. Looking upon self-defence as honest and right, Bacon, who in his attempts to be heard amid the din of the sensuality, avarice, contention, and hierarchical pride of the former popes, found no ear inclined to listen, did not fail in energy or hope, even in these his latter hours, when seventy-four years had waved their changeful magic over his life, but appealed to Jerome, his former judge, for remission of the injustice of the sentence he had passed on him while Franciscan general at Paris. He, now Nicholas IV., felt not the beatings of a generous heart agitate his bosom. On the

contrary, his former hate was increased at the haughty insolence which could demand as a right that he, the Pope, should convict himself of partiality or incapacity, and claim as due from him what he had sued for from his predecessors. He added to the severities of his fate, increased the rigours of his confinement, and caused his bonds to be more scrupulously tightened round him. The spite of the monk overcame the clement spirit which should reign in the soul of the chief magistrate of God's earthly church.

Private solicitation and interest at length effected what the papal sense of justice could not yield to bestow. Some of the noblest peers of England, in this act truly noble, combined to beg for Bacon what he could not stoop to supplicate for on his own account. Politic adulation of the men in power and station led to a remission of the punishment of Bacon; he was released from his Parisian conventual prison-house, and permitted to return to Oxford, and, amid his old associates and associations, in the scene of his former labours, lecturings, and sufferings, to drag on an old age which anxiety, confinement, disappointment, and the super-human industry which work, theorized and experimented on even in the grasp of persecution, had rendered no smooth-laid passage to the inevitable resting-place of man. He had written for Pope Nicholas IV. a book upon the means of retarding the infirmities of old age, in the belief that such a proof of his sanity and the efficacy of his discoveries might work in his favour, and win him a little of that gratitude which might be felt by one on whom a much-desired benefit had been conferred. The Pope died in April, 1292, and Bacon survived him nearly two years. The natural strength of his mind seems to have been little abated, for during the latter years of his residence at Oxford he wrote a compendium of theology, an indirect protest against the alleged heterodoxy of his opinions, doings, and discoveries. On his death, which took place in 1294, the monks of his fraternity, fearing some magic-working revenge for their brotherly attentions to his spiritual state and concerns, placed his writings, &c., under the power of lock and key, that no opportunity might be given for any exertion of their powers of injury. For many years they lay undisturbed, save by the insects, who found them pleasant food; and the parchments on which the grand revelations of a God-sent mind were written suffered as much injury from their close confinement as did the writer from his personal trials.

That Bacon's fame was not evanescent, we have good proof in the numerous MS. copies of his works, or parts of them, which occupy places in the various university and national libraries at home and abroad, and from the careful way in which his correspondence with Pope Clement, and the holy Father's replies, are preserved in the Vatican library. The monks, to conceal the

true nature and character of his opinions, circulated numerous strange and marvellous tales among the people, which became embodied in legends, and gave him a notoriety among the commonalty resembling that of Michael Scott in Caledonia, Faust in Germany, and Albertus Magnus in France. Yet there was always a feeling "akin to love" prevalent in the popular mind, and hence when, in the days of Queen Elizabeth, "The Famous Historie of Fryer Bacon" was written, we find that, unlike other magicians, he is not represented as in league with, but as a constant foil to, the works of the prince of the powers of darkness, and at the close is allowed to repent, become an anchorite and a true divine; and in Greene's highly popular play of "Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay" he is represented as saying,—

"It repents me sore
That Bacon ever meddled with this art.

* * * * *

Sins have their selves; repentance can do much.
Think! Mercy sits where Justice holds her seat,
And from those wounds the bloody Jews did pierce,
Which by thy magic oft did bleed afresh,—
From thence, for thee, the dew of mercy drops,
To wash the wrath of high Jehovah's ire,
And make thee free as new-born babe from sin
Bungay, I'll spend the remnant of my life
In pure devotion, praying to my God
That He would save what Bacon vainly lost."

These things show that the kindly feeling of English hearts could not be turned even by the "sweet deceiving tongues" of "the monks of old" from doing such justice as they could to the memory of the deserving, and prove how incapable even ill-natured though "pious frauds" are to serve the ends of their originators when opposed to plain, sturdy honesty of thought and the instinct of true hearts, even when they are rude and unlettered, not much given to the sifting of evidence, or the logical determinations between true and false.

One or two observations regarding matters which did not seem capable of being wrought into our narrative without making it too digressional may now be offered to the reader, viz.:—

Bacon is the reputed discoverer of gunpowder, and inventor of the telescope, spectacles, &c. That he discovered a sort of detonating mixture resembling, if not really, gunpowder, is certain, for he describes not only its effects but its ingredients, though, after the manner of his time, he conceals the special point of his own discovery in an anagram which, strange to say, baffled ingenuity for some centuries. "This substance is composed," says he, "of *lurv mope can ubre*, of saltpetre, and of sulphur," i. e., *pulvere carbonum*, or powder of charcoal. It is

one of those strange things which he mentions that "strike terror on the sight, so that the flashings of the clouds are beyond comparison less disturbing," which give us an "imitation of thunder and lightning," and constitutes "a fire which will burn to any distance." That he had *thought out* the whole theory of a telescope is also quite true, though whether he *constructed* one may be doubted; unless we accept as evidence the tradition of his "glass prospective," "wherein he could see anything that was done within fifty miles about him," coupled with his assertion that "we can so shape transparent substances, . . . that objects may be seen far off or near, and thus, from an incredible distance, we may read the smallest letters, and number the grains of dust and sand." Leonard Digges, writing of his father in 1590, says, "He was able by perspective glasses . . . to discover every particularitie of the country round about, where-soever the sunne's beames might pearse, . . . which partly grew by the aid he had of one old-written book of the same Bacon's *experiments*." Though Bossuet says the invention of spectacles belongs to the close of the thirteenth century, and that we are indebted for them to a Jacobin friar, and Smith in his "Optics" asserts that incontestable proofs exist that the first glasses of this kind were constructed by Alexander de Spina, a Jacobin friar, who died in Pisa in 1313, we know that Bacon, in his *Opus Majus*, 1267, describes and explains them, remarking; as if they were already in use, "hence this instrument is useful to old persons and those who have weak eyes.

With geography and chronology he was so conversant, that he gives a lengthy and learned account of the inhabited world, the chief portions of which are drawn from the writings of preceding and contemporary travellers, including Marco Polo; and he suggests to Clement, his patron, that very reform in the Calendar which Pope Gregory XIII., 300 years after, did himself honour by adopting.

His acquaintance with optics enabled him to explain, in some degree approximating to the canons of modern science, the phenomena of the rainbow, while his mechanical knowledge was such, that Dr. Friend calls him "the miracle of his age, and possessed, perhaps, of the greatest genius for mechanical science that has been known since the days of Archimedes."

All these facts prove that Bacon was a man freed from the enthralling despotism of traditionalism in thinking, one who, though he stood in the shadow of superstitious reverence for and submissiveness to authority, yet looked beyond the shadow, and caught glimpses, at least, of truths and facts which lay beyond the borderland of then permitted thought or speech: a man who would not, like a bruised snail, shrink himself to endure and suffer, and remain a memorial of the blasting weight of the oppressor's foot, or lower his life's aims and efforts by

prescription; or for the pleasure of being patted, like a pet of the kennel, now and then, fawn, and cringe, and crouch, and flatter, only to gain a more distinct application of the whip when he should fail in any point implied in the monkish lesson in subserviency. He had a praiseworthy stubborn uprightness, a rightful confidence in his own powers of thought and action, a knowing acquaintance with the fallacies of the soul as well as the sophistries of his sect, and a firm-set faith in the truth of God, when read aright either in word or work. How sad to think that such a one as he should feel necessitated to complain that he was held back from pursuing his researches into nature by "the rumours of the vulgar"! How refreshing it is to find him, even when beset by his enemies, asserting, regarding one of his new discoveries, that it is "of more satisfaction to a discreet mind than a king's crown." There is a depth of feeling in the phrase as uttered by him, which gives it emphasis. These are the words of a simple, single-minded, benevolent, philosophically inclined man, whose heart was grieved that aught else should be preferred to "divine philosophy." Like an early ripe fruit in a surly spring, he was used frostily, and the flavour of his life was somewhat lost; enough, however, remains to make us feel that he was one of Time's favourite children—a foreshadower of the future. He did not give actual being to experimental philosophy, but he did, more than any other man of his own or any other single age, compared with his surroundings, establish the principle that experimentalism is the test of theory, and the touchstone of thought, the handmaiden of truth, and the chief foe to self-deception in investigation. He is the earliest consistent theoretical and practical inquirer into the realities of natural phenomena; the noblest advocate in his own age of the right of private judgment on matters of science, of the need of reform in study, teaching, and thinking. The sorrows he bore for his beloved's sake—Truth—endear him to our heart, and warm up our sympathies to the highest. We know not if we have so thought and expressed ourselves as to make this plain to others, as it seems to be to us.

"It must oft fall out,

That he whose labour perfects any work,
Shall rise from it with eye so worn, that he,
Least of all men, can measure the extent
Of what he has accomplished."

We sincerely hope that this, at least, has been made palpable—that even amid the greatest difficulties of the saddest times in the world's history the truly gifted man can work the work given him to do, and leave his memory green in the hearts of the people, in spite of ignorance, misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and malice, and that truth is stronger than persecution, neglect, contumely, and death.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE resurrection of the body is a doctrine so grand and mysterious, that the unassisted mind of man fails to grasp the mighty thought. While a consideration of the nature of the mind led to an almost universal belief among the ancient philosophers that it would live for ever, a consideration of the structure of the body as a material combination led as certainly to the conclusion that this combination would be dissolved; and though men at different times have doubted almost every truth in connection with themselves and the universe, yet that their own bodies would at one time or other cease to exist is a fact which has never been really doubted. But the supposition that the body, after having died and returned to dust, would ever be raised and re-animated appears never to have been seriously advocated, and certainly was never generally believed. Though it is probable that certain individuals may have had some vague ideas about a resurrection, yet without a direct revelation from God, man could not arrive at any certain knowledge on the subject. So incomprehensible, indeed, did this doctrine appear to heathen minds, that when it was first preached by the "Apostle of the Gentiles" to the Athenian philosophers, their cry was, "What will this babblers say?" declaring him to be "a setter forth of *strange* gods, because he preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection." So great, moreover, was the tendency to doubt on this point, that it was denied by many of the early Christians; and the apostle Paul, in writing to a Grecian church, found it necessary to refute, at considerable length, the assertions of some among them who denied the resurrection. These facts show that man would never have arrived at any firm belief in this doctrine, had it not been revealed to him in the clearest and most direct manner. Hence, from the nature of the subject, as well as from the form of the question, we must in our inquiries confine ourselves exclusively to the Bible.

Though the immortality of the soul is a truth of such funda-

mental importance, it is to be observed that it is nowhere systematically demonstrated in the Scriptures. The reason of this is very obvious; for it is a truth so inseparably connected with the very existence of religion, that it would be impossible to have a system of religion which did not build upon this as one of its fundamental truths. Now, though the resurrection of the body does not follow as a consequence of the immortality of the soul, yet there is really an intimate connection between them. Hence, to us, there appears no single doctrine more fully or earnestly taught in Scripture than the one under consideration.

In order, therefore, to answer the question before us, we have only to inquire what is the most natural and proper interpretation to put on those parts of Scripture which relate to the subject. A thoughtful consideration of all that is revealed to us on this point must, we believe, lead to the conclusion that *there will be* "a resurrection in which some of the materials of the present body will form part of the future one." We believe the Scriptures teach that there will be a general resurrection; that the resurrection body will be essentially a *material* one; and that this material resurrection body will be *essentially the same* as the present body.

First, then, we believe it to be clearly taught in Scripture *that there will be a general resurrection.* That the Bible speaks of a resurrection in some sense of the term cannot be denied, but the question comes, in what sense we are to understand this term. If we take it in its *literal* meaning, it refers to the body, for the soul, not being subject to death, cannot be said *literally to rise again.* So that those who object to the doctrine of a resurrection of the body, can do so only by asserting that the expression has a *figurative* meaning, relating only to the soul, and by *spiritualizing* or explaining away certain passages of Scripture bearing on the subject. If, then, we can show that these passages are to be taken in their literal sense, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the resurrection spoken of in the Bible must be a resurrection of the body.

The certainty of a resurrection of the body may be inferred from the fact that *it has already taken place in particular instances.* Thus it is said, in connection with the death and resurrection of our Lord, that "the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many," Matt. xxvii. 52, 53. But this is not the only recorded instance of a literal resurrection. Let us select, for example, the resurrection of Lazarus; a thoughtful attention to the whole of the narrative will reveal two or three facts of the highest importance. We see, first, that Martha firmly believed in the resurrection of the body; for when Christ assured her

that her brother should rise again, she replied, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." Now, the context shows that she here referred to the *body* of her brother. And we see further, that Christ not only did not contradict this assertion, but that, had he intended to give his hearers the fullest confirmation of it, he could not have said or done anything more calculated to do so than what he really did say and do (see John xi.) ; so that supposing the resurrection of the body not to be a true doctrine, our Lord here gave his hearers the fullest possible confirmation of a gross error.

The certainty of a general resurrection may be inferred, secondly, from the resurrection of Christ himself. If we admit that the resurrection of Christ was real, and not merely apparent, then the inference of a *literal* resurrection from this fact is warranted by both Scripture and reason. It is warranted by *Scripture*, being an inference drawn by the apostles themselves. Thus it is said of Peter and John that the priests and the Sadducees (who denied the resurrection) were "grieved that they taught *through Jesus* the resurrection of the dead," Acts iv. 2. And the apostle Paul repeatedly makes use of this argument to prove the resurrection of the body. He says, "Knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus *shall raise up us also by Jesus*, and shall present us with you," 2 Cor. iv. 14. Again, "That Christ should suffer, and that he should be *the first that should rise from the dead*," Acts xxvii. 23. Now if there were no resurrection, how could Christ be "the first that should rise from the dead"? Again he says plainly, "If there be no resurrection from the dead, then is Christ not risen," 1 Cor. xv. 13. But Christ evidently had risen, and *therefore there must be a general resurrection of the dead*. And in the same chapter he declares that "since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. If the apostle here refers to the body, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that every human body will be raised by virtue of Christ's resurrection. If he does not refer to the body, then these assertions are positively incorrect; for although all souls do in a sense die in Adam, yet all souls are not made alive in Christ. But the apostle asserts that all shall be made alive in Christ, and therefore he can refer only to the body. Again, *reason* warrants our inferring a general resurrection from that of Christ. For the object of Christ's death and resurrection was to redeem man from the curse and punishment of sin; but that curse extended to the body of man as well as to his soul; hence, if Christ had not redeemed the body as well as the soul, he would not have effected a complete redemption.

Again, the resurrection of the body is proved, thirdly, by the plainest declarations of Scripture. It was foretold by the pro-

phets of the Old Testament in the clearest possible manner. Thus it is spoken of by Job (chap. xix. 25—27), by Isaiah (chap. xxvi. 19), by Daniel (chap. xii. 2), and by Hosea (chap. xiii. 14). In the New Testament the apostle Paul declares, "And God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by his own power," 1 Cor. vi. 14. "For the trumpet shall sound, and *the dead shall be raised*," 1 Cor. xv. 52. "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad," 2 Cor. v. 10. Our Lord himself declares that "the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation," John v. 28. Paul, in writing to Timothy, says, "I charge thee by Jesus, who shall judge the quick and the dead." And in the vision of the last judgment, seen by John, "I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God: and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to their works," Rev. xx. 12, 13. Now, it is difficult to see to what these predictions refer, if they do not refer to a literal resurrection of the body. It is for those who deny the resurrection to show how these passages can be reconciled with that denial. If we are to understand them in their literal and most obvious sense, it is impossible to deny that they teach in the most unmistakeable manner that there will be a general resurrection of the dead.

Secondly, we believe the Scriptures teach that the resurrection body will be essentially a *material* one. This will require but little effort to prove, for if we have succeeded in establishing the preceding position—that there will be a resurrection of the body—then it follows, as a *necessary consequence*, that this body must be a material one. If the resurrection body were not a material one, but a mere ethereal phantom, having the *form* and *appearance*, but not the *substance*, of the present body, it would be ridiculous to call this a resurrection from the dead, for this spiritual phantom would be something which had never existed before, and, therefore, could not, in any sense, be said to have *risen again*. If, then, it be admitted that there will be a *resurrection of the dead*, it is impossible consistently to deny that the resurrection body will be a material one. This idea of a "spiritual" body evidently possessed the minds of our Lord's disciples, even after they were in some measure convinced that he had risen; for we read that at his appearance "they were

terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit." Now, mark how completely our Lord destroys this notion, both by words and actions. "Behold," he says, "my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; *for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have*;" and at his own request, "they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honeycomb. And he took it, and did eat before them," Luke xxiv. 36—43. And this was done evidently for the purpose of more fully convincing them that the appearance before them was a *material body*.

Thirdly, we believe we have scriptural proof that the resurrection body will be *essentially the same* as the present body. If we admit that there will be a resurrection of a material body, then the most *natural* supposition is, that this body will be essentially the same as the present one; for that the mind of man will be united at the resurrection to an entirely different body is a supposition which has not the slightest foundation in Scripture. If the future body were not the same as the present, then the word resurrection could not be applied to either of them; for it would be absurd to apply it to a body which had never existed before, and no less absurd to apply it to one which became extinct at death. But the assertion that the future body will be one which has *risen from the dead* is irreconcilable with the supposition that the two bodies will not be identical.* If the two bodies were different from each other, then the present body must evidently become extinct at death; but the Bible does not sanction this idea, but constantly speaks of the dead as they that "sleep," an expression which clearly intimates that the grave is but a temporary resting-place, from which the material of the present body is in the future to be raised. And again, the assertions that "the dead men shall live," that "the dead shall be raised," and that "all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth," and similar predictions, clearly prove that the present body will not at death become extinct.

To conclude, although reason, apart from revelation, does not lead to accurate conclusions on this subject, yet God, having expressly revealed his intention of redeeming man from the curse of sin, reason leads at once to the conclusion that the body

* It must, however, be distinctly understood, that in asserting the identity of the two bodies, we are not contending for an identity in the *properties*, but only in the *substance* of the two. It is obvious that the properties of the present body must be changed, in order to fit it for "an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and which fadeth not away;" but no one will deny that this change can be effected without an entire change in the material of the present body. And, in fact, the assertion of Scripture, *that the present body shall be "changed,"* is of itself sufficient proof that the future body will be substantially the same as the present.

will participate in the benefits of that redemption as well as the soul. When we consider the beautiful sympathy existing between the soul and the body, and the complete fitness of the body to be the dwelling-place of the soul; and when we see how fearfully the body has become debased and corrupted by sin, it seems almost impossible to believe that God would redeem the soul from the effects of sin and leave the body to perish. The Scriptures declare plainly that this is not the case. What, for example, does Job mean by saying, "In my flesh shall I see God," if he did not expect a redemption of his body? And God himself declares, "I will ransom them from the power of the grave." Now the soul of man never was subject to the power of the grave, consequently it must be the *body* the redemption of which is here spoken of. And again, Paul plainly asserts that as Christians we are waiting for the "redemption of our body." Now the redemption of the present body obviously necessitates a resurrection in which the future body shall be identical in substance with the present. If, then, we admit that it is the purpose of God to redeem the body no less than the soul, we cannot avoid the conclusion that there will be a resurrection in which some of the materials of the present body will form part of the future one.

NEMO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"It is nowhere asserted in the New Testament that we shall rise again with our bodies."—*Dr. Burton, Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford.*

"In the Apostles' Creed the expression is 'resurrection of the body;' in the Nicene or Constantinopolitan Creed, it is 'resurrection of the dead,' which is more scriptural. The 'resurrection of the body' was not inserted in the Apostles' Creed till some years after the composition of the Nicene Creed. In the Creed of Aquileia, and some others, it is still worse, 'the resurrection of the flesh,' which is directly contrary to the authority, and even the express words of the apostle, 'Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.'"—*Bishop Newton.*

"The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is unscriptural and unphilosophical."—*Sir Humphrey Davy.*

HAVING directed our attention to this question at a somewhat early age, and having then arrived at a conclusion which a few advancing years have strengthened, it is with much pleasure that we recur to the subject, in the hope of helping to root out some of the errors by which it is surrounded.

We sincerely believe that freedom of thought and expression is at once truth's best aid, and a means, when properly and dispassionately conducted, of raising the bulwarks of reason and judgment round childhood's reverence for the Bible.

First, then, we would record our conviction that a dogma, which denies that there *is* another life, and only affirms that there *will be* one at some indefinitely distant period, is an out-birth of the Sadduceeism which denied it altogether. With

every respect for the many good and great men who have held the reviviscence of the material body, we must be permitted to say that this singular notion owes its existence to another error which regards the soul as a formless evaporable essence, and the body as the sole organ of life. All things, including creeds, are however doubtless of divine permission, and it is consolatory to reflect, that unless this view of an interrupted re-existence had obtained, belief in the soul's immortality would never have so widely prevailed; for the true doctrine that death offers no interruption to human life, but only dissolves its immediate connection with bodily life, would not have been received in the world which believed that the two were identical. But we plunge without parley *in medias res*. There are two ways on which the question might be argued, (1) from reason, (2) from revelation. It might be urged that what is absolutely irreconcilable with reason, not merely above or beyond, but contrary to its perceptions, must be equally opposed to revelation, there being in strict necessity no other divinely authorized means by which we may judge what revelation is, and what it teaches; for even supposing any other interpreter to be employed, it is only an antecedent act of reason which delegates the authority. Thus, when a churchman of any sect yields up his faith to the guidance of an eminent fellow-sinner, living or dead, it is still reason, however crude and inconsiderate the act, that suggests and sanctions his doing so, and his risk of error is of course proportionately great, as he trusts once for all to a single act of reason, instead of "proving *all things*" as occasion may require. "Theology," says a living writer, "what is it but the science of things divine? What science can be attained unto without the help of natural discourse and reason? May we cause our faith without reason to appear reasonable in the eyes of men?" Reason with many good people is a sworn antagonist to revelation, instead of its dear ally; nor is this mistaken view of its nature altogether inexcusable, for the character of its lucubrations will entirely depend on the consort with which it is united,—the nourishment with which it is fed. When clinging with gross *centipedal* tenacity to the evidence of the senses for its sole guidance it begets rationalism, properly called sensationalism; but borne aloft on the wings, or spiritually perceptive powers, of imagination* reason is the handmaid of revelation, and doubtless supplies the very ether in which the light of heaven vibrates to our sense. With this apology for allowing the voice of reason to be heard, let us ask of what christian use or advantage is the dogma of a corporeal reviviscence? The Bible describes the re-

* The imagination casts thoughts in our way, and forces the understanding to reflect upon them.—*Duppa*.

appearance "of our brethren the prophets," who come to the faithful with all the attributes of humanity,—a humanity so glorified as to invite worship, yet, forsooth, the cast-off dust is wanted to complete it, which only confined it in the pupa state! What christian "good tidings" are there in the repugnant proposition that the body, which is being continually put off during the whole of life, is to be put on after death, when christian revelation announces that it is not essential to our existence? The resurrection of the body is clearly begotten of the anti-scriptural notion that life is impossible without it, and as the unnatural offspring of an adulterous union, fathered on Christianity by an unfaithful church, and accepted as legitimate by believers in simplicity, let it be restored to its parent materialism. But we forbear to push the argument from reason, as we presume it will be more satisfactory to the reader to appeal at once to Scripture.

Inasmuch as "life and immortality were brought to light by the gospel," it is generally admitted by commentators that little direct evidence of the nature of the resurrection can be drawn from the Old Testament. Allusions to the subject will probably be obscure and inexhaustive in proportion to the obscurity which existed in the minds of the Jewish writers, who were the mediums and mouth-pieces of divine inspiration, but not necessarily conscious of its full import. As, however, the English version of Job xix. 25, 26, is apparently affirmative of the question at issue, we may be expected to allude to it on the present occasion. It will, however, be sufficient to observe that almost every word which has a positive reference to the supposed doctrine, is printed in italics, to intimate that it does not exist in the original; while the words, "yet in my flesh shall I see God" is fully explained by the subsequent acknowledgment (xlii. 5) "Now mine eye seeth thee," and afterwards, "The Lord blessed the latter end of Job." Thus, it is evident that the patriarch of Uz is merely expressing confidence in his ultimate restoration to prosperity; while to interpret the passage as an allusion to the resurrection of the body at the end of the world is wholly inconsistent with the declaration he elsewhere makes (vii. 9), "As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave *shall come up no more.*"

Turn we to the eloquent discourse of St. Paul (1 Cor. xv.), written, as the reader may observe, to refute the denial of another life, but which has been supposed to inculcate the resurrection of the flesh, or material body,—terms which do not occur in the chapter, nor indeed in Scripture, because they are utterly repugnant to its teachings. First, to inquire into the actual meaning of the words, resurrection of the dead (ver. 12), on which the question turns. That by "the dead" is not meant inclusively the bodies of the dead is evident from the context,

but especially from ver. 35, where the term "body" first occurs and is placed in close juxtaposition to "the dead." "How are the dead raised, and with what body do they come?" Whence it appears that "the dead" mean the dead to sense, or the departed, and that the apostle is hypothesating the question, In what body do the departed live? The resurrection of the dead means, therefore, the resurrection of the departed, as will further appear in the sequel. Now, this "resurrection," or anastasis, which the Greek reader is aware means simply reviviscence, or re-existence, if indeed it includes the meaning of "again,"—is it present or only future? Is there actually any resurrection, or re-existence for the dead, or is there only to be one at some future time? We answer with St. Paul, there is a resurrection, for the aim and object of the apostle is to prove nothing else. The resurrection, or the other life, is indeed future to the living, but there is not a shadow of ground for supposing it future to the dead. We cannot quote all the passages which prove this position; suffice it to say, that the present tense is invariably used throughout the chapter, except in one or two places, where the living are referred to, showing that it is the present existence of the dead which is preached, and *not* the future resuscitation of their bodies thousands of years after their consignment to the grave. Thus, in answer to the query, "How ARE the dead raised, and with what body do they come?" the apostle, in allusion to seed sown, affirms that there are different kinds of flesh and different kinds of bodies, and, finally, that "there is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." We submit that if he had been writing to refute the notion of a corporeal resuscitation—which he was not, for he had doubtless never heard of it—he could hardly have expressed himself more clearly; for he not only denies that the resurrection body will be the same as the body that is buried, but he asserts that there is a spiritual just as much as there is a natural body. How do such expressions consist with the notion that the resurrection or spiritual body is formed out of the natural body, and not till many ages after the death of the natural body? for he certainly declares that both exist, the one as the organ of our consciousness here, the other as the organ of life hereafter. It cannot be too often repeated, that the "resurrection of the body" denies by implication the life after death, although it meagrely affirms a future life; for the dead are supposed to be awaiting a re-union with their bodies before they "rise" into life. But what is this but asserting that it is the body alone which lives, which gives life to the soul, and that the soul is *not* immortal, but merely resuscitable?

But, returning to ver. 12, we read of the resurrection of Christ, and in a Westminster Abbey sermon, preached on Easter Sunday last, which may be taken as a standard of orthodoxy and a

sample of the nourishment offered for our acceptance, the Bishop of Salisbury rests the evidence for the resurrection of the flesh on the great fact of our Lord's resurrection. Here, again, all reference to the body is purely arbitrativ and groundless, and only betrays the deeply-seated materialism that there is no life out of the body. For the apostle does not say, Christ rose with his whole body, therefore the dead will be raised with their bodies; but he says, Christ rose, therefore the dead *are* raised. The mode of our Lord's resurrection is not even hinted at; the fact of His immortality is only affirmed as proof of the immortality of the departed. He may, indeed, have risen with his whole body complete, but it by no means follows that the departed rise in the same manner; on the contrary, He himself declares that they "have *not* flesh and bones as ye see me have." We may, however, observe that the apostle's words (ver. 23), "Every man in his own order," or "each (*i. e.*, Christ and man) in his own rank," as they may be more accurately rendered, are sufficient to suggest a difference between the manner of our resurrection and that of Christ's; to say nothing of the difference of detail to be collected from the Evangelists. Yet, remark, that the manner of His resurrection is entirely foreign to the apostolical argument,—Christ rose, therefore the dead "rise." Remark, also, that if a future resurrection of the dead were meant, instead of an actual one, the verb is not only in the wrong tense, but allusion to the dead is pleonastic and unnecessary, and the apostle might simply have said, Christ rose, therefore man will rise.

We now come to the metaphor of the grain. Here it would seem unnecessary to do more than quote the words (ver. 36, 37), "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it *die*; and that which thou sowest, thou sowest *not* that body that shall be," words which are carefully excluded from the sermon alluded to, as doubtless tending to embarrass the argument for the resurrection of the body that shall not be.* But an attempt may be made to evade the difficulty by starting the hypothesis of an indestructible germ, from which the "future" body is to be formed. But this heresy within a heresy is inconsistent with the subsequent declaration (ver. 50), that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." It not only cannot enter the kingdom of God, but it cannot inherit it any future time by virtue of an incorruptible germ. It is elsewhere asserted (2 Cor. v.), that the resurrection body is "from heaven," not from the grave, and that to be present with the Lord is to be absent from the natural body.

* The text was confined to ver. 35: "How are the dead raised," &c. We cannot but regret that the apostle should be interrupted to make way for the episcopal reply, instead of being allowed to answer his own question.

Let it be noted, also, that the object of the apostle is to meet the denial of an anastasis, or re-existence after death, and it is unfair to expect from him a refutation either of objections which did not exist when he wrote, or of all the quaint and far-fetched interpretations which may have been since put upon his writings. Draw the meaning from his words by as much criticism as you like, but do not put meanings into them for which there is no warranty.

We proceed to the concluding paragraph of the chapter (ver. 51—58), "We shall not all sleep: we shall all be changed in a moment," &c. Here, again, but for the preconceived notion of a general resurrection of our bodies, it would be seen that St. Paul is not speaking of a general resurrection at all, but only of the resurrection of the just; as, indeed, some of our most distinguished commentators have remarked. For what can be said of the exclamation, "O death! where is thy sting?" and how can "death be swallowed up in victory," if there be any allusion to the wicked? The sting of death is defined to be sin, and sin will be evident enough at the resurrection of the wicked, yet the apostle "gives thanks to God" for its being put off. Therefore, "this corruptible," which is to put on "incorruption," does not refer to the body, but to the carnal mind, which is frequently called "corrupt." Compare 1 Tim. vi. 5; Ephes. iv. 22, and many other places. The terms, "mortal body," "body of this death," and "body of sin," are also used synonymously; and in Rom. viii. "the flesh" and "the body" are terms continually used in the same metaphorical sense. Can it then be maintained that, in the chapter before us, St. Paul is only speaking of what is put into the grave? And need we allude to those passages about "quickenings our mortal bodies," as if they involved any allusion to a future recombination of their material particles into the same human frame?

But if the chapter offers no support for the dogma at issue, what becomes of the extravagant absurdity advocated and thus expressed in the sermon: "Adam and the babe who was buried yesterday *will start into life* at the same moment"? Our Saviour has said, "He is not a God of (the) dead, but of (the) living,"—the article is not in the original, and weakens the force of it,—and he told the thief on the cross, "*To-day* shalt thou be with me in Paradise;" yet a modern bishop, in a christian pulpit, affirms that the dead are still waiting to be made alive! The Sadducees denied another life, or any life for the dead; our Lord tells them the dead do rise, or that man rises after death. Yet the Church is not only unable to say when the dead rise, but actually declares they are not living! And this is the food she throws open the fretted aisles of her most venerable pile to offer to the halt, the maimed, and the blind. The dead, forsooth, are not gone before us, after all; they are waiting for us to go with

them. Reader, if you search the Scriptures and find that these things are not so, if you also discover that the Lord's ascension was never seen by the Church of the day,* and that his second coming was to be "in like manner," wonder not that "the leaders of the people do cause them to err," as the prophet Isaiah says, for the time of the prophecy is at hand: "Behold, I make all things new." Away, then, with the re-combination of particles that hourly dissolve; strip off from your faith in immortality its tattered garment of Sadducean materialism; unite the intuitions of your heart with the professions of your understanding; reconcile the dictates of reason with the revelations of God's holy Word; and learn to acknowledge, what you unconsciously believe and feel, that "there is a spiritual body," in which man rises again immediately after death, for "He is not a God of dead persons, but of living persons—the countless LIVING STILL.

Gentle reader, one word more. If you have "lost" a friend, an affectionate parent, whom in youth or ripening manhood once you loved, and who perhaps now loves you more dearly than the material particles permitted, believe you not in your heart that she is *gone* to heaven, while believing that you believe that she is *to go* to heaven? Then listen to her very words, uttered in your spirit-ear, though I know you are dull of hearing, for thus she speaks: "I know nothing of creeds and the dictates of men. I only know that whereas I was blind I now see, and that I was dead and am now alive. I know that I live in the presence of God and his angels, as well as you know that you live among men in your world. So that I need not to reason about it, for the case is just as plain to my perceptions as it is to yours. The spirit leaves its earthly habitation, and it rises in a spiritual tenement instantaneously on quitting the natural one, which floats on the breath of life that animates creation but to be recomposed into some other structure. It cannot be transported into a spiritual sphere, for between nature and spirit there is a great gulf fixed, so that one cannot pass over to the other. Such a return to materiality is monstrous and revolting to spirit-perception." † W. W. F.

* After his resurrection our Lord was seen only by his disciples. It appears from the record of the event that the scene of the ascension was in the spiritual world, for the disciples were "*in the spirit*" at the time (*i. e.*, "*their eyes were opened*" into the spiritual world), or they could not have seen the "two men in white apparel." Hence the personal coming at the last judgment must also take place in the spiritual world.

† "An Angel's Message."

HEAVEN-BORN, the soul a heavenward course must hold.—
M. Angelo.

THE rough-shod foot treads most firmly on slippery ground.
—*Ch. Brontë.*

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

THACKERAY.—ARTICLE II.

THE state of literature in England is very different now from what it was some hundred years ago; the detestable courting by literary men of the favour of some great person as patron is now unknown; except when the innate baseness of some aspirant to literary honours cannot be restrained by any considerations of decency. Hence has gradually arisen the present custom of appealing to the public as judges in matters of taste as well as in mere money-making and commercial concerns. Thus a new class of men has sprung up; and writers can now dare to tell "great folks," as well as the poor, of their failings. Foremost among the brotherhood of the pen are Dickens and Thackeray. No country is often blest with two such writers at the same time; but when any land is, it behoves her children to see that such are not neglected; and in this respect, with regard to one of the two at least, we certainly think England cannot be blamed. In both Dickens and Thackeray there are some points of resemblance; they are both men of the people, and men, too, who are not above owning that they feel for those who are below them in the social scale, but although alike, yet how different! We strongly admire both; we have every respect for Dickens; we are thorough appreciators of his humour, eloquence, and prose-poetry; but much as we love his books, we are compelled by truth to affirm that we like Thackeray's much better. Our reasons we will at once adduce.

1. *As to style.* Thackeray's style is *PURER* than Dickens'. Purity of style is a point which is just now perhaps receiving more attention than it has hitherto done; for many years showy, gaudy, flimsy writing was the fashion; and if at the present time a neater and more thoroughly classical taste is beginning to be diffused, we owe its advent to Whately, Macaulay, and Thackeray.

Take up any later work of Dickens', then one of Thackeray's; open them; compare them. In the one a striving after effect is visible in almost every page; in the other, the style is easy, pure, natural, and unaffected. The former loves startling, paradoxical sentences; the latter never uses them. The former is noted for his descriptions of "persons, places, and things:"—well, turn to one. We have plenty of flowing language; plenty of laboured minuteness; but we venture to assert, that with all Dickens'

Dutch-picture-like painting no one can honestly say that, after reading his description, he carries away with him a thoroughly vivid conception. Now turn to Thackeray's description of a single day in the Temple:—

"If we could but get the history of a single day as it passed in any one of those four-storied houses in the dingy court where our friends Pen and Warrington dwelt, some Temple Asmodeus might furnish us with a queer volume. There may be a great parliamentary counsel on the ground-floor, who drives off to Belgravia at dinner-time, when his clerk, too, becomes a gentleman, and goes away to entertain his friends, and to take his pleasure. But a short time since he was hungry and briefless in some garret of the inn; lived by stealthy literature; hoped, and waited, and sickened, and no clients came; exhausted his own means and his friends' kindness; had to remonstrate humbly with duns, and to implore the patience of poor creditors. Ruin seemed to be staring him in the face, when, behold! a turn of the wheel of fortune, and the lucky wretch in possession of one of those prodigious prizes which are sometimes drawn in the great lottery of the bar. Many a better lawyer than himself does not make a fifth part of the income of his clerk, who, a few months since, could scarcely get credit for blacking for his master's unpaid boots. On the first-floor, perhaps, you will have a venerable man whose name is famous, who has lived for half a century in the inn, whose brains are full of books, and whose shelves are stored with classical and legal lore. He has lived alone all these fifty years, alone and for himself, amassing learning, and compiling a fortune. He comes home now at night only from the club, where he has been dining freely, to the lonely chambers, where he lives a godless old recluse. When he dies, his inn will erect a tablet to his honour, and his heirs burn a part of his library. Would you like to have such a prospect for your old age; to store up learning and money, and end so? But we must not linger too long by Mr. Doomsday's door. Worthy Mr. Grump lives over him, who is also an ancient inhabitant of the inn, and who, when Doomsday comes home to read Catullus, is sitting down with three steady seniors of his standing, to a steady rubber of whist, after a dinner at which they have consumed three steady bottles of Port. You may see the old boys asleep at the Temple Church of a Sunday. Attorneys seldom trouble them, and they have small fortunes of their own. On the other side of the third landing, where Pen and Warrington live, till long after midnight sits Mr. Paley, who took the highest honours, and is a fellow of his college; who will sit and read and note cases till two o'clock in the morning; who will rise at seven, and be at the pleader's chambers as soon as they are open, where he will work until an hour before dinner-time; who will come home from Hall, and read and note cases again until dawn next day, when perhaps

Mr. Arthur Pendennis and his friend Mr. Warrington are returning from some of their wild expeditions. How differently employed Mr. Paley has been! He has not been throwing himself away: he has only been bringing a great intellect laboriously down to the comprehension of a mean subject, and in his fierce grasp of that, resolutely excluding from his mind all higher thoughts, all better things, all the wisdom of philosophers and historians, all the thoughts of poets; all wit, fancy, reflection, art, love, truth altogether: so that he may master that enormous legend of the law, which he proposes to gain his livelihood by expounding. . . . He could not cultivate a friendship, or do a charity, or admire a work of genius, or kindle at the sight of beauty or the sound of a sweet song; he had no time and no eyes for anything but his law-books. All was dark outside his reading-lamp. Love, and Nature, and Art (which is the expression of our praise and sense of the beautiful world of God) were shut out from him. And as he turned off his lonely lamp at night, he never thought but that he had spent the day profitably, and went to sleep alike thankless and remorseless. But he shuddered when he met his old companion, Warrington, on the stairs, and shunned him as one that was doomed to perdition."

How life-like! After reading the above, surely every one knows the Temple inhabitants almost as well as if he himself had lived among them for the last twenty years. We seem as though we were perfectly well acquainted with them all; the face of old Mr. Grump may be seen any day in our Law Courts; and no one who has ever been at college can fail to recognize the "yellow face" of Paley.

What else is Dickens famed for in his writing? Eloquence? Certainly, if Dickens is eloquent, Thackeray is more so. The concluding sentences of "Pendennis" are some of the finest ever penned in any novel; and there is nothing in Dickens half equal to many passages which could be pointed out in "Vanity Fair," "Edmond," and "The Newcomes." But Dickens has so many faults, that everything he writes is greatly marred by them. Instead of keeping to his own proper sphere of humour, he tries to unite in his own person the politician, philosopher, and ultra-philanthropist, without possessing the requisite mental organization. A talented writer in *Blackwood* ably exposed, some twelve months back, his more striking faults; and to the whole article (entitled "Remonstrance with Dickens") we would recommend our readers. In concluding this point we would say, that although in Dickens you may find much that has no business there; in Thackeray you cannot find a single phrase of clap-trap, or a single paragraph of ornamental writing put in just to show off the facility of the writer. Our second point is:—

II. *Thackeray's conceptions of character are more TRUE TO LIFE than Dickens'.*

Nearly every character of Dickens' is *false*; this may seem strange language; but we say that there is hardly a single personage in one of Dickens' novels that is to be met with in every-day life. Take the "Pickwick Papers:" here the nearest approach to the real is Sam Weller; but certainly he is not life-like: it may be a very good conception, a very humorous conception; but nevertheless, he is not *true to nature*. But a novelist, to be a good one, *ought* to be true to nature; truthfulness is the charm of Defoe, of Fielding, of Walter Scott; but certainly not of Dickens. In his earlier works we see a mighty master of humour, but in his later—oh, how are the mighty fallen! "Dombey," "Copperfield," "Bleak House," "Little Dorrit," how different from "Pickwick," "Oliver Twist," "Nickleby," "Humphrey's Clock." Dickens is indeed sadly fallen away! In his earlier works his untruthfulness may be excused, because they are almost professedly humorous; but now that he has taken upon himself to judge the world and to regenerate the whole social machinery, it cannot; and it is here more particularly that Dickens has failed.

Now let us look at Thackeray's characters: and first of all, what a thorough knowledge of human nature is there displayed. All his men are real men; his women real women; his children real children. Of course, every one has read "Vanity Fair;" what a truly natural, though, thank Heaven! scarce character is Becky Sharp; and we have it on the author's own authority, that Sir Pitt Crawley (the only one of Thackeray's characters which does not strike you at once as perfectly true to life) was a really living man only a very few years before the book was written. In "Esmond," the hero of the book is a perfect representation of the thorough gentleman of Queen Anne's reign. Beatrix Esmond is one of the most excellent creations of womanly beauty anywhere; and her end is, alas! the end of too many. Then where is there a more refined, more gentle incarnation of the true matron than in Esmond's patroness? Viscount Castlewood is as good a representation of the English nobleman some hundred and twenty years ago as any in the whole range of our descriptive literature. Then turn to "Pendennis;" what a truly perfect embodiment is Pen himself; nothing of the ordinary novel style about him; no "conventional simper;" but he is *natural*; and no writer except Thackeray since the days of Fielding has endeavoured to his utmost power "to depict a man." A George Warrington is not often found; would that such as he were more plentiful; but no one can venture to say with any show of truth that he is not a real, living person. The old Major may be seen at the West End any day; and the foolish Lady Clavering is by no means unrepresented in every-day existence. The two best impersonations in the book are perhaps Helen and Laura; and the fondness of the mother for her "boy" is one of the simplest yet truest touches in Thackeray. And now let us look

just one moment at "The Newcomes;" and we would only ask our readers to call to mind the characters of the old Colonel and Ethel; and leave this part of our case in their hands.

III. *There is throughout Thackeray's writings a more EARNEST tone than in Dickens'.*

Thackeray's religion is a part of the man; and, as a consequence, every large work of his carries upon it the stamp of solemn conviction. His general tone is *higher, purer, better* than Dickens'. In Thackeray we find none of those sneers at the words of Christ which so much disfigure the pages of Dickens. I need hardly say that I refer more particularly just now to the disgusting conversation between Sam Weller and his father in "Pickwick," in which the words of our Lord—"Ye must be born again," are made the butt of some of the most revolting ribaldry ever penned. Again, in nearly every one of Dickens' works there is introduced some preacher or minister, such as Mr. Chadband, Mr. Howler, &c. Now, why is this? There is no need, because there may happen to be some black sheep among the dissenting clergy, that they should be continually brought in for the purpose of throwing discredit on all profession of religion. But we trust that the far-fetched untruths, with which the characters of these men are illustrated, are so thoroughly ridiculous, that by their means Dickens defeats his own object.

In Thackeray there is none of this. His life is too good, his religion is too pervading, to allow him for one moment to indulge in such scenes as Dickens delights to depict. His volumes are throughout text-books of practical religion; of that "religion of the heart" which is destined one day to supersede the cracked and crabbed formularies of different sects which now pass for "true conversion." Thackeray's charity shines out like the sun at noon; it is not confined to one church or narrowed within the walls of Exeter Hall; but it spreads abroad, and diffuses around it an atmosphere of love and holiness. Some complain of his satire; say he is ill-natured. Those who assert such things should remember that vice needs lashing; that satire has frightened some into good behaviour, who would never have reformed before the influences of persuasion or exhortation. The charge of ill-temper in his writings is perfectly unfounded; throughout there breathes a geniality and large-heartedness which we fail to find in any other writer of the day; although neither Dickens nor Bulwer can be charged with cynicism.

Then the *humour* of Thackeray is not the foolery of a clown, nor the sparkling of a mere wit; it is real humour: such humour as we find in Fielding, Goldsmith, Jerrold. Not broad, coarse caricature, such as Dickens has degenerated to, but a beautifully refined wit; which, if we except Bulwer, is to be found, we fear, at this time, in Thackeray alone.

We have referred before to Thackeray's religious principles;

we would just notice the true morality which breathes through his writings. His high sense of honour, his thorough detestation of vice in every shape, cannot be too much praised, when there is abroad in the world such a disposition to flirt with sin as there is at present. Thackeray's writings are really elevating; none, unless extraordinarily debased, can rise from their perusal without having gained a great deal of good; without his better qualities being strengthened, and his bad ones weakened; without feeling in his heart a higher love both towards his Maker and his fellows than he felt before.

We shall now leave this subject with regret. Abler pens than ours will, doubtless, take up the question; better masters of analysis than ourselves will point out the nicer shades of character in "Pendennis," and the complete realization of olden time in "Esmond;" the masterly touches in "Vanity Fair," and the sweet home characters in "The Newcomes." In conclusion we will quote the eloquent words of Charlotte Brontë in her preface to "Jane Eyre," and leave our case in your hands, O reader!—

"There is a man in our own days whose words are not framed to tickle delicate ears: who, to my thinking, comes before the great ones of society, much as the son of Imrah came before the throned kings of Judah and Israel; and who speaks truth as deep, with a power as prophet-like and as vital, a mien as dauntless and as daring. Is the satirist of 'Vanity Fair' admired in high places? I cannot tell; but I think if some of those amongst whom he hurls the Greek fire of his sarcasm, and over whom he flashes the levin-brand of his denunciation, were to take his warnings in time, they or their seed might yet escape a fatal Ramoth-Gilead. Why have I alluded to this man? I have alluded to him because I think I see in him an intellect profounder and more unique than his contemporaries have yet recognized; because I regard him as the first social regenerator of the day—as the very master of that working corps who would restore to rectitude the warped system of things; because I think no commentator on his writings has yet found the comparison that suits him, the terms which rightly characterize his talent. They say he is like Fielding; talk of his wit, humour, comic powers. He resembles Fielding as an eagle does a vulture; Fielding could stoop on carrion, but Thackeray never does. His wit is bright, his humour attractive; but both bear the same relation to his serious genius, that the mere lambent sheet-lightning, playing under the edge of the summer-cloud, does to the electric death-spark hid in its womb."

ALEPH.

Politics.

OUGHT THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"THE East India Company," says Macaulay, "was at first a great trader, and a petty prince." The situations have since been reversed, and this "*great*" prince people want to put down. Why, we cannot imagine. Why it should not be, we can easily see.

The East India Company *have governed India well*; and "Let well alone" had better be applied to them.

Compare the state of the country now with what it was some 150 years ago, and we find India twenty times as prosperous under Leadenhall Street rule as under native princes; and prosperity is certainly a test of good government. What says Macaulay upon this point? Speaking of the time more immediately preceding the Company, he says:—"The people were ground down to the dust by the oppressor without, and the oppressor within; by the robber from whom the Nabob was unable to protect them; by the Nabob who took whatever the robber had left to them. All the evils of anarchy, and all the evils of despotism, pressed at once on that miserable race. They knew nothing of government but its exactions. Desolation was in their imperial cities, and famine all along the banks of their broad and redundant rivers. It seemed that a few more years would suffice to efface all traces of the opulence and civilization of an earlier age. Such was the state of India when the Company began to take part in the disputes of its ephemeral sovereigns. About eighty years have elapsed (1833) since we appeared as auxiliaries in a contest between two rival families for the sovereignty of a small corner of the Peninsula. From that moment commenced a great, a stupendous process; the reconstruction of a decomposed society.

"Two generations have passed away, and the process is complete. The scattered fragments of the empire of Aurungzebe have been united in an empire stronger and more closely knit together, than that which Aurungzebe ruled. The power of the new sovereigns penetrates their dominions more completely, and is far more implicitly obeyed, than was that of the proudest princes of the Mogul dynasty." Then the *Times*' Correspondent, William Russell, compared, in one of his letters, the manage-

ment of the war in the Crimea with the management under the Company in India; and what is his conclusion? Why this; that in the Crimea *nothing* was well done; in India *everything* is well done: that there is plenty to eat and drink; resting-places provided for the troops; baggage trains ready; no unnecessary delay; and all the arrangements as nearly as possible complete. Let our readers compare this management with that of our Government, and remember, that the good, and not the bad system, was working under the condemned Company.

The East India Company *instituted Competitive Examinations*, and we suppose our readers will hardly condemn them for that. What guarantee have we that this system will be persevered in, in all its integrity, by Cannon Row imbecility? We have seen lately, how a so-called Whig ministry, and the Horse Guards, between them, were shuffling out of their *inferior* system; then how can we suppose they will maintain the *superior*?

With regard to the *evils* of Indian rule, which some people have been so forward to father on the Company, all we can say is, that the ministers of the Crown are, at least, as much to blame for them as the Company. Macaulay, in his celebrated speech on the government of India, says:—"For all measures of internal policy, the servants of the king are at least as deeply responsible as the Company. For all measures of foreign policy, the servants of the king, and they alone, are responsible. I was surprised to hear the honourable gentleman accuse the Directors of insatiable ambition and rapacity; when we must know that no act of aggression on any native state can be committed by the Company, without the sanction of the Board; and that, in fact, the Board has repeatedly approved of warlike measures, which were strenuously opposed by the Company. He must know, in particular, that during the energetic and splendid administration of the Marquis Wellesley, the Company was all for peace, and the Board all for conquest. If a line of conduct, which the honourable gentleman thinks unjustifiable, has been followed by the ministers of the Crown, in spite of the remonstrances of the Directors, this is, surely, a strange reason for turning off the Directors, and giving the whole power unchecked to the Crown." Thus we see that the good has originated with the Directors; nearly all the bad with the Vernon Smiths of aristocratic government. Some of the Exeter Hall heroes—Lord Shaftesbury, "who is not as other men are," for instance—have been excessively fond of charging the government of the Company with *cherishing idolatry* in India. This is on a par with their absurd declamations against the Maynooth Grant. If the *Record*, and its clerical followers, would take the trouble to inquire into facts, instead of talking off-hand in the way they have done about Indian mutilations, they would find that every sum of

money received by the temples in India is theirs, by every title of law; theirs, by every right which a monarch's word can give; and if England undertakes the government of a country, it is but fair she should take up the liabilities of the Government that preceded her. In many of the instances cited, the money paid is simply rent for so much land farmed by Government; but it does not suit our platform orators to publish this fact. Then, even till lately, the so-called religious newspapers have represented the temple of Juggernaut as being, in some measure, supported by Government. Now here is a direct untruth; because for some years past the temple has received nothing. The Company, urged on by their spiritual guides in England, contrary to every principle of justice, gave up the payment which, after all, was, and is, as much due to the priests (be they what they may), as any debt ever contracted.

And now, having glanced at that point, we would say—

That the *constitution* of the House of Commons *forbids change*. It is well known, that at least forty members are required to make a house. Now, we feel confident, that after two years are gone by, it will be with the utmost difficulty that a house will be formed for the discussion of Indian affairs. It has been so in old time. Had it not been for the Mutiny, no government would ever have been able to whip up 350 or 400 members, *even to vote*, upon an Indian question. Then the House *knows nothing about* Indian affairs. Look through the list of members; though, indeed, the lamentable ignorance displayed in the late debates is enough (one would think) of itself to damn for ever their claim to legislate. Perhaps there may be twenty men who have studied India. Lord Stanley certainly has. So has Gladstone; and we may add to these T. Baring, Sir F. Baring, John Bright, the elder Ellice, Ross D. Mangles, Lord John Russell, Sir H. Rawlinson, Col. Sykes, and Pollard Willoughby, and the list is somewhere about complete. Lord Palmerston, and Mr. Disraeli, have "crammed" themselves with just enough knowledge to enable them to let off a grand speech; but, as for having studied the question, after reading their speeches, the supposition is simply ridiculous. Then, supposing the House of Commons to be everything that can be desired,—supposing that it possessed the knowledge requisite for governing 200,000,000 of a foreign people (which it does not)—all we can say is, that with these points in its favour, it could not see after India, because *it would have no time*. Already almost every hour of the day and night is taken up; and seeing that members are now thus occupied, where is the time to be found to discuss all the arrangements for India? The House has its Railway Committees, and its Gas and Water Committees, and its Election Committees; it has its Parliamentary Reform, and its Law Reform; its supply, and the internal management

of England; and in addition to all this labour, it is wanted to place on its shoulders the government of India.

Again: supposing that the House of Commons had time, and took upon itself to govern our Eastern empire,—what would be the result? We believe the complete loss, and that speedily, of all our gorgeous possessions in Hindostan; because the House is always more or less a party-divided House; and it is absurd to suppose that bodies of men, opposed diametrically on almost every point brought before them, would so far rise above common mortals as at once (and only on this one subject) to lay aside all prejudice, and discuss Indian matters merely on their merits. Discussions lately have shown us what we must expect if the affairs of our far-off empire are handed over to the tender mercies of party government. In favourable contrast with all this is the Company. At the Council Board there are no politics to thwart this or that measure; government may supersede government, but the directors hold on their way, uninfluenced by the shuffles of Cannon Row; and now, in place of this politically unbiassed body, we are asked to install as overseers a set of men, returned, most of them, simply for their adherence to certain cliques of politicians.

Now, supposing that the government changes hands, and that it is transferred to the Crown, surely no one can be mad enough to think that the Crown can exercise all this mighty power unchecked. But the House of Commons, we have shown, cannot act as this check, because it has neither knowledge, time, nor disposition. Who, then, is to do so? Why, say some, commissioners appointed by the Crown, during pleasure, will do. But they would form no check on the Crown, inasmuch as the Crown had raised them to their high position. Then, say others, commissioners appointed for life, either by the Crown or Parliament, will do. But these would not do, because they would always be appointed by the political party at the head of affairs for the time being; and if a new government succeeded the old one, these commissioners would harass the new government with most vexatious opposition. Then, say others again, directors nominated every so-many years by the Crown. But these directors would always be appointed from the supporters of the Ministry for the time being; their situations would depend on the stability of the Ministry by which they were appointed: hence, all their power and patronage would be employed to prop up the Ministry with which they were connected; and if a change occurred, the same means would be used to molest and injure the new government. In short, they would be subservient while their friends were in, and fractious when their friends were out.

We will now glance at the different plans which have been laid before the House of Commons. There was, first, Lord Pal-

merston's bill. He proposed that there should be a President, having to assist him a council composed of eight members, nominated by the Crown, every eight years. Lord Ellenborough's bill came next, proposing what was, taken in all, not a bad council; and it certainly recognized the elective principle. So far, so good; but the council so well constituted was to have no power, and the effect would have been that the Minister would have had his own way quite as much with as without them. And, third, we have Lord Stanley's bill; and what does it do for India? It appoints a council whose functions are nowhere defined, and its powers can only be inferred. The number of its members is to be fifteen; and these are to be distributed into committees for special business. The council will meet once a week for general debate, but the functions of the Secret Committee are altogether handed over to the Secretary. In fact, the council can hardly be intended to exercise any serious influence on Indian policy. The councillors will be head clerks, and nothing more. The appointments are practically for life; and we all know how long comfortable, sleek-faced red-tapists live. In short, as a writer remarked the other day, the most appropriate designation for this third India Bill would be—"Satisfactory solution of the problem how to make a great empire a little one."

One of the great arguments used in the debates has always been, that there is at present a *want of responsibility*. But we think that this charge is unfounded; for the President of the Board of Control is responsible; there are always directors in Parliament who are responsible; and if a party government for India should be passed (as doubtless it will), there will be no more responsibility than there is now; for if the offending minister be a member of a *strong* government, the whole of the ministerial followers will support him, right or wrong; and if he be a member of a *weak* government, a censure upon him will be simply a censure on the whole cabinet. And then as to the cant about "*double government*!" It was just the same during the Crimean War, and the consequence was, a Secretary for War was made, and some most useful offices abolished. But does the Secretary for War manage his army better than the double government of India? No; nor one-third as well; and not all the talk in the world can for one instant persuade any sober man to believe that our own army is maintained on anything like an equal footing with the Indian one.

Then the supporters of Palmerston's bill say, Well, after all, it was a very modest measure! Modest? We'll see. Lord Palmerston's bill proposed utterly to destroy the popular element in the home government of India, and to remove all checks from the Imperial power. Hitherto we have had a governor-general and governors of minor presidencies, appointed conjointly by the

Crown and directors, and removable by the fiat of the court. Associated with these have been local councils, appointed by the Board of Directors. Thus we see that the members of council owe nothing either to the Crown or its nominees, and are in no way dependent on them; they have been selected from the Indian services, because they have given proofs of their capacity; and, as a rule, none can deny but that the best men have always been elevated. But by the Tiverton bill these councils were to be appointed by the governors, and the governors by the Crown; and thus, alike in the East and in the West, the despotic principle was to have full sway. The representative principle was to be entirely destroyed; the ministers were to appoint their own parliaments; and Downing Street was to be the all-in-all of the new government of India. Very modest, truly! The evil effects of the bill could hardly be estimated; the long and short of the measure was to transfer all power to the Crown, or, in other words, from the *Browns* and *Smiths* to the *Fitzbattles* and *Phippses*. Lord Palmerston thought by his bill to please the aristocracy; to plant himself firmer than ever in his seat: but he reckoned without his host; and, please God, "the German cousins and cousins-german—the ennobled poverty and ornamental indolence—the aristocratic manufacturers of paper that can't get discounted—the Honourable *Lawleys* and *Villierses*—the wrecks of the turf and the ruins of the hells—the seedy squalor of Brussels and Boulogne"—shall never be emptied out on the East to imperil the fortunes of India by that vice and profligacy which have already, in too many parts of the continent, made the name of Englishman "a very synonym with bully and blackguard."

Lord Ellenborough's bill would have made, as we have stated before, the council a mere nullity; it would also have placed the whole patronage in the hands of the Secretary of State; thus of necessity making every appointment a party one.

With regard to Lord Stanley's bill, it is decidedly the best of the three, although it has many faults. We are glad to see, however, that the noble lord does not disdain amendments; and if we must legislate for India, and if there is no hope in the "obstructive abilities" of the House of Lords, why let us take Lord Stanley's bill, and make it the groundwork of something better.

But by any one of these bills *far too large* an amount of power is placed in the minister's hands. Nepotism and favouritism will, we fear, creep into our government, and will at length rise to such a height, that in a very few years hence a new bill must be provided, if, in the meantime, we have not lost India altogether. The appointment of Lord George Paget to a place manufactured on purpose for him is an earnest of what we are to expect under our new rulers.

Then the supporters of a change say that the Queen has no power in India; now we say, on the contrary, that the Queen has as much *real* power in India as in any other part of her dominions. If the Queen is to have *apparent* power, as well as *real* power, let her be called Empress of Hindostan; let the Company govern in her name, and that point is gained.

Again, those who cry out most for the change are to be found in the higher ranks of life. Why? Because India is a middle-class country, and the great Fitznoodle family wish to get for their offspring more jobs than they even can at present. And here is the real interpretation of all this sudden opposition to the Company. The middle classes should rouse themselves, and see to it that their only government is not snatched from them.

Who have been the only two men who have disgraced themselves in India? Generals Wyndham and Walpole, both Queen's officers. Who have distinguished themselves? The Lawrences, Outram, Neill, all Company's men; and Havelock, although a Queen's officer, had for many years served under the Company. "The tree is known by its fruits." Judge for yourselves.

Then we say, without hesitation, that *this is not the right time*. Is it the time to revolutionize a government when every resource must be brought to bear on a well-furnished army? Is it a time for change in the middle, not of a mutiny, but of a war? No. And if our House of Commons cannot see it now, they will have to see it before many years have passed over their heads. Amid "peals of laughter" the Government of India Bill (No. 3) was brought in. While England mourns over wasted life, and blood, and treasure, our legislators are indulging in the laughter of fools. A nice prospect for India! the descendants of Nero, it seems, have not yet died off the globe. But amid all this, it is gratifying to see that there are yet four men in the House, men of great talents, who have all along opposed change; need we say that we mean Gladstone, Graham, Baring, and Ellice? All honour to them! Their names will go down to posterity as upright and high-minded statesmen, who would rather serve their country than their own interests.

In conclusion, if there must be a change (and it appears inevitable), why adopt the insane course of present legislation? Why not appoint certain committees to search out the matter, to discover the causes of the mutiny, to inquire in what way a recurrence of evil may be prevented, and then to legislate according to their reports. That is the only sensible way, and if that had been adopted at first, plans very different from any that have been proposed would have been the result. ALFRED.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN entering upon the discussion of this interesting topic, we might, did space permit, endeavour to lay before our readers

some detailed statements of the principles of action by which the speculating portion of the community should be guided. The great principle of life—it seems so at least to us—is frequently set aside by our traders; to “do as they would be done by” is seemingly considered by them as decidedly inconvenient and obstructive to the progress of business. If we consider the early history of companies, united together by the glowing prospects of eastern commerce, we, in perusing their trading records, are almost forced to the opinion that in the human family there are vultures as greedy and rapacious as the winged inhabitants of tropical America. There seems to us, however, some excuse for the continuous course of extortion practised by the East India Company, when we remember that our own Government has sought to benefit the exchequer in the renewal of their license or charter: thus we find that a loan of £1,000,000 in the year 1744 enabled the Company once more to obtain an extension of their privileges. To our opponents, however, we leave this consideration; our duty it is to advocate the abolition of this peculiar ruling power. We are, indeed, curious to see the grounds upon which the negative portion of this debate will be conducted.

We hold that humanity and common honesty are the disputed points in the present stirring events; we contend that justice demands from Englishmen redress for the terrible wrongs inflicted upon our darker brethren. To uplift the curtain and reveal the past in all its hideousness would occupy a lifetime of study. Some day, perhaps, we may receive at the hands of a truthful historian the records of pillage, murder, and brazen injustice resulting from an unscrupulous desire to enrich a few at the expense of millions. The eloquence of Burke has been quoted by newspapers of the present day; his thrilling charge against this Company is of no small importance to those who love honesty rather than blood-stained influence. He branded them with “having sold every monarch, prince, and state in India, broken every contract, and ruined every prince and every state who had trusted them.” These facts are now universally admitted; upon these we take our stand. It may be urged that the present surveillance exercised by the press and people of this country will in future control and direct their *modus operandi*; we contend, however, that this will be of little or no effect in extinguishing the fire of revolt, or in producing respectful and affectionate obedience, should we conquer. The past, with its annals of confiscation, rapine, taxation, and insult, has been handed down from heart to heart. The aspiring Hindoo has cherished the thought of revenge, held sacred, no doubt, by his progenitors. This thirst for retribution has, in our opinion, been engendered by the false conclusions of this Company; the groan of oppression has been answered by increased taxation;

a manly protestation against prospective ruin has been met by troops of military; the parent, foreseeing the future destiny of his wife and little ones, has ventured to stem the tide of monopoly desolating his nation; famine and death have settled the dispute; from these victims of injustice have arisen millions who, in the hour of desperation, have united together to rid their country of a plague, whose onward march had thickly studded the bright earth with ruined homesteads, famishing people, and the graves of those whose lives had been sacrificed by Mammon. Details of these acts are for the present unnecessary; should they be disputed, we may, in a future article, furnish instances. For our own part, all we would urge is embodied in the quotation from Burke. Upon this we advocate the necessity of thorough investigation into the claims of India. The gallant sons of our soil have fallen in the vast effort to crush the necessary result of oppressive measures. The pale moon sheds its silvery beams over the narrow bed of *our* Havelock, that great yet unobtrusive embodiment of religion and true valour. Would that his blood had been ventured in a nobler cause! So true a Christian must have been alive to the wrongs under which his foes had risen. Must we harass to the death our gallant Colin in this mighty project? No; let us by just and truthful measures investigate the claims of suffering India; let us once again strive to merit the confidence of this noble race; let us strive to educate and develop the exquisite appreciation of beauty and proportion, evidenced in the handiwork of this swarthy people; and, as a necessary preliminary to this, let us remove from their dread that which, it seems to us, is principally to blame in this great struggle; in other words, let us abolish the authority of the East India Company.

Birkenhead.

W. O. H. E.

PERSECUTION.—It is the essence of injustice to persecute any person for omitting to conform to the established religion. No man should be deprived of any part of his liberty with respect to his opinions, unless his actions, derived from such opinions, were clearly prejudicial to the state. It is not in the power of man to surrender his opinions, and therefore the society which demands him to make this sacrifice, demands an impossibility.

VIRTUE.—There is but one virtue; this has its foundation in the propensity, seated in the heart of man. When this inclination, or propensity, is wanting, there is not virtue, notwithstanding all external appearance. Not every inclination to do a good action, nor every good action performed, is virtue: virtue requires a predominant propensity to follow what is acknowledged to be right. Virtue cannot be estimated from actions alone; it depends likewise on internal sentiments.—*Feder.*

The Essayist.

I.—BRITISH POETRY.

THOUGHTFUL reader,—that practical good *may* and *does* result from the study of poetry you will acknowledge. That many men, in consequence of inefficient information, misjudge the mission of poetry, is not less patent. That a desire to see Parnassus, although perhaps unaccompanied by the desire to “work your passage,” is every now and then asserting vitality, is, I doubt not, an equally unquestionable, although perchance hitherto carefully guarded, secret of your inner life.

Let us “*book*” our passage in company; for verily a companion in pleasure is equally as desirable and indispensable as a companion in toil.

Let us inhale together the bracing atmosphere that is ever being wafted past the portal of our souls. Now and then we will be told to “go up higher.” We must nerve to climb the hill, scale the rugged cliffs, leap dark, treacherous chasms, and at last see with strong vision new wonders, and appreciate with refined soul new and beauteous things.

We would not advocate the study of poetry were it inconsistent with the study of men. To “live” is hard enough work for some, but to live thus and grow poetical were harder still. Worse than all is it, that men sometimes unthinkingly attribute to poetry what really is the result of poltroonery. A man with Byronic collar, pale, meaningless face, unsettled eye, and listless, hanging gait, who, too lazy to do battle with the stern world, sits down and writes *lines that rhyme* to his *sith-ter*, or lines that don’t rhyme and don’t mean anything, and are consequently classed with blank verse, to his “oppressed country,”—this miserable dolt gets called a poet. A poet, forsooth! By-and-by, the genius sails in troubled waters, becomes acquainted with the physiology of the red-herring, lives in a garret, sits on a three-legged stool, ultimately on the floor; and last of all, finding his true level, turns day labourer. Then scorners cry, “Lo! this is what comes of poetry.” Friend of mine, believe it not! Poetry is God-given. This man is no poet,—indeed, no man. If you know such an one, advise with him. The story of a poet’s life is not one of listlessness and inactivity. He sings,—

“I will go forth ‘mong men, not mailed in scorn,
But in the armour of a pure intent.
Great duties are before me, and great songs;
And whether crowned or crownless, when I fall,
It matters not, so that God’s work is done.”

In tracing the rise, progress, and power of British poetry, it will be our humble endeavour to winnow the chaff from the wheat, and offer you food free from falseness or impurity. If in this we fail, blame not the harvest from which we glean, neither the gleaner's intent,—for this is pure, and that is golden. But blame rather the fallible instrument, and let charity temper the measure of your reproach.

We would take a general survey of our poetic literature, from the earliest recorded period down to the present time; consequently our notices must be rapid, and our sketches brief.

Centuries before the Christian era there came from the East warrior hordes, who, gradually advancing towards the northern and western extremities of Europe, ultimately established themselves as three distinct races, with languages, habits, and modes of worship peculiar to each.

The Kimmerian and Keltic were the earliest invaders. The Scythian, Gothic, and German evidently followed. The Slavonic and Sarmatian were the last. These established themselves in Poland, Bohemia, Russia, and the neighbourhood: the Scythian, Gothic, and German already occupying most of Central Europe; the Kimmerian and Keltic having pushed forward to the extreme west, and possessed the adjacent islands.

The Phœnicians, Carthaginians, and Greeks, either visited Britain, or were acquainted with it, and consequently must have left some colonial results. But, according to Sharon Turner, "The great masses of the populations which have successively planted themselves in the British islands have sprung from the Nomadic classes."* The earliest of these that reached the northern and western confines of Europe, the Kimmerians and Kelts, or Celts, may be regarded as our first ancestors; whilst from the German and Gothic nations, who with the Scythians formed the second great flood of population into Europe, our Anglo-Saxon and Norman ancestors proceeded.

The Sarmatic has never effected a settlement among us. Not long since they felt our power as enemies; now we are but superficial friends. Thus, our population came unquestionably from the Kimmerian and Keltic stock. Among them the Druids were the repositories of learning. Cæsar found that they studied the stars, the aspect of the world and its countries, the nature of things, and the force and power of the immortal gods. They consisted of three orders of men, Druids, Bards, and Onates. The Onates sacrificed, divined, and contemplated the nature of things. The Druids cultivated physiology and moral philosophy. Whilst the Bards were the poets, musicians, satirists, and encomiasts of their time.

Their writings were not such as to ensure immortality; else,

* Sharon Turner's "Anglo-Saxons," vol. i., p. 85.

adown the dark tide of nineteen centuries some waifs of the heart would have floated, and some noble sentiment or sacred hope have gained perpetuation. As it is, writers are almost unanimous in subscribing to the assumption, that although the Druids may have generated true poets, yet of the snatches of their productions left little can be classed much higher than narrative. Indeed, narrative entered into and was the stamina of most of the warrior poetry of the early ages. War was the business of a man's life, therefore war must be his theme.

We "who sniff the battle afar off," look subjectively from our observatory upon the distant struggle, and dream of mimic tournaments, and see only painted slaughter, can only think subjectively, and consequently reason and poetize in like manner. Far different was it with the Celts. The club and sword their birthright, and blood and conquest their gods, they fought sometimes a foreign foe, sometimes their fellows, "Glorious battle" was as much their font of inspiration as was "the glory of goodness" that of Milton's muse.

They, their deeds, and their song of joy and wails of sorrow, have drunk deep of the waters of Lethe. The few fragments that research has recovered barely suffice to build a simple tablet, on which "In Memoriam" is, by time, inscribed.

Cæsar, who planted the Roman eagle on our shores half a century before the Christian era, gained knowledge and glory for himself, and added to his country's power, but left no seeds of learning behind. Indeed, so far as can now be known, throughout the whole period of her domination over her last-acquired and first-relinquished possession, Rome does not appear to have sought to establish any kind of learning, or plant one germ of education in our land. Palaces were erected, roads cut, and walls reared, a few hoar and ivy-clad memorials of which still whisper to us of the "brazen eagle and the Julian spear," and the terrible energy of the conquerors of the world; but no palace of the mind, no book or ballad, or fable curiously wrought, brings the Romano-Celtic soul of *that* day into contact with the soul of *this*.

During the fifth century, after the Romans had retreated from Britain, there came, from the banks of the Rhine, the Oder, and the Baltic, and from the northern extremity of Denmark, the Angles, the Saxons, and the Jutes. The descendants of these tribes, but chiefly of the Angles and Saxons, henceforward formed the chief mass of the population, and their tongue became the language of the country: the Celts gradually withdrawing to the retirement of the mountain fastnesses, where their bards still sang of the glory that was eclipsed.

The conquering Saxons brought with them their gleemen, or poet-musicians, whose first songs were of the Sagas of the north. One epic remains, the oldest of Germanic Europe extant; which

conveys to us some idea of the modes of thought, the superstition, the religion, and the bravery of our fathers. This poem has been translated by Mr. Thorpe, and recently rendered into very fascinating prose by a learned contemporary. We subjoin an outline, chiefly condensed from the prose rendering.

King of the Scyldings was Healfdane,—old and war worn. He begat four sons, Heorogar, Hrothgar, Halga, and Ela. Hrothgar, mighty in battle, built a great mead-house, which he called Heorot, and he dealt out to his people all that God gave him for his own—money and bracelets he gave. The harp was awakened, and the gleemen sung. All the guests were happy, till a time when one Grendel worked fiend-like. The moors and fens were his. He was son of one of the mis-shapen daughters of the accursed Cain. He came at night to the great mead-house, and found a band of Athelings asleep, after their beer-drinking. He slew and carried away thirty warriors.

The thanes sat in sadness, when they saw that Grendel, the accursed sprite, had been among them. For twelve drear winters he warred, till desolate were the best of houses. Hrothgar sat in sad thought.

Athane of Hygelac's heard of Grendel's deeds. He sped in a ship to help the great prince whose men were slain. Landing on the field, the warriors shook their war-shirts, and thank God who had made the wave-path easy. The leader said to Hrothgar's thane, "We are of the Goths' kind; we come to help thy lord. I may, perchance, teach Hrothgar how to overcome the foe." The warder said, "Bear thy weapons forth, and I will lead the way."

They went till they could see the gaudy house all worked with gold, where the rich king lived. Then Wulfgar, a proud warrior, asked them, "Whence go ye?" The proud lord of the Weders said, "We are Hygelac's board-sharers. Beowulf is my name. I will tell my errand to thy master."

Then he turned to where Hrothgar, old and hairless, sat, and said, "Hail! Hrothgar, let me, with my band, cleanse Heorot. I hear that the wretched Grendel scorns weapons. I will grapple with the fiend in death grasp. What is to be, goes ever as it must."

Hrothgar said, "Friend Beowulf, for fights thou hast sought us. Sit now, and unseal thy breast with mead." Then the thane poured out the bright ale, the gleemen sung, and the warriors were glad, peaceful in Heorot.

Egclaf's son grudged the praise of Beowulf, and taunted him. Hunferth said, "Breca overcame thee. I look for worse if thou abide a night with Grendel." Beowulf replied, "Thou, drunken with beer, hast spoken much. Grendel would not have done such fell work in Heorot if thy deeds were fierce as thy words."

Wealtheou, Hrothgar's queen, greeted with winsome words Beowulf. Then said he, "I shall do brave deeds, or await my death in this mead-hall."

Hrothgar went out of the hall. Beowulf and his seamen bowed on their beds.

From afar stalked the shadow-walker. He strode upon the clouds,—he rushed to the golden halls, and wroth of mood, trod on the blood-stained floor. He saw war-men sleeping, and laught. He seized a sleeping warrior, slit him, drank his blood, swallowed him. Nearer he stept; but Beowulf, alert, hung upon his arm. Grendel felt the strong grip, and became fearful, and was bent on flight.

Upright stood Beowulf and grasped him. The hall thundered; fierce were the strong fighters; the hall was full of din; over all the watching Danes stood fear. Hygelac's proud kinsman held the foe of God in his hand. The fell wretch bore pain,—his sinews sprang; the bone-locker burst asunder; to Beowulf was war-strength given. Grendel fled, death-sick, to the fens; his life's end was come.

Beowulf's praise was sung.

Hrothgar spake, "I will love thee Beowulf, best of warriors. May the All-wielder pay thee with good."

Then to Beowulf he gave horses and weapons, and to his warriors each a gift.

The gleemen sang.

Wealtheou, Hrothgar's queen, gave to Beowulf twisted gold, two sleeves, a cloak, and a ring.

They went to rest, and knew not of a grim hereafter.

Grendel's mother came to wreak wroth for her dead son. She came to the halls of Heorot. Then had Beowulf perished had not his war-shirt helped, and God decided; for Grendel's mother, armed fiercely, bore hard with edge and point upon him.

He saw amongst the weapons a huge bill, greater than any other might wield. He seized the knotted hilt, and struck her with the brand upon her neck, her bones brake, she sank upon the ground. He looked outside and saw Grendel lying lifeless. Beowulf cut off both the giants' heads, and carried them to Hrothgar.

Many words spoke Hrothgar—he said, "Great is thy glory, Beowulf."

The Athelings wished to return to their own land. Twelve gifts gave the son of Healfdane to Beowulf.

The warriors went to the ship. They sailed away.

Afterward the broad land came under the sway of Beowulf. After fifty winters a dragon, which watched a hoard of gold heaped up in sin, won mastery. Three hundred years had the fiendish air-flyer held the cave. Then a man by chance found a rich cup. The cave was searched whilst the worm slept, and each time the

dragon woke there had been theft. He found not the man, but wasted the whole land with fire.

It was told Beowulf that his home was burnt.

He sought the dragon's den and fought with him.

The poison worm wounded the old hero. Whilst he sat death-sick on a stone he sent his thanes to see the dishes and the cups in the den of the twilight-flyer.

He gave his war-clothes to a young warrior, and said, "My kinsmen are gone to the God-head; I follow them."

In the midst of a mound of earth, hung with shields and helms, the Goths laid their lord; and whilst the heaven swelled with smoke the warriors sang a lay of sorrow.

F. G.

The Reviewer.

CONTINUOUS EDUCATION. By the Rev. F. W. NAYLOR, B.A., Vicar of Upton, Notts. London: Bull, Hunton, and Co. Price 1s.

THIS is a small book on a large subject, and contains much practical information about "libraries, discussion meetings, lectures, and other means of promoting self-culture, with especial reference to rural and suburban districts; to which are added remarks upon half-time system, tea festivals, suitable books, working men's associations, village cricket clubs," &c. The writer is evidently one who takes a deep interest in the welfare of working men, and understands how to use various important means for their elevation.

TABLES OF ENGLISH HISTORY. By EDWARD BALL. London: Longmans. Price 6d.

These are very carefully prepared tables, exhibiting the descent and succession of the English sovereigns, from the reign of Egbert to the present time, illustrating the Wars of the Roses, the origin of the Norman and Danish kings, &c. They are admirably adapted for the use of schools, for private students, and especially for pupil teachers. We cordially recommend them.

TRUE LIBERTY.—

This is true liberty, when free-born men,

Having to advise the public, may speak out;

Which he who can and will, deserves high praise:

Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace.

What can be juster in a state than this?—*Euripides*.

THE poor man's life should never depend upon the rich man's pleasure.—*S. Lover*.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.*

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART III.—THE CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES.

III. THE SUBSTANTIVE WITH THE ADJECTIVE—*continued*.

34. In the use of adjectives in the comparative degree, the latter substantive or pronoun is not governed by *que* (than), but is either the nominative case to a verb, or the oblique case governed by a verb or preposition. The second verb and preposition are frequently omitted.

- (1) In case the elliptical form is used, *I, thou, he, they, &c.*, must not be translated by *je, tu, il, ils, &c.* (which are used only before verbs), but by *moi, toi, lui, eux, &c.*; by the forms, in fact, which are employed after prepositions; as, *Il est PLUS FORT QUE TOI, mais tu es PLUS SAVANT QUE LUI.* He is stronger than thou, but thou art more learned than he.
- (2) When the sense is fully expressed, the latter verb takes *NE* before it provided that the sentence is affirmative, not interrogative;—and positive, not negative; otherwise, it does not take *NE* before it; as,—

Vous ETES plus savant qu'il NE l'est.

You are more learned than he is.

Etes-vous plus fort que je l'étais ?

Are you stronger than I was?

IL EST plus plaisant que je NE le croyais.

He is more jocose than I thought him.

Elle N'EST PAS plus belle que je la croyais.

She is not more beautiful than I thought her.

35. Before a verb in the infinitive mood, *than* is expressed by *QUE DE*; as,—

J'aimerais mieux travailler QUE DE perdre le temps en bagatelle. I would rather work hard than waste time in trifles. *Il n'y a rien de plus difficile QUE DE se défaire de mauvaises habitudes.* There is nothing more difficult than to leave off bad habits.

36. *PLUS* and *MOINS*, in the comparison of numbers, require *DE* instead of *QUE*; as, *A la bataille de Salamine, la flotte des Grecs était composée de trois cent quatre-vingt voiles, et celle de Xercès de PLUS DE treize cents.* At the battle of Salamis (B.C. 480), the fleet of the Greeks was composed of 380 sail, and that of Xerxes of more than 1,300.

37. *THE MORE* and *THE LESS*, in English, used as in the following examples, are expressed in French by *PLUS* and *MOINS*, without the article:—

PLUS ils se sentaient pressés du joug des Gentils, PLUS ils conquirent pour

* Continued from page 184, Vol. V.

eux de mépris et de dédain. THE MORE they felt themselves oppressed with the yoke of the Gentiles, THE MORE contempt and disdain did they conceive for them.

PLUS il gagne d'argent MOINS il dépense. THE MORE money he earns, the less he spends.

PLUS on est grand, PLUS on ignore l'art et l'affectation de le paraitre, THE GREATER (the more great) a man is, THE MORE does he neglect the art and the desire of appearing so.

Je ressens d'autant PLUS l'insulte, que je la méritais MOINS. I feel the insult so much THE MORE, as I merited it THE LESS.

PLUS le jour est long, PLUS la nuit est courte. The longer the day is, the shorter is the night.

In sentences of this kind, the order of the words is—1. PLUS or MOINS. 2. The nominative to the verb. 3. The verb. 4. The substantive, with DE; or the adjective, without DE. And the corresponding part of the sentence in the same order.

IV. PRONOUNS.

1.—PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

38. JE, TU, IL, ELLE, NOUS, VOUS, ILS, ELLES, are used as nominatives to verbs.

39. ME, TE, LE, LA, NOUS, VOUS, LES, SE, are used as objective cases between the nominative and the verb.

40. LUI, LEUR, X, are used as objective cases between the nominative and the verb, when the verb does not directly govern a case, but requires the preposition *à*; as, "*il LEUR pardonna*," "he pardoned them."

41. MOI, TOI, LUI, ELLE, NOUS, VOUS, EUX, ELLES, are used in any other case.

42. JE, ME, TE, LE, SE, lose E before a word beginning with a vowel.

43. To these pronouns are assigned a special and precise order which must not be infringed. In every separate clause of a sentence, unless it expresses a command or a question, conjunctions, and any other introductory words, stand first; then comes the nominative of the verb, with adjectives, adjective pronouns, and the like, belonging to it; the third place belongs to NE; the fourth, to *me, te, se, nous, vous*; the fifth, to *le, la, les*; the sixth, to *lui, leur*; the seventh, to *y*; the eighth, to *en*; the ninth, to the auxiliary verb (or, if the verb is in one of the simple tenses, its place is here); the tenth, to *pas, point, rien, or guère*; the eleventh, to the participle. No simple sentence can have all these at once, but those that are used are to be placed in this order; as, *vous n'y touchez pas* (you do not meddle with it). The places occupied here are numbered above, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10. *Nous ne lui en avons pas donné* (we have not given him any), 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. *Quand vous ne le lui avez pas envoyé* (though or whereas you have not sent it to him), 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11.

44. In positive commands, 9 must precede 3, 4, 5, 7, 8; as, *envoyez-m'en* (send me some), 9, 4, 8.

45. To avoid the disagreeable sound of *donnez-me-le*, *me* becomes *moi*, and is placed after *le*, making *donnez-le-moi*, give it to me. And so, *me* and *te* in positive commands always become *moi* and *toi*, except before *en*; as, *parlez-moi*, speak to me; *parlez m'en*, speak to me about it; *taie-toi*, be silent; *va-t'en*, begone.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.—During the several evenings of the week (June 14—19) discussions have taken place in the Lecture Hall, Goodramgate, on questions connected with the evidences of Christianity, between Mr. Thomas Cooper, the well known lecturer and author, and Mr. Geo. Jacob Holyoake, the equally well known editor of the *Reasoner*. The room was tolerably well filled on each occasion by audiences, who, generally speaking, listened calmly and attentively to the various arguments brought forward.

On Monday, June 14th, the Rev. Canon Robinson occupied the chair, some 200 to 300 persons being present. The subject was stated to be the "*A priori*" argument for the being and attributes of God; and the moral argument, or proofs derived from a consideration of man's nature as distinguished from that of animals, involving the doctrine of human responsibility." The affirmative was, of course, maintained by Mr. Cooper; the negative by Mr. Holyoake. In opening the proceedings the Rev. Canon Robinson asked for a fair hearing, without interruption or applause, for both speakers; and then the discussion proceeded. So far as we could judge it was of the usual character of this class of polemics, with the novelty, however, that both speakers standing in the position of private friends, there was more of genuine courtesy in their treatment of each other than commonly prevails in word combats. Between the two the difficult subject was treated with considerable ability, both speakers making the best of their positions. Speaking generally, the argument was fairly and properly conducted, though, occasionally, Mr. Holyoake showed a disposition to avoid the issues raised by his antagonist. It is but fair to state, however, that he

did not appear to do this except where, as he expressed it himself, he did not care either to affirm or deny; and except where (being the teacher of a positive and not a negative creed) he deemed it necessary, in order to his being understood, that he should state his own doctrines, though they did not exactly bear on the point under consideration.

The subject for discussion on Tuesday evening was the design, argument, or proofs of the existence, power, wisdom, goodness, omnipotence, and unity of God, derived from a survey of the teaching of science. Mr. Ald. J. Meek, who occupied the chair, stated, in his opening remarks, that a clergyman had expressed to him an opinion that these discussions would not go beyond the first evening, and that they would break up in uproar. The very patient and careful attention of those present justified the sanction given to this controversy by gentlemen like the Rev. Canon Hey and the Rev. Canon Robinson. He considered that inquiry, conducted in a proper, truth-seeking, truth-loving spirit, ought not to be frowned down. He would always, to the best of his ability, wage war against any authority, be it priestly or secular, that would crush honest thought and stifle proper inquiry. (Applause.) Mr. Cooper then proceeded to establish his position pointing out the evidence of design, contrivance, &c., in man and all the inferior animals, and urging that this design argued an intelligent mind, which carried them to God. Mr. Holyoake said he appeared before the audience with the object of proving that Theism was so far from having absolute certainty on its side that it has no right to claim dogmatism; and that atheists are entitled to some recognition as persons having actual, conscientious views. He admitted the evidence of

apparent contrivance in the universe, nor was he disposed to wonder less than Mr. Cooper at the marvels which nature everywhere presents, but he had stated nothing to prove that God had done it all. If he stated that nature had done it all, his assertion and that of Mr. Cooper were merely opposed to each other. He quoted authority in support of his argument, that though there was design in nature, it was not conclusive as to the existence of God, and it was safer to be ignorant than to be misinformed. Mr. Cooper, in reply, submitted that it was childish to suppose nature could make nature. Nature was non-intelligent; man was intelligent. How was it possible that non-intelligence could produce intelligence? The argument was continued until about half-past ten o'clock, when the proceedings closed with a vote of thanks to the chairman.

On Wednesday evening the hall was again well filled, the audience being composed chiefly of the working classes. The Rev. Canon Robinson presided, and opened the proceedings by expressing himself favourable to discussions such as the present, and considered the propriety of the auditory was a sufficient argument against all that had been advanced in opposition to free discussion in public. The subject of the present evening's debate was an "Argument for man's spiritual nature and for a future state." The affirmative of the question was maintained by Mr. Cooper, who brought all the powers of his intellect to bear upon it. His arguments were deduced from the facts of science, man's progressive nature, and, lastly, his moral nature, which were presented to his audience with great perspicuity and fairness. Mr. Holyoake, as on former occasions, took the negative side of the argument, and, so far as we were able to judge, his defence was far from being any answer to Mr. Cooper's arguments. To give in language any idea of the views entertained by that gentleman on this most important topic would be utterly impossible, as all his

remarks only tended to an evasion of the views enunciated by his opponent, and not to set up any particular theory of his own.

The subject on Thursday was the "Historical evidences for the truth of Christianity," Mr. Ald. J. Meek occupying the chair. Mr. Cooper took the initiative, detailing clearly and succinctly the usual arguments in support of the fact that Christianity is more than a mere tradition; was founded by Jesus Christ, who was a real person; that the written documents on which it rests were composed by the persons to whom they are ascribed; and that, from the evident truthfulness of these persons, and their full opportunities to, and capabilities of, forming a judgment, their record is to be believed. Mr. Holyoake, following the well-known bent of his mind, asked, "What good?" He was willing, he said, to concede all that had been asked, to allow that the New Testament had come to this generation in the way stated, had been written by the men stated, who believed that what they wrote was true, but what then? All that did not support the general proposition in the least. It might be true, but it did not make Christianity true—in his estimation, therefore, it was all of no value in argument. He asked Mr. Cooper to show its value. Mr. Cooper declined, saying that to do what Mr. Holyoake asked would be to trench upon the subject for the next evening, and that with Mr. Holyoake's concession his end was gained, for that was all he sought to establish.

The closing discussion took place yesterday evening, the Rev. Canon Hey being in the chair, and the room being quite filled with an attentive audience. The subject was the moral argument for the truth of Christianity. At the termination of the discussion, Mr. Cooper moved and Mr. Holyoake seconded, a vote of thanks to the chairman, who made a few remarks in conclusion.

LITERARY NOTICES.

MR. PETER CUNNINGHAM promises to visit America, we suppose in quest of fame and dollars, or dollars and fame, soon. It seems it will require the *Leviathan* to take him there.

PROUDHON has been sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of 4,000 fr., for publishing his *De la Justice*.

M. DE SACY, one of the chief editors of the *Journal des Débats*, has published a collection of articles contributed to that paper during the last 30 years, on Politics, Literature, and Morality.

State papers in the Foreign Secretary's office, bearing a date prior to 1688, may now be copied for historic purposes by authors. LORD MALMESBURY has earned the thanks of literary men by his common-sense view of this subject.

The Whittington Club—founded by Douglas Jerrold—purified by fire, has been rebuilt and reopened.

"*The Age*," a satirical poem by Philip James Bailey, is just published.

M. BIOT, the most distinguished living aged savant in France, intends publishing three volumes of selections from his literary and scientific writings.

ROBERT BROWN, D. C. L., "*Botanicorum facile princeps*," as Decandolle called him, keeper of the Botanical Department in the British Museum, and author of several important works on plants, died 10th inst.—aged 85.

M. A. HORSAGE has issued a clever work on Voltaire and his Times.

M. LEON DE ROENY is publishing a splendid artistic, literary, archæological, and historic work "*On Writing*."

An autograph Shakespeare signature of date March 11, 1612-13, was bought for *The British Museum*, at £315. Some choice quarto plays were at the same time sold.

WM. GRAHAM, author of "Owl-cots, and other Poems," known as "the Bard of Milk," a small river in Dumfriesshire, died at Moffat, in that county, 16th ult., aged 72.

"*The Tivoli*," after a two years' run, has stopped.

MR. SHIRLEY BROOKS is said to be editing "The Literary Gazette," under the proprietorship of Messrs. Bradbury and Evans.

ARY SCHEFFER, the artist, died on 15th ult. in Paris.

FRIEDRICH BODENSTEDT has just issued at Berlin the first part of a work, entitled "Shakespeare's Contemporaries and their Works."

A revised and enlarged edition of MR. NEIL's work, entitled "Debating Societies: an Essay," is in preparation.

Mr. Eades, of Bilston, a contributor to the *British Controversialist*, has published, during the past month, a small volume entitled "The World's Charity," and other poems.

A *Norfolk Man*, in the "Athenæum" of June 5th, says, that an editor of Shakespeare has made a discovery a short time ago of which he has seen the proofs, "that the widow of the immortal SHAKESPEARE married a man called Richard James, who, it is believed, was a barber!" *Incredible dictu!* The letter in which the above announcement is made contains a brief biographic sketch of that Sir Andrew Fountain whose features have, as it is said, passed for Addison's for more than a century.

JOHN C. PRINCE, the Lancashire poet, who was born at Wigan, 21st June, 1808, has, consequently, now crossed the archway of a century, and is "lip-deep in poverty" and distress. Any of our readers who have sought to spare might do much good by forwarding it direct to the bard at Charles Street, Ashton-under-Lyne, and *feel* the poetry of charity.

Classics seem gaining ground again. Scarcely have we got the ex-Chancellor's Homeric criticism digested—which, it will be remembered, was preceded by Sir G. C. Lewis's "Credibility of Roman History," than we are called upon to listen to Lord Ravensworth's English and lyrical translation of HORACE,—the most polite and accomplished gentlemen of Augustan times.

The Philosophy of History.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the Art of Reasoning, &c., &c., &c.

"Divine providence is the ship, and God is the pilot."—*Jeremy Taylor*.

"Unerring Providence has appointed to man *two* ends to be aimed at, viz., the happiness of this life and the happiness of the life eternal."—*Dante*.

"Everything desires its own perfection; and in this rests all its desires; and for this is everything desired."—*Dante*.

"The best state of man is that in which he is most free."—*Dante*.

THE artist, Thought, wears a care-fretted brow so long as the Protean speculations on which he employs his pencil remain changeful and unfixed. Content only beams in upon him when, by might of mind, he has seized the subtle and versatile ideas which flit, phantom-like, before the vision of his soul, and has compelled them to assume significance, reality, and form.

No one can have read extensively, or reflected intently, upon any subject, without having felt somewhat of this uneasiness and dissatisfaction—a dissatisfaction which will not cease its disturbing influences till the mind has mastered for itself some point of view from which the varied and multiplex objects in the panorama of thought, fact, feeling, and fancy fall into fitting places and correlations, and so acquire some degree of fixedness, clearness, comprehensibility. The ever-changing, still-recurring phenomena of thought, by their very mystery and strangeness, excite inquiry, set observation on the watch, and rouse the reason to exertion. Investigation, once fairly instigated to examination and research, is ceaselessly active, unrestingly attentive, and the truth cannot long evade her sleepless vigilance. All the interest which the science of logic receives, all the industry the art of reasoning excites, is the result of the anxiety of Thought to master the mass of experience and idealisms which present themselves to him, and threaten to overmaster him. As Philip Van Artevelde says of the citizens of Ghent, so Thought says of all phenomena,—

"I purpose but to lead them where I will;"

but the soul, instinctively as Adriana, answers—

"Then they will turn upon thee; never yet

Would they endure a chief that crossed their humour."

It would seem, then, that Bacon was right in affirming that "Nature is only subdued by submission?" No! not wholly so.

Thought is also a power; it also demands homage, and Nature can only subdue Thought by submission:—

“The artist cannot give
The pictured form unless ‘tis in his mind.”

Here, then, are apparent irreconcilabilities; two powers, each claiming sovereignty, each unyielding unless submitted to, and yet each ineffective alone. Unless Nature will enter the moulds of Thought, and become subject to its laws, science, knowledge, art, progress are impossibilities; unless, on the other hand, Thought fashions its Procrustean bed of observation, experiment, &c., so as to satisfy Nature, she will not abide with the soul, but remain alien and unfriendly. The intercourse which gives birth to science, art, civilization, &c., cannot take place. Who will release us from the dilemma of conscious impotence thus pressed upon us, and brought into keen prominence? By what means shall we learn to bring into one—to reconcile—the contesting theories of thought in which this paradox originates? How shall we educe a “Logic of Experimentalism,” in which these two theorems shall be held as true, yet neither contradictory nor inconsistent? That task we shall undertake at another time, we hope. Meanwhile, it is sufficient for our present purpose to have brought it clearly within the vision of the consciousness, and to have shown that, notwithstanding this seeming antagonism and real congruity, science, civilization, and art have had their being, form, and outward fashioning—to prove that Thought is not a victor over an oppositionless foe, is not uneasy causelessly, has indeed cause for care, and is, in the warfare of speculation, not without difficulties to overcome.

Should our thought, therefore, propose to itself a task in which it may be overpowered, and attempt a conquest in which itself may be defeated, it will be granted that often before has thought failed—for a season—to vanquish phenomena; and that our thought is, in that act of failure, not singular indeed. The history of science proves that it is through a line of failures the human mind marches on to ultimate success. It is a perilous victory, indeed, when Thought attains at one leap the vantage-ground it seeks, and, gaining it, succeeds in that which it determined to perform.

On few topics is there greater difficulty in forming settled opinions than on that which we have now selected—and selected for that very reason—as the subject of our present paper. “The Philosophy of History” has occupied the inquiries of many of the most brilliant and far-reaching thinkers of all ages. From the era of Herodotus to the yesterday’s issue of the *Times*, its problems have, in some form or other, been before the thoughts of men, and it has had more effort expended upon it than any other speculative *thesis* whatever; except, perhaps, the great and

paramount problem of modern, if not all, days, How can I most advantage myself? It is not at all probable, then, that in a brief and hasty prelection, such as this, *we* shall be able "to pluck out the heart of the mystery" of a topic at once so recondite and so common: yet, without altogether laying ourselves open to the Menzelian compliment paid to Hegel, of being "a speculative, self-sufficient, and self-satisfied *Ego*-ling," we presume that *we*, like others, may *attempt* to suggest one or two ideas on the subject—which though they may not be new *and* true, may have one or other of these characteristics. To look a difficulty in the face is half to master it:—

"All my life long,
I have beheld with most respect the man
Who knew himself and knew the ways before him,
And from among them chose considerately,
With a clear foresight, not a blindfold courage,
And having chosen, with a steadfast mind
Pursued his purposes. I trained myself
To take my place in high or low estate,
As one of that scant order of mankind.
Wherefore, though I indulge no more the dream
Of living—as I hoped I might have lived—
A life of temperate and thoughtful joy,
Yet I repine not."

In reading the thought-laden "*Scienza Nuova*" of Vico, the difficulty of rightly treating this subject first prominently suggested itself; and it will be recollected, that in a brief biography of that great man, presented to our readers, we promised to take up the question. That promise we feel bound now to redeem, and shall, with diffident boldness though unhaltingly, proceed to an exposition of what we believe to be the true "*Philosophy of History*."

History is the note-book of Time. It contains snatches, here and there, of those matters relating to man's doings, feelings, thoughts, conditions, sayings, writings, &c., which he has deemed, wisely or unwisely, worthy of preservation. Indeed, it might almost be called, Time's Autobiography, edited by his children,—

"And, at his pleasure, 'tis made rich or poor."

Those who would search into it must partly know and partly guess; and it is in this act of guessing that man's chief liability to error lies and lurks. No pedantic spirit of historic illuminism should animate us as we look upon the records of Time. We cannot enlighten the thick darkness that broods over the past, unless our light can flash at once upon all the facts of bygone life, and, as the rays reflect thence, behold in their light the whole plains of history which have not been noted, and the streams of events which have not had their courses marked, except by here and there a dotted line. Niebuhr, Lewis, Glad-

stone, Merivale, &c., have attempted this; and yet, though sometimes successful, how few can see, with the lamp they hold, the things they point to as lying full in the line of vision. We have neither space, time, nor wish to shed new light upon the dark places of history *now*. We desire rather to comprehend the true and right fate of our race, as deducible from history and thought—to become acquainted with the pathways in which man has journeyed towards civilization—to see the directing spirit of events, and to inquire reverently within the holy temple of Providence whether the race of man is bound by the omnipotent decrees, overmastering all human foresight and endeavour. If we could understand the relationships of God and man in history, the means by which the agencies of each and both might be brought into co-operative activity, the end towards which events tend, and the task man has before him for accomplishment, we should rejoice exceedingly. How much of these aims lie beyond the compass of human thought, how much within the legitimate grasp of the mind of man? Let us go on and see.

The universe in which we dwell, and of which we are the prime denizens, is fashioned in accordance with the decisions of some all-ruling Power, whose gift its being, form, powers, processes, changes, laws, &c., are.

The souls and bodies of which, in union, we ourselves are composed, originate not in, from, with, or by ourselves, but are the results of circumstances, laws, powers, &c., of which we may or may not be cognizant, but of which we have been or are the subjects; and are still subservient to laws, powers, influences, circumstances, &c., dominion over which is not wholly given to us.

The conditions of Nature are fixed and enduring, except in so far as miracle may have been, or may be, interposed to change them, or the laws under which these conditions are now extant provide for and necessitate a change or changes therein.

Nature is, therefore, so far as man is concerned, a congeries of conditions, animated—let us say, for want of a better expression, by laws—laws not, so far as we know, innate in themselves, or likely to be so, but impressed upon them, or, rather, interpenetrating them, and conforming them to the accomplishment of the designs of that power in whose mind these laws originated, and by whose decrees they now are and operate.

Man, in this living unity of soul and body, feels within himself that his being is subject to law—that occurrences uncontrollable by him go on in his frame and spirit—that changes and acts in and on which his will has, at least, no conscious influence, take place—that he also is, in fact, a congeries of conditions animated by laws over whose appointment, operations, and processes he has, or has had, no direct or directing power, derived from some source not *in* him, and obedient to a will other and higher than his own.

In all ages man, feeling this, has named this higher and all-controlling will, God.

The will of God, so shown in *man*, has been often named *Destiny*: in *Nature*, Providence; though this latter name more properly refers to the interrelations of man with man, man with nature, and nature with man; and the former ought, more properly, to be regarded not as *destiny* but *purpose*.

History is the result of the action and re-action, or rather the interaction, of man and nature. Events are the outgrowth of the human will, under the tillage and in the atmosphere of nature. Providence has the oversight, and draws the plan of all. Man *proposes*, God *disposes*; and history is the fruit of this double act. It is no single, separate, and isolated effluence which works out events; it is a conjoint, though not always consentaneous and harmonious, outgoing of Divine design and human intention and act. To *be* as well as to *do* are forms of historic existence, and each is possible only in so far as the will of man operates within, against, or along with, the diviner will, whose plans are settled in eternity. History, so understood, is a study of high and pure meaning, of enduring interest, of grand and noble bearing. Its meaning is lengthened, and broadened, and greated, because it comes from eternity through time, and circles back from time into eternity again.

The laws of nature are ever operant around, on, and within man. They ceaselessly declare, by their effects, the will of God, their author, to man.

Man's nature is so constituted as to make him seek happiness as his chief good—the end, aim, and purpose of his life.

Happiness is to be found truly and only in actions, &c., conformable to the laws of our own being and the laws of nature, wherein God has incorporated his will.

But man, being created in the image and fashioned after the likeness of God, is also the possessor of a will—the prime quality of which is a capacity for determining.

In the active, continuous, and effective exertion of this will as the highest and noblest, indeed the most Godlike, of human attributes, man feels his chief happiness to consist.

The grand practical problem of life, viz., the attainment of the greatest possible happiness, would be solved could we determine and define the means by which the will of man, in the secret retirements of his own soul, and the will of God, shown in the constitution of man and nature, could be brought into harmony, agreement, consentaneous activity.

In determining this, we may be helped by reflecting that the ordinances and decisions of God are changeless—that his purposes are “from everlasting to everlasting.” Man alone is changeable in his ways, thoughts, determinations, &c., but not in his ultimate destiny, which is God-appointed.

Were man *now* in his original state, his being, impulses, and desires would co-work with nature to bring about the fulfilment of his predestined purpose, and happiness would everywhere necessarily abound.

Neither do man's thoughts, &c., co-operate with nature, nor happiness overspread the whole earth as a garment of delight; therefore man is not *now* in his "first estate."

Nature and he are dissonances; "like sweet bells jangled out of tune, and harsh," they chime no longer with the heavenly harmony of their "origin and end."

Either man, or nature, or both, must have changed from the mode and manner of their earliest being before such a dissonance could have happened.

Nature is *wholly* animated by the will of God; man is only partly so; *i. e.*, so far forth only as he is a part of nature, and a constituent element in the multitude of her forms.

God, being essentially changeless, nature, so far as it is the expression and symbol of the will of God, must have been and be changeless too, except in so far as miracle and law provide beforehand for change.

Change must, therefore, have originated in and with man.

Any change made by man in the pre-ordained mode of ongoing in the universe, must have resulted in and be continuously productive of evil, seeing that it was and is a change from the Divine mode and state, in which happiness is alone attainable.

Any change so made must eventually produce, not misery only, but a desire and a struggle to get free from that misery.

But change having originated in the will of man, no thought of return, but rather of ongoing, would excite his breast—the will is stubborn, froward, selfish, persistent.

In so far, then, as existence was possible in antagonism to and violation of the purposes of God, conveyed to man by the intimations of his own consciousness, by the laws regulating the phenomena of nature, in the centre of and environed by which he had his being—without taking into account at all, just now, a revelation of the conditions of human life and happiness given to man in the dawn and dayspring of being—man would, in all likelihood, follow the bent of his own propensities, and go on pursuing the desire of his own heart, withstanding the warnings, the threatenings, and, at last, the pains of contravening the implied—if not the expressed—wishes of his Creator.

Suppose, however, a law not written in the heart only, or in nature only, but spoken in the accents of love and lovingkindness, of warning, and instruction, then would the sin be greater—but then, also, would the tendency towards a return, repentance, be less; for the wayward will, beset by its own self-love, and led on by the greed of "finding its own pleasure," would go

on with greater intensity of eagerness when it sought for proofs, in experience, of its own rightness and righteousness.

To teach the human race the lesson of its own impotence the struggle, too, must be allowed to proceed. Laws must be broken, their penalties must be borne, their full influence felt, except in so far as mercy chose to interfere for their mitigation. Every turn and manœuvre of human ingenuity would be brought into play to quirk the sufferer out of the bondage of law in which the individual was darkly bound. "Many inventions" would be tried to escape from or lessen the power and the punishment of the majestic laws which, by the ordination of the Highest, held court in every avenue of sense and thought, of experience and anticipation. All would be found hopeless and unavailing. When the experiment had proceeded so far as to show man—if he really sought happiness, as it was the tendency of his nature to do—it was not to be found in pursuing his own will, it must be brought to an end. And man, who before had only the theory of punishment *subjectively* inlaid in his soul, should thereafter bear the knowledge, the pain, the practical sight and touch and endurance of pain *objectively* brought within the mind's ken, and impressed upon the very essence of the soul. A turning impulse must be given to man, and such measures must be used as should effectually arouse the fear, the awe, and the attention of the race to the terrific consequences of traversing the will of the Almighty—and the Deluge came. The renovated race, saved, with all the experience and little of the positive sin of the past, were permitted to re-occupy the earth—the incentive of evil example being taken away, lest it might mislead the ondriving energy of a fearful experience lying behind them—lest they should backslide; and the beacon-light of "a glorious hope" being hoisted, that they might be induced to push on "towards the mark and the prize."

The ages pass on, and men still continued to seek their own way, and to take delight in pursuing *that*. In so doing, they spread over the earth, and extended their conquests over nature in some points, but allowed their own souls to live on without the seed of godliness being sown therein, or the fruits of righteousness being got therefrom. In their self-love and self-will they in many instances forgot God; and the several nations arose in their own strength to work out a civilization.

Nations take their characteristics from the conditions of nature, the circumstances, &c., which surround them, and the will which operates within them. Differences of climate, fruits, ease or difficulty of gaining a livelihood or wealth, the dispositions of neighbouring tribes, &c., cause differences in manners, inclinations, customs, tendencies, &c., which, being constantly, or at least persistently, operative upon the people migrating to, settling in, or born and reared in those countries, educe simi-

larities in mode of thought, life, occupation, social habits, laws, governments, &c., and so spring nationalities, having diverse interests, feelings, wishes, &c., which, separating themselves from the community of mankind by these artificial barriers, grow, at last, to regard themselves as antagonistic races, whose glory is conquest, and whose interest is dominion. The real unity of the race being lost, men aim at its re-establishment by the strategies of war, &c. So grow they up, forgetful of their true needs, and striving to fill themselves with the very husks of happiness; they depart from its sources farther and farther. As races diverge and lose themselves thus, a new form of the agency of Providence is elicited—for though changeless in *essence*, the forms and procedure of God are ever adaptive to the urgencies of any given or possible case—and a *choice* is made of a nation who shall be the testimony and the test of righteousness in the earth. They must be tempted and tried, but upheld. They suffer, and even fall; but they are raised again and again. An education of mercy is granted unto them. They are enfranchised. Their enemies are defeated. They are called to new trials in their service by being dedicated to the working out of a new form of God's design, by being made the custodiers of a written law, and the possessors of an exclusive ritual. They are thus hemmed in from contamination, and set apart as an example and influence to others. Prone as is the nature of man to follow the devices of his own heart, they were frequently found relapsing and sinning, but were still upholden and guarded; while the experiment was making elsewhere of the possibility of seeking and finding God by the pathways hewn by the human will. The failure of each nation to know and revere God was marked by its downfall. In all the ancient nations the period of their declension—their excision from the roll of history—was when they had given good proof that their own will was “the man of their counsel,” and God was not in all their thoughts. Form after form of national life, religious worship, rite and ceremony, philosophy and doubt,—but each, as it failed to recall man to his mission and to bestow on him the reality, and not the mere formal seeming, of what he sought—happiness,—gave place to another and a newer form, until the cycle of experiment was exhausted, by man as man, and “God saw that it was good” to bring to light the merciful issue out of all their distresses which he had in store for man.

The gorgeous sensualism of Nineveh and its co-empires faded; the gigantic utilitarianism of Egypt was found wanting; the intellectualism of Greece had failed; the majestic constitutionalism of Rome was waning, if it had not waned; Judaism, as a theocratic enginry, had wantoned with the ways of the outer world, and, despite the warnings and threatenings of prophets and the lessons of Providence, was driving right ahead towards destruction, when

—the Saviour of the world came, suffered, taught, and died. The olden civilizations fell; their mammoth and colossal bulk made their ruin only more marked, more hideous, more needful. The leaven of a new civilization was worked into society, and change was potent everywhere.

The old civilization was national, not personal; it provided by external pressure for the changes it produced; it was therefore the cause of great works, politics, wars, &c.: but the new civilization was personal, and thence truly national, for it provided for the forthgrowth and outgrowth of the individual.

In the civilization of the ancient world—except partly in the “peculiar people” of God—the law of action was from external sources to bring about and cause internal change, to make change “enter into” the heart from without; in the christian civilization which now prevails such progress as is truly praiseworthy and beneficial “proceedeth out of the heart.” In the one, the conduct was lacquered over with apparences and shams; in the other, the pure and genuine soul is itself exhibited in earnest and faithful honesty of endeavour.

For a while the world was in a transition state; the two forms of progress, the two terms of ongoing, the two principles of societarian life worked, sometimes antagonistically, sometimes harmoniously, but never in coalesced oneness. And hence the national changes, the evolutions and revolutions of society, of life, of events and purposes. The failure of Greece, the fall of Rome, the growth of Germany, the rise of the nobility, the increase of true commerce, the compromise of Mohammed, the empire of Charlemagne, the strength of feudalism, the subsequent falling asunder of artificially compacted nationalities and formation of small states, the establishment of republics, the dismemberments of despotisms, and the grand heroism of the crusades, were all so many forms of the working of this individualism of which Christ was the originator—this stirring, and groping, and striving after an ideal form of empire, wherein government and nationality could coexist with personal freedom, wherein the inner thoughts and purposes of men’s changed hearts might be actively exerted in the promotion of national prosperity and governmental superiority. Hence the vast multitude of enterprises which, in the early ages of the new civilization, gave scope for the outworking of the newly-aroused personal energies of men.

But the world had neglected to search for and consciously comprehend the spirit of the new birth of society, and the church and governments generally were hurried into false steps. The only known forms of government had been those in which the coercive measures of the law were enforced upon the human will by outward pains and penalties, and recommended only by the prowess of the state. The Roman law, as the greatest embodiment of national state-craft, became the groundwork of all

jurisprudence, and the imperialism of the old historic times was accepted as the guide and guard of the new.

The church pursued the same plan, and by the institution of a tyranny more galling than the old forms of life, destroyed its own noblest distinction as the advocate of personal change, the defender of the consciously and conscientiously changing, and the God-appointed guild for the protection of the right to think, speak, and do, as conscience warranted. The dark ages ensued.

But the still small voice of the gospel kept urging the individual to attest the sincerity of faith by works, and the church and state-fettered soul felt grieved, tortured, and rebellious. Its activities took in some the pathways of art, in others of arms, in others of adventure. Italy became famous in architecture and painting, Constantinople was subdued, and the names of Vasco de Gama and Columbus tell the rest.

The enfranchisement of speculation and of religious belief became the next necessities of man. Abelard, Aquinas, Scotus, Roger Bacon, Raymond, &c., were the forerunners of the change in the former, perfected by Francis Bacon and Descartes. Wickliffe, Reuchlin, Erasmus, &c., were among the agitators whose voice evoked the Reformation, and gained the free right to worship God for the human race. The religious wars resulted thence, and the many important changes which the attainment of free thought in some countries introduced by competition into others. The best and most valuable boons to mankind are often abused, and the freedom of the will having been frankly declared by some portion of the church, the advocates of licence became clamorous for farther concessions, and the French Revolution was the ultimate protest in France against the compulsory and external domination of the church over the human soul. For a time the old imperialism was required to restrain the over-proneness of the soul to overleap the bounds of safety, and then arose the conqueror of Europe and "the scourge of God." There was required, too, a balance for the power of Roman Catholicity in Europe, a free brotherhood, a national power, whose weight in the scale would overmatch the union of despots in favour of the external pressure of the abolished *régime* of old civilization, and be itself a potency and a standard-bearer in the cause of freedom. The American Revolution accomplished this. Later still did it become requisite to clip the wings of despotism, and, strange to say, in the magnificent workings of Providence, an upstart and unstable, but for the time effective, despotism helped to strike down the age-potent dynasty which rules the Slaves, and gave the example to the world of a house divided against itself. This acted only so far as the champion nation of free thought wished, and as a prelude to another exercise of a Providence-appointed lot. India—age-fettered in soul and conscience—begins a mistaken struggle, whose

high purpose seems to be to work out for these mighty millions emancipation from caste and superstition, and to crown the whole contest with the right—to which the knowledge will be added—of serving the true God in and from the heart, and working the will of the World-Disposer with willingness and joy.

This less than "a bird's-eye view" of a most important subject we have thrown off in haste, though not, we hope, carelessly. The grand canons of the philosophy of history which we desire to promulgate, and of which the foregoing pages have been designed to be a brief exposition, are as follows:—

1st. The human race has, in its individuals and in its collectiveness, a purpose to fulfil, a world-life to go through, having an aim and end to be either consciously or unconsciously worked out.

2nd. If consciously worked out by individuals, reward-worthy in them.

3rd. That purpose is to bring the perfection intended for the race out of the now existent imperfection of the race.

4th. The means by which this is to be brought about are the bringing of the human will into harmony with the Divine will.

5th. The possibility of this is certain, because the providence of God in the laws of nature and our own being makes happiness,—the object of man's keenest search,—dependent on attention to His will. Every time that the creature, individually or nationally, opposes the will of the Creator, a corrective is applied, which, being registered in experience, becomes a dissuasive in future from pursuing such a course. History is thus a report of a hitherto unsuccessful experiment made by the human race for the attainment of happiness. Each failure, by a system of exclusions, ought to be cut out of the programme of the future. Unless, indeed, mankind could wisely accept and act upon the divinely given theory, wherein failure is impossible—the hearty and practical adoption of "faith in Jesus Christ."

. The following works may be advantageously studied by the reader interested in the topic of the foregoing paper, viz.:—

"Scienza Nuova" (Vico's), 1st Ed., 1725; 2nd Ed., 1730.

Herder's "Ideas upon the Philosophy of the History of Man," 1784-87.

Hegel's "Lectures on the Philosophy of History," Bohn, 1857.

Schlegel's "Philosophy of History," Bohn, 1843.

Miller's "History Philosophically Illustrated," Bohn, 1849.

Fichte's "Characteristics of the Present Age," Chapman, 1847.

Lewes' "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences," Bohn, 1853.

Littre's "System of Positive Philosophy," translated, *without acknowledgment*, in "The United States' Democratic Review," 1847.

Religion.

**DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL
BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE
MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM
PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?**

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

SCRIPTURE and nature plainly teach that the future life will be higher than the present, and that it will be a continuation of the present; consequently, those beings who are to exist hereafter must, according to the laws of adaptation, be possessed of a higher organization suited to this higher state. It does not follow, from these premises, that the bodies we shall receive in the resurrection will be composed of different material to the fabric we now inhabit, but that our future body will be a higher and more complex organism, though composed of the same material. This we hold to be the true meaning of the word *change* in those passages of Scripture which refer to this subject, and is all that is necessary to establish identity between the present mortal body and the future immortal one. There is no reason to suppose that the difference between the resurrection body and the present one will be any greater than the apparent difference existing between the butterfly and caterpillar; and the former is admitted by all to spring from the ruins of the latter. Indeed, it is impossible to deny this, for "it is well known to naturalists that Swammerdam, by a process not necessary to detail here, discovered the lineaments of the butterfly in the caterpillar, even before its metamorphosis into a chrysalis."* If, then, it is acknowledged that the ungainly worm contains the lineaments of the gaily-clothed insect, why, we ask, may not this vile body contain the lineaments of the future glorious one?

Again: we are not to infer from the fact that this body is to undergo certain changes, and finally to assume a form somewhat modified, that it will not be constituted from the same material, any more than we are to doubt that snow contains the same unalterable atoms of oxygen and hydrogen as water, or that nitrous oxide and nitric acid are compounds of nitrogen and

* "God Revealed in the Creation," &c., p. 98.

oxygen. According to the laws of combining proportion, it is only necessary for the same elements to combine in certain fixed ratios to cause the greatest variety in vegetable and animal substances. This was evidently Paul's argument in the words:—"All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds," &c. In other words, what absurdity is there in supposing that He who created so great a variety of species from kindred matter will, at some future period, call into existence a nobler structure, containing "some of the materials of the present body," which shall flourish in everlasting youth in the presence of the eternal God and His holy angels? Surely, it is no difficult task for the Almighty, who not only created all things, but sustains them all by the power of His word, to add another more perfect link to the chain of creation. Say, Infinite Spirit,—

"For thou knowest; thou from the first
Wast present, and, with mighty wings outspread,
Dove-like, sat'st brooding on the vast abyss,
And mad'st it pregnant;"

is *this* beyond thy power and thy *will*?

But, again, if this theory is "a virtual repudiation" of our "own doctrine," why endeavour to construe those passages which positively affirm that "*this* corruptible must put on incorruption," as referring to some event other than the glorious resurrection, which is to bring forth our frail bodies from the bowels of the earth, and impregnate them with the strength and vigour of eternal life? Really, such declamation is eminently the deafening of our ears with an "abundance of superfluous breath;" for if the body will not be risen, there is no *resurrection*, and the word is not only meaningless, but absurd. However, "E. Foster" asks, "If they are changed, how can they be the same bodies?" Let his own definition answer, viz.:—"The meaning of this passage is, that the spiritual body we have will be [but is not *now*] an image of the Lord's divine one, which even now is being fashioned [or changed] within us by his regenerating energy." If, then, "the spiritual body" can undergo certain "regenerating" processes, and still retain its "specific individual identity," this material one may remain "the very identical body," although it must be changed. And, indeed, this is not all; this "perfectly substantial being" is reinvigorated hereafter, as well as being continually renewed here; for "them that sleep in Jesus will God bring with Him," means, according to Dr. Dwight, "not the bodies of the saints; but the spirits of just men made perfect;" and this opinion E.F. has indorsed; but in the very next sentence he denies the possibility of the material body being identical if subjected to

similar refreshings. If this is not nonsense, we know not what is. "Well it may be said, that there is no consistency in error."

"But admitting, for the sake of argument," says he, that God will raise the dead, &c., it remains to be shown "by what peculiar process matter can be converted into spirit." In this we have been kindly anticipated, for he assures us the spirit is "a perfectly substantial being," in direct contradiction to our Divine Lord's solemn declaration, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones." The only way of reconciling these statements, is to assume that the soul has, through some unknown agency, been endowed with organic form and substance, which it did not possess previous to its entering this tenement of clay. Hence it obviously follows, that the same mysterious law that converts spirit into matter can also convert matter into spirit. The process is as simple in one instance as the other. But it is further asked, "If God will *give* it a body, how can it be the same body?" In reply we ask, If God is to give it a body in the resurrection, how can it be in possession of that body in the present life? Or, is E. F.'s spiritual-material body to be clothed with another? If so, will its specific, individual identity be preserved? According to his own views, identity of soul and body will be for ever lost. There cannot, therefore, be either rewards or punishments, nor even a future life. Understand the phrase, "God giveth it a body," as we may, it is evident that its meaning is the same when applied to the vegetable kingdom, for the latter part of the same verse expressly asserts, "and to every seed his own body." The text may be paraphrased thus—God giveth it, that is the human, his own body, as He gives to every seed his own body. But granting for the present that E. F.'s exposition is correct, the inevitable climax to which it leads is, that the produce is not identical with the seed itself. Positively, we have been too hasty; its absurdity does not end here, for if the fruit is not of the same kind as the seed, the necessity of tilling the soil, and sowing in it various seeds, may cease for ever. Why earn our bread by the sweat of our brow any longer? Let us "eat, drink, and be merry," and feel assured that the Lord will crown the fields with abundant harvests, whether we sow or not.

We are instructed in the Bible that God is a perfect being; but if his almighty power exceeds his goodness and his love, his perfection is incomplete. The negative writers in this debate do not presume to measure Omnipotence; but they are desirous of applying their mathematical calculations to His attributes of justice and mercy. We do not doubt that God *can* raise the dead, but we deny there is evidence that he *will*, is the objection urged; and to this objection we now intend addressing ourselves. It is demonstrated from the fact, that the physical portion, as well as the soul, is subject to pain and pleasure, annexed

to good and evil actions here, that they will endure perfect punishment or receive perfect happiness together in a future life. Because it is unjust to inflict temporal pain and award temporal pleasure only to one part of the human being, and eternal retribution or reward to the other. "If in this life only we have hope in Christ," says Paul, "we are of all men most miserable." Unquestionably, if there is no resurrection of the dead, our Ruler is only partially perfect. But, in order to extricate himself from this dilemma, E. F. asserts that the outer body, with which the inner one is clothed (we do not wish to be irreverent, but we must believe that if the soul is "a perfectly substantial being, possessed of the human form," and "endowed with all the organs that constitute the material one," that it must be less than it), is "insensible." It is the spiritual body that enjoys and suffers; the other is totally devoid of life. Indeed! Then it is the spiritual one that bleeds when an incision is made in the lifeless part: and "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," is the unerring testimony of inspiration, without being changed,—unless, indeed, its Lilliputian dimensions may enable it to creep in unobserved. We should like to know, if a man were to lose a leg, or an arm, or both, would his soul remain perfect? Decidedly not, if E. F.'s notions are correct, for "matter cannot occupy two places at one and the same time." And amputation must equally impair the symmetrical proportions of each. We trust the mere opening of *this* assertion is a satisfactory refutation of it. But to return. Does it not amount to positive proof, that as it is necessary to raise this corporeal form from the tomb, in order to justify His dealings toward us, and maintain the equilibrium of His attributes, that the same *will* be done.

We can hardly credit that the simple assertion, that a passage of Scripture is "figurative," is a satisfactory demonstration that its allusions have more particular reference to one event than another; or, admitting that such reasoning is logical, it remains still to be proved that its expressions are not typical of some other similar event.

In turning more immediately to the Scriptural argument, we beg to assure E. F. that our abhorrence of the dogmas which have been attached to Christianity is as unbounded as his own; and that our feelings toward "public and private creeds," and especially the opinions of Jews, let them be ever so "liberal minded," may be expressed in the same words; for the very simple reason, that the dogmas complained of and "public and private creeds," &c., are one and the same thing. We trust, therefore, that we are justified in thus abruptly dismissing this point, and those who deem it of importance, without further comment.

The more celebrated than accurate Locke says: "In the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the

Christian faith) I find our Saviour and the apostles to preach the 'resurrection of the dead,' and the 'resurrection from the dead,' in many places; but I do not remember any place where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember, in any place of the New Testament where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of, any such expression as 'the resurrection of the body,' much less of 'the same body.'" And we cannot do less than say, in return, that his philosophical research was more extensive than his knowledge of Scripture; for, had he examined accurately, he would have seen the following, "For *this* corruptible must put on incorruption, and *this* mortal must put on immortality. So, when *this* corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and *this* mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory." Now that the defect in Mr. Locke's Biblical knowledge has been supplied, and as this is all he seemed to require, the whole of his elaborate reasoning may be regarded as "set at nought."

If there were no other passages upon this subject than the recorded instances of the translations of Enoch and Elias, these of themselves are sufficient to prove that this material body is to "inherit the kingdom of God." In the case of the first, we read that he "was not found;" and in that of the second, that he was taken up into heaven in a "chariot of fire." If the material body did not accompany the soul, where did it go? Why was not the former found? And why did not the latter obey the same law as his *mantle*, and fall to the earth? True, these were exceptions to the law now in operation, that every man must die, and be raised again; but they are not exceptions to the law that the whole of the man is not to exist in a world beyond the grave; for if this is impossible to the whole of the human race, it is equally impossible to every individual. On the other hand, again, as the bodies of two saints have entered the land of glory, the inference is complete and unanswerable, that the whole of the human family will be immortalized too.

And not only have we the instances of Enoch and Elias being taken up into heaven, but there is the great fact upon which Christianity is based in our favour, viz.:—the resurrection of Christ's material body from the grave. It is hoped that those who doubt this are few indeed. However, if there are any, they are referred to Matt. xx. 19, 20; Luke xxiv. 5, 6, 12; John xx. 27; from which they will see that the same body that was nailed to the cross, and buried in his own sepulchre, snapped asunder the bonds of death, and rose triumphantly on the morning of the third day, and "showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs." Is there any one who doubts the identity of the body? If there is, let him examine the prints

of the nails in the hands, and the wound in his side, and "be not faithless, but believing." Will any of those who deny the resurrection inform us what became of his body? and whither did it go? Why did it not remain in the sepulchre with the linen in which it had been shrouded? Will they accept a bribe from the Jewish Sanhedrim, and swear "that his disciples stole him away," while the Roman guard slept? But why doubt? why hesitate? He *did* rise, being seen of his disciples "forty days, and speaking of things pertaining to the kingdom of God." If it is objected that the disciples did not immediately recognize him, our answer is, it appears they were unprepared for so joyful a meeting; but they were not long in doubt, and the instant recognition took place, they embraced and worshipped him as their former Lord and Master. From this, too, it may be seen that there was no deceit practised: and be the change of death what it may, it does not annihilate identity. If it is still further inquired, How could such a body penetrate stone walls? we ask, in return, How could such a body make for itself a highway on the bosom of the troubled deep?

It may, however, be asked, What has Christ's resurrection to do with the universal one? Much; for the certainty of the final resurrection is founded upon his. "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. . . . For if the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised." And as his material body rose from the grave, so must ours, ere we can be modelled in "the perfect image of his glorious body." To affirm, therefore, that God *will* not raise the dead, is a direct imputation upon his truthfulness; for he asserts—"this mortal shall put on immortality;" and that Christ has "become the firstfruits of them that slept," and thus obtained for us a victory over death. "But thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ." But how can the victory be won, if death's icy grasp is still unbroken? And how can it be said the king of terrors is vanquished, if he exercises eternal dominion over us? Away with such scepticism from our hearts and minds!

We readily admit that we are unable to explain how the dead are raised, or how the seed is quickened, so that "it bring forth much fruit;" nevertheless, as our opponents admit that God *can* do it, and as we think it is shown that He *will*, the conclusion is as convincing and as irresistible as if we were able to do so.

EUGENE ARAM.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."—*Matt. xxii. 32.*

In ages past a belief in the resurrection of the material body was doubtless essential to preserve the idea of man's immortality; and to a great extent, we fear, it is essential now—now

in this age of progress of which we so often boast. When ignorance prevails respecting a future world, and the nature of man's soul as its inhabitant, how can we have a permanent idea of man's immortality, unless we believe the body to be the subject of the resurrection? That such ignorance prevails at the present day is made manifest to us by the confession of those whose duty it is to "bring life and immortality to light." When we question our christian friends upon the subject, we are generally met with the exclamation, "It is a mystery." We ask, *Where* is heaven? *where* is hell? To reach heaven, shall we have to travel through space till we pass the stars, whose distance from us is incalculable? Will it be possible thus to arrive at the boundaries of space? If so, we make our exit from space into what? What is it that separates the natural from the spiritual world? Do the good and the evil take their flight in opposite directions? Are the patriarchs and apostles *now* enjoying the bliss of heaven? Can they *see*, and *hear*, and *speak*? In what *form* do they appear to each other? Are they *sensible* of each other's presence? Shall I be able, immediately after the death of the body, to see and recognize my friends who are gone before me, and enjoy their presence as I did in this world; or must I wait for the uncertain time of the resurrection of the material body? If the latter, shall I remain, in the meantime, in a *conscious* expectation, or shall I lie dormant in "the land of forgetfulness"? If we could find our christian friends able to give lucid and satisfactory answers to all these questions, the doctrine of a material resurrection would soon be amongst the things that were; but we contend, on the other hand, that if these things are not understood, it is difficult for them to *see* and believe that man is an immortal being, independent of the resurrection of the body. And hence, as it is essential that a belief that man is immortal should be universally held, it is doubtless of the divine providence that this doctrine should yet be preserved.

When searching for the truth of any particular point of doctrine in the word of God, we need be especially careful that we do not decide too hastily as to the true meaning of the terms used. It is thought by many that as death is spoken of as sleep, it will therefore be similar to the sleep we experience here, only deeper and more protracted, and, consequently, that the body will be again raised to life. "Clement" says, "As sleep is the state in which the body takes its rest after the toils of the day, so we find it is written of those who work for Christ here and 'die in the Lord,' that *they* rest from their labours." He should have added, "and *their* works do follow *them*." "Clement" here evidently confounds *they* with *their bodies*. How could *their works* follow them into the *graves*? And what does he understand by the term "rest" in the use he makes of the

passage? Does he understand it to mean inactivity? So far as the body is concerned, as an organized existence, it is annihilated, while its constituent parts, as particles of materiality, are separated and dispersed in never ceasing cycles throughout the habitable earth. What, then, does he understand by rest? We can understand the nature of the rest we enjoy in sleep, and see its important uses; but when we are told the body rests after it is dead and buried, we are bewildered. A periodical return of sleep is essential, while we live in this world, to recruit and strengthen the body. But is the body restored to health and strength by being laid in the grave? Our own experience tells us plainly that nothing can be more preposterous. Disease, death, and corruption surely are not the high road to health and happiness.

The prominent feature in sleep is unconsciousness. It appears as if the mind had withdrawn itself for the time from the external senses, that there may be an income without expenditure to recruit the sensorium and its derivatives. The things of the external world may knock at the door of the senses in vain, if the sleep is sound and healthy, for no heed is taken; we remain unconscious. And we find in the sacred Scriptures that states of unconsciousness, either apparent or real, are spoken of as sleep. We find that death, both spiritual and natural, is called sleep. And we also read of sleeping and waking, where neither one nor the other can be literally meant, as when sleeping and waking are predicated of the Lord. See, for instance, Psa. xliv. 23; lix. 5, where sleep evidently means a state of apparent, not real, unconsciousness.

Spiritual death is when the *inner* man—that takes cognizance of spiritual and divine things—lies dormant, undeveloped, unknown, and uncared for. The *old* man, which by nature is the seat of every disorder, is alone active. From this spiritual *death*, this unconsciousness of the things of eternity, we are called to *awake*. The Lord says, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from *death* unto *life*. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and *now is*, when the *dead* shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live" (John v. 24, 25). The Saviour evidently speaks here, not of dead bodies, but of souls dead in trespasses and sins. Of those who are confirmed in their evils, whose "iniquities are full," it is said, "They shall sleep a *perpetual sleep*, and not awake, saith the King, whose name is the Lord of hosts" (Jer. li. 57). In Daniel we read, "*Many* of them that *sleep* in the dust of the earth shall awake" (xii. 3). From the expressions used in these passages, it is evident the death of the body is not alluded to.

So again, Psa. xiii. 3, "Consider and hear me, O Lord my God: lighten mine eyes, lest I *sleep the sleep of death.*"

Natural death is also called sleep in the sacred Scriptures, and the expression appears to us very significant and appropriate. When we witness the departure of a Christian, what does it appear but a falling into a gentle sleep? The sleep, however, we think, is of short duration. How long did the rich man and Lazarus sleep? Did they not immediately awake, and *lift up their eyes* in another world? We fall asleep, or become wholly unconscious to everything here, and immediately awake in a higher sphere of existence. The total extinction of the life of the body is the departure of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body. In the words of "Clement," "we infer that death is to be understood as being, in these respects, a state similar to sleep, and that we should hope in a joyful awakening therefrom with as much confidence as we do when we prepare to take our rest in slumber;" and we will add, our joy is immensely enhanced by knowing for a certainty that the "awakening" will be immediate. It gives us great consolation to know that when the cold hand of death would seize us, we elude his grasp by dropping this "mortal coil," and find *ourselves* welcomed by angelic beings in a brighter world, where death is for ever excluded. When the pupa case is put off, the perfect insect rises to life and liberty, and this appears to us a beautiful illustration of man putting off the material body, which, although it is absolutely essential as a basis to our existence as spiritual beings, nevertheless is not adapted to, and never was designed for, an immortal existence in the spirit world. With these reflections we can approach the hour of death with pleasure unspeakable, seeing that death is a continuation of life more immediately in the presence of Him "in whose presence there is fulness of joy." For us the grave can have no terrors. But if we believed that the *sleep* of death meant to be laid in the dark, cold grave, where death and corruption reign triumphant, what would our feelings be when we found the horrid monsters approaching! We know by what we have seen, that death would conquer us as he has done all who have gone before us—ruthlessly tear us from those who are dear to us, and deliver us into the hands of corruption, to be devoured by disgusting larvæ till we are utterly consumed. We know also that it is true that a literal resurrection from the grave *will* take place, but not till corruption has done its work. Then *we* (supposing we and our bodies to be identical) shall not rise, we shall be consumed and wasted away, and the elements of which we were formed will be dispersed, to enter into new forms of life, both vegetable and animal, to be again handed over to death and corruption. But the elements of *death* can form no part of *man*—man is *immortal*. We will therefore

leave this doleful tale to others, and see what consolation the sacred Scriptures will afford us.

The Lord said to the Sadducees, "Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him" (Luke xx. 37, 38). This is the proof which our Saviour gave of the resurrection, from which it is also plain that the patriarchs were living in the time of Moses; and therefore, according to the evidence afforded by "*the TRUTH*," there is something more than dead bodies appertaining to man; and what is it? I said appertaining to man; but it is evident from the Lord's words that man is complete without the material body, which is of the earth earthy, and returns to its native dust when the soul needs it no longer, for he says, "They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, . . . *are equal unto the angels*; and are the children of God, *being the children of the resurrection*." Those worthy beings, then, who are gone before us are *now* enjoying the beatitudes of heaven with angelic delight. Are they not, therefore, "*just men made perfect*"? Can anything be found in this lower world that can be added to them, to make them more complete in that world of bliss? Is there anything more to be resuscitated when they are already "*the children of the resurrection*"? The idea is preposterous. Could anything of the material body increase the beautiful appearance or the inner bliss of that angelic being whose presence filled the apostle John with adoration, and led him to fall down to worship him, but who nevertheless said, "I am thy fellow servant, and of thy brethren the prophets." Surely these considerations will lead us to the conclusion that when the resurrection is spoken of in the Word of God, the material body is not to be understood.

What saith the great apostle? "For we know that if the earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens" (2 Cor. v. 1). What can "*the earthly house of this tabernacle*" mean, but the material body? Evidently the apostle was looking for a final dissolution of the body of flesh, without a hope for, or seeing the necessity of, its resurrection, as it belongs to "*the things which are seen and temporal*;" whereas the spiritual body which he hoped for belongs to the things which are not seen (or not visible to the eye of the body), and are eternal. The apostle would lead us to understand that the proper possession and use of the spiritual body depends upon the dissolution of the material body; "We know that *if* the earthly house of this tabernacle," &c. So again, in other words, "*absent from the body, present with the Lord*." The complete dissolution of the natural body, and at the same time the development of the spiri-

tual body, comprehends the doctrine of the resurrection and immortality, as taught by St. Paul: "Though our outward man *perish*, yet the inward man is renewed day by day" (chap. iv. 16). He "earnestly desired to be clothed upon with his house from heaven, . . . that mortality might be swallowed up of life" (chap. v. 2—4). Without this "building of God," this "house from heaven," he doubtless well knew that he could not live in heaven, any more than he could live in this world without the material body. Without a body in which the activities of the soul may terminate, there evidently can be no conscious existence. When, however, the energies of the soul have their termination and fixity in the material body, as they have while we live in the material world, we feel a comparative absence from the Lord and the life immortal. "Therefore we are always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord" (ver. 6—8). When death seizes the body, and the grave swallows it up, the living, immortal man in heaven can exclaim, "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?"

We turn now to the famous fifteenth chapter of St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians. And in noticing the different assertions here made by the apostle, it is well to remember that he is always speaking of the resurrection, when verifying the truth of man's immortality. (See ver. 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 29, 32, 35, 42.) Now, one thing is certain, namely, when the body dies, the soul departs, and has a conscious, separate existence, according to the general tenour of the sacred Scriptures: "This day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." Here, then, is certainly a resurrection. If, then, there is one resurrection at death, and another at the end of the world, how is it the apostle does not speak of the *one* and the *other* distinctively? Evidently, he could not speak of both as *the* resurrection; or he would, when speaking of one, have called it a part. Although we read in the Apocalypse of a first resurrection, no one can find a second mentioned. In like manner, we read of the second death, but there is no mention of the first. Now, if the apostle is contending in this chapter for the resurrection of the material body, and at the same time acknowledges, that to be absent from the body is to be *present with the Lord*, how could he assert that, if Christ be not raised, "then *they* also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"? He might have said, their *bodies* are perished. Most evident it is, that the being absent from the body, &c., is the resurrection he is contending for. We cannot conceive how the existence of St. Paul *now*, in the spiritual world, can depend upon the resurrection of the material body at some unknown future period.

But some man (who, like "L'Ouvrier," thinks the body is the *principal* part of man) will say, "How are the dead raised up,

and with what body do they come?" Evidently they cannot live without a body taken from the earth, for materiality is the only thing that has a real, substantial existence. That airy phantom, the soul, how can it exist without a body to give it vitality and durability? So reasons (?) the sensualist and the materialist. And to such St. Paul's "masterpiece of divine logic" is addressed: "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die." This should have pointed out to us, by analogy, how it is with man, as an immortal being. When the seed is quickened, it perishes as to everything that is manifest to us when it is sown; and so completely does it perish, that not a single part of it remains when once the future plant is developed, and finds itself fixed in a congenial soil. And so it is with man. When man is quickened, or enters upon his immortal career, his whole natural body perishes; and if there is any resemblance between it and the seed that is sown, then *most certain* it is that it will never be re-assumed. The soul, like the embryo plant, has no longer any need of that which served only as a basis upon which it might rest during its development. The soul again enter the material body! The full developed plant again enter the seed! O, thou lofty, towering oak of the forest! all thy luxuriant, spreading branches—supported, as they are, by the robust stems that have braved the wintry blasts of a century—must dwindle into insignificance, and enter again the dry husks of the acorn! And you, ye angelic beings, who are now enjoying the glorious beams of the "Sun of Righteousness," prepare to have your expanded powers diminished to the standard of the material body, for although ye are the "spirits of just men *made perfect*," yet there can be no real, eternal happiness without the *principal*, that is, the material body!! O "Clement," "L'Ouvrier," &c., that you could once be led from this absurd theory, and be induced, without sectarian spectacles, to read the following assertion of St. Paul, written for the downfall of materialism,—"*That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be.*" Our opponents must know that "*not that body*," cannot mean "*the identical body*." But some one will say, See the beautiful parallelism between the seed sown in the earth, containing the embryo plant, and the natural body sown in the grave, containing the embryo of that body which shall be. Are natural bodies buried *alive*? How preposterous it appears to us, that burying a dead body in the grave should be called *sowing*! What the surface soil is to the seed, the whole world is to the natural body. The natural body, like the seed, is sown *alive*; and, like the seed, acts its part for the development of that which shall be, *before* it dies; and also, like the seed, it is then rejected *for ever*. Here is the parallelism: "A natural body sown," in the natural world, "a spiritual body raised," in the spiritual world. The apostle will not allow the possibility of confounding

the two—"There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."

There are other important particulars pointed out by the apostle, which space forbids us to notice. For instance: "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption" (ver. 50). And without doubt, as "L'Ouvrier" says, "the word flesh here is used to denote body." If so, there is an end to the discussion.

We admit, with "L'Ouvrier," that "the chrysalis of to-day is the gaily painted butterfly of to-morrow." But we cannot agree with the words that he has adopted from another author, that "the body of the worm, the chrysalis, and the butterfly, is the same." The individual is the same, from the egg to the perfect insect; but the latter must for ever remain in embryo, if the different bodies are not successively *put off*. So with man.

"L'Ouvrier" notices the moral aspect of the question, and considers that as sins are committed by or through the body, it ought, in justice, to partake of the punishment hereafter. He says, "Who will dare impeach the Divine justice, by justifying the negative of the present debate? What! shall God, infinitely wise and just, be made to punish the soul alone for theft, when the hands joined in the robbery?" We reply in his own words, "Philosophy tells us—and, as we believe, truly—*there is not one material particle of the prenatal embryo, the infant, or the youth, in the physical constitution of the hoary head as it descends into the valley of the shadow of death, &c., while the individual and moral identity is preserved in the most absolute completeness.*"

In conclusion, we may refer to another passage of Scripture, a passage which, we think, gives a clear view of the spirit world, and entirely excludes the idea of a material resurrection: "After this I beheld, and lo, a great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations, and kindred, and people, and tongues, stood before the throne and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in their hands; and cried with a loud voice, saying, Salvation unto our God which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb" (Rev. vii. 9, 10). We beg of our Christian friends to look at this passage with serious attention. What a multitude! They are all "children of the resurrection;" surrounded with the glories of heaven, and "equal unto the angels." Behold these angelic human beings, in possession of the happy abode for which man was designed, and which was designed for him by divine love. Their souls overflow with gratitude and love while they "cry with a loud voice, saying, Salvation unto our God which sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb." Not naked souls, these; but souls invested with a spiritual body, a body adapted to heaven, and consequently subject only to the laws of heaven, being as far beyond the laws of nature, and as far superior to the material body, as heaven is beyond and supe-

rior to the earth. But those happy beings, of whom we are speaking, not only have souls and bodies, but they are "clothed with *white robes*, and palms in their hands." We ask our friends, where now is the vacuum that is to be filled by anything that can rise from the dust of materiality? Surely any portion of the material body, be it even, according to "Clement," an "infinitesimal small portion," would prove a clog, and be subject to the laws of nature.

When the natural body dies, may every reader have a happy resurrection into the spiritual world!

St. Osyth.

R. G.

GRACEFUL PHILOSOPHY.—The true greatness of mind consists in valuing men apart from their circumstances, or according to their behaviour in them. Wealth is a distinction only in traffic, but it must not be allowed as a recommendation in any other particular, but only just as it is applied. It was very prettily said, that we may learn the little value of fortune, by the persons on whom Heaven is pleased to bestow it. However, there is not a harder part in human life than becoming wealth and greatness. He must be very well stocked with merit, who is not willing to draw some superiority over his friends from his fortune; for it is not every man that can entertain with the air of a guest, and do good offices with the mien of one who receives them.—*Steele.*

THE WORLD.—

O world, thy slippery turns! Friends now fast sworn,
Whose double bosoms seem to wear one heart;
Whose hours, whose bed, whose meal, and exercise,
Are still together; who twin, as 'twere, in love,
Unseparable, shall within this hour,
On a dissension of a doit, break out
To bitterest enmity: so fellest foes,
Whose passions and whose plots have broke their sleep,
To take the one the other, by some chance,
Some trick not worth an egg, shall grow dear friends,
And interjoin their issues.—*Shakspeare.*

WANT.—It is not from nature, but from education and habits, that our wants are chiefly derived.—*Fielding.*

CIRCUMSTANCES are the rulers of the weak; they are the instruments of the wise.—*S. Lover.*

SERVILITY creates despotism.—*Ch. Brontë.*

PHILOSOPHY.—The love and pursuit of wisdom; a science which investigates the laws of nature, with a view to the regulation of human conduct, and the enlargement of human power.—*Anon.*

SELF-CONCEIT and malice are needed to discover or to imagine faults, and it is much easier for an ill-natured man than for a good-natured man to be smart and witty.—*Sharp's Essays.*

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

DICKENS.—ARTICLE II.

"Tis with our judgments as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own."

It will be a long while before Henry the Eighth's "Bill for abolishing diversity of opinion" is read a third time and passed in an English House of Commons. Alike unsalutary and absurd, its tendency would be to check the disposition honestly to controvert the views of others, when they differ from our own; than which exercise, intellectually speaking, there is nothing more profitable or pleasurable. In fact, it is the only natural outlet with us for that pugnacious disposition of mind, which is as characteristic an idiosyncrasy in our constitution, as is the physical development of the same tendency in our worthy and warm-hearted neighbours of the Emerald Isle. Regarding it in that spirit of candour and courtesy which has ever been displayed in the pages of the *British Controversialist*, we confess to a liking for the task, and admit that "Dickens *versus* Thackeray" sounds melodiously in our ears. But, since it is not our object, either unnecessarily to wound the feelings of our peaceable friends, or indiscriminately to eulogize controversy in general, we will content ourselves by enforcing it in the particular case before us.

In insisting upon the superiority of Dickens, we do not intend to underrate the merits of Thackeray. On the contrary, we shall take occasion highly to extol him, and shall only stop short of giving him the palm as the abler writer. We wish to state the case fairly, and to give, in as concise a form as may be, the reasons of our preference for Dickens, but shall refrain, on principle, from referring to the works of either in confirmation thereof. We consider it both unfair and unnecessary to select favourite characters, or exquisite scenes, as affording specimens of an author's knowledge of life and manners, or of his ability to portray the same. We prefer in an argumentative article to confine ourselves to reasons, rather than resorting to that invidious practice of singling out isolated beauties in the works of one author, and comparing them with isolated blemishes in the works of another; moreover, those who are acquainted with these works need not to be informed where to look for the "nest sketch or the most magnificent paragraph; and to those

who are unacquainted with them such a course is only irritating and confusing. We regret to find that what we are complaining of has been found in the articles that have already appeared on this subject, especially in that odd one on Thackeray in the last number, by "Aleph" and Charlotte Brontë. We are there treated, most unnecessarily, with a page and a half (viz., 65 lines!) of pure Thackeray. Respectable as is the quotation for a specimen of style, we see nothing in it to justify so unwarrantable an intrusion. Surely Thackeray's works are not so scarce that, on the reference being given, the extract could not have been perused. Sincerely as we wish that the circulation of this serial may extend everywhere, we hope that the number for August will not fall into the hands of the gentleman whom it is intended to defend. We must, however, reserve to the close any further remarks upon this article, or upon that in the preceding number, which, although far superior to it, is, we think, a little too discursive.

True are the lines of Pope,—

"'Tis hard to say if greater want of skill
Appear in writing or in judging ill."

And we feel this the more as we remember that in some few respects it really is difficult to decide which of the two is the abler writer,—the balance when held by an impartial hand being occasionally almost level; yet, fully satisfied (as, indeed, what advocate is not?) of the perfect righteousness of our cause, we commit it to the suffrages of our intelligent readers, and "fear not to abide the audit." In debates it not unfrequently happens that exception is taken to the use of some word or form of expression in the question itself, and being anxious that in the present case such should not occur, we take leave to state what we understand by the term, "abler writer." Although we have been accustomed to regard Dickens and Thackeray as humourist and satirist respectively, we shall now regard them in the more general character of novelists; for, admitting that there is a slight divergence in their paths as literary men, it does not make it at all incongruous that their merit as writers should be adjudged side by side. Keeping this in view, we shall discuss the merits of the different schools (if we may be allowed the expression) to which they severally belong. Noticing afterwards, if space permits, any minor points, such as style, earnestness of tone, selection and arrangement of plot, delineation of character, consistency of detail, &c., &c., not forgetting to ascertain if possible whose works exhibit the greater variety and force of the English language, and consequently, by refining the imagination, elevate the taste of the reader. In most of these particulars the superiority of Dickens over Thackeray is undoubted, while in some it is peculiarly manifest. Such being our thesis, we proceed

to expound, simply remarking by the way, that there is an universality about the genius of Dickens's works; for they may be read by persons of either sex and of all ages with equal pleasure and avidity. He deals with life, and not simply with youth. Hence the absence of that maudlin sentimentality which chokes the reader of every modern novel, many of which may scarcely be called *novels*, since they "believe their name and offer nothing new." But to return, it will be remembered that according to the theory of Aristotle, the essence of art in works of fiction consists in imitation. It will not be denied that Thackeray is a firm believer in this theory, and has ever assiduously adopted it, with a good measure of success. In fact, it is the first thing his followers advance in his favour. They say, "Do you not admire the reality and truthfulness of Thackeray's delineations of life and manners?" They maintain that it is the sole business of the novelist to represent men as they are, with all their faults as well as their virtues; in other words, to imitate real life. "Away, then," they exclaim, "with demigods and giants, we have to do with men and women of like passions with ourselves; we like to read of those persons of ordinary stature, the black and white in whose characters is so mixed, that they shall neither seem crows or doves, but all, more or less, magpies." According to this, there will soon be no further use for the saying, "Half the world knows not how the other half lives." Is it not all written in the books of Thackeray? Now, this is good to a certain extent; but had the rule always been peremptory, where had been our Achilleses, our Prometheuses, our Lears, our Hamlets, our Fausts, our Ivanhoes, Rebeccas, Pickwicks, and Sam Wellers?

While we cannot but join the acclamations of the followers of Thackeray for the prose fiction of social reality to which he so constantly treats us, we must assert that the revival by him of the Aristotelian theory of imitation in literary art has already resulted in that species of success which sooner or later must induce satiety. If we have not been clear in our endeavour to show the inadequacy of this school of art to the wants and tastes of the age, we hope, by contrasting with the foregoing our opinion of Dickens and his school, to show the propriety of our claim for him of superiority to Thackeray.

Bacon asserts that the essence of art consists in idealization, and says that "there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety than can be found in the nature of things;" and in another part of his works more expressly still, "The use of feigned history, or fiction, is to give to the mind of man some shadow of satisfaction in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it." The sympathies of Dickens have ever been with this Baconian theory; and though many may affect

to condemn the phantasies and caricatures so abundant in his works, we do trust they will not so theorize as to exclude from prose fiction, when they can get it, "the boundless imagination of another Richter, or the lawless zanyism of another Rabelais." We do not intend to offer any definition of our own, for as we cannot conceive that in any case our appreciation of fiction can depend upon its truth to life, we have nothing suitable except one that would be tantamount to that already given by Bacon, who adds, "Because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy and prose fiction feign acts and events greater and more heroic."—

It will be seen that upon the success of our endeavour to establish the Baconian over the Aristotelian theory hangs, also, our defence of Dickens, who, we consider, may take the benefit of the authority of the theory of Bacon in those cases where he is charged with unreality. At any rate, it is quite possible for there to be a style of prose fiction altogether different from that of Fielding or Thackeray, and yet as legitimate in the view of art. But we cannot admit that there is this absolute truth to nature which is boasted as a crowning characteristic in Thackeray's favour; and we say that, strictly speaking, there is not a single character in his works which is a fac-simile of what is real. If they are closely examined, it will be found that they are recognized by us as life-like, not so much because we have already met them in the world, as that we are familiar with them in other works of fiction. Although the Waverley novels may be considered to belong to the imitation school, yet throughout the whole there is scarcely a single person who would have spoken precisely as Scott makes them speak. To sum up the whole matter, we admit that the lines of Shakespeare convey the truth, when he says,—

"E'en that art
Which you say adds to nature,
Is an art that nature makes;"

but we add, there is more truth in the aphorism of Goethe, "*Art is called Art, simply because it is not Nature.*"

As to the purity of style, we are content to return the unproved assertions of "Aleph," and say that Dickens' style is purer than Thackeray's. It is at any rate far more attractive, and we are quite willing that it should be handed down as the style most in favour with the nineteenth century novel readers. Little reason is there for calling in question the purity or attractiveness of the style of a man who, if popularity is to be taken as a test of merit, must be ranked next to Sir Walter Scott in the list of English novelists. Again, Dickens is singularly felicitous in his selection and use of language and illustration. While he generally deals in good classic English, he is not insensible to the claims, nor ignorant of the value, of a good

sprinkling of Anglo-Saxon; and although there is a Johnsonian completeness about his sentences, which are sometimes long and involved, yet the constant bubbling up of his exhaustless humour (which, by the bye, Mr. "Aleph," is not the foolery of a clown any more than is some of Thackeray's twaddle) carries one through without the slightest feeling of fatigue. The very fact of such comicalities being expressed in a highly Latinized diction adds to the humorous effect of the narrative, and irresistibly provokes applause. Referring to this point, a modern critic says, "Pickwick is throughout a sort of half conscious parody of that style of writing which demanded balanced sentences, double-barrelled epithets, and a proper conception of the office and authority of semicolons. It is as if a saucy lad were to strut about the house in his father's court dress, with the sleeves turned inside out, and the coat-tails stuck under his arms." But any allusion to the humour of Dickens would be as superfluous and absurd as an attempt

"To gild refined gold, to paint the lily,
Or lend a perfume to the violet."

It is wrong to suppose that Dickens has interested the lower classes at the expense of the higher. He certainly has sketched with inimitable vigour all the varieties of London life, without exaggerating either the selfishness of the higher or the narrow-mindedness of the lower classes. In this respect, at least, he has followed his own fancy, and yet been true to nature. Dickens never forgets that he lives in a

"—land where, girt with friend or foe,
A man may say the thing he will."

Without abusing liberty to licence, we contend that no one more than he has been true to English subjects. Nor is it too much to say that he has ever spent the resources of his genius, his faculty of observation, his knowledge of character, his power of painting, his tenderness, his jovial humour, in the recapitulation of home scenes and home life. What den of crime, what working place of wretchedness, what abode of patient, uncomplaining toil, what sunny retreat of kind, homely nature, what fantastic dwelling-place of pride, eccentricity, pretence, and whimsicality, has he not entered for our amusement, our instruction, our delight? In the broad galaxy of humorous character set before us by Dickens, from Sam Weller down to Inspector Bucket, from Mrs. Nickleby, of immortal memory, down to Little Dorrit, is there one the English reader would be glad to spare? For ourselves we answer, No!

We had intended to say more, but our space is exhausted; and we conclude by remarking that the study of the amusements—especially the literary amusements—of an age throws more light on its character than anything else; and that to Dickens

pre-eminently we are indebted for the ability and success with which he has amused the present generation. If it should be thought we have said little of Thackeray, we reply, we have said as much of him as "Aleph" has said of Dickens; and although we can never consent to call Thackeray the abler writer, we are quite prepared to show our cordial good feeling to him and his admiring and critical readers, by transferring to him what we had originally reserved for Dickens:—

W. M. Thackeray—deny it who can—
Is a downright, upright, honest man.

S. E.

Most men never distinguish their own decisions from what is right; not considering that, if others are not of the same opinion as themselves, neither are they of the same opinion as others. This arises from that pride which makes every one assume as a fixed principle that he is right. This pride is particularly the lot of the ignorant; and hence the saying that "he is quite proud of being ignorant." Socrates was just the reverse of such men; after he had learned all that the wisest of his day could teach, he declared that he knew nothing.

WILL, WIT, AND JUDGMENT.—At twenty years of age, the will reigns; at thirty, the wit; and at forty, the judgment. —*Gratian*.

PRIDE.—Pride has, of all human vices, the widest dominion; it appears in the greatest multiplicity of forms, and lies hid under the greatest variety of disguises; disguises which, like the moon's *veil of brightness*, are both its lustre and its shade, and betray it from others, though they hide it from ourselves.

DANGERS OF AUTHORSHIP.—Many a man has passed for a wit in conversation, that utterly undid himself by setting up for an author; puffed up with the indulgence of his friends, he launched out into the ocean of mankind; and being read by some with envy, by others without partiality, his reputation was shipwrecked at once. It is not enough for a man to say he endeavours to please, he must be able to do it. Critics will discount nothing with us for our bare good-will.

BEAUTY AND HONOUR.—It is with honour as with beauty; a single fine lineament cannot make a handsome face, neither can a single good quality render a man accomplished; but a concurrence of many fine features and good qualities constitute true beauty and true honour.

SOURCE OF SYMPATHY.—There is a first model of beauty and agreeableness, which consists in a certain relation between our own nature and the thing with which we are affected. Whatever is formed on this model, interests and delights us; whatever differs from it, is always displeasing. —*Pascal*.

Politics.

OUGHT THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO BE ABOLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

To those of our readers who, for the last twelve months, have watched the dire calamities which have visited our Indian empire, and like the blast of the simoom have swept over her fair provinces, the present inquiry affords abundant materials for retrospective, as well as prospective, reasoning. The more this all-engrossing topic is considered, the more momentous and weighty does it become, and as the subject progresses, a mine of argument, both *pro* and *con.*, will no doubt be opened. For months has the question of the reformation and modification of the bases of our Indian administration been the subject of anxious consideration. Statesmen, with their coadjutors—representatives and electors—have alike been impressed with its paramount importance and necessity. Not only in the legislature has the subject been fully ventilated, but public opinion has clearly indicated the policy it would be desirable for the future to adopt, for the efficient government of our Eastern possessions. Hopes and fears have alternated, in proportion as success or reverse has been experienced, and conveyed to us by telegram or despatch. Parliament has been roused to a sense of the importance of this subject, and has passed a measure which, though somewhat of a piecemeal character, will nevertheless tend to an effectual modification of this long-neglected, but now painfully prominent, topic.

In dealing with the question, whether the powers of the East India Company ought to be subverted, we must remember that it is not the idol of an hour with which we have to do. We regard it as a gigantic system of misrule and oppression, which has been gradually increasing its power for upwards of two centuries. But, like the ivy which entwines the oak, it has sapped and destroyed the object to which it has clung for support, and has committed suicide by its own folly. To change the figure,—the amount of pressure, as applied by the East India Directors, has not been sufficiently well regulated to keep intact the mighty engines of consolidation and able administration—those two great essentials to successful government.

It would, perhaps, be superfluous to most of the readers of the *British Controversialist* to recapitulate, in detail, the origin of

that Government, which now extends over an area of 1,370,000 square miles, representing a population of more than 160,000,000 of souls; but still it may not be uninteresting to some briefly to recount the circumstances attendant on the first accession to territorial and political assumption by what is now called the Honorable East India Company.

We find, that in the year 1600 a charter was granted, on petition from several wealthy and speculative merchants, which sanctioned their enrolment as a corporation, to be entitled, "The Governors and Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies." It consisted of a Governor and twenty-four Directors, in whom were invested the exclusive right of trading "to and from the countries of Asia, Africa, America, and other countries, where traffic might be advantageously pursued." The charter was originally limited to fifteen years; but at the expiration of that term it was made perpetual. India, offering the largest share of commercial enterprise, was at once selected as the entrepôt for the Company's speculations. Factories, or forts, for the protection of their servants and property, were erected by permission of native princes; and at Surat, Cambay, and Hooghly, settlements were formed. By the year 1636, two other factories or settlements had sprung into existence, viz., one in the island of Bombay, and another at Madras, all of which were remarkable, no less for their advantageous situation in a commercial point of view, as for their easy adaptability for military purposes. At the end of the first century of the Company's existence, British enterprise began to develop itself; and the monopoly of trading was no longer confined to the English. France struggled long with us for supremacy; she, too, had her factories and commercial depôts; but after severe contests with that power, aided by British intrigues with native princes, she was driven off the ground.

The necessity of self-defence made the Company's position a military one, and by degrees it extended its character from a company purely commercial to one more clearly defined as legislative and territorial. It will be needless to detail every fact which occurred at this era of the Company's rule, or to trace specially the successes which were attained by the valour and genius of Clive and Lawrence; but it must not be forgotten that it was by such men as these that the power of the British empire was confirmed, and a *prestige* given to its character, which has never been so rudely assailed as in the present fearful outburst.

In 1774, the ministerial magnates in England thought it necessary to put a counterpoise to the hitherto uncontrolled and almost absolute policy which these military merchants had for so long a period adopted. Accordingly, a show of supremacy was exercised over the Company by the establishment of a Governor-General and four Councillors, subordinate to the authorities at

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home, but endowed with large and extended powers of control over the English subjects and dependants in the various territories. This was the first great move towards establishing that system of "double government," about which so much has recently been said. The Company, who had for so long a time held almost absolute sway as legislators over Hindostan—who had been stimulated to rapacity and power, as much by the monopoly of commerce and the illusion of wealth, as by the ready facilities it afforded them of amassing fortunes—whose coffers were filled with money exacted from nabobs and their dependants—was now, in turn, to have a supervisor placed over them. Warren Hastings was the first Governor-General appointed under this new *régime*, and with an iron hand he grappled with the difficulties that beset him, and, by force and diplomacy, developed the British power in India. Leaving this enterprising statesman, we arrive at the period when Pitt was Prime Minister in England (1786), and he, with his colleagues in office, were so impressed with the desirability of applying a counter-check to the Company's movements, that a Board of Control, consisting of six Privy Councillors and a Secretary of State as President, was appointed, subject to the Crown at home, but nevertheless endowed with powers to overrule, if desirable, the Directors of the East India Company. Under this system of administration, annexation began to exhibit itself, and the territories of Scinde, Gwalior, the Punjaub, and various minor states, succumbed. The kingdom of Oude, still more recently annexed, is only a continuation of this policy of extension; and now we find the confines of our Indian empire stretching from the snow-capped Himalayas in the north to Cape Comorin in the south, from Calcutta in the east to the Malabar Coast in the west. It must not be forgotten, however, that the East India Company sometimes disapproved of these successive conquests and annexations by various Governors-General; it has even been affirmed that they protested against them on more than one occasion. Their own power and authority, however, had been gradually established, and what could not be accomplished by force was gained by intrigue. They were a species of land-agents, who, though not exactly *claiming* to be absolute masters of the soil, yet retained to themselves the power of levying rates or tolls on the masses. Had this state of things been uninterrupted now, it could not have lasted very long, because the foundation, upon which the mighty structure was reared, was one of sand, and could, at any moment, have been swept away by mere internal pressure. Hence, it was deemed essential, by the opposition Government, to assume a more determined demeanour, and adopt a more definite policy than might be expected from a private company, and one which would impress the native mind with a feeling of awe, when they reflected on the power of centralisation

displayed by their rulers. Whether this mode of government has been subsequently abused, and the boundary limits overstepped, we shall not stop to inquire. One thing, however, is certain—that had the East India Company been allowed to persevere in their temporizing policy, their ruin must have been secured, for the plague-spot was already visible, and fast approaching to maturity; but the fatal blow was suddenly averted ere its descent, and, as we now unfortunately know, only delayed to gather strength by age. But not the less surely and deadly has been its visitation.

Thus far has the rise and progress of the East India Company been traced. The primary question still remains unanswered; and I propose to consider it under two heads: First, Whether the policy of the East India Company, from its establishment, was the wisest that might have been adopted? Secondly, if a negative reply is returned to the preceding interrogation, to ascertain, Whether the empire of India would be benefited by the executive and administrative powers being vested in the Crown?

No doubt some will ask, in answer to these inquiries—What has transpired to bring about such a revulsion of feeling against a company who for upwards of two centuries have successfully carried on their political and commercial transactions? Or what now requires the interference of a superior authority? Has not the Company, during that long period, often displayed a rigorous and austere disposition towards those with whom they had so marvellously become acquainted? Is it necessary to relate the means they employed, by an extensive system of torture, to exact the taxes they were wont to impose upon the population? It is a patent fact that the rites of the heathen were at one time a fruitful source of revenue, and that oppression and cruelties were enacted to augment the income. Instead of suppressing, they winked at outrages perpetrated by their hirelings and servants. They cared not to inquire whence the money came, or in what way it was obtained, so long as they received it. Again and again has it been asserted, on good authority, that various officers were employed in the Company's service who lived in almost open hostility to all moral laws,—systematic abduction and seduction of women forming a most prominent but disreputable feature. It cannot yet be forgotten that the Sepoys who were in the Company's service were humoured and petted beyond measure, encouraging and fostering the leprous system of caste, which has unfortunately had the effect of contributing to the pride and superstition of the bloodthirsty Sepoy.* I do not intend again reviving the subject as to whether the

* To such an extent was this pandering to native superstition carried, that, not many years ago, even the soldiers in the Company's pay were permitted to grace the solemn processions on certain public occasions in which the absurdities of Hindooism were conspicuous.

Sepoy mutiny was or was not accelerated by the system of caste, for that has already been ably discussed in recent numbers of this magazine. We cannot, however, shut our eyes to the fact that the Company has been guilty of gross culpability in neglecting to infuse a *religious* element into their administration, neglecting the propagation of the gospel amongst its millions of subjects. The policy of non-interference in the native faith had always been regarded as essential to a secure and perfect administration. They have not only been charged with *neglecting* the advance of Christianity, but of *wilfullyretarding* it in various ways. On more than one occasion have most unwise and reprehensible measures been adopted to check its growth. The degradation of the Sepoy at Meerut, who had become a convert, is an instance. Need reference be made to his expulsion from the regiment to which he belonged, incurring, as he did, by that disgraceful proceeding, not only the loss of caste, but the sacrifice of his worldly possessions and position, becoming at once an outcast and renegade?

Surely these are charges quite compatible with the assertion that the East India Company's policy has not been of a nature to justify its retaining a vestige of supremacy. Much, very much, that has transpired in India, will be for ever hidden in the dark recesses of oblivion; and how much the liberty of the press has been curtailed, with a view to keeping these fearful facts concealed from public gaze, the present restricted privileges of Indian publishers will prove. Perhaps there was a necessity for the arbitrary measure, which made it competent for a single magistrate to pass summary conviction on any person, European or native, who kept printing materials without a license, making themselves liable to a penalty of several thousands of rupees, or, in default, two years' imprisonment. It is not unlikely that this harsh measure will go far to keep down the public inquiry of the "why," and the "wherefore," which is England's boasted privilege.

We now turn to the second part of our inquiry, viz.—*Would the empire of India be benefited by the executive and administrative powers being transferred to the Crown?*

In answering this question, we must not forget we are dealing with one of a more lucid nature than that preceding it, when we reflect on the amount of information that will be for ever suppressed; that only a part of what has really transpired in reference to the mismanagement of the Company, has obtained circulation, and that through a maze of difficulty and opposition. Whether the Company deserved the opprobrious epithet applied to them by Lord Wellesley, who was unquestionably competent to form a correct estimate of their virtues or vices, I will not say, but when he stigmatized the Company as "the ignominious tyrants of the East," he certainly must have had some grounds for making so bold an assertion. Sir Charles Napier, too, during his life-

time, was not accustomed to speak in very flattering terms of the Directors; and he predicted, with a foresight and genius he ever displayed, the disastrous consequences which have now unhappily fallen to the lot of India, and which he asserted would ultimately be the result of the unscrupulous and persecuting government. It certainly appears feasible, if a body of commercial traders and *soi-disant* legislators, were supplanted by a firm and consistent government, that the machinery for controlling the masses would be simplified. It will be in the recollection of most of our readers that, about six months since, the legislature decided, by an overwhelming majority, that the time had arrived when something should be done with a view to remodel the existing Government of India. Lord Palmerston's bill was brought forward in response to the demand, but before it had attained maturity, that statesman was compelled, from other causes, to resign the helm of state. Consequently, it has fallen to the lot of his successor (Earl Derby) and his coadjutors, to frame a bill with this one purpose in view, and which has now been passed, with various alterations, by Parliament. It would not be advisable for us to dilate upon the various clauses of the "India Bill;" what concerns us more directly is the necessity of transferring the executive from the Directors in Leadenhall-street to abler hands.

Few will deny that evils have resulted from the "double government," as it is termed. The complexity of the present system has been felt alike by the Directors and by the Board of Control. The business that required urgency and dispatch has often been delayed, perhaps unavoidably, owing to the complicated and cumbrous forms which surrounded the imperial and commercial administrators; and the necessity of reformation in subordinate departments has been, consequently, over and over again, confirmed. Facts have proved that a double government is a type of obstruction. Grave charges have been brought forward and substantiated, that they have in times past grossly exceeded discretionary bounds. Progress, the handmaid of experience, has gradually restricted their once unlimited sphere of action. Successive eras have wrought as many changes in the *Company's* constitution. The year 1813 was inaugurated by the abolition of their trade monopoly, and it might naturally be supposed that now the last remnant of their power is assailed, that some attempts at a stand against it should be made. The nation, however, has aroused itself to a realization of the importance and necessity of improved legislation on this subject, which has found a ready response by the Bill passed by their representatives in the Commons.

Let experience teach our rulers the course it will be desirable for the future prosperity of India to pursue. Let the shortcomings of one power be so many beacon-lights to warn those

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that follow ; substituting an effective, yet mild administration, for a temporising and tyrannical policy. Christianity must be nurtured and encouraged, not retarded. Other countries may govern by restraining free thought and expression, but let the English maxim of equality be extended alike to conquerors and conquered. Justice and impartiality must replace partisanship, that arbitrary and self-willed individuals may never again commit the grossest flagrancies without being amenable to the higher powers. A discreet application is only requisite to render these improvements acceptable to the teeming millions in India ; and surely a policy which is fostered and watched by the skilful and jealous eye of a statesman, will be a guarantee of success. More English blood must be instilled into the arteries of our Indian empire, and native support must not again be so blindly relied upon. Such a fitting opportunity as the present affords may never again present itself for consolidating and establishing our power so effectually, and therefore a consistent system of rule must at once be adopted. A feeling of confidence in our administration must be cherished in the native mind. Justice and mercy must be equally dispensed, and we shall find that when the troubled sea of mutiny has subsided, when the torrent of blood has ceased to deluge the land, and the avenging arm of retribution paralysed, a more humane and conciliatory policy substituted,—then, and not till then, will contentment and bliss smile upon the millions of natives in that fair but now unhappy land.

On this subject, to the English nation may be addressed the words of a well-known poet-laureate :—

“ Remember, thou art placed
The guardian of mankind, nor build thy fame
On rapines and on murders. From thy example
The bliss or woes of nameless millions, springs
Their virtues or their vice. Nor think by laws
To curb licentious man. Those laws alone
Can bend the headstrong many to their yoke,
Which makes it present int'rest to obey them.”

D. K.

MORTALITY.—

Where is the dust that hath not been alive ?
The spade, the plough, disturb our ancestors :
From human mould we reap our daily bread.
The globe around earth's hollow surface shakes,
And is the ceiling of her sleeping sons.
O'er devastation we blind revels keep ;
Whole buried towns support the dancer's heel.—*Young.*

The Essayist.

POETIC CRITIQUE.—I.

"Short is the date, alas! of modern rhymes,
So 'tis but just to let them live betimes."—*Pope*.

In the olden time poets were few and critics rare.

So noble and so spiritual was the soul of poetry then esteemed, that fabulous powers were attributed to its possessors, and the direct intervention of heaven was deemed necessary to quench the fire that brightened on the altar of the poet's heart.

Arion, the inventor of dithyrambic poetry, was rescued from drowning by a dolphin that took on its back the affrighted bard, and carried him safely to the welcome shore. An epic poet, named Aristeas, was represented as a magician whose soul could leave and re-enter his body at will. And it is said of Æschylus, the tragic poet of Greece, that an eagle, mistaking his bald head for a stone, let a tortoise fall upon it, to break the shell, and so fulfilled an oracle decreeing that the poet should die by a blow from heaven. Thus, prophecy and the fates conspired to take his life, and end his song.

In the modern time,—to-day, we scarcely look up to the poet as to one who sips nectar from the goblet of the gods. Indeed, except in very rare cases, it is supposed that heaven has nothing at all to do with poetry; and as to the poor poets, there is no lack of tortoise critics who, in their earthward gravitations, break many noble heads, and wound to the death a multitude of tender hearts. Lord Bolingbroke, in a conversation with Pope, said, "It is the business of the philosopher to *dilate*, if I may borrow the word from Tully, to press, to prove, to convince; that of the poet to *hint*; to touch his subject with short spirited strokes, to warm the affections, and speak to the heart." But what of the *critic*? Surely, he must neither dilate on the philosophic, nor touch the poetic. He must see that practice and profession are *one*, and speak of things as they *are*. Alas, for mortal's power! This is easy to say, but hard to do,

"Tis with our judgements as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own.
In poets, as true genius is but rare,
True taste as seldom is the critic's share."

There are a few general principles which we would endeavour to enforce on the attention of our poetic readers. In poetry sense ought never to be sacrificed to sound. Ornament must not be so profuse as to eclipse substantial thought.

Music must ever clothe and harmonize language.

Conceit must not be mistaken for imagination, neither must dreamings usurp the domain of *truth*.

A well defined purpose, and a high aim must be the sun and moon of your intellectual heaven.

Wit to enliven, morals to purify, imagination to uplift, sober judgment to sift, a reverence for the holy, and abhorrence for the base, religion to unlock the gates of Paradise, and fellow-love to unseal the world's stern bosom; all must unite in the poet's heart, and permeate the poet's song, else there comes no rapture to the reader, and no glory to the bard.

There are great poets and small,—men of might, whose powers in song thrill with gladness ages yet unborn, and men whose less gifted touch causes only a slight vibration that dies in a summer night. Both are born to fulfil their purpose. Both have their mission. The twitter of the sparrow is not less the voice of a *winged* songster than the mellow flute note of the soaring lark. Must we acknowledge that since announcing our intention of opening a section for poetic critiques our humble homestead has only been honoured with visits from the sparrow tribe; but perhaps we are wrong, they may be nightingales in disguise.

Ballads and rhymed romances, love-prompted lyrics and miniature epics, songs with very sad burthens, and stanzas with approved morals, make up the substance of our "Contributions received." "The World's Charity," by S. A. H. Eades, is a book we do not care to review, seeing that it is liable to indictment in the Court of Poesy for having come into the world under false pretences. It is a book of philosophy, morality, and religion, but not a book of poems.

One piece, signed C. W. C., we cannot decipher; others are very trifles, unworthy of regard: *some* are evidently the products of hearts both noble and true.

The most thoughtful, pathetic, and musical, is the following, entitled "A Dream," by Kelvin:—

"A DREAM.

"Last night I had the strangest dream.
I dream't I saw a child,
Its little limbs were thin and cold;
Its eyes were very wild.

"No kindly hand had ever smooth'd
Its rough and matted hair;
'Twas dirty, almost naked, and
Its tender feet were bare.

"I saw the child go on its way,—
A dreary way and long,
And there was none to take its hand
And lead it when 'twas wrong.

- "But yet the child was not alone;
For keeping pace with pace,
A monster stalked, tall, lank, and thin,
And stared him in the face.
- "I thought at first, 'it is a friend.'
Alas! no friend was he.
Tho' ever constant to the child,—
His name was *Poverty*.
- "Anon, I saw a motley troop
Of spectres, fierce and wild,
They said they would companions be
To that poor friendless child.
- "And there were Hunger, Thirst, and Cold,
Desire with greedy eye;
And oh! most terrible of all—
Temptation's family!
- "And what was that poor child to do
Amid that hideous throng?
But go as they were driving him,
Life's rugged path along.
- "And as the child to manhood grew,
From these companions grim,
To be released, there was no chance,—
There was *no hope* for him.
- "But fast they hurried him along
To sin's high precipice;
And thence they dash'd him headlong down
The depths of that abyss.
- "I shudder'd at his mangled form,
As lifeless there he lay,
And wonder'd that there had been none
To save the monster's prey.
- "But oh! I wonder'd most of all,
When standing by his grave,
To hear him curs'd, reviled by those
Who never tried to save.
- "And ah! I wept to think, how sad,
How wretched, life must be,
Without a friend to love or warn
One, what to choose or flee.
- "And still I saw those spectral forms
Pursue their friendless prey.
From child to man they hunted them,
Along that dreadful way.
- "I stretch'd my hand in agony,
To stay the living stream
Of hapless victims, and I woke,
And found it was a dream.

"And long I ponder'd o'er that dream;
It made me very sad.
Could I but know it was not real,
I should be truly glad."—KALVIN.

The ballad metre is adapted, perhaps more than any other, for the relation of wild dreamings, or strange, startling anecdote; but in this "Dream" the accent is not always true, as instanced in the last verse—"Could I but know it was not *real*." The word *real* must here be pronounced as *reel*, to agree with the measure of the first line; this is inadmissible. It is a pity that the harmony of a whole verse should be marred merely from a want of a little care, and a slight revision. Lochiel's "Seeker amidst Ruins" holds one or two good thoughts embodied, but the multiplicity of words in which those thoughts are wrapt, deprive them of all their force. We wish sincerely that Sir Walter Scott could come "back again," if only to look at the strained imitations of his numbers, that like this "Seeker," come looking into the eyes of the people, inducing frowns instead of smiles.

Our next is a piece headed "Truth lies Hidden," by J. E., which lacks in music, though not in thought. Too much care can never be bestowed in polishing and refining; repetitions should be avoided, such as occur in the first verse,—"*truths*" being unnecessarily repeated. Accents should fall on words worth accenting, not on such as *but* and *for*, in the second verse. The third and fourth verses are faulty in the same respect as those already instanced.

" TRUTH LIES HIDDEN.

"Glorious truths lie undiscovered
In the depths of many a mind;
Heedless travellers, on life's pathway,
Fail these gem-like truths to find.
"Pity 'tis the world should lose them;
But they are not fruitless quite,
For they beam from souls' that bear them
In their deeds of love and might.
"Would we see them in full beauty,
We must draw them forth to view;
Stimulating their possessors
Into noble deeds and true.
"Search ye then for truth, tho' hidden
In the human heart's deep well;
Bring it forth,—its godlike influence
Shall the power of error quell."—J. E.

We have a lengthy piece before us, called "The Mystic Warning," by J. M., who scorns to confide to us his patronymics. This commences in the patent ghost-story style, and, like its

types, is without point and poetry. Take the opening declaration:—

“THE MYSTIC WARNING.

“Twas on a windy, winter's night,
No star shot forth its twinkling light;
The village dames had gone to rest,
And Jack his lovely maid had press'd;
But scarce the parting words are told,
When something strange they both behold,—
A ghastly form in white array,
Glides lightly o'er the path that lay
Between them and their rustic home,
From which they oft were wont to roam
On nights like these, when love ran high,
To breathe their vows of constancy.”

This is a fair specimen of the whole. How often must it be told and re-told, that rhyming is not poetry, any more than the ringing of bells is a godly sermon? We *expect* to find the one where sounds the other, but they may each be, and are, alas! very often, distant as the poles.

“Tis not enough, ye bards, with all your art,
To polish poems;—they must touch the heart.
Where'er the scene be laid, whate'er the song,
Still let it bear the hearer's soul along.
Command your audience or to smile or weep,
Whiche'er may please you,—anything but sleep.
The poet claims our tears; but, by his leave,
Before I shed them, let me see him grieve.”

On the daring author of a volume now before us, a blunt matter-of-fact friend pronounced this impromptu eulogium:—
“That man's *pluck* is praiseworthy. To publish *such* insufferable stuff must, indeed, require no small admixture of devil-may-care-ism and self-esteem.”

Would that we could have written more mildly in this our first critique! but without hesitation we must affirm that our standard shall never be lowered to a Lilliputian level, whilst there are *men* of mind, whose powers are *not* dwarfed, and whose writings *may* command our respect and our reverence.

We insert the following “approved pieces” without criticism.

“DREAMS AND REALITIES.

“Gorgeous dreams of passing splendour
Float in beauty o'er my soul,
Like the golden-tinted cloudlets
That from sun-tipt mountains roll.

“Dream I now of bliss unbounded,
Realized by man on earth;
Bliss that only they inherit
Who are of celestial birth.

Dream I that the bands are broken,
Which enthrall the world's oppressed;
Storms are over,—safely havened,
Earth enjoys a perfect rest.

"Peace supreme reigns in all bosoms;
Men in brotherhood are bound;
Gentle Love, in all her sweetness,
Monarch of the world is crowned.

"But I wake from these my dreamings
To a sternly real life;
Discord, poverty, oppression,
Tyranny and wrong are rife.

" 'Men and brethren!' ought these evils
To be rampant in the world?
Should they not, in holy justice,
From their thrones be swiftly hurled?
Up, my brothers!—be in earnest!—
Apathy does not becom.
Those who wish the reign of freedom
May not revel in a dream.

"Look above for strength and guidance;
God, we know, defends 'the right';
Struggle on,—believing ever
Right shall triumph over might."—J. E.

"THE SEA.

"All silvered with smiles is the sun-softened sea;
Glowing chaplets of sapphire the wanton waves gracing;
Low-whispering winds wafting wierd melodie
From the flower-burdened shores they are love-worn embracing;
And the raptures of Paradise gently descending,
With ocean, and zephyr, and sunbeam are blending.

"All furrowed with frowns is the sable-browed sea;
Old 'Tempest' the breakers with fury endowing,
While shrill shrieking winds sing with murderous glee,
Of the brave hearts engulfed, and the orphan's tears flowing;
And the wraiths of the storm are a jubilee keeping,
And a hundred pale mariners foam-wrapt are sleeping.

"All placid again is the moon-charmed sea,
And white-winged the barque o'er its starred bosom glancing.
How wondrously sweet is this strange minstrelsy
Of the night winds that sing while the wavelets are dancing!
All hushed is the storm, and the orphans are sleeping,
And pitiful angels pearly dew-tears are weeping."

Chertsey.

M. C. B.

F. G.

MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

THE indifference to education, once so prevalent among the lower classes, has now, happily, in a great measure passed away; and with it the fear of the higher classes, lest the extension of its advantages to their poorer fellow-countrymen should prove inimical to the exclusive interests of their order. One of the greatest questions of the day, in the solution of which many eminent, good, and great men are engaged, is, How most effectively and widely to disseminate the blessings of knowledge? As to the best means of accomplishing this there are many and various opinions; but the direct tendency of the thought and interest excited in their discussion has been to raise the standard of education among all classes of the community; and among the many attempts to supply the demands made by young men for improved and more available means of education, Mutual Improvement Societies have sprung into existence, and have attained a prominent position. As a matter, therefore, of considerable importance, it is proposed, in the present paper, to examine,—1st, The *disadvantages*, real or assumed, which have been charged on these societies; 2ndly, Their *advantages*; and, 3rdly, To point out some things which seem absolutely essential to their well being and success.

I. *Their disadvantages.* The one which has been most frequently and loudly insisted upon is, that they tend to produce and foster *superficiality*. Archbishop Whately has urged this with great force in his Rhetoric. He says, "When young men's faculties are in an immature state, and their knowledge crude, scanty, and imperfectly arranged, if they are prematurely hurried into a habit of fluent elocution, they are likely to retain through life a careless facility of pouring forth ill-digested thoughts in well-turned phrases, and an aversion to cautious reflection. For when a young man has acquired that habit of ready extemporaneous speaking, which consists in *thinking* extempore, both his indolence and self-confidence will indispose him for the toil of carefully preparing his matter, . . . and he will have been qualifying himself only for the lion's part in the interlude of "*Pyramus and Thisbe*."

SWUG. "Have you the Lion's part written? Pray give it me, if it be; for I am slow of study."

QUINCE. "You may do it *extempore*; for it is *nothing but roaring*."

"*Midsummer Night's Dream*."

This is a serious charge, and obviously contains much truth, but the disadvantage here laid bare has many effectual remedies. Let each young man, who is learning the art of speaking by taking part in debates, see to it that he never speaks against his conviction. Let him never attempt to bolster up the wrong side of a question by sophistical arguments, the fallaciousness of which he himself sees; nor be deterred by a false shame (which

it is to be feared is too prevalent) from surrendering an opinion when it has been clearly proved to be incorrect, merely because he has once committed himself to it. As a young man should never speak against his conviction, neither should he ever speak without a conviction, and in order to obtain this he should diligently investigate his subject, carefully weigh the evidence on either side, and then draw his conclusions. Thus he will be preserved from that verbosity, insincerity, and shallowness, which the Archbishop says debating is likely to produce upon unripe minds, and will qualify himself for something better than the lion's part referred to. But a chief feature in most Mutual Improvement Societies furnishes another protection against this disadvantage, viz., the practice of original composition in writing. One of Bacon's finest aphorisms is, "Reading makes a full man, writing an exact man, and conversation a ready man;" and while it cannot be denied that the tendency of debating, unless tempered by other intellectual exercises, is to produce readiness at the expense both of fullness and exactness; yet if the mind be diligently stored by a systematic course of reading, and carefully disciplined by exercise in writing, these two latter requisites will be secured, and superficiality effectually prevented.

Another disadvantage charged upon Mutual Improvement Societies is, that they tend to *produce self-conceit*. That there are egotists in these societies we do not dispute; but to affirm that, therefore, it is the tendency of Mutual Improvement Societies to make their members egotistical, is surely illogical. The young man who is an egotist here will be invariably found to bear the same character in the social circle, in the place of business, and wherever else he is met. Possibly a society of this kind may foster his vice, but this is because it is the nature of those afflicted with it to debase everything, no matter how good in itself, to serve their purposes of self-aggrandisement, to make everything minister to their rapacious self-importance. One of the principal advantages of Mutual Improvement Societies is, that they are great stimulants to study, to the acquisition of knowledge; and it is an undoubted fact, that with the increase of his knowledge the student's pride of intellect decreases in the same ratio.

"The pride of man in what he knows
Keeps lessening as his knowledge grows."

If we are asked the reason of this, we reply, because almost the first knowledge the earnest student obtains, is that of his own ignorance. As the traveller, ascending some hill before the sun has melted the mists and clouds which night has hung over the earth, only becomes conscious of the greatness of these and of the extent of prospect they hide from his view, as he ascends above them, so is it with he who climbs the hill of knowledge; it is only as he emerges from the mists and darkness

of ignorance which surround its base, that he becomes aware of the almost unlimited expanse which their shadows rest upon and conceal. Men who might with the greatest show of justice have claimed that their knowledge was universal, have been the readiest to acknowledge its limited character. Even Socrates declared, "he only knew that he knew nothing." Surely there can be no more effective antidote to pride of intellect than this. But there is another way in which Mutual Improvement Societies are antagonistic to the development of this vice. If the exhibition of a young man's talents, however insignificant they be, is confined to the small circle of his own acquaintance, who usually bestow upon him nothing but approval, they are likely to assume in his own eye most unwarrantable dimensions; but let him join one of these societies, engage in its various intellectual exercises, take part in its debates, and the comparison he will be compelled to institute between himself and others, better educated and informed, will cause his exaggerated notion of his own capability to dwindle to something like just proportions. Moreover, an impartial observation of the majority of young men's characters will show that self-conceit is not nearly so prevalent as a craven fear and self distrust; and while the former is an evil much to be deplored, the latter destroys and paralyzes the mental energies incalculably more.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.

Y. E.

(To be continued.)

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

195. Was Ossian the author of the poems ascribed to him by Macpherson; or, were they ancient poems collected by Macpherson, and by him published as Ossian's; or, were the reputed translations Macpherson's own compositions, given out to be translations from ancient poems by Ossian?—W. W. YORK.

196. A reader of the *British Controversialist* would be much obliged by your favouring him with the etymology of the following words, &c.:—"Zoist"—the name of a journal published by Bailliere, of Regent-street, on Cerebral Physiology and Mesmerism; "Gutta Percha;" "Crinoline;" and "Pic-nic." I would also be obliged by an explanation of the term "Lakers" applied to the poets Coleridge, Southey, Wordsworth, and others.

197. Would M. H., who so kindly answered my former question, be so good as to give me, through the medium of the *British Controversialist*, a list of the books most suited to a regular course of *Theological* and *Ecclesiastical* study; including the chief works bearing on the various controversies; also, the *principal* books setting forth and defending the various tenets of the Dissenters? And if M. H. would name one or two *elementary* works on *general* architecture, and then some really good ones on *Ecclesiastical* Architecture and Archaeology, M. H. would still further oblige and befriend—THEOLOGIAN.

198. Will some kind reader of the *British Controversialist* inform me what are the qualifications required to become a "Fellow of the Geological Society?"—LEYSON RHYS.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Johnstone Young Men's Total Abstinence and Mutual Improvement Society.—The first annual soiree of this society was held on Friday, the 2nd of July, in the Temperance Hall, which was kindly granted for the occasion. The hall was elegantly decorated with a great variety of flowers and evergreens. Notwithstanding that the admission was limited to the members, and a female friend each, the attendance was most cheering. After tea, the meeting was addressed by the chairman, who was followed by Messrs. McLellan, Burns, and Cameron. Between the addresses were interspersed songs and recitations, by different members. Indeed, every individual seemed to do his utmost in keeping up the hilarity of the evening. The usual votes of thanks having been moved, the meeting separated at a seasonable hour, all in excellent

spirits, and felicitating themselves on the success which had attended their efforts in getting up the social party.

Bridgnorth Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—This debating society was established early in the present year. The first subject discussed was, "Does not the present state of society denote that an improved method of christianizing mankind is required?" Among the subjects that have since come under consideration, are, "Does novel reading tend to moral and intellectual improvement?" "Is the consumption of flesh as food natural to man?" Essays are promised on, "The right of Government to interfere in education." "Is the British stage worthy of support?" "The ballot." Judging from the past career of the society, it promises to become a useful and flourishing institution.

LITERARY NOTICES.

CARLYLE's "Frederick the Great" is to be published this month.

MR. EDWARD CAPPS has gained the £200 prize offered by the Society of Arts for an essay on political economy.

W. H. MURRAY, a self-raised, self-guided, and self-educated man, editor of the Edinburgh "*Daily Express*," died July 25th, aged 39.

SHAKESPEARE is again being translated into Russian.

IVAN GOLOVIN has founded a paper, "*The Arrow*," to shoot into Russia.

CARDINAL WISEMAN made his debut as a playwright in St. Cuthbert's College, near Durham, as author of "*The Hidden Gem*."

BAILEY's satire, "*The Age*," is published, but it is an ill-fitting theme for him. Satire and "trade winds only blow in low latitudes."

We hear that the editorship of "*The*

Leader" has passed into the hands of F. G. Tomlins, on a change of management.

"In what church in England was Shakespeare married?" is asked by Mr. Cunningham in "*Illustrated London News*."

SIR JOHN PRIOR, K.H., was Editor of the works, and author of "*The Life of Goldsmith*."

CARLO TROYA, author of a "*History of the Middle Ages*," died at Milan, aged 74.

M. GUIZOT is the guest of Lord Aberdeen in Haddo House, N.B.

WALTER SAVAGE LANDOR is in pecuniary difficulties; and the recent-damaging law suit adds to the evil of his old days.

A new Quarterly Review is to appear in December.

SIR ROD. MURCHISON is surveying the Orkney and Shetland Lias.

Biography.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the Art of Reasoning, &c., &c., &c.

EVENTS are the elements of history ; but men are the creators of events. Biography, therefore, takes us more into the interior of circumstance than history, and brings us nearer a true comprehension of social life, than chronicles and annals. History is a large hemispherical map, on which *minutiae* are not desired. Biography is a smaller map, but is better filled in with details. The scales on which they are constructed differ. Events occupy the foremost position in historical narration, and individuals are subordinated in place, while the grand march of circumstance is in process of representation. In biography, on the contrary, the inner life which manifests itself in circumstance, and deploys itself in events, is the primal object of investigation and exhibition. The *results* of life appear in history ; the *productive forces* of results receive the chief attention of biography. The greatness and grandeur, the value and responsibility of life, consist in this—that it is the originator of change, the agent by which the evolution of events is accomplished. The potencies of life are not man's to use at his own pleasure, to work out his own purposes. They belong to their Divine Giver, and to their fellows, in the space-domain wherein the sphere of their existence is allotted. This right of property in each other's being gives earnestness to the desire of knowing in what manner the purposes of life have been fulfilled by our neighbours ; for

“ All are needed by each one,
Nothing is fair or good alone.”

The perennial curiosity of man for knowing what manner of life his fellow men have lived, is thus accounted for, and the eagerness with which the details of the private lives of public men are read and spoken of, is reduced to a law of nature and of right. It is because of the community of nature, interest and destiny in man and man, that curiosity—like death,

“ *Equo pulsant pede pauperum tabernas,
Regumque turres.*”

and that “ The Annals of the Poor,” “ Lives of Men of Science,” “ Biographies of the Illustrious,” &c., have each their multitudes of readers. The greedy partiality of the human mind for biographic records is one of the providential safeguards of

our moral being. We know the hungry zeal with which we listen to the recital of the doings of others; and learn hence that we also are objects of lively interest to our *confrères* in being; and studious of our repute with the society in which we mingle, strive to live "*sans reproche*." In every act of our existence we involuntarily write our biography on the memory of others, and by our action, or inaction, for good or evil, influence all those on whom the outgoings of our being have operated. Not to or for ourselves alone do we live. The interests which stimulate, the passions which agitate, the motives which actuate, and the impulses which move us, are infinite in their effects upon others; because the points of impingement, and action, and interaction, are numberless and incalculable. Is not life truly then a heritage of responsibility?

All men are biographers, yea, *auto*-biographers. Yet how few seem to recognize the ominous fact! Did we all seriously remember this, how many times would we rein in our activities with hasty arm, and power of will. In this

"Changeful life,
So manifold in cares, that every day
Brings its own burden with it"—

how sedulously ought we to avoid harassing the present with the cark arising from misuse of the past. All life is full of hazardous turns; but his is most exposed to risk and peril, whose past lies like a huge and blistering leprosy upon the activities for which the present calls. May none of us ever find that the years of old have been spent in studying the character of Marplot, as too many have discovered when the mistake was too difficult to mend: for what is writ in memory once, and graven in habit, is hard to be erased, and not easily rewritten. Such an autobiography may we never write; such a biography may we never have written of us.

It is too commonly supposed that only exceptional men merit the flourish of an author's pen; that those of mark and likelihood alone should receive record, and be held in memory. These, it may be, ought to gain eternization in type and history; but it is not the less a fact, that all men write their lives in the minds of, and mirror them in their influences upon other men; and no one knows, or can know, how much his life may operate upon his neighbours.

These observations bring into prominence a fact which requires to be kept steadily in view, if we would rightly comprehend the uses, the methods, and the purposes of biographic literature. To these three topics we desire, in brief language, to direct our readers' thoughts; but first permit us a few preliminary words.

Biology (*Bios*, life, and *grapho*, I write) is a word of modern

usage, which signifies an account of the birth, growth, culture, disposition, studies, accidents, actions, fortunes, difficulties, cares, casualties, influences, circumstances, sorrows, &c., and death of an individual. It is distinguished from history, as we formerly remarked, both in matter and aim. One man in his activities operated upon by others, and operating upon them in return; hemmed in by circumstance, and doing battle with it, now yielding, now winning, and so working out new combinations, and evoking other environments; in short, producing events,—such is the material of biography proper. Men in multitudes, in the ceaseless interaction of principle, position, choice, design, interest, and wish, joined together into socialities, states, armies, parties, sects, &c., mutually actuating, exciting, and impressing each other so as to bring forth change; coming into contact, hostile or friendly; combining or seceding; leaguings or beleaguering; stimulating, agitating, and affecting each other; in short, the whole moving panorama of events, their evolution, march, and progress,—these are the topics of history in its most genuine form. Were we to name the one *story*, the other *history*, we might indicate the difference between them; the former then signifying something built up from within, and simple; the latter something built up from without, and complex,—though this might seem an innovation in speech. It is seldom that the distinction drawn above in theory is adhered to in practice; for Nature does not permit one man to be singled from his fellows and presented to the eye continuously and uncontrasted, isolated and self-centred. The need of the soul for distinctness of thought does not operate imperiously upon the outward, and compel it to assume those shapes which the exigencies of the human mind demand that the objects of its investigations shall take. Men, grouped and grafted together by relationship, wants, friendships, treaties, state purposes, &c., are seen and known; act, and are the subjects of action; submit to serve, or rise above control and service; do, suffer, and become. So collocated and compacted, they are historic. But when we desire to specialize our view, we select from among those congregated throngs the individual whose life we desire to note and notice, and concentrating our whole endeavour of mind upon him, so abstract ourselves from his surroundings, that he becomes the chief object of thought, and all else, howsoever important, is regarded as subordinate to him,—worthy of remark only so far as they operated upon him to produce any new development in his soul, or evolve any change in his doings or fortunes,—men become then and thus the objects of biography. In the great theatre of Time we choose one actor, and thoroughly casting from us the general progress of the play, we watch only the part he enacts, the mode in which he works out his character, and the influence he exerts in the scenes where he appears, or which find their origin or results in his designs. The *man* is, in

this view, the primary object of thought, the plan, purpose, plot and *dénouement* are secondaries. In history it is different; the composite fabric, the structural scheme is all in all; the man is but an item in the onswEEP of the unity observed. Biography is sculpturesque; history picturesque; the individual is the subject of the one, the multitude of the other.

Even this differentiated, however, the fascination of biography is such, that the historian often leaves the pinnacles and high places of pompous circumstance to enter the home of his heroes, saints, martyrs, or villains, that he may exhibit them in the undress of daily life, or show them apart from the splendid garishness of state or glory, the attractive notoriety of politics, or the scenery of justice halls and blazing market-places. The broad outline of the matter, whatever it is, being drawn and painted, the artistic historian touches in the portraits he requires, placed, shaded, and surrounded as he wishes, and so animates and enlivens the page that the pulse quickens, and the eye dilates, and the heart throbs, and excitement rushes through and agitates the soul, more from the personality presented than from the circumstances transacted. The very form and fashion of life is preserved; and the reader seems to live along the line of the events of which he is in reality only the time-distant spectator. Such is the interest of biography, that history forgets her dignity and grandeur, and leads to the footlights, for closer inspection, the chief actor of the time.

So much being postulated as preliminary thought, let us now advert for a few paragraphs to *the uses of biography*.

Biography, if it be true, has its first use in being a memorial of the dead. All men cannot, or, at least, do not, so live as to deserve and obtain the affectionate remembrance of the heart; but all men, by the very necessities of life, do cast forth a film, of finer or of coarser stuff, from their being into that of others. The good lay past in their lifetime so much of the odorous spikenard of desert as serves to embalm their names and the record of their deeds; the evil, with the horrid essence of their devilry, pollute the chambers of thought, and cause the palimpsestic walls of memory to fume forth the ill-flavour of the writing inscribed upon them. The natural biography of each man is written first in the souls of others; it may or may not thereafter be retranscribed into the archives of the world's illustrious ones, and acquire a corner in the library of Fame. Montgomery truthfully says, it is the "common lot" of the members of our race to leave behind—

"No other trace
Than this—There lived a man."

Yet even could this be honestly said of each of us, how much would be implied in it that is not now to be witnessed in our

lives! None die unremembered; few die unregreted; the greater number of us must die unwritten of, except in the lives we have blessed or cursed; the hearts we have eased or burdened; the influences we have used or misused; the duties we have done or neglected; the purposes we have fulfilled or failed in; the good or evil that "lives after us." Graves abound, but they much outnumber memorial stones, and these again far exceed the note-worthy names which stud, but seldom occupy five lines in any biographical collection. Few are the names, and far between, whose owners have so won the world's heart as to be embalmed in imperishable story, retained in the memory of nations, and made the watchwords of those engaged in labours tending towards progress, enlightenment, civilization, and christian zeal. To be worthy of remembrance is a laudable object of ambition; and, if sought by true and honourable means, the more widely we can spread the interest of our lives the better for ourselves and mankind. Biography, now-a-days, cares for all those regarding whom the world feels anxious. Whoso merits the preservation of his name may now confidently hope that he will not be left in "cold oblivion," or wholly pass into the "land of forgetfulness,"—it is sure to pulsate in the memory, and evoke the music of admiration, and the wish to imitate. Let us each, then, walk worthy of the vocation whereunto we are called, depending on our motives and our deeds for true remembrance in the inner hearts of loved ones, the respectful regret of friends, the fond regard of those wider circles to whom our efforts may have endeared us. Biography written in the heart, fortune, and future of others, shall raise such a memorial of us, as desert warrants, and the true soul craves not vainly.

A memorial would ill fulfil its purpose were it merely to recall the dead to memory, and keep a name alive in after ages. That were a small and unimportant service truly, and would be little valued by the genuine and honest soul whose name and deeds were notified thereby. To become "to dumb forgetfulness a prey" would be preferable to this forthholding of a lightless lamp into the far future,—a lamp oilless and serviceless, which only in its outward aspect seems to offer help, but gives none. Such lightless and delightless urns we have seen,—vain efforts at the immortalization of Un-worth,—jewelless caskets, for they held no essenced memory brilliant with the glory of well-doing. Pomp, vanity, passing show, gauds to make death's kingdom fairer, but flashing forth no eternal music to the memory of the heart, and communicating no undying influence to surviving souls, fill too many cemeteries and other resting-places of the dead. These but make a life's inconsequence more patent, more painfully apparent, and more palpable. Biographies, like monumental stones, are often disproportioned to the merit of the persons memoried by them. Accidents magnify them. Time, however, sends forth the night-birds of Oblivion, who flap their

wings over the memory thus vainly overrated, and Waste works wondrous swiftly to obliterate the lies of accident; so that in the end all is right,—the stone stands up as an Ebenezer—"signifying nothing," like "an idiot's tale," while some humbler and mayhap stoneless grave becomes a pilgrim's shrine for ages, and its very dust is held "sacred to the memory" of some meritorious worker or sufferer for man and God. Not as a memorial of the dead therefore does biography exert its noblest function; it is as an example to the living that its highest use is shown. Thus, a man "being dead, yet speaketh," and his life becomes "a lesson for the ages to come."

In the sorrowful Bethesda of desire how many sit watchful, but helpless, seeing the angel-troubled waters of opportunity, yet unable to attain their verge and margin, to step in and heal their hopelessness of soul; let but the doings of another in like circumstances be shown in the clear water mirror of reality, and the eye brightens, the sinews stretch, the impotence vanishes, and the man walks, yea, runs, towards the fields where exercise and usefulness invite him. In a field of graves, sealed up by the iron hand, one may sit and weep, stricken with sadness and supine through grief; but the memory of a good and true man is a continual resurrection, and from under the very tombstone the salutary restorative will issue, which will enable us to become girt about with the might of endeavour, and be stronger, more indomitable, truer and healthier of soul in the every-day life we shall lead when our visit to the grave is over. Biography is a perfect storehouse of friendships, a world of gratifying and stimulating intimacies. Its inhabitants have lived and died for us, have wrapped up the essences of their being, and trials, and doings, as a gift for us; they speak out, not evasively, but earnestly, true words of hope, expostulation, encouragement, and warning. They have no jealousies to fear, no rivalries to effect, no delicacies to impede confession, or hinder dissuasion; no fear of rousing rage by advice, no interest in keeping "the fair side of their friends," no risks to venture of life-long estrangement for rebuke given or offence taken, no self-seeking to promote, and are liable to no suspicions which can distress them. Their example they can freely and readily afford to lay before us; and how suggestive may not that be for the unrecorded future of the world! Though narrating the experience of one poor unit of humanity, in how many points may it touch others, and impel them to go on in a chosen but difficult path, or propel them into a track less dangerous than that they were bent on venturing along. They may become type-lives and models to show by what slender means history may be set agoing, and how simply events of pith and moment in the world's welfare may be meditated in peasant hut, though enacted on the broad stage of the centuries. The hill Difficulty stands before us all—the Slough of Despond there are few who fail to

get into—a sea of troubles must by most be voyaged across—the battle of life all must wage, though the foes may be rougher, or sterner, or better trained, or more impetuous, or more subtle than another one fought—but others have clomb, waded, navigated, fought, and offer the secret of success to us, or disclose the cause of failure. They offer in this the most powerful teaching, the most persuasive counsel, the sweetest consolation, the best spur to effort—example.

In presenting its examples to us, biography encourages and stimulates hopefulness. All these have lived and fulfilled destinies, and shall not I too. With them the course of life was dark, the genuine import of their experience enigmatic; I can, however, see glimmerings of light reflected upon my path here and there from the gravestones which margin the progress of the ages past. Let me, too, go on my way, laying up oil in my vessel and my lamp, that I, too, may be among those who lighten the future by the effulgence of their endeavour and striving, if not by their success. I, too, may be a pilgrim of duty, and erect along the wearisome wastes of effort signals of progress and indications of the places where firm footing may be found or unsafe seemings allure only to destroy. Biography carries in her right hand the lamp of hope, and in her left the staff of comfort. She offers the one to the wayfarer, and waves the other far over the fields of futurity, and bids us go on fearlessly, but not foolhardily or in self-trust alone.

The *methods* of biography vary not only with the person and character of the person whose life is to receive illustration, but also with the intents of the author. Of the *modes* in vogue of manufacturing biographies, memoirs, &c., we do not now care to speak. Many of these miss the true end of their authors, because they have been cast into moulds unprepared to present a true and living likeness of their subjects. The roundness, the polish, the *finesse* of art has been used to bring the real within the realms of the ideal, and make it submissive to her laws; whereas truth is the only modeller from whose hands a cast should be taken. Hence we have catalogues of virtues, descriptive sketches of personal form and outward aspect, annals of everyday doings, chronicles of comings and goings, and estimates of character, but little delineation of men as real, living unities, true co-efficients in the outworking of the problems and plans of "the Lord of life." That is not the method in which a trustworthy, useful, vital biography can be written. We want to *know* the man in the entirety and integrity of his life, the wholefulness of his experience, the microcosmic oneness of the sphere of his being, and with an all-inclusive adequacy of exposition. In written biography intended as a memorial, an example, and an encouragement, the canon that suffices for mere acquaintance-ship and common friendship will not hold. Occasional greetings

in the market-places of life, seldom-got interviews, brief, stray gossipry, now and then a letter or a passing visit may suffice for these, but for that we require a man's relationships with the world, society, friends, events, &c., the inward springs of his nature, the outward circumstances of his life, how these co-existed and modified each other, with what efforts did he struggle to escape from the control of passion, suffering, and sin; when and how did he falter, sink, or fail; what did he think, do, effect, endure, avoid, cleave to, despise, resist, succumb to; and what change was brought about by his life in society, arts, literature, science, thought, civic polity, or national position. A mere amorphous up-piling of facts, dates, criticisms, objects, occupations, parentage, titles, works, sicknesses, death, &c.—the whole spawn of compilations,—is useless, worthless, and unsatisfying. We must be taught to live his life, burn with his hopes, glory in his successes, sorrow in his sufferings, sigh over his sins, and pulsate with each varying emotion which moved him. Thus biography is absorbed into our thought, habits, and life, and becomes a transfused soul-power, giving a true metempsychosis to humanity, and making the dead past not a joy only, but a utility for ever. In each life the mysterious web, whose warp is necessity, and whose woof is freedom, is woven. The familiar and the eccentric, home and civic duties, personal and public relations, powers and impotencies, triumphs and defeats, sins and glories, schemes and careers, character and outward being, intent and opportunity,—all must be worked together in their true though tangled mode of evolution, and we must see the very threads of circumstance driven along by the skilful hand of will, forming "the web of life." So ought biography to be written with a due apportionment and disposition of all the elements of character, station, time, chance, power, and activity, presenting to the reader's mind the whole process of culture and growth through which the man ripened, and left behind him the seeds which should bud and blossom into the future. To *know* a man in his entire being is seldom given to himself; other eyes must behold him and estimate him; hence biography is preferable to autobiography, when the latter has placed the material in the hands of the former. Build up the narrative of facts, inner and outward, in the very forms and from the same designs as they took their rise in or from at first. Let each element have due place and weight, show the causation of each effect, and display the order, the process, and the result of each phase of activity of being or thought. This we conceive to be the best method of biography.

Purpose and use do not always coincide, although the words overlap, in great measure, the ground and field of each other's signification. Purpose is theoretical; use, practical; the one presides at the very birth of a thought, scheme, or act, any col-

location of means ; the other accepts means collocated, agencies extant, and employs them for or in the accomplishment of some end, either that at first intended, or some other. Purpose originates ; use applies.

The *purposes* of biography differ with the aims of the writer ; its uses remain the same. Of the various biographies of the self-same person the terms and elements, being, as they are, the educts and products of the past, are the same—the view-point or the intent of the writers only differ. Hence it becomes right and requisite to speak of the purposes of biography, although at first sight that might seem to be accomplished in our observations on its uses.

Biography is frequently used as a *means of propagandism*. Some thinker or actor has evolved a new form of doctrine or practice, and it is believed by his friends, followers, or disciples, that the most convenient form in, and the most alluring agency by which these opinions or schemes may be commended to the minds of others is by recounting the events of the projector's existence, and the mode in which the suggestive faculty operating upon him led to a change in his views or actions. This kind of biography depends upon the maxim of the general uniformity of thought in men, and is adopted in the hope that this may induce others to follow the same course, and come to similar conclusions—in short, to be a propagandist agent.

Somewhat similar in its reasons and procedures are *political and religious biographies issued by parties or sects*, or their opposers and defenders—whether agreeing with or differing from the objects of the person whose biography is written. The success of the party or sect of the writer is the chief end of the composition, and the biography is used as an easy and attractive medium for elevating one party or sect, and depressing another. This form of biography occasionally degenerates into the *controversial*—wherein the persons introduced are made merely the lay figures upon which are hung the pros and cons of political animosities or sectish rivalries ; at other times it may be raised to a class worthy of being denominated the *expositive*—wherein the opinions, tenets, beliefs, discoveries, doings, suggestings of the person biographized are made the media through which the party or sect with which he co-laboured is recommended to the reader.

Some biographies are *panegyrical* ; radiant with the purple flush of love or reverence ; and seeing, or at least showing, nought that is not worshipful and right : others are *detractive*, and endeavour to win away admiration by an exposure of weaknesses and failings to which the world, however much it may be the victim and slave itself, denies homage, and refuses merciful consideration. A few may be regarded as *hortative or dissuasive*, which come pretty near those mentioned above in the spirit of their execution, though differing slightly in their aim. They

seek to hold up a mirror, not always *true*, wherein an image pleasing or displeasing may be seen, to be admired and imitated, or to be despised and abhorred. A very few biographies are merely *memorial*—a record of facts, incidents, thoughts, or doings—tentatives only of the world's feeling; others again are *critical*. These latter take the different views of various men as expressed regarding a character, and examine the facts in their relation to those opinions, and endeavour to educe, from the investigation resorted to, the true aspect in which *the* man ought to be regarded by posterity. A further class, partaking somewhat of the characteristics of that last mentioned, may be called the *apologetic*. This, while admitting many defects in the hero of the story, seeks to show that despite of these his merits demand public recognition, and that the person ought to receive the grateful though regretful admiration of the people for whose behoof he laboured, suffered, or thought.

Under certain circumstance, each and all of those forms of biography may seem advisable or be needful, besides other forms of which we have made no mention and taken no account. But, as a general rule, they are each and all misleading, or have a tendency to misdirect and misinform. They imply something ulterior as an object lying beyond the life of the person, and best, or most easily attainable, through the form of composition which biography assumes. Our own belief is that biography ought to have no other object except that of exhibiting *the* person with all his surroundings, trials, obstacles, in all his activities, fortunes, states, among all his relationships, under the influence of all his impulses and all his passions, all his outward duties and all his inward struggles and triumphs. The true and legitimate purposes of biography are only two :—

First, Exemplative. Second, Explanative.

First. Men are readily acclimatized to the companionship they have the opportunity of forming, and the circumstances in which he is placed, or places himself. Example urges and persuades, insinuates and succeeds. Its ever-flowing tides work and eddy and swirl and circle and subdue. There is little power of resistance in man compared with the powers without him which operate continuously upon him in conscious and unconscious hours. To strengthen the mind against these we should extend the sphere of our companionship, and take into our counsel the great and good; the workers and the thinkers of the past—from them we should learn to stand fast in our integrity, and receive them as the exemplars of our life. To be so used biography ought to be exemplative.

Second. To make any life truly exemplative it must be thoroughly understood to be so; it must be fully, clearly, truthfully explained. The elements, the circumstances, and the obstacles of growth should be shown. The natural co-working of life on

life, of state and action, of event and result ought to be carefully noted, and the interaction of thought and occasion should be distinctly expounded. When thus written biography is an easily read lesson on the life which we may each lead—it is tinted by the light of a divine purpose; the glory of a God-given life-lot beams on it, and the light of truth flows forth from it with steady radiance and ever-increasing brilliancy. When biography is so written—

“Age cannot wither it, nor custom stale its infinite variety.”

“Other men,” says Emerson, “are lenses through which we read our own minds.” They are presentative in themselves; representative to us. But they are far more than this; they are participant in our fortunes and destinies, as we also are in theirs. Out from each, influences ray forth upon others, and they reciprocate that same gift by giving also. The true charm of life is this power of affecting others. Hence biography, which extends, and multiplies, and intensifies the influences of a life, is a grand agent in the progress of humanity. It humanizes by proxy, and keeps up a man’s active moral force, like electricity in a Leyden jar, for use or illustration in the future. During life, example passes off from a man as naturally as the rays from the sun, or the shadow from the wide-spread oak; but biography gives perennial efficacy to this stimulant or sedative effluence, and elevates to a sort of sublimity the private experiences and doings of the hero of its homage. Every one thus becomes to us a fact, and a thought to be transfused into our souls, and to gain a new being in our hearts. This thought should make the life of each man a sincerity. To enjoy a rich and exalting revivification, like that of which we have spoken, one must be true and reverence-worthy, and be no wilful participator in the envies, hates, contentions, regrets, and egotisms which fill the world with folly and sin—no assertor of an injurious superiority, or advocate of exclusivism. There must be in him no tendency to bankruptcy of soul, feeling, equity, or honest purpose.

Men fail, but their memories remain; they die, but the remembrance of thousands holds the influence of their lives in solution with their own. In each precipitate of action there is some portion of the effect of another’s being. “No man liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself,” is an eternal truth, of which biography is an exemplification. Life is ours now; let us each so live as to arouse and excite such thoughts and feelings as shall make our life fragrant and fruitful through the ages, for good shown or done. It needs no exalted station, or world-revered position, to write a loving biography in the hearts of those we leave behind—in the records of those whom we fly in death to companion with.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL
BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE
MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM
PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

“For I am sure that my Redeemer liveth;
And that *I shal ryse out of the earth in the latter days*;
That *I shal be clothed againe with this skynne,*
AND BE GOD IN MY FLESH.
Yee, I myself shal beholde him,
Not with other, but with these same eyes.”

Job xix. 25—27; Myles Coverdale's Translation.

“For our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: *who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body*, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself.”—*Phil. iii. 20, 21.*

“WHY should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?” Such was the question Paul addressed to the Jews, his persecutors, when at the bar of Agrippa. We, also, under different circumstances, address the same words to G. A. H. E., “E. Foster,” and R. G.; and, as Agrippa was, by the reasoning of Paul, persuaded to be almost a Christian, we hope to convert our friends, not almost, but altogether, from their idealistic theory—from the spiritualism of an exuberant fancy, to the realities of fact, and firm belief in the express declarations of God's word.

We have previously observed that it is the extent only of the resurrection that is the object of the present debate; we have shown that the entire reappearance of man as he now is must be an impossibility; that in the future life man will reappear changed in some important respects, yet with his identity and personality strictly preserved. These observations were illustrated from the analogies of vegetable and insect life, and the various mutations, *prenatus* and *postnatus*, to which man is subjected in this life. We also adduced the moral constitution of man, and the consequent necessities of rewards and punishments, as proof; and, finally, we gave confirmations of our views, in extracts from the works of learned and pious men. In continuing our remarks, we entreat the candid attention of our

opponents, as truth, not victory, is our aim, and brotherly love the consummation we devoutly wish.

Our first parents, previous to the fall, occupied a different position in the scale of existence to ourselves. The *law* given to them by God himself required obedience at once willing and implicit; the terms employed are clear, plain, and easily to be understood,—“And the Lord God commanded Adam, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,” Gen. ii. 16, 17. Adam broke the law, endured the penalty, and, as the progenitor of the human race, has entailed that penalty upon the whole of his posterity. After the curse was pronounced upon the first sinners, the Scriptures represent God as saying, “Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken,” Gen. iii. 22, 23. These passages necessarily imply that, previous to the fall, Adam possessed a nature fitted for existence without limits; that the only condition which affected the continuity of his existence was of a moral character—his obedience to the divine law. Continuance in moral rectitude ensured eternal life. Disobedience “brought death into the world, and all our woe.” The wages of sin *were* death, the gift of God *was* eternal life. That man was thus created immortal, and that he forfeited that immortality by sin, are truths, we presume, which will not be denied; and were we not in possession of other evidence upon this subject, this conclusion would be inevitable—that man originally was immortal, but now he has no existence beyond the present life. Fortunately for us, God has revealed his will by the inspired penmen, and the holy Scriptures are replete with evidences of his immortality. “*Christ Jesus came into the world to seek and to save that which was lost.*” And the apostle Paul, treating upon this topic, declares, that “as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. . . Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life,” Rom. v. 12, 18. In other words, Jesus came to restore man to his immortality, to restore that which Adam’s sin had lost—eternal life. Christ in his own person has paid the penalty for sin, a vicarious sacrifice for the sins of others, that whosoever believeth on Him might have eternal life, and that he who believeth not should receive everlasting punishment.

From these observations it appears that Adam before the fall, as a man—a compound of body and soul—was immortal; that

this immortality was placed in abeyance by his sin; that Christ Jesus came into this world, took upon Himself the likeness of sinful flesh, became man, that He might suffer and die to bring life and immortality to light through the gospel; that, possessing human nature, He lived, and died, and rose again. When the Marys and the two disciples visited the place where He had been laid in the tomb, He was not to be found; an angel informed them that He had risen, showed them the place where the Lord had lain, and directed them to go quickly and tell the disciples that He was risen from the dead, and was gone before them into Galilee, where they should see Him. He journeyed with the two disciples to Emmaus; He appeared in the midst of the assembled disciples; Thomas, the incredulous, was invited by the risen Saviour to put forth his hand, and examine the print of the nails, and see the gash made by the spear in His side; He brake bread in their midst, and blessed them; afterwards He was seen by five hundred at one time, and in many ways verified the truthfulness of His bodily resurrection from that tomb watched by the disciples, guarded by the Roman soldiers, and sealed by His vindictive enemies, the Jews. Christ is risen from the dead, and become the firstfruits of them that slept; and when the last trumpet shall sound, the dead shall all be raised, and Christ Jesus shall appear, surrounded by His angels, on the great white throne,—then, in the great day of His appearing, *"we know that we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is,"* 1 John iii. 2.

Jesus rose from the dead the firstfruits of the resurrection, possessing a glorified body, but still a body such as could be experimentally tested in its reality by the incredulous Thomas—a body known and recognized by the apostles and by five hundred disciples as the body of the Christ Jesus—the God-man, the human body and divine spirit, the same identity in a glorified condition after as before the resurrection. Surely if Christ is not risen, we are of all men most miserable, we are still in our sins. But if Christ is risen, His whole nature has risen, the human body and the divine spirit. Abundance of witnesses prove this. He has become the firstfruits of the resurrection, and as is the change in his body, so will be the change in ours, for we shall be like Him. It is thus evident from the Scriptures, that if the human body has no part in the resurrection, Christ has not risen from the dead, the preaching of the apostle is a deception, and we are without hope of salvation. We are ourselves very reluctant to admit any doubt or dogma which false reason or spurious philosophy may suggest to invalidate the great hope of the Christian, and remove the chief corner stone of all religious doctrine. The pious and learned of all ages have held fast to this truth, the resurrection of Christ as the centre of religious truth, confirming our views by such names as Justin,

Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, the Protestant Reformers, Luther, Calvin, Matthew Henry, Goode, Dr. Clarke, and many others; in fact, the orthodox of all ages have uniformly received this doctrine.

The passage quoted from the Book of Job (xix. 25—27) unmistakably affirms the resurrection of the body; for if we suppose Job refers to any other than his personal bodily resurrection and redemption by Christ, we convict ourselves of weakness of intellect and imbecility, or we charge him with the utterance of a known falsehood; we accuse him of deception, and impugn the veracity of the Holy Scriptures. This must be evident as a species of hardihood none but the most desperate atheist could knowingly attempt; such we cannot by any means suppose our opponents to be, and therefore account for their opposition as errors of opinion, which time, and the pious study of God's word, will doubtless rectify.

R. G., referring to our previous remarks, p. 120, line 6, is slightly incorrect; the expression is used by Albert Barnes, and is found in our quotation from his "Notes on 1 Cor. xv. 39 and 40," and not from verse 50, as stated; besides, it is not our own expression. We repeat, that our argument consistently maintains the resurrection of our mortal bodies, with such modifications as shall not destroy their personal individual identity, while fitting them for that higher, nobler state, where corruption is changed for incorruption, and mortality is changed for immortality. That flesh and blood, such as now possessed by man, can inherit the kingdom of heaven, is contrary to reason and revelation, and also foreign to our purpose and argument. We firmly believe the Scriptures to be perfectly truthful and harmonious in the declaration, that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven," and that Job will see "God in his flesh," with his own eyes, and not with another's. Have our friends forgotten the first elements of Scripture history, those interesting events connected with the translation of Enoch and Elijah? These did not die; their bodies, united with their souls, were taken to heaven. True, these were miracles; and is it not a miracle which is spoken of when the resurrection is described by the sacred writers? and by this fact must we judge the event, for thereby is every apparent difficulty removed. God, who created perfect manhood out of the dust of the earth, shall He not be able to make that change in our present sinful bodies which shall reinstate them in the pristine purity and consequent immortality of the original work of His hands? When Christ, by His justifying grace, has sanctified the moral nature of man, his physical nature, which is the less difficult work of purification, shall be readily made meet to dwell with the angels of light before the throne of His glory.

The extracts made by R. G. at p. 120, line 16 *et seq.*, from our

moral view of the resurrection of the body, is an *ex parte* statement, and therefore void of power. We do not suppose it possible that any one can deny the personal identity of man, although the material particles of the human body are constantly subject to change; and we presume it would be difficult to persuade R. G. that the bodily members he at present possesses are not the same as those possessed by him in his early youth. We have contended for the real personal identity of the body, while the material particles have been subject to change, or what appears to us, as finite minds, to be changes. And, we observe, there is nothing in the nature of the case to weaken the analogy which this progressive change presents to the change necessary to fit the body, after death, for the eternal existence of the future life. Thus, it will be perceived, R. G.'s objection rather confirms our argument than otherwise.

The "great multitude" (Rev. vii. 9, 10), quoted by R. G., are described with bodily members and attributes, such as we have described in p. 12, line 12 *et seq.*, as having the "*soma pneumatikon*—the *spiritualized body*—which is raised to the nature and enjoyments pertaining to the spiritual world;" wherein that which constitutes the element of decay and dissolution has, by an act of divine power, been converted into an undying existence.

We are admonished by our space to conclude; did time and space permit, this interesting subject might be much extended, with both pleasure and profit, intellectual and moral; in our advocacy of the doctrine we hope to have many friends, but no enemies. The time is coming when we desire to meet our friends before the throne of the glorified Redeemer, and with them prostrate our glorified bodies at His feet, who hath redeemed us with His precious blood.

"To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honour, and immortality, God will recompense eternal life," in which all the powers of body and of soul shall find sweet employ.

Birmingham.

L'OUVERIER.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"Whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord." "We are confident, and willing rather to be absent from the body, to be present with the Lord."—*Paul*.

THE view of "the glorious and heart-cheering doctrine" for which we are contending is, we candidly confess, materially different from that of our opponents; nevertheless, its scriptural and rational character ought, we think, to have exempted us from the insinuation of "Eugene Aram," of totally denying this consolatory doctrine. Surely it does not follow as a necessary consequence of our denying the resurrection of "the material body"

(which, he says, "is to inherit the kingdom of God," in direct opposition to the apostolic declaration, "that flesh and blood cannot enter" there) that we deny the resurrection inculcated in the Scriptures; on the contrary, we do most cordially believe it. Our doctrine, therefore, is that man not only rises from the grave in the earth, but from the grave of his dead material body. This resurrection is immediately after death, when the man (that is, the soul or spirit) finds himself in a world of substantial existences, he being also a real and substantial man in perfect human form, possessing at the same time all the powers and senses proper to man, though invisible to us in this world, owing to our senses and capacities of perception being comparatively dull and gross, by being shrouded with a body of unapprehensive clay. Such, then, is our view, and one which, we apprehend, the intelligent and reflecting will endorse. However, be this as it may, the article adverted to contains a few particulars which call for a reply; the first of which refers to the nature of the "change in the resurrection body," which, according to E. A., will be precisely the same after the "change" has taken place; for, says he, "it does not follow that the bodies we shall receive in the resurrection will be composed of different materials to the fabric we now inhabit." So that "when Christ shall change our vile bodies, that they may be fashioned like unto his glorious body," they will not, according to him, "be any different to the fabric we now inhabit." "If," to employ his own phraseology, "this is not nonsense, we know not what is." With reference to the transformations which the caterpillar undergoes, he says, "There will be no greater difference between the resurrection body and the present one than that which exists between the butterfly and caterpillar." Now, I ask, can a caterpillar fly? Certainly not; it, like man ere he "casts off this mortal coil," is confined to the earth; nevertheless, as soon as its skin, which gradually becomes parched and brittle, opens to admit of the fully developed butterfly being extricated from it, it branches immediately into the air, with all the gracefulness and ease that are peculiar to it.

We are ready to admit "that the worm contains the lineaments of the gaily clothed insect," just as we believe that the body contains within it the spirit, soul, or man, which at death emerges from this tenement of clay, and rises, as we said, into the world of substantial existences a real and substantial man in perfect human form. But who ever heard of a butterfly resuming the cast-off envelope in which it was confined? No one, of course; and therefore we must not for a moment imagine that the body cast off at death to admit of the spirit existing without the need of translation in the spiritual world will ever be re-assumed, inasmuch as material bodies are unsuitable for inhabiting the spiritual and celestial regions. But really the

sensual and material ideas which "Eugene Aram" entertains about the resurrection are such as to preclude the possibility of his conceiving of any other body than what is "of the earth, earthy," or of any resurrection but of dead material carcasses.

He asks, "What absurdity is there in supposing that some of the materials of the present body will at some future time form a nobler structure?" I answer, "absurdity" in the extreme; for if "some," why not all? and particularly, as he says, "that the physical portion, as well as the soul, is subject to pain and pleasure," and that "it would be unjust to inflict temporal pain and award temporal pleasure only to one part of the human being, and eternal retribution or reward to the other." According to this, all the matter which at any time was vitally united to the soul must be re-formed into a body; that is, if it be deemed essential to justice that the body should be punished as well as the soul; but what monsters should we be, as Dr. Hody remarks, if the whole of the materials which had formed our various bodies were united into one, we should, to say the least, be sixty or seventy feet high, and bulky in proportion. But, says the doctor, if we seriously and impartially reflect upon this subject,—namely, that God is obliged in justice to reward or punish the body together with the soul,—we shall find it to be untrue.

"My reasons," says he, "are these:—First, to speak properly, the body is not capable either of sinning or doing well. It is only the instrument of the soul, and the arm that stabs sins no more than the sword; it is the soul only that is the murderer. Neither, secondly, is the body capable of any reward or punishment; it is the soul only that is sensible, and nothing but what is sensible can be capable of reward or punishment. Thirdly, if it be injustice in God to punish the soul alone without the body, in conjunction with which it committed the sin, then all the matter which constituted the body when the several sins were committed must be raised again, and re-united to the soul." For, as before observed, if "some," why not all?

With reference to the addition of "another more perfect link to the chain of creation," I assert it to be impossible, and I apprehend it will not be regarded by the intelligent and reflecting as in any way derogatory to the omnipotence of God to affirm that matter cannot be compacted into the human body by any other process than that which we see He has previously provided, and invariably employs for the purpose. If, therefore, the laws by which all the changes of matter are governed are those of the Creator himself, we may reasonably conclude that in all His operations upon matter He will regard the nature which He himself has given it, and follow the laws appointed for the transmutation of dead matter into living and human substance. We ask, Is it possible to change that nature, and

reverse those laws, without abolishing matter as it now exists around us, and producing a new substance possessing a different nature, and at the same time subject to totally different laws? Certainly not, and therefore we affirm, in the most emphatic language, that the resurrection of the body, composed, as it is, of the matter now existing, is an utter impossibility, an assertion which no more includes a negation of the divine omnipotence than to affirm that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; for matter must continue to be matter, and at the same time cease to be so, to admit of the resurrection of the gross material body. Indeed, Sir Humphrey Davy himself says, "that the resurrection of the body is unscriptural and unphilosophical;" and another celebrated chemist, Professor Johnson, treats the doctrine as unscriptural, "crude, untrue to nature, and irrational." For, says he, "that which is formed of matter such as circulates in living beings now can neither be a *spiritual body*, nor free from the changes which are commonly implied by the word *corruption*."

E. A. presumes to say "that if the body be not risen, there is no resurrection;" from which it is perfectly obvious that he is not acquainted with the import of the term which, according to Dr. Dwight, literally signifies to stand up, or to stand again. This word (*anastasis*), says he, "is commonly, but erroneously, rendered *resurrection*, but it usually denotes our existence beyond the grave. Its original and literal meaning is to stand up, or to stand again, and many passages of Scripture would have been much more intelligible, had they been rendered accordingly. Such, for instance, as the following:—'Then came unto him the Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection,'—*me einai anastasin*, that there is no future state, or no future existence of mankind. With reference to her who survived seven husbands, they ask, 'Whose wife shall she be *in* the resurrection?'—*en te anastasei*, in the future state. Our Lord answers, 'In the resurrection;' or, as it should be rendered, in the future state, &c. But as touching the resurrection of the dead, or, as it ought to have been rendered, the future existence of those who are dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, 'saying, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob: God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.' Were we at a loss about the meaning of *anastasis*, this would determine it beyond dispute. The proof that there is an *anastasis* of the dead, alleged by our Lord, is the declaration of God to Moses—'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac,' &c.: and the irresistible truth, that 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living'? The consequence is, that Abraham, &c., were living at the time the declaration was made, and shows that those who die live after death, the future life being the *anastasis*, as our Lord proved in this passage, and which is

universally denoted by the term throughout the New Testament."

Such, then, is the lucid statement of the learned Dr. Dwight, from which it will be seen how far "E. A." is justified in saying that the word we have been considering "is meaningless and absurd, if the body be not risen." Surely he will not contend that the *bodies* of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, had risen from the grave, nor yet presume to deny that their resurrection had already taken place.

What I said about the change which the *spiritual* body undergoes is perfectly compatible with what the Bible teaches, nor does the "regenerating process," in the least degree, destroy the "specific individual identity" of spiritual bodies any more than those mutations which material ones undergo every seven years destroy the identity of them. With reference to my saying that the spirit is "a perfectly substantial being," in "direct contradiction," as "Eugene Aram" says, to the Lord's declaration, "a spirit hath not flesh and bones, allow me to say that his partially quoted passage by no means invalidates the truth of my assertion, and particularly when we reflect upon the peculiarity of the circumstance which occasioned the "declaration." Thomas, we know, asserted that he would not believe in our Lord's resurrection except by proofs afforded to his physical senses. Under these circumstances, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that our Lord would manifest himself in the presence of His apostles, in a way that would be adequate to remove his incredulity, and hence the invitation, "reach hither thy hand, &c.—for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." But be this as it may, if E. A. is correct, there was not the least necessity for such an appearance as that we have adverted to, for he says that "it was Christ's material body that rose from the grave," and, "if any one doubts the identity of the body, let him examine the prints of the nails and the wound in his side." But surely he does not deny the existence of "substantial beings," because he cannot see and feel their "flesh and bones;" if so, how does he account for Moses, at the transfiguration, appearing as a *man*, when the flesh and bones, which formed his material body, had hundreds of years ago been mouldered into dust?

If his assumption respecting "the soul, through some unknown agency, being endowed with form and substance which it did not possess before"—"is not nonsense, we know not what is." That which is destitute of "form and substance" is an absolute nonentity, and incapable of entering this tenement of clay.

With reference to the "absurdity" involved in our saying, "that God giveth to every seed his own body," he asserts, "that the produce is not identical with the seed itself." Now I ask him, Is the butterfly (which is the produce) "identical" with the caterpillar, which may be regarded as the seed;—and whether

we should be justified in declining "to till the soil," and sowing "not the seed which shall be," because "God giveth it a body as it pleaseth Him, and to every seed his own body"? He next attempts (but signally fails) to prove that I am in error in saying that the body is "insensible;" and he also asserts "that it is the spiritual one that bleeds when an incision is made in the lifeless part." Now it will readily be admitted that the soul is immortal, and, as such, cannot die: to say, therefore, "that it is this spiritual body that bleeds when we make an incision in a lifeless part, is ridiculous in the extreme, inasmuch as its immortality precludes the possibility of its ever becoming "lifeless," or of being mutilated in the slightest degree. Again: if, as he asserts, "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," why has he said "that the recorded instances of the translations of Enoch and Elias are sufficient of themselves to prove that this material body is to go there?" Nay, as he exultingly interrogates, "If the material body did not accompany the soul, where did it go?" Why, "to the earth as it was," without doubt. Again: look at the intense absurdity involved in A. C. saying that "amputation must impair the symmetrical proportions of body and soul," a parallel to which it would be impossible to find. "But," says he, "we should like to know if a man were to lose a leg, would his soul remain perfect?" Yes, in every sense of the term, as the following phenomenon will prove:—A man came in this morning who was minus a leg, and I asked him if he suffered from a pain in the toe of the amputated member; and not only did he say that he felt the pain most keenly on a change of the weather, but admitted his ability to stir his toes as well. And, says he, if you ask another person who is similarly maimed, he will say the same thing, for when the pain is most acute in the amputated limb, it has very often happened (the impression is so strong) that we have carried our hands immediately to the affected part, with the view of compressing the pain, when, to our utter disappointment, for perhaps the hundredth time, we seized nothing but a piece of insensible wood.

If E. A. is not conversant with facts like these, let him ask the first he meets without a leg or an arm, and he will soon confirm them. He will, perhaps, be struck with this remarkable phenomenon, and desire to know the cause; but neither science nor philosophy can properly explain it. But by granting the existence of "a spiritual body," for Paul declares there is one, we have then an explanation which will satisfy our reason.

However, this amputation of a leg, or any other member of the material body, does not deprive the spiritual one of any such member; on the contrary, he who so loses a limb preserves the spiritual body in its integrity; and if the spiritual limb be invisible to the eyes of the material body, it is because the material is not capable of seeing anything but what is material. It is

not, it is true, the spiritual eye which sees but the material; for as in general the spiritual eye cannot see in our world but by the medium of a material covering, so, for this reason, the material can see nothing but what is material. Now, since the spiritual leg of the amputated person always exists, though invisible to the eyes of our body, it is not astonishing that this leg, or even its extremity, should be affected with pain, of which the amputated person will experience the sensation, because it is the spiritual body which suffers in him and not the material. Besides, as there are circumstances where, with those who enjoy their material limbs, a pain in the superior parts extends even to the heel or toe, and becomes even more severe in those extreme parts, it may clearly be seen that it should be the same in like circumstances, though the material leg no longer exists. This, therefore, will be amply sufficient to prove that "amputation does not impair the symmetrical proportions of body and soul, and at the same time substantiate what I previously advanced, viz., the "insensibility" of the gross material body: for, surely, it will not be contended that the amputated limb is—

"Sensible to feeling as to sight,
Cut and carve it as we might."

For one, like "Eugene Aram," to attempt "to set at naught" the truly elaborate reasoning of the celebrated Locke, is presumption in the extreme, and particularly when I reflect upon the truly illogical style which characterises his own. It does, however, verify the somewhat popular phrase, about impudence and insolence, which, however, we will not quote.

It is unnecessary to reply to the "nonsense" he has stated on the subject of the bodies of Enoch and Elias being taken to heaven; his ideas are so grossly material. If heaven, as he supposes, is beyond the ethereal canopy, no wonder that a "chariot" and full-bred "horses," too, were required to convey him to his far-off destination. And not only so, but provision must be made for the following contingency, viz., The rupture of his veins by the freezing of the blood; for one thing is quite certain, that if Elias took to heaven "this material body," which E. A. says he has done, it could not possibly live beyond a certain altitude, for the blood and other fluids, which were there contained within it, would soon become solidified, and death would ensue. Whatever, therefore, became of the body, we know for certainty the fate of the *life* of it. But to be serious; the translation of Elijah was not seen by bodily eyes, but by those of the spirit; had such not been the case, there would have been no necessity for the intimation that it was by special divine favour that one was enabled to see the other. When, therefore, the Scriptures inform us that "The Lord would take up Elijah by a whirlwind or storm," and afterwards that He did so, they tell us

by a euphuism that Elijah died as Aaron and Moses, also, by divine appointment, each went up into a mountain to die (Numb. xx. 25, &c.; Deut. xxxii. 49, &c.), and sufficiently explains why his body could not afterwards be found.

To conclude: the doctrine of the resurrection of the material body is nowhere taught in Scripture; it involves a host of difficulties, absurdities, and physical impossibilities which, it must be remembered, are the result of the order which God has stamped upon creation; it has afforded matter for ridicule for the sceptic and scoffer in every age; it weakens, with many, the belief in the immortality of the soul; and it is opposed to the common perceptions of almost all Christians who, when left to their spontaneous thoughts, invariably regard their departed friends as having entered into the possession of the eternal inheritance, and never think of their decayed bodies. On the other hand, the doctrine of the continued existence of man in his spiritual body is in agreement with common perception; is directly sanctioned by the express language of Scripture; is in perfect harmony with reason and science; is full of consolation to the departing spirit; and, above all, it presents every powerful inducement to lead a truly christian life.

Preston.

E. FOSTER.

THE DEITY UNCHANGEABLE IN HIS DECREES.—If the Deity were as finite and imperfect a being, as limited in His views and as mutable in His resolves, as some theologians seem to think, and some formularies of worship would lead us to suppose, we might well imagine that He would be willing, now and then, to suspend the execution of His resolves, or to make an alteration in His providential schemes. But if enlightened reason can teach us anything of the Infinite, it is, that He must be just in all His acts, benevolent in all His purposes, invariable in all His schemes, and immutable in all His determinations. What He wills, He wills once and for ever. There is no variableness nor even shadow of turning in Him. As He is infinite in all His attributes, His will, as it respects us, must be benevolent, however it may appear the contrary in its immediate influence and effects; and for us, therefore, to pray Him to alter His will, or change His purpose, is at once a mark of folly and impiety. It is, in fact, to suppose that the Deity is not infinite in wisdom and goodness. To ask the Infinite to do what we wish, rather than what He intends, is to doubt whether He knows what is best for us, as well as we do ourselves.—*Fellows.*

A PHILOSOPHER is one who disengages himself from all former prejudice, masters his passions, and learns to think, speak, and act, according to rule and order.

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

THACKERAY.—ARTICLE III.

THE tone of the opening article in favour of Mr. Dickens is, on the whole, in harmony with our English notions of justice and fair play. The writer of it seems to concede, as far as with his mistaken views he honestly can, that Mr. Thackeray has great ability, and tells us that to exalt Mr. Dickens there is no need to disparage his contemporary. Though we frankly confess our object in taking up our pen is to upset H. V. M.'s "inkbottle," we would imitate him in this particular. An appreciative admiration of both the distinguished authors whose names are now before us is perfectly compatible with a belief in the superior ability of the one. The *entente cordiale*, too, subsisting between Mr. Thackeray and Mr. Dickens, should prevent their respective admirers, out of jealousy for their favourites' fame, from indulging in unjust detraction towards his rival.

At the onset, we are told by H. V. M., that "Dickens, like Byron, retired almost unknown to bed, and rose and found himself famous."—while Thackeray has "climbed fame's rugged acclivity step by step." What argument is intended to be drawn from this fact, we scarcely know; if it has any significance, it certainly favours the idea of Thackeray's superior ability. Perfectly true is it that Mr. Dickens "struck twelve all at once," and not the less true that he had struck a smaller number each time he has appeared before the public since.

"Small by degrees and beautifully less"

have become the number of his strokes, till at length the full sounding "12" of *Pickwick* has dwindled into the feeble 3 of *Little Dorrit*. Mr. Dickens's course has been a gradual retrogression; Mr. Thackeray's a slow but sure progression. The secret of the former's wonderful success undoubtedly has been his humour; a humour so sparkling, so happy, and so piquant, that before it the gravest were compelled to unbend and the most cynical to burst into the heartiest gaffaw. All the charm and interest of his books have centred in this characteristic. Whenever and according to the measure in which this has been lacking, has been the degree of his failure, and latterly this has not been slight. Mr. Thackeray's fame rests on a more enduring basis. "A vein of humour running through" his productions there

certainly is; but a humourist in the sense in which Mr. Dickens is one, he certainly is not. He is far too earnest for that. Society is his subject; human nature his study. Each successive book he has written has been the result of his better understanding of these things, and the embodiment of his musings upon them. And, hence it is, that the circle of his influence is ever widening, that the number of his thinking and intelligent admirers is constantly increasing. While Mr. Dickens though still retaining his hold upon a vast number of people who read only for amusement, has yet greatly declined in the estimation of those who look for something more.

— Again, we are told, "Dickens is superior to Thackeray in the art of delineating character." To this we demur. The *dramatis persone* of Mr. Dickens are the offspring of his fancy only, and not the result of his observation of life, or knowledge of human nature. A character is invested with some peculiarity of dress or person, characterized by an epithet, and then introduced to the reader; thus, Mrs. Merdle is the "Bosom," Mr. Panks the "Steam-tug." In the dramatic power by which an author vivifies his creations to us by their words, and causes them to interchange their ideas, as living men and women would do under similar circumstances, Mr. Dickens is altogether deficient. An incident in the "Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby" supplies us with an exact analogy to much of his writing. Nicholas is represented on one occasion, when making his usual appearance in the green-room of the Theatre Royal, Portsmouth, as finding all the company in a state of unusual commotion, the cause of which he discovers to be the presence of a London manager amongst the audience. When the curtain is drawn up, all eyes are directed to the box in which he sits; the comic countryman makes faces at it; Miss Bravassa warbles her sweetest strains to it; Mr. Crummles dies "point blank at it," and as the dead body is removed from the stage its eyes are observed to open and stare at the London manager.

Now, this style of acting is the exact counterpart of Mr. Dickens's style of writing; he never loses sight of his audience; the conversations of his characters, instead of being directed to each other, are aimed at the reader; their soliloquies are prolonged *asides*; there is a continual strain after effect. It is in this way we account for many of his ridiculous exaggerations, which, while giving zest to the reader's mirth, and perhaps increasing his interest in the plot, yet detract from the author's reputation for truthfulness. Very different is Mr. Thackeray's method from this. Mr. Dickens idealizes, Mr. Thackeray paints from the life. As his men and women pass across the stage before us, we exclaim, "These people we have seen and known." That man there swaying from one extreme to another as vanity and ambition, hatred or love, alternately influence him; now

lending a charmed ear to the syren voice of pleasure, or recalled to loyalty, to virtue, by the remembrance of a mother's purity and love, that man is myself. The art which seizes upon some external peculiarity of dress or appearance (*e.g.* Mrs. Gamp's umbrella, which is made to play so prominent a part, that we suspect were the old lady to lose it, even HER identity might be disputed), which fancifully plays about it, and invests it with a halo of poetry or humour, making a thing insignificant in itself a recognized part of its owners individuality; in this art Mr. Thackeray seldom indulges. The personal appearance of his creations becomes known to us by implication, rather than by direct allusion; but their characters, they themselves are revealed to us clearly and completely in the words of their mouths. Take, for an illustration of this, the Beatrix of Esmond. 'Tis true we once catch a glimpse of her red clocked stockings, and once she makes a faint allusion to her hoop, but neither of these are invested with an importance which should properly attach to their owner's self. It is not by these trifles she is "individualized;" by which, as we read her pretty impertinencies or brilliant tirades, the very tones of her voice seem to fall on our ears. But "Thackeray's characters have a sameness running about them;" he portrays "much the same characters in the 'Newcomes' as in 'Esmond,' and in the 'Virginians' as in the 'Newcomes.'" "His friends may tell us this may spring from a love of them." Mr. Thackeray's friends, we beg to inform H. V. M., will stoop to no such wretched compromise, they utterly deny that any such assertions for a single moment can be sustained. The only resemblance Mr. Thackeray's characters bear to each other is that which obtains between the men and women we meet with in our every day experience of life, and which springs as a natural consequence from the possession of the same nature and similar passions, without which sympathy and love, and brotherhood, would be an impossibility. And this fact, seeing that he strives to paint, not anomalies, but the real and actual world of people around us, instead of detracting from his excellence, adds a new brightness to it. The selection of books H. V. M. has made, in order to give a show of plausibility (to do more was impossible) to his statements, is peculiarly unfortunate. Is it possible that the chivalrous Col. Newcome is but a perpetuation of Col. Esmond? or worldly, yet loving and self-forgetting Edith but a copy of the intriguing and selfish Beatrix? Can the soul of Lady Castlewood have transmigrated into the body of the "Campaigner"? or, is the redoubted F. B. but a reproduction of the fuddling Lord Castlewood? Verily the man who can detect any affinity between such characters as these (and we have mentioned those with whom such an affinity assumes the nearest approach to possibility), must have a subtle power of detecting analogies which place him on an

equality with a certain naturalist, who found an intimate relationship to exist between black beetles and birchen brooms, and discovered a close analogy between pigs and humming birds.

We now come to the charge brought against Mr. Thackeray of reckless satire. The dissecting knife, though not the most agreeable of instruments, is yet a most necessary one. But the complaint is, that Mr. Thackeray has used it mercilessly, recklessly, &c. This is one of the many assertions H. V. M. has seen fit to indulge in, but which he has *not* seen fit to attempt to substantiate by any trustworthy evidence whatever. We wish to be perfectly fair to this gentleman as to the author he has championed, but we would humbly beg to be allowed to "suggest a *hint*" to him, that before indulging in assertions, he should examine their truth, and, if assured of this, should condescend to impart to his readers the grounds of his conclusions. His neglect of this duty in the present instance would justify us in passing over his charge in silence; this, however, we will not do, as it is a very old one, and H. V. M.'s cry but the faint echo of the alarm once raised; the origin of which is to be found in Mr. Thackeray's subject—Society. She sits in his studio; he stands at his easel and paints her portrait; he looks for no gift at her hands, nor cares for her applause, and, therefore, discharges his business with faithfulness. Has she an evil eye? It is reproduced on the canvas. Is she old and withered? So is she in her portrait. Is she rouged? Is her hair false? The artist tells us as much, and having completed his work, holds it up to the gaze of the world. But Society,

"A would-be lady with her thousand graces,"

exclaims against this proceeding, is displeased at this faithfulness, addresses her painter (as little Rosey addresses George Warrington), "You *satirical* creature, you," becomes indignant at the rude man who daringly tears down the veil which conceals her deformities, and exposes her hollowness to the astonished gaze of her devotees. Most individuals, while extremely ready to *confess* their general weakness, and the depravity they share in common with all others, are yet greatly astonished and disgusted when *charged* with any *particular* failing; and so, when a man arises with a soul too lofty to walk in the leading strings of conventionalism, with a keen eye for unmasking cant and pretence, and doing this with dauntlessness, with no respect of persons, all the hangers-on of society (which is but a combination of individuals, retaining in the whole the sensitiveness characteristic of its component parts), are at once ingeniously striving to discover some spot in his reputation or writings upon which they may settle, buzz and hum over, and magnifying it into a sore, excite thereby the disgust of mankind. Or misrepresentation is brought to bear, righteous indignation at

evil doing is the "cynic's growl;" to analyze and faithfully to pourtray the foibles and selfishness of the world and worldlings, is to "degrade our common nature."

In answer to this charge, much might be added; but even if it were necessary, space precludes us from doing more than merely accounting for it. The intelligent readers of Mr. Thackeray will be aware, that although it was once somewhat wide-spread, and became indeed a sort of popular belief among those who knew him only by hearsay, it will no more bear investigation than the popular belief respecting the man in the moon.

Several other accusations—side hits, rather—our opponent has made against Mr. Thackeray, which we are anxious to rebut; our remaining space, however, must be devoted to giving more positive reasons, than we have hitherto, for our belief in the superior ability of our chosen author. And in so doing, we shall accept one or two of the "essentials" H. V. M. has laid down "as necessary to make a successful novelist," and endeavour to discover how far each writer can lay claim to them. We remark, then—

I. Mr. Thackeray is more *comprehensive* than Mr. Dickens. It has been said of the latter, that he can "describe a town pump, but not the falls of Niagara"—an admirable criticism, aptly defining the limits of Mr. Dickens's powers of description. It is in low-life, and its surroundings, that his forte lies; he is more at home in St. Giles than in St. James; he has a far better understanding of crossing-street sweepers, bailiffs (we do not mean as a householder), flunkeys, Punch and Judy men, &c., than of persons of a higher social status. His most successful impersonations are drawn from such sources. Do you entrust yourself to him for introduction into aristocratic circles, you soon discover your errors. A Lord Dedlock is presented to you as the type of aristocracy in general; a Mr. Tite Barnacle as the embodiment of senatorial wisdom. Do you look to him for descriptions of social or political institutions, you are instinctively conscious he is "chaffing" you. With Mr. Thackeray, on the contrary, all classes come alike; rich and poor, high and low; Belgravia and Cockneydom; he has equal control over all.

Consider too, what must be the comprehensiveness of that mind, which, while it faithfully conceives and pourtrays the present, can yet so sympathetically realize the past.

In this line of art we place Mr. Thackeray foremost. Unlike most historical romancers, the characters he introduces to us are not merely modern men and women, surrounded by the upholstery and drapery of ages gone by, *acting* certain parts assigned them by the author of the plot; he is not satisfied with reproducing the garb of the ancients without their life. But Mr. Thackeray has successfully accomplished a far more

difficult task than this even, in bringing again before the scenes historical personages, with whom, through their works or deeds, we are in various degrees familiar, and of the truthfulness of whose portraits we are thereby enabled to judge. Steele, generous, thoughtless, fuddling, prodigal Steele, is introduced to us. All the strangely contrasted qualities of his nature being so aptly pourtrayed, that the "Christian hero" is as well known to us, as he was to his own generation. Accepting our author's guidance, we enter the coffee-houses—see there Mr. Gay or Dr. Arbuthnot, make our bow to St. John, and reverently admire the great Mr. Congreve. Or, ascending to a certain second story back in the Haymarket, we peep over the gentle Addison's shoulder, are privileged to read the "Campaign" in manuscript; and as the wine unlooses its author's tongue, we hear, from amidst a cloud of smoke, words of serene wisdom, befitting the author of the Saturday papers in the "Spectator." Enchanting, however, as are the sketches of the great men we have mentioned, we refer with still greater confidence to the delineation of the character of Marlborough in *Esmond*, as unsurpassed in our fictitious or historical literature. To say we admire, is not sufficient; we venerate the man who, by the magic of his pen, can transform history from a vast caravansera into a real and living world; who can people afresh its deserted halls, call to life again the great ones who have lain there; enable us to grasp hands with them across the intervening years, and listen to their voices of kindness and wisdom. All this has the author of "*Esmond*" and the "*Virginians*" accomplished.

II. Mr. Thackeray is more *unprejudiced* than Mr. Dickens. He appears as though seated on some serene height, far above the influence of the passions which move and agitate the men below. He looks down upon them buying and selling, loving and hating; every move and turn in the game of life seems laid out before him; and with a pen so unimpassioned as almost to be god-like, he presents them in his works. His pages are never sullied by passion; his books are never mere party pasquinades. Mr. Dickens, on the contrary, frequently indulges in the lowest form of political satire; and it would be difficult to mention a single book he has written, in which some principle is not recklessly attacked. Yorkshire schools; the administration of the law; the Government of the country; and, not content with institutions, he has subjected individuals to the stroke of his lash. But if Mr. Dickens really lamented the evils he wished to expose, he would, we think, have been satisfied with representing them as they really are, or were, without indulging in exaggerations, which even the "license" allowed to "modern novelists" will not justify. But with Mr. Dickens, we fear, as with some other writers of fiction, a jest is of far greater value than a principle; and it is much more important to please the public, than to write up to a strict standard of moral truth.

III. Mr. Thackeray's writings have a more *elevating tendency* than those of Mr. Dickens.

The creations of the latter pass before our eyes—a motley group, with innumerable peculiarities, moving us to laughter or to tears, as the case may be. But of the nature and heart of man, we are told nothing; of his mission and destiny we are kept in completest ignorance. Nearly every recognised form of belief has, in its turn, been made the butt of his humour; the failings of professors of religion, odiously caricatured, have been made to reflect upon the creed they profess. We cannot excuse, upon the ground Mr. Dickens has endeavoured to excuse it himself, the character of Mr. Stiggins. We can more readily forgive the licentiousness of Tom Jones, than the profanity and indecency of this portraiture. The age in which Fielding lived might be an excuse for him; Mr. Dickens can urge no such plea. This is only one of many instances we might give of the low moral tone of Mr. Dickens's books. The highest article in his creed is *good nature*; and this, coupled with a little cheap sentimentalism, constitutes the *summa totalis* of his religion.

From considerations of this kind, we turn with renewed satisfaction to Mr. Thackeray's pure and elevating pages, to learn afresh the lessons which the Bible, and which all nature teach us, that "Ambition is but selfish vanity;" that to be rich, to be famous, will profit us nothing a year hence, when other names sound louder than ours, and we lie hidden under the ground, with the idle titles engraven on our coffins;" that "scepticism leads a man to shameful loneliness and selfishness; the more so, because it is so good-humoured and conscienceless, and serene;" that up above the stars yonder is a heaven of immortal glory and loveliness; and that the sure passport there is the doing of duty here. That—"If the fight for the truth is taking place, and all men of honour are on the ground, armed on the one side or the other, and we alone lie on balconies, and smoke our pipes, out of the noise and danger, we had better have died, or never have been at all, than such sensual cowards." We linger fondly over sentences like these; gladly would we cite a thousand such. We long to follow in the wake of one who has preceded us, and speak of Mr. Thackeray's pure and reverent devotion to women, and how through all his books the true object of sexual love is pointed out—

"To learn by mortal yearning to ascend,
Seeking a higher object:"

and how, as he expresses it, we "prove God by love;" but we fear we have already outraged the patience of that inexorable monster, the *printer's devil*. Y. E.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.

Social Economy.

IS THE INCREASE OF A NATION'S WEALTH FAVOURABLE TO ITS MORALITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THERE are two ways of considering this question. Either we can look at it poetically, or we can look at it practically. The sin and degradation necessarily attendant upon an increase of wealth has ever been a favourite theme for poetic rhapsodies. Innocence and simplicity on the mountain top, or in the rural hut, far from the busy haunts of men, surrounded only by nature with its awfully still forests, its meadows fanned by the gentle zephyrs, and its rippling streams, on the one side; on the other, the selfish, money-loving crowds, only intent on gain, the cities full of crime and miseries;—these have been painted again and again by each of our poets with more or less success. These representations may, indeed, do for a Southey or a Coleridge to harp upon, but they will not do for us to depend upon; because if we endeavour to put them into practice, and reduce them to every-day life, the Paul and Virginia of romance become merely illiterate savages, and the cherished, highly-wrought Utopia of the poet fades away. We have, then, only to look at this question in a practical light.

The mere consideration of the term "wealth" points to a great moral advantage which it must bring with it, viz., industry. For wealth "does not consist of gold and silver," nor of "everything useful, agreeable, or necessary to man," as it is very common to define it; but it is "all exchangeable things useful, necessary, and agreeable to man, *produced by labour*." We may, then, with an accuracy sufficient for the present investigation, define "wealth" as "the produce of man's industry;" and with the most superficial consideration it will be seen that there must follow, as a necessary consequence, that as the produce increases, so must the producer; or, in other words, industry will always vary according to the increase or decrease of wealth. And industry must ever have the best moral influence.

Another way in which wealth affects the moral well-being of a nation is the refinement that it produces. For wealth, or at least a competency, is necessary to enable men to follow any of the fine arts; and it also gives them the means of gratifying their wishes in obtaining luxuries which they could not otherwise get. This, by enlarging the demand for things not absolutely necessary, gives an opening for the inventive powers of man. If

England had not had wealth to develop inventions, should we have had that wonderful power to assist us—steam? If wealth had not aided the invention of printing, would the marvels of Caxton have been known? I think not; and we have only to consider the state of men, before and after these wonderful inventions, to appreciate their great moral importance. Philosophy and the fine arts have always chiefly flourished in the time of great national wealth, from the days of Pericles to our own; and this is, to a great extent, because wealth enables higher rewards to be given to artists, &c., and, therefore, more competition is necessarily created. It has been argued that people would be better off, in a moral point of view, without the luxuries which wealth and a love for the fine arts are chiefly instrumental in obtaining; but few, if any, now profess such untenable views. Much of the feelings of those who take the other side of this question arises from ancient prejudices. The moralists of old looked upon wealth as a great evil, because it was supposed to do away with all those warlike feelings which they so much admired; but their chief reason for dislike of it was because it must be obtained by labour, and they all—even the princes of philosophy, who ought at least to have been superior to such narrow-minded and absurd views—had the most supreme contempt for artizans of every description; and unless every encouragement is given to the working part of the people,—even supposing that wealth could be obtained, which would not be the case,—all the attendant good, by being hampered by this mutual dislike, would be of no avail. Their descendants of the present day also despise it, or, at least, pretend to do so; for it suits that cant style of religious morality which is, alas! so predominant amongst us, to look down upon, and consider itself superior to all thoughts of, riches and luxuries. And again, there are people who—either from a real love of the past, or the unhealthy state of their powers of thought, cramped and fettered by prejudices, or from a self-deception practised upon themselves, even more dangerous to the cause of truth, because it is practised unconsciously—think that we are daily growing worse, and echo the words of the poet,—

*"Ætas parentum, pejor avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiore."*

If we look around us, and compare any rich and poor nation, we shall see how wealth works upon morality. We will not take our own case, for we may be prejudiced in favour of everything English, but take America, the next wealthiest nation to ourselves, and Russia, fast increasing in prosperity, and the standard of morality will then be found to be very high. On the other hand, look at the licentiousness and depravity of

Stockholm; look at Paris, that nest of all that is impure. Why should it be worse than New York? Yet no doubt it is. Surely it is because wealth has raised the feelings and improved the morals of the Americans, while poverty—national poverty, remember—has ruined the French. Look, too, at the petty duchies of Germany, and think of the state of a country where the prince is obliged to obtain his revenue from gambling houses, and we shall indeed congratulate ourselves that England is a wealthy nation.

Wealth, then, increases labour and industry: it refines and softens men, and it encourages the fine arts. These are our reasons for thinking that the increase of a nation's wealth is favourable to its morality; but it must be directed by good national education, or, instead of being advantageous, it will be most disadvantageous, by rendering the people narrow-minded and selfish. We have the wealth; take we care that we also have the education.

C. C. A.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In addressing myself to the present debate, it may perhaps be necessary—lest opponents should find fault with my reasoning—that I should state the grounds upon which I proceed in determining the question under discussion. I beg, therefore, to submit, as the basis of my arguments, that “the rule of life, drawn from the ascertained consequences of human actions, constitutes morals;” and I may add, that I intend availing myself, on this occasion, more of the judgment of others than of setting forth my own, since the recorded opinions of those who have studied the subject for a lifetime may be more confidently received than the ideas and observations (however truthfully and honestly expressed) of a young man.

Now, in answering the question in the negative, we take it that the material part of the matter is assumed, and that the point involved on account of morals is not what *ought to be*, but really and absolutely what *is*. If the question was, Ought the increase of a nation's wealth to be favourable to its morality? we should be found on the opposite side, replying in the affirmative; but when invited to decide upon the question heading this paper we are compelled reluctantly, and not without pain, to answer, No.

Our principal object, then, will be to ascertain what has been the state of morality, where national wealth has been enjoyed? In respect to ancient kingdoms, Chenevix says of Athens, “When the successes of Aristides, of Cimon, of Pericles, had increased their wealth and their dominions, this people sunk into every species of luxury. Their religious ceremonies were more pompous than those of any other Grecian city; the pleasures of the table were indulged in to excess; the men became effeminate, and the

women harlots. Athens was more flourishing than she had ever been before, but she contained a greater contrast of good and bad than could be exemplified in any other country."

Of modern kingdoms, a recent writer, speaking of Stockholm, says: "It has been called the most licentious city in Europe; and, I have no doubt, with the most perfect justice. Vienna may surpass it in the amount of conjugal infidelity, but certainly not in general incontinence. Very nearly half the registered births are illegitimate, to say nothing of the illegitimate children born *in* wedlock. Of the servant-girls, shop-girls, and seamstresses in the city, it is very safe to say that scarcely ten out of a hundred are chaste, while many girls of respectable parentage, belonging to the middle class, are not much better. The men, of course, are much worse than the women, and even in Paris one sees fewer physical signs of excessive debauchery. Here the number of broken-down young men, and blear-eyed, hoary sinners, is astonishing. At the restaurants, young blades order their dinners of the female waiters with an arm around their waists, while the old men place their hands unblushingly upon their bosoms."

"In Naples," says the Rev. G. Pugh, "vices of the foulest licentiousness prevail unpunished; and, as far as I have ever been able to ascertain, unchecked and uncondemned by any law of the political or judicial constitution, or any enactment of the executive police: whilst, at the same time, the people generally are destitute of the heroic courage, the self-sacrificing patriotism, and the indomitable energy of the soldiers and citizens of classic Rome and Greece, and are also inferior to these their ancestors in intellectual development and literary habitude. Not accustomed to political responsibility and action, nor, in any degree, to the exercise of individual or co-ordinate judgment and control in the working of municipal or other civil institutions, they have no self-reliant independence of character, nor any trustworthy good faith and mutual confidence in co-operating for a common object. Moreover, from the necessary want of any due stimulus to exertion, and being without any constitutional or magisterial duties, and not addicted to rural pursuits, and considering professional labour beneath their rank, the majority of the higher classes possess neither mental nor physical energy or firmness, and waste their lives, if not in vicious pleasures, almost necessarily in frivolous amusements, and in conversation of the most trifling and unprofitable character."

Another author says: "Look at the red man, the aboriginal sovereign of America's forests; has the gift of civilized experience been to him a gift of love and peace, bringing virtue and happiness? Regard him, in the simple majesty of his former ignorance, before the pale-faces crossed the great salt lake in their floating dwellings: think of him as the forest philosopher, the stoic of

the woods, the free, dauntless, generous warrior, the bold, sagacious hunter, the faithful friend, the dignified human being,—and see him now, with his new-gained experience, chaffering for a dollar with some mercenary pedlar, or higgling with some government agent about the price of his father-land."

"Or, to retrace the annals of this nation (to which we shall now confine our remarks), there were the honest days of good king Alfred, when gold and silver were left unguarded on the highways, while men knew not what it was to steal. Would the shining heaps be so very safe among us, their enlightened and virtuous posterity? Or shift the scene to classic ground (by way of contrast), to the land of Numa, the wise and peaceful; of Brutus, the stern and the upright; of the self-devoting Scævola; of the patriot Curtius; of Regulus, preferring death to falsehood; of Arria, dying to encourage a husband's faltering resolve; the land of high-minded matrons and hardy soldiers, the eternal city, whose wisdom and prowess made her the mistress of the world: then cross to the Grecian peninsula, visit Thermopylæ and Marathon. Say, are our senators so much more upright and incorruptible than the Roman? Are our politicians so much more noble-minded than he, who, when he lost his election as one of the three hundred, went away rejoicing that there were found in Sparta three hundred better men than he? Are our soldiers so much more brave than Leonidas's little band? our citizens so much more temperate than they who sat down to the black broth at Lycurgus's tables? Or, to speak even of the refined arts,—have we rivalled Cicero? have we better orators than Demosthenes? more cunning sculptors than Phidias? more finished painters than Apelles? Say, are we, with all our vaunted experience, so far beyond what millions have been, ages, long ages ago?"

"No man, who has been accustomed to think seriously and to judge independently, can look around him, and, with a practised eye, mark the peculiarities of our time and country, and compare things as they are with what, as a Christian and a patriot, he would have them to be, without becoming conscious and increasingly aware that there is some great defect still remaining in the practical application of professed principles and prevalent conviction to the general good of the people. Amidst all the writings and preachings of divines, regardless of the continual efforts of the diurnal and periodical press, in spite of the thunders and penalties of the law, and almost in mockery of the repeated parliamentary discussions and suggestions on educational, reformatory, and penal measures, vice and immorality rear their head."

Fain would we see an alteration; it would delight us to be enabled to affirm that our moral has been equal to our material progress; but while, on the one hand, the general addiction to gross and sensual vices has been checked and lessened, on the other hand we are forced to admit that we have lost some portion

of the manly virtues by which our ancestors were characterized; that in our daily intercourse we have swerved from the road of honesty and truthfulness into the paths of expediency and conventionalism; that in our individual strivings after riches and position the feeling of patriotism has been deadened, until our whole existence has become so tainted by selfishness that we suffer ourselves to view the interests of our country only as they may affect our individual case or progress, and are become so heedless of national honour as willingly to accept advantages which our power may have wrested from others, although at the expense of our character for justice, and even to the outraging of international law.

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay"—

is an opinion which has been reiterated time after time; it is a sentiment which some have latterly begun to acknowledge; a verdict to which there are many who now give at least a nominal assent. And no wonder, when we remember the extent of the criminal classes, of female prostitution, of our prison population, the inmates of our lunatic asylums, our hospitals, and poor-houses, and consider the causes which have produced so frightful an amount of destitution, immorality, and crime. The author of "The Night Side of London" (from whose excellent little work we purpose making a few extracts) remarks, "As a nation we have worked out one problem in civilization; we have shown that the utmost wealth can exist side by side with the deepest poverty—the grossest ignorance with the most cultivated knowledge—the most elevating piety with the most debasing fetichism—the fairest virtue with the most revolting vice."

To take a cursory glance at the present state of society and of crime as exhibited in England.

First. "We nurse up in our midst and reverently worship, and denounce as worse than an infidel every one who utters the truth respecting it, an aristocracy the richest and most luxurious in the world—an aristocracy which would long ere this have become intellectually *effete*" but for causes over which they had little or no control. S. G. O., of the *Times*, says: "Who is so blind that he cannot see how every class is morally affected by the habits of the class immediately above it? If the higher steps of a staircase are very foul, you may clean your feet as you descend, but you will scarcely leave the last step uncontaminated. Why will not the orators of the platform and the senate look straight before them and around them rather than for ever be looking downwards? Why make Africa and Cripple-gate, foreign heathen and home moral destitution, the perpetual burden of the evangelizing, moralizing song, and forget the squares, the parks, the villas, the Stock Exchange, the casinos, the turf, the 'Tra-

viata' ? But I scarce know a crime now that does shock society, although society sadly laments, per platform, the growth of crime among the lower orders." "In an age of the most wanton extravagance, productive of all the moral deterioration money difficulty ever begets, we hear ceaseless lamentations over the extravagance of the classes who receive on Saturday what will hardly pay their maintenance up to the Friday night!" The profligacy and immorality of the "upper" classes almost defies description. "Mr. Patmore affirms that in the higher ranks of life a young man is obliged to keep a mistress, to avoid being laughed at;" and we need but refer to the cases of a certain "young nobleman" ("an officer" but not "a gentleman"), who "made himself famous by his insults to unprotected actresses, and by his ferocious attempt to murder the manager of the Windsor theatre, when that far too indulgent and lord-loving personage interfered to protect the women of his establishment," and who afterwards was dismissed Her Majesty's service, for inflicting unprovoked indignities upon a brother officer: of Madame Marie Audrey, a notorious procuress, the splendour of whose residences was something extraordinary: of Madame Denis, who entrapped the Belgian girl, Alice Leroy, over to this country in 1854—and the disgusting disclosures touching "foreign princes, royal dukes, peers of the realm, ambassadors, and other 'noble' and distinguished personages, made *in re* "Harrison v. the Marquis of Bath," subsequently brought before the public: or, more recently, to the cases of Madame Annie Rosenberg, a German procuress, indicted at the Liverpool assizes, and sentenced to four months' imprisonment with hard labour, and a fine of £25: and of Mary Ann Bowcam, who was seduced by "a married man, with a family of five children, and holding a high appointment," and upon whom an inquest was held in London in December last—in corroboration of Mr. Patmore's statement.

"If I tell you," says an author previously referred to, "that that respectable old gentleman, coming out of his club, is going to inspect a fresh victim, whom some procuress has lured with devilish art, you will tell me that I am uncharitable; or if I point you to that well-appointed equipage in the Park, and tell you that that fair young girl that sits within has crushed many a young wife's heart, and has sent many a man to the ——— before his time, you will tell me I exaggerate; I do nothing of the kind. If I were to tell you what most men know—what every one knows, except those whose business it is to know it, and to seek to reform it—I should be charged with indelicacy; as if truth could be indelicate." The fact is, "we are choked up with cant; almost everything we believe in is a lie."

Secondly, turning to the commercial world, we make little doubt it will be admitted that *its* moral code—if ever it possessed one—is now, if not entirely abnegated, at least, very lightly

esteemed. Indeed, it has almost become to be thought (as the old lady said to the tradesman), "What a pity it is a sin to lie, since it seems so necessary to business!"

A man of substance, honour, and integrity among the trading community is looked upon almost as a novelty; while mere adventurers—men "of straw," of falsehood, and chicanery—abound to such an extent, that it is only in extraordinary cases, or when a commercial revulsion or monetary panic—such as we have lately passed through—occurs, that they are discovered to exist, where their presence was not previously even thought of. Upon this particular the *Times*, at the close of 1856, observed, "There is no man, whether engaged in business or a profession, who can help feeling that recent occurrences throw a stain on the morality of our age. Go no further back than the year now drawing to a close, and what do we find? Breaches of trust the most flagrant, embezzlements and frauds the most iniquitous and most ruinous. The past year has, indeed, been fertile in enormities which are incompatible with a general and earnest love of mercantile integrity;—a great banker—a man of family, education, and social influence—purloining securities entrusted to his care; a great City firm making advances in order to prop up a rotten and fraudulent imposture; clerks forging certificates to the extent of thousands of pounds; and then, two joint-stock banks, pillaging alike their depositors and their contributories, to further the speculations of their directors and their functionaries. The year that has witnessed the malversation of Paul and Strahan; the frauds of Sadleir, Davidson, Windle Cole, and Co.; the robberies of Robson, and the explosion of the Tipperary and Royal British Banks, is more eloquent on the state of our social morality than any elaborate theme can be. Bad as the naked truth is, there is worse behind. Detection does not constitute guilt. How many persons must have been—or, at least, might have made themselves—cognizant of the iniquities at work ere the explosion took place! Will any one tell us that Robson's frauds could not have been suspected and nipped in the very germ? How many men—respectable men—in the City were privy to the misdeeds of Davidson and Gordon? And how many were participators in that monstrous swindle, the concoction of the Royal British Bank, and the dissipation of its funds? This last case is so much more flagrant than the rest, inasmuch as the guilty conspiracy of several men indicates a lower tone of morality than the scheme, however bad, of one or two men. A man may plot some infamy in the solitude of his own house, and be scouted as a monster when the contrivance bursts upon the world; but a score or two of men combining to divert the opportunities of their education and position to the ruin of some thousands of people, meeting day after day and week after week to authorize, first, a public deception, and then

a series of private robberies, in the heart of London, to the daily gaze of hundreds of respectable citizens, without opposition or remonstrance, this is a thing far more painful, far more pernicious, than the delusion of any number of subscribers, or the losses of any number of depositors. And all these people met one another week after week, met other City men of influence, were on terms of friendship with them ; yet they were allowed to proceed without opposition in a career which was patent to all conversant with the banking transactions of London, and without a reproach on manœuvres which cannot have been concealed ! As in another case we have cited, the most unscrupulous of the set continued his ostentatious performance of religious duties, his attention to religious societies, and all the Pharisaical observances which disgust one half and delude the other half of mankind. It is idle to moralize on these things—they are lamentable, deplorable, humiliating."

Further, Mr. Warren, Recorder of Hull, in his charge to the grand jury at the assizes of last January, remarked, "What appears to me so oppressive is, that, judging from the experience of the last and several preceding years, we really seem, as a nation, to be surrounded by an atmosphere of commercial immorality and folly. It blunts, it confuses our perception of right and wrong, and seems to set up a standard for judging between what is right in private personal transactions and in affairs of business ; it tends to resolve very quietly culpability into misfortune, to convert the culprit into the victim."

But, generalities apart and theory aside, let us see what a practical investigation of the subject discloses. Writing in 1843, Porter observes, "If we refer to our criminal returns, it will be found that in England and Wales the number of persons committed for trial is now five times as great as it was at the beginning of the century ; while in Ireland the proportionate increase has been even more appalling, there having been in 1839 sevenfold the number of committals that were made in 1805, the earliest year for which records are available. There are not any accounts of so early a date by which we are able to make a similar comparison for Scotland ; but comparing the number of committals in 1815 with those in 1839, we find that in those twenty-four years they have augmented nearly sixfold.

"Comparing this statement with the increase of population during a similar period, as follows,—

From 1801 to 1811, 18·50 per cent.,

" 1811 to 1821, 26·12 "

" 1821 to 1831, 27·14 "

" 1831 to 1841, 28·24 "

we have *prima facie* evidence that the increase of crime has far outstripped the increase of our population, and without doubt of our wealth also, great as their increase has been."

If details are required, it may be stated (as examples) that in thirty-six years (from 1805 to 1841) the increase in criminality in the population, taking the number of committals, was, in—

Monmouthshire,	1,720	per cent.	against an increase of 128 per cent.
Staffordshire,	1,063	„ „	113 „
Cheshire,	1,078	„ „	106 „
Worcestershire	1,009	„ „	67 „
Middlesex	194	„ „	94 „

The following statistics from "The Night Side of London" may also prove interesting:—

One man in every nine, in London, belongs to the criminal class.

The prison population at any particular time is 6,000, costing for the year £170,000.

Including prostitutes, there is a total of 16,900 criminals known to the police.

Almost 20,000 persons are engaged in Sunday trading; the number of ragged children is nearly 30,000; the number of families living in one room is estimated as high as 150,000.

At the last census there were 2,362,236 inhabitants, out of which there were but 691,723 attendants on divine exercises.

We now, for the present, take our leave of the subject, believing, after what we have stated, and remembering, further, the violent and determined character of crime in a certain class of our countrymen; the extensive adulteration of articles of common consumption by another class; the cool, business-like and triumphant hypocrisy, making gain of pretended godliness, of a third class; and to particularize, the recent forgery of a will by Monk, a borough and county magistrate, and the oldest inhabitant of Preston; the still more recent barefaced forgery by a minister of the Established Church (the Rev. George Ratcliffe, sentenced to ten years' transportation); the fraudulent character of the Rev. Allan Macpherson's connection with the Kettering Bank; the fact of a grave and important measure affecting our Indian empire being postponed, in order to allow of the Prime Minister and Parliament of Great Britain attending Epsom Races; the fact that while theatres are being opened, literary institutions are being shut up (as the closing of the Adelaide Gallery and the failure of the Panopticon in Leicester Square bear melancholy witness), and that a newspaper, in publishing its last number, a few weeks since, attributed its failure to the circumstance that its design—aiming, as it did, at providing purely moral and intellectual entertainment for its readers—was its ruin;—that we have not failed to prove that "the increase of a nation's wealth is *not* favourable to its morality."

Bilston.

G. A. H. E.

The Essayist.

MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

(*Concluded from page 143.*)

HAVING thus examined the two principal objections urged against Mutual Improvement Societies, and seen that they are caused by no inherent defect in their constitution and working, we proceed to consider,—

II. Their advantages; and first we may remark, they are *stimulants to the acquisition of knowledge*. There is in everyone a deep shame* at inferiority, especially when it might have been avoided, and associated with this a love of power and reputation. A young man who has not previously felt the importance of self-culture, yet who possesses these qualities in common with the rest of men, joins one of these societies, he soon perceives how great is the superiority which one whose mind is stored with well arranged and digested knowledge, and who has learned to use that knowledge aright, possesses over his fellows, his shame at inferiority, and his ambition to attain a like position, are immediately developed, and these impel him to the use of the same means, in order that the same result may follow. It will no doubt be said, that it cannot be called a good feature in these societies, that they stimulate to the acquisition of knowledge by developing these passions; but, in return, it is asked those who have with ardour and with some measure of success bought knowledge, if these were not the motives which, in the onset, stimulated them? Human nature is such, that, generally speaking, it is only through self-love that men can be induced to undertake any enterprise which requires labour and self-denial; and, in this case, when a man has once tasted the inexpressible satisfaction and delight which knowledge gives to its votaries, the motives, essentially base in themselves, which first goaded him to the chase, give place to the love of knowledge for the sake of its own inherent beauty and loveliness. It will, however, under any circumstances, be found that our young men need some stimulant to give that ardour to the chase which is necessary if knowledge is to be obtained in any degree of fulness and extent. This stimulant the periodical meetings of these societies supply, seeing that they cannot be participated in to any worthy degree without some amount of reading and reflection.

The next advantage which presents itself, is the *educational*

* Sydney Smith's "Moral Philosophy."

character of Mutual Improvement Societies. It has long been the custom to use the terms instruction and education as though they were synonymous; but in reality the one is the exact antithesis of the other,—instruction implying a *putting in*; education, a *drawing out*. Most educational institutions have been framed with an utter disregard of this distinction. The human mind has been treated as though it were merely a receptacle into which knowledge was to be crammed, as though it were to take in only, and not to give out; as though it were only a bucket, into which waters were to be poured; and not also a well, out of which waters might be drawn. A standard rose-tree in mid-winter looks but a withered, worthless stick; yet spring showers and summer suns will draw forth its tiny leaves and tender branches, making these to increase in size and number, till the dry stick has assumed the aspect and proportions of a beautiful shrub. It is a similar influence that Mutual Improvement Societies seek to exert on the uneducated mind. They cannot supply the place of study any more than the sunshine and rain can create the sap in the tree; but they seek to draw out, to educate its innate natural powers, and by certain intellectual exercises to expand and train them. It is necessary, "if it be only as so much ballast," that the mind should be tolerably well stored with information before it is brought under this influence, or it will become dogmatic and superficial, making a great sound, perhaps; but, like some rivulets, simply because of its shallowness.

One of the means by which this educational influence is exerted, is the practice of written composition. The minds of those who are accustomed to read largely and frequently without this discipline, resemble some disorderly apartments, containing much that is valuable, but in which you can lay your hands on nothing as you require it, it being without order and arrangement. A haziness surrounds all their knowledge, there is nothing tangible in it, it requires method and system. This mars its usefulness, by the extreme difficulty of laying hold of it when you have need for it. Such a mind needs that exactness which Bacon says writing is calculated to produce. But the practice of written composition not only enables the student to retain the knowledge he obtains through reading, by impressing it on his memory, but by the meditation and concentration required for it he makes that knowledge his own; the substance of his reading, the imaginations of other men, with thoughts of his own suggested thereby, are melted down in his mental crucible, and brought forth stamped with his own image and superscription. Thus his mental perceptions are quickened, and his thinking powers strengthened and expanded. The debates, which form a prominent feature of all Mutual Improvement Societies, constitute another phase of their educational character.

It is a great fallacy to suppose that those powers of mind which enable men to express their ideas with fluency, and clothe them in fitting words, before a numerous auditory, are what is called, "born with them." Numerous and illustrious instances might be given to the contrary. "When I was at the Temple," says Curran, "a few of us formed a little debating club. Upon the first night of meeting I attended, my foolish heart throbbing with the anticipated honour of being styled 'the learned member who opened the debate;' or, 'the very eloquent gentleman who has just sat down.' I stood up, trembling through every fibre; but remembering that in this I was but imitating Tully, I took courage, and actually proceeded almost as far as 'Mr. Chairman,' when, to my astonishment and terror, I perceived every eye was turned upon me. I became dismayed and dumb. My friends cried, 'Hear him;' but there was nothing to hear. My lips, indeed, went through the pantomime of gesticulation, but I was like the unfortunate fiddler at the fair, who, upon coming to strike up the solo which was to ravish every ear, discovered that an enemy had soaped his bow! so, you see, it was not 'born with me.'" We know, too, that Demosthenes, who, in after years, wielded by his eloquence so mighty a power over the Athenians, when he first attempted to speak in public, was hooted from the rostrum by his auditory. Orators like Curran and Demosthenes are "few and far between," yet nearly every man possesses, in some measure, powers similar in construction, though not in extent, to those possessed by these great men; and it is the aim of Mutual Improvement Societies to draw out, educate, and expand them, by the best and, indeed, only means, viz., by practice, at an age, too, when the mind is most plastic.

Another great advantage which these societies present to young men, is the means they furnish of innocent recreation. That for the weary mind and body recreation is necessary, we need not attempt to prove; and where this necessity does not exist, there is still a natural inborn craving for diversion and amusement which will seek to satisfy itself, either by innocent and harmless means, or by their opposites. The various objects which are resorted to for this purpose need not now be enumerated, they will suggest themselves at once; and the fact that many of them are most foul and sinful; others, though not absolutely immoral, are of such a character in themselves or their adjuncts, that they tend to enfeeble the intellect, demonstrate the necessity for some innocent means by which this natural appetite may be appeased. Mutual Improvement Societies certainly form one of these. The knowledge, to the acquirement of which they stimulate, and the love of which they create, affords enjoyment of the fullest and completest kind; enjoyment which knows no satiety, and places a man beyond the control

of the lower passions of his nature, and above the influence of the sensual and effeminate recreations which would satisfy them. As well might the peasant girl raised to imperial dignity in Russia have laid aside her crown, put off her royal robes, left her palace, and with content resumed her rags, her scanty fare, and degraded station, as for a man, who has once partaken of the refining and elevating joys which knowledge bestows on her votaries, willingly to surrender these for the sensual and effeminate gratifications, which can only feed the inferior part of his nature. When bodily and mentally wearied with the anxieties of our calling, knowledge comes, as a good Samaritan, and relieves us of our carking cares. We partake of its provisions, and are refreshed and strengthened to go on our journey. Our friends may prove unfaithful, worldly fortunes may fail, but the love of knowledge will prove a never-failing spring of ever new delight, "an asylum against all the misfortunes and sorrows of the outer world."*

Man is a social being, and any attempt to satisfy his appetite for pleasure, which ignores this, must necessarily be unsuccessful. Mutual Improvement Societies recognize it. The opportunities for social and friendly intercourse afforded by their various meetings amply provide for it.

III. We now consider, and lastly, some of the essentials to the success of Mutual Improvement Societies. The former parts of our subject have occupied so much space, that little more will be attempted than merely to indicate what these seem to be. There is, then, first, *UNITY*. This is too obvious to be dwelt upon, and we merely remark, then, that unity must not be confounded with uniformity, but that it implies the existence of differences of opinion and expects their expression, but requires that such expression of opinion shall be so moderated by good temper, courtesy, and kindness, as to cause no breach of the peace, or interruption of friendly relations.

In the second place we may mention *efficient officers*. It would be as wise to try to prove the necessity of a compass to a ship when ploughing the trackless ocean, as to endeavour to substantiate this; we therefore at once pass to the next essential, viz., *zeal and earnestness* on the part of each *individual member*. The entire work of supporting and conducting these societies is too frequently left to a few of its members. This should not be. A society cannot be in healthy condition thus supported. It is possible, we know, in the human body for the pulsations of the heart to be regular and uninterrupted whilst the limbs are paralyzed; but such a body could not be said to be in a healthy state. Health consists in the vigorous flowing of the life-blood in every artery and vein, in the strength of every

* Sydney Smith's "Moral Philosophy."

nerve, in the vigour of every muscle. So is it with one of these societies. If it be dependent for its interest and efficiency upon a comparatively small number of its members, it may have life, it may continue to exist, but it cannot be called healthy. It cannot have that full, free, and vigorous life it would have, if each individual member was actively working and contributing his quota to its sustenance and support, nor that capability of achieving the objects for which it was instituted.

The last essential to which we shall refer is *Christian principle*. The necessity of this may not be so obvious as the others mentioned, but its importance, nevertheless, is pre-eminent. It is not by dogmatizing on sectarian peculiarities, not by the exhibition of party spirit, by the use of scriptural phraseology, nor even by prominence given to directly spiritual subjects, that the existence of this principle is indicated; but by the influence, silent and imperceptible indeed, yet as effective as that the dew has on the dusty bushes and shrunken flowers; by the influence, we repeat, which it exerts upon the character and deportment of the members. It controls the passions, and gives the way to reason and judgment. It is the truest source of charity, mutual forbearance, and considerateness for the feelings and opinions of others. It is the firmest bond of unity, the best guarantee for the purity and worth of the objects these societies seek to attain. In the absence of it, the student will drag down knowledge to his own level, instead of knowledge raising and elevating him. He will seek in knowledge rather "a fort or commanding ground for strife or contention; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a shop for profit and sale," instead of what the greatest of philosophers tells us should be sought in it, "a rich storehouse for the glory of God, and the relief of man's estate."

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.

Y. E.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

199. I have to thank you for the prompt attention my previous communication met with, and hope I may may not be troubling you too far in asking your advice again.

(a) Do you think that reading the writings of such men as De Quincy, Macaulay, &c., would tend anything to the acquisition of a good style of writing? And if you do, will you kindly recommend the books best calculated to this end?

(b) Which is the best French Grammar, giving a good acquaintance with the idioms and language generally? I have already learnt Christison's little grammar, and read "Telemaque," "Charles XII.," and some of Racine's plays, but I want a standard grammar. I thought the lessons in the *Popular Educator* pretty good, but there is, no doubt, a better.

(c) Is there any encyclopædia coming out in parts at the present time?—HUSTER.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

169.—*The value of Gold and the Course of Exchange.*—An error on the part of the printer or transcriber, occurs in the extract from the daily journals, for which an explanation is sought in inquiry No. 169. When corrected, it will read as follows:—"The quotation of gold at Paris is 6 per mille premium, and the *short* exchange on London being 25/30 per pound sterling, gold is one-tenth dearer in Paris than London." &c.

It will be understood that gold, in addition to its being a medium of exchange and currency, is also an article of commerce, affected by the laws of supply and demand, and consequently subject to variations in price. The extract given by W. J. relates to the prices of gold in the three principal marts of the world having relations with that of London. In addition to scarcity and abundance as disturbing elements in the market price of gold, may be noticed the changes in the value of silver, especially where it forms part of the standard of value, as in France. In all cases, the cost of transmission from one country to another must be considered in transactions of this kind.

The purity of the metal is a circumstance which affects the price as between two countries. When the coins vary in comparison with the standard coin of England, an adjustment of the relative values has to be made, and this, when arrived at, is called the *par of exchange*; thus, the English sovereign, in its 123½ grains of standard weight, contains 113 grains, or, more correctly, 113·001 grains of fine gold; whereas, the standard of France is $\frac{9}{10}$ fine; the adjustment of this difference produces 25 francs 16 centimes = to £1. This, for the two countries, is called the *par of exchange*,—gold for gold, fine. In the extract referred to by W. J. gold is quoted 6 per mille premium, i.e., 6 francs per 1,000 francs; so that, for every 1,000

francs of gold bought in Paris, if paid for in silver, 1,006 francs must be given. This affects the *course of exchange* between Paris and London, because the price of gold, as an article of commerce, in London is fixed, whereas in Paris it is variable.

In Hamburg money is reckoned 27½ marks banco (equal to 1s. 5½d. each) for the Cologne mark (or about 233½ grains Troy) of fine silver; consequently the par of exchange with London is 13 marks 10½ schillings; 16 schillings being equal to one mark of 1s. 5½d. The quotation given of gold is 423 schillings per mark of 233½ grains.

In New York, the real sterling value of the dollar is about 50d., the calculation in exchange takes it at 54d. so that £100 will produce 8 per cent. more, making the par of exchange between New York and London 108, as equal to £100 sterling.

The *par of exchange* is a convertible term for the "*Mint par*" between two countries. These are different to the "*course of exchange*," a term previously used in this reply, and referred to in W. J.'s extract, although not by name. In the commercial transactions carried on between two countries, it would be both inconvenient and expensive to remit the precious metals for goods purchased; an expedient is therefore provided in *bills of exchange*. As it is probable that the merchant who desires to remit may have no one upon whom he can draw in the country where he has purchased his goods, his inquiries are directed to find bills payable in the country to which he desires to remit. Dr. Kelly, in his "*Cambist*," puts it in this form:—"When London merchants want to draw or remit foreign bills, they meet on the Royal Exchange, where this kind of business must be transacted. They (the merchants) are distinguished into two classes, called *drawers* and *remitters*; the former are also called *sellers* of bills, and the latter

buyers and takers, and like buyers and sellers of all other articles, their interests are opposite. The market is constantly attended by *exchange brokers*, who generally bring the parties together, and settle the price of exchange for the day, when they have learned how the market stands with respect to the wants or offers of buyers and sellers." It will have been observed, that the practical meaning of the *par of exchange*, e.g., in France, is that a bill for £100 is convertible in that country into 2,516 francs, or into 100 sovereigns in England. Now there may be a greater or less demand in a particular country for bills to discharge the balance of trade. "If for goods which have passed from one country to the other, France has drawn bills on England to the amount of £2,000,000, and England has drawn bills on France to the amount of £3,000,000, France will be liable to remit, in order to pay the balance, £1,000,000 in coin or bullion to England; but if it happens that, in like manner, for goods which have passed between the two countries, Holland has drawn bills on England for £2,000,000 while England has drawn on Holland bills to the amount of only £1,000,000, the surplus million of bills drawn in Holland may, and no doubt will, be sent to the Paris market, because they will fetch a premium there, as a means of paying the debt, and equalizing the balance of trade between France and England. The amount of this premium being added to the *par of exchange*, forms a sum which is quoted or referred to as constituting the *course of exchange*.*" In W. J.'s extract the *course of exchange* for Paris, or the *short exchange*, i.e., for bills payable in about a week or ten days, is quoted 25 fr. 30 c. In Hamburg the *course of exchange* is 13 marks $\frac{1}{4}$ schillings; whereas for New York,

the quotation is given for bills payable at 60 days' sight.

Most good Arithmetics furnish rules for calculation of exchanges, but W. J. may learn something of their operation from either Tate, or Kelly's "Cambist;" from McCulloch's "Commercial Dictionary, or the small work referred to in the note.

"COMMERCIAL."

177. *Sir Wm. Herschell*.—In Longman's edition of Sir W. H.'s works. But why be so particular? Cannot you have any portrait reduced by photography?—ASTRONOME.

178. *Editiones Poetarum Principes*.—Halliwell's or Knight's Shakespeare, Newton's Milton, Carruthers' Pope, and Gilfillan's Dryden.—O. P. Q.

188. *Debates on the Plurality of Worlds, and Reason versus Instinct*.—"Quill" will find two very full and able discussions on these interesting subjects in the Vol. of the *British Controversialist* for 1855, in which the principal authors on each question are mentioned.—S. G.

190. *For A. S. A.*—Write a paper, forward it to the Society, pay your subscription to a local association, and then become a candidate for the honour you desire.—F. S.

199. *Hunter* will find the following replies sufficient perhaps:—

Style.—Macaulay's "Essays," and De Quincy's "Works" are models of style. *Imitation* is never advisable. Study the flow, the correctness in the use of words, the clearness, the pliant liveliness of expression which these and all good writers show, but do not attempt to copy the set and form of their sentences.

French Grammar.—The very work you seem to want is Merlet's "Dictionary of Difficulties," published by Walton and Maberly: London.

Encyclopædias.—Yes: "The English Encyclopædia,"—very excellent, and the "Popular Encyclopædia,"—very much to be avoided.—R. M. A.

* "Catechism of Foreign Exchange," by John Taylor.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

The British Literary Society.—The annual meeting of the British Literary Society was held on Friday evening, Sept. 17th, at Anderton's Hotel, Fleet-street. The chair was taken by the Rev. Professor Christmas, the honorary president, at half-past six; when a general report of the history, position, and prospects of the society was read by James Drake, Esq., the secretary, and an able address was delivered by the chairman. The meeting was also addressed by the president, Alfred Elwes, Esq., the Rev. R. J. Macdougall, M.A., Archibald Belaney, Esq., E. R. Russell, Esq., Senor Morentin, and other members. Various points of a business character were discussed, and the officers of the ensuing year were elected. The early connexion of the society with the *British Controversialist* was frequently alluded to in the Annual Report, as also by various members in the course of the evening's proceedings; and upon the motion of Mr. Drake, seconded by the Rev. John R. McDougall, M.A., a vote of thanks to the Editor of that Magazine was carried by acclamation. Supper was afterwards served, when some characteristic speeches were

made in answer to toasts proposed in reply to one on foreign literature, with which the name of Senor Morentin was coupled, that gentleman spoke at considerable length on the influence of Spanish literature upon the world at large, and particularly dwelt upon the gratitude owing to it by France. The arrangements were agreeably varied by a few quartets which were sung by some gentlemen present; and the meeting, which was pleasant and satisfactory throughout, was brought to a close about midnight. The British literary Society is one of mutual improvement in literary composition by the aid of essay writing, and criticism by the rest of the members; and at the present time, when the shortcomings of young men have been so prominently brought forward in connection with the examination for public offices, we think it right to call their attention to the labours of a society whose chief object is to remedy defects of style, and impart facility and elegance in the use of the pen. We purpose, therefore, as far as other demands upon our space will permit, noticing the Society's Annual Report in our next number.

LITERARY NOTICES.

MR. RICHARD FORD, author of "The Handbook of Spain," died Aug. 31st, aged 62.

A son of VICTOR HUGO's is engaged on a translation of SHAKESPEARE; and PHILARETE CHARLES is writing a work in English on his "*Sonnets*."

Though "*The Dial*" has not yet unveiled its broadsheet to the sun, there is a rumour about a London penny weekly paper, to be called "*The Telegraph*."

CAIRD'S "Religion in Common Life" has been translated into Dutch by W. H. Howel, and G. Knijper has translated MACAULAY'S "*Lord Bacon*."

Bentley's "Quarterly Review" is postponed till Feb. 1859.

Mrs. H. B. STOWE is *said* to be at Rouen, studying for a novel, or historical romance.

The Association of Social Science meets next month (October.)

Thomas Carlyle :—

A LITERARY BIOGRAPHY AND A CRITICISM.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the Art of Reasoning, &c., &c., &c.

IN the very white-heat of the French Revolution, after the Reign of Terror had closed, and while the Directory were considering the tranquilizing policy of reproclaiming the (officially-denied) existence of the Divine Being, the great historian of that miracle of national convulsion was born. Under the shadow of Birrenswark Hill—"where Agricola and his Romans left a camp behind them"—lies the gingham-manufacturing town of Ecclefechan. It is in the parish of Hoddam, and the county of Dumfries, Scotland. In a small farmhouse near there, on the 4th of December, 1795, Thomas Carlyle first saw the light. He was the firstborn of his mother, a Miss Aitken, the second wife of his father. An elder brother by the former marriage had preceded him, and cut him out of the total actuality of primogeniture. There succeeded Thomas three other brothers, at least, and four sisters. Several of these still survive, and hold befitting stations in the roll-call of life. Comfortably circumstanced, though not wealthy, his father possessed such character, ability, and religious earnestness, as procured and secured widely spread moral influence and respect. His mother was a woman of superior mind and culture, a keen-sympathied, pious, and faithful wife, parent, and friend. By "the benevolence, the modest and prudent integrity, the true devotedness of these good people"—as he remarks of Schiller's parents—"his heart was nourished," and "thus the better part of his education prospered well." Likely enough, the memory of his own youthhood was busy within him when he portrayed William Burns, the father of the Scottish poet, as "a man of thoughtful, intense, earnest character, as the best of our peasants are; valuing knowledge, possessing some, and what is far better and rarer, open-minded for more; a man with a keen insight and devout heart; reverent towards God, friendly, therefore, to all that God has made." Of his mother, who died only about three years ago, we believe it is his own opinion that heaven's poetry alone could express her just praises.

Amid the rough, sturdy, healthiness of a farm life he grew into boyishness, and was then sent to the parish school, which he attended for some years. There he received the rudimentary

education which Scotland provides for all her children, besides a slight knowledge of the Latin tongue. We have heard a tutor of the lad's express himself to the following purport regarding his character at this time: "He was a plodding, stubbornly studious boy, who never left a task till it was thoroughly mastered, and it was then long retained and distinctly remembered; all that he read or learned was indelibly registered in his memory, and he kept all his knowledge readily at the service of his mind." How truly does this verify the Wordsworthian adage, "The child is father to the man."

About this time the grammar school of Annan a Burgh, at the *debouchure* of the river of the same name into the Solway Frith, possessed a considerable reputation; and to it Thomas Carlyle was sent, to be "pushed on" in those branches of learning which were requisite to qualify him for admission among the *alumni* of the University of Edinburgh. For "in his simple Scottish circle," as he says of Edward Irving, with whom he formed a "fast-friend" intimacy in Annan, "the highest form of manhood attainable or known was that of Christian; the highest Christian was the teacher of such." His "lot was cast"—not, however, it would seem, irretrievably; he was destined for the ministry in the church of Scotland. Irving's glowing and enthusiastic talk "of famed professors, of high matters, classical, mathematical—a whole wonderland of knowledge," must have been a keen stimulant to the youth of fourteen, who had been by his schoolmaster introduced, with becoming pride, to the young, promising, and hopeful University prize-winner of sixteen, in whom that youth afterwards recognised "the freest, brotherliest, bravest human soul" his "ever came in contact with." Rarely fortunate must he have been in his pupils who numbered among them Hugh Clapperton, Edward Irving, and Thomas Carlyle.

In due time Carlyle, too, found his way to the Scottish metropolitan university. This would be about 1812, at which time, if we remember rightly, the chairs of the art-classes were held by Dr. John Hill (Humanity), Dr. Alexander Dalzell (Greek), Dr. David Ritchie (Logic), Dr. Thomas Brown (Morale), Dr. John Leslie (Mathematics), and Dr. John Playfair (Physics). Dr. Hill held the reins of government loosely in his grasp, and seems to have made little real impression on his students; Professor Dalzell, though not an able teacher, was kindly, honest, and earnest; Ritchie was commonplace and dry; Brown an acute and rhetorical improvisatore; Leslie a clear-thinking and profound analyst; and Playfair a man of sound, vigorous, and original capacity. Cast with eleven hundred other young men, many of them fresh from the parochial schoolmaster's ferula, and tasting now, for the first time, the sweets of independence, there were many temptations before him to stand and withstand. For Scotch students, unlike English ones, are free from the overseeing control of the

collegiate authorities, by being non-resident within the walls. Is this a reminiscence of these years? "The university where I was educated still stands vivid enough in my remembrance, and I know its name well; which name, however, I, from tenderness to existing interests and persons, will not divulge. It is my painful duty to say that, *out of* England and Spain, ours was the worst of all hitherto discovered universities. . . . We boasted ourselves a rational university, in the highest degree hostile to mysticism; thus was the young, vacant mind furnished with much talk about progress of the species, dark ages, prejudice, and the like, so that all were quickly enough blown out into a state of windy argumentativeness, whereby the better sort had soon to end in sick, impotent scepticism; the worser sort explode in finished self-conceit, and to all spiritual intents become dead. . . . What vain jargon of controversial metaphysic, etymology, and mechanical manipulation, falsely named Science, was current there, I indeed learned; better, perhaps than the most. . . . By instinct and happy accident I took less to rioting than to thinking and reading, which latter also I was free to do. Nay, from the chaos of that library I succeeded in fishing up more books, perhaps, than had been known to the very keepers thereof. The foundation of a literary life was hereby laid. . . . A certain ground-plan of human nature began to fashion itself in me, wondrous enough now when I look back on it. . . . Thus from poverty does the strong educe nobler wealth; thus, in the desolation of the wild desert, does our young Ishmael acquire for himself the highest of all possessions—that of self-help."* If this be, as has been often thought, an autobiographic glimpse of his own student-days, we may guess, at least, what his mind was slowly settling on, and that it was finding out then, what he afterwards affirmed emphatically in word and life, that "the hero, as man of letters, will be found discharging a function for us which is ever honourable, ever the highest, and was once well known to be the highest."

During this university period, say from 1812 to 1820, what was the chief topic of thought and talk in the midst and hurry of which Carlyle found himself? Lord Henry Cockburn will tell us: "Everything rung, and was connected with, the Revolution in France, which for above twenty years was, or was made, the all in all. Everything, not this or that thing, but literally everything, was soaked in this one event."† In this extract we see, as we think, a grand co-efficient—public interest—working in the forming mind of this one of the "eleven hundred Christian striplings," in whom we have already seen "the fire of genius struggling up among fuel-wood of the greenest, and,

* "Sartor Resartus," pp. 120—127. † "Heroes and Hero-Worship," p. 244. ‡ "Memorials of his Time," chap. ii.

as yet, with more of bitter vapour than of clear flame." The earnest excitement created, as successively the sounds of Corunna, Talavera, Torres Vedras, Almeida, Salamanca, Vittoria, Toulouse, Bayonne, Waterloo, &c., &c., struck upon the ear, and roused the patriotic feelings of the young enthusiast, could not but induce a thought, a wish, to know thoroughly the nature, causes, realities, and issues of that explosion and conflagration of human passions, interests, and systems, that "overturning of a world." "One many-glancing asbestos thread in the web of universal history, spirit-woven it rustled there, as with the howl of mighty winds, through that wild, roaring loom of time." He heard its rustling, and mayhap even then resolved that the memory of the eventful whirlwind, which overswept so many nations with its swell and bluster, should not depart into the inane nonentities of blue books and annual registers, to rest in dull oblivion there and rot.

How far Carlyle's literary bent may have been influenced by the decided success of the "Edinburgh Review," established in 1802, the *Scotsman* newspaper, and "Blackwood's Magazine" (begun as the "Edinburgh Monthly"), in 1817, we will not venture to say; yet we fancy that that, too, must have exercised a signal influence in determining his choice. In these, considerable reputations were acquired; among others by Jeffrey, Sidney Smith, Francis Horner, Charles Maclaren, Pringle, Laidlaw, and John Wilson. Stir, novelty, interest, and excitement were everywhere prevalent, and these could not but in some measure affect a young man brimful of literary liking, of multifarious reading, and extraordinary mental energy.

Then about the time when he had finished those studies, which would have qualified him for admission as teacher in the church, he found that field of labour in a sadly unwholesome state, as he thought, for the life-long adhesion of one who abhorred *unveracity* in all, but most in sacred things. That movement had begun in it which eventuated in the secession of 1843. The popular spirit which animated all thought was then leavening the church, but each presbytery, synod, and assembly was a scene of hot contention between what were then called the Evangelicals and the Moderates. A contemporary, — Lord Cockburn, — speaking somewhat prejudicedly, however, says of the church at this time, that "the old historical glory had faded, and under the insignificance of repose, it was chiefly a lower description of men who were tempted to enlist in the ecclesiastical service. The humbleness of their livings, and even the well-meant cheapness of their education, vulgarized them still more, so that learning and refinement, being scarcely attainable, ceased to be expected; and, with too few exceptions, vegetating in the manse, and the formal performance of the parochial duties, came to be the ultimate object of clerical ambition. . . .

A new Presbyterian revolution was approaching, which brought out new men, and new dangers, and new popularity, with a necessary elevation of those who shone in it. But about this time *the old thing was dead.*" *

Perhaps we may even say with Carlyle himself,—allowing for the exaggeration of spoken language,—“Doubt has eaten out the heart of it; a human soul is seen clinging spasmodically to an ark of the covenant, which it half feels now to have become a phantasm.”† To one who thinks that than “the worship of formulism”—“no more immoral act can be done by a human creature—for it is the beginning of all immorality, or, rather, it is the impossibility henceforth of any morality whatsoever—the innermost soul is paralyzed thereby, cast into fatal magnetic sleep. Men are no longer *sincere* men.”‡ Not alliance with, but “inextinguishable aversion” to, a church so set was alone, in his opinion, possible. When, therefore, the hour for final choice came, he withdrew his foot from treading in the sacred enclosure of the church, as one of her ordained and licensed teachers, with firm but honest decision, and by-and-bye thereafter consecrated his soul for the “priesthood of letters.”

For awhile after his renunciation of the ministry, he was put both to his shifts and thrifts. He taught mathematics some time, both publicly in the Academy of Kircaldy, in Fifeshire, and privately elsewhere; but shortly afterwards—viz., 1823—became tutor to the late Charles Buller, who subsequently distinguished himself as a politician, and made pauperism a special topic of study. During his tenure of the office of mathematical teacher, he translated and published Legendre's “*Elémens de Géométrie*,” to which he prefixed an original disquisition on “Proportion,” which won the notice of the present Sir David Brewster, and other men of note and renown. In the leisure afforded him by his tutorial appointment, he took his first decisive public step towards pure literature, by producing “*The Life of Schiller*,” 1823-24, in the “*London Magazine*,” started in 1820, under the editorship of John Scott. In 1824, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, published Carlyle's translation of “*Wilhelm Meister*,” anonymously; and in 1825, Taylor and Hessey, London, re-published separately, but still anonymously, the “*Life of Schiller*,” revised and enlarged. This launch being made, his bark was instantly boarded by those revenue-cutters of literature—the critics,—and several reviews speedily appeared. Of these the most noticeable were those contained in the “*Edinburgh Review*,” the “*Gentleman's Magazine*,” the “*London Magazine*,” the “*Monthly Magazine*,” and “*Blackwood*.” It is rather singular that the “*London's*” critique was from the pen of Thomas

* “*Memorials of his Time*,” pp. 236—239.

† “*Heroes and Hero-Worship*,” p. 192.

‡ *Ibid.*

De Quincy, and that it attacked both Goëthe and his translator in no very measured temper or language. In "Blackwood" a hint was given which the young *littérateur* was not slow in accepting, viz., "We would fain hope to receive a series of really good translations from his hand." "Specimens of German Romance," in four volumes, appeared in 1827, and comprised examples of the works of Goëthe, Richter, Tieck, Musæus, and Hoffman. In the same year, too, he acquired a new footing in the literary world by admission into the coterie, whose papers formed the "Edinburgh Review." "Richter," and "The State of German Literature," were his first subjects therein. The "Foreign Review" was established in 1828, and contained in successive numbers articles from his pen on "Werner," "Goëthe's Helena," "Goëthe," and "Heyne." A magnificent and hearty tribute to "Burns" occupied the "Edinburgh Review" of 1828 also. In this busy year, we think, he married a lady of considerable personal (and other) attractions, for whom he had long felt an attachment, namely, Miss Welsh, the only daughter of a medical doctor and veterinary surgeon, then resident in Thornhill, but born in Haddington, and claiming lineal descent from one of Carlyle's heroes—John Knox. Almost immediately after their union they retired from Edinburgh, and removed to his wife's property in Galloway, called Craigenputtoch, "about fifteen miles north-west of Dumfries." "Here," he says, in a letter to Goëthe in answer to inquiries made, "with no small effort have we built and furnished a neat, substantial dwelling; here, in the absence of a professional or other office, we live to cultivate literature according to our strength, and in our own peculiar way, . . . six miles removed from anyone likely to visit me." Among "the granite hills and the black morasses" which surrounded "the bit of earth" he could now call his "own," "Sartor Resartus" was conceived and composed. It went the round of many publishers, and gained—rejection. "German Playwrights," "Voltaire," and "Novalis," are the contributions to the "Foreign Review" of 1829; and in the "Edinburgh" he sketches the "Signs of the Times." "Richter" and "History" employed 1830. With the latter he made his *début* in "Fraser's Magazine," which reckons this as its birth-year. Next year was prolific in ably executed work—the genuine, honest toil of a yokesman by choice to the service of the children of Mnemosyne. "Luther's Psalm," "Schiller," "Early German Literature," "German Poetry," "Characteristics of Man," and the "Nibelungen Lied," are harvested in the periodicals of 1831. The last-named is his opening paper as a contributor to the "Westminster Review." Papers on "Biography," "Samuel Johnson," "Goëthe's Death" and "Works," "Elliot's Corn-Law Rhymes," &c., fill 1832 with literary activity. "History," "Diderot,"

"Cagliostro," and the publication of "Sartor Resartus" in "Fraser," occupy 1833-34. During the same period too, and afterwards, he was a contributor to "The Edinburgh Cyclopædia," a valuable and useful work issued under the editorial superintendence of the celebrated scientific writer, Sir David Brewster, between the years 1808-30. The "Death of Edward Irving" alone seems to have moved his thoughts to then published authorship in 1835, in which, or in the following year, he left his Scottish home, to reside in London. Here he established his domestic *penates*—where he does still—in Cheyne-row, Chelsea, in the neighbourhood of his associate and friend, Leigh Hunt; and in the very central heart of literary activities and intimacies. In 1836, "Sartor Resartus," and several of his review articles, were re-published in Boston. But though these two years bore no outward fruit in their own season, he had been maturing himself for the period at which he might advisedly throw aside the veil of anonymity, and with some laudable thought-work in his hand present his name to his countrymen for recognition and criticism. He had garnered his efforts, and the result was the "French Revolution," a history, by Thomas Carlyle, 1837. That name became thereafter an utterance of the age; for, in that work, with unsurpassable distinctness and graphic skill, the whole objective actualities of that grand, ghastly, and terrific storm-rush of events is pictured forth to the mind's eye in style and diction strange and medley as the time it treats of. The "Diamond Necklace," "Mirabeau," the "French Revolution," were the subjects of the contributions of 1837 to periodical literature. In the summer of the same year he first lectured in public in Willis's Rooms, London, on "German Literature." These being successful, he adopted the "History of Literature, or the Successive Periods of European Culture," as the topic of twelve lectures, delivered in 1838, which were graced, like the prior course, by a crowded and select audience of the two aristocracies—birth and genius. They were extemporized, though pre-studied, expositions of grand views and theories, among which were interspersed cleanly carved and exquisitely characteristic portraitures of the men and women of the old historic times. In 1838, the "Memoirs of Sir Walter Scott," and the merits of the recently deceased "Verhagen Von Ense," gave him opportunity for discourse in the "London and Westminster Review;" and in 1839 he delivered a course of lectures on the "Revolutions of Modern Europe," published "Chartism," and presented a very able and idiosyncratic petition to the Commons House of Parliament on the Copyright question, in the preamble to which he designates himself, "Thomas Carlyle, a writer of books." He delivered his only published lectures, "Heroes and Hero-Worship," in 1840, and declared that thereafter that mode of utterance would be no longer employed by him. This determination he has since kept unbrokenly,

though he grants himself that "there was much pleasure for me in this business, if also much pain."

We have now arrived at a point of time in the biography of Thomas Carlyle when we can stay and review the past—see resolve resulting in performance, aim becoming issue, and preparation producing its intended effects. The literary life chosen as the highest then available mode of securing the independence through which he could be enabled to remain *true* to himself, has brought him "through the entanglements of his peculiar position, and is already ripe with accomplished work and fame." The eulogium he passes on Goëthe is most truly applicable to himself:—"This man, we may say, became morally great by being in his own age what in some other ages many might have been—a genuine man. His grand excellency was this, that he was genuine."* He who regards truth must expect martyrdom on all sides, and he got it, and gets it, and yet keeps up marvellously his soul's independence in its despite. In him, as in the true literary man, there is ever, acknowledged or not by the world, a sense of the "infinite significance of duty;" but there is this much more in him than in many, that he *does* it, while they only feel it, admit, and lament their impotence of will to undertake the dark pilgrimage of actively pursuing it. Actualities, not sentimentalities; deeds, not sighs; labours, not lapses, he brings to the world's banqueting house as the gift and product of his existence.

At the time we are now about to review, he has attained his forty-fifth year, eighteen of which he has spent, less or more, in professional literary exertion as a labourer with mind and pen, and the chief items upon which his activities have been spent have been already by name rehearsed *seriatim* in our preceding pages. It falls to us now to estimate the spirit of these works as means of appreciating the past, and comprehending the future of this member of that "vanguard of humanity" who, "amid the perplexities of every day existence, form themselves into harmony and wisdom, and show forth the same wisdom to others that exists along with them."

In looking over the titles of the contributions which Thomas Carlyle has made to our century's loftiest literature, it will be noticed that they may be readily arranged into three chief classes, viz., criticisms in literature, strictures on social life, and historical summaries, besides the positive additions to the modern library of "Sartor Resartus" and the "French Revolution." Over these we shall briefly cast a critical eye, before we pass on to the more recent products of a singularly industrious, prolific, and genuine soul. His literary criticisms are distinguished for geniality, width and wealth of scholarship, keen insight, thoroughly vivid exposition of the views, doctrines, habits, form, and being of the characters of whom they speak; they are able

* "Miscellanies," iñ, p. 98.

and comprehensive, and they then opened up to the English reader a whole hemisphere of important thought and genius which was almost, if not wholly, unknown and unesteemed. On social life his thoughts are more vague and enigmatical than besecems treatises applicable to human cares and the real and actual businesses of life. They are strong, healthy protests; but they are not sound, reinvigorating and solid disclosures of important thoughts, schemes, or doctrines. His historical summaries are pithy, pointed, broad etchings of times, periods, and events. They are distinguished by lucidity and sarcastic allusion, by intense personality and vehement earnestness, and by a certain dramatic scenianness and tableauism which is very effective in impressing, informing, and attracting the reader, whose faith resigns itself to the onrushing energy of the strongly manifested aim of this sketcher in the palace halls of time.

The chief and main tendency of his thoughts, according to our hypothesis of his life,—but it must be distinctly borne in mind that we speak without personal knowledge of the distinguished “vates and seer,”—was towards the up-clearing and thorough comprehension, if not explanation, of the grand echoings, which ever and anon came across seas in his youth-time, of the “French Revolution.” The bent of mind towards “that plastic philosophy which employs itself in giving form and life to the dry bones of events” is, as we apprehend, clearly indicated in his earliest attempt at authorship—the “Life of Schiller,” part iii., where he somewhat comprehensively sketches the aim, mode, and spirit which should regulate the historian’s pen. The same drift is shown in his reiterated papers on “History,” which, in a clear and masterly manner, expound views of the profoundest nature upon the subject of discourse. But more decidedly than all, it is capped and crowned with evidence in that work, the “French Revolution,” which, as Sterling says, “thrills with life-blood through and through,” and wherein “so wondrously (we quote his own words regarding Goëthe) the wrecks and pulverized rubbish of ancient things, institutions, religions, forgotten noblenesses, made alive again by the breath of genius, lie here in new coherence and incipient union, the spirit of art *creative* through the mass: that *chaos* into which the eighteenth century, with its wild war of hypocrites and sceptics, had reduced the past, begins here to be once more a world.”* The second grand characteristic of his mind is a keen zeal for literature. This is displayed, not only in those precious early words on the life of a man of letters, which form the preem to the second part of “Schiller’s Life,” and which are so well calculated to—

“arm the obdurate breast
With stubborn patience as with triple steel,”

* “Miscellanies,” iii., p. 97.

but also in those genial and congenial sketches of literature and literary men which form the staple of his "Miscellanies." All these are papers in which living energy is shown in the graphic style, the picturesque expressiveness, the *vraisemblance*, and the pure brilliancy of the light of his composition, in which there is nothing—

"Come pittura in tenebrosa parte,
Che non si può mostrare,
Ne dar diletto color nè d'arte."*

The third peculiarity of his mind seems to be industrious truthfulness. He knows well that in the many avenues, through which the will may be influenced, there may be many motives brought to work and lurk; and hence, that he, who would know well, must search both widely and minutely into the tendencies of the mind, and the aims which set it in motion. And this he does with all earnestness and might of the inner man; not with *logic-spectacles*, but with an *eye*." His keen insight and instincts enable him to detect a sham—of which he is bigotedly intolerant—in an instant, and his perfervid veraciousness sets him to unwarp from it all the specious involvements and hypocrisies in which it has rolled itself, and to set it in the intense light of the glaring hatred he feels for all things unquestionably untrue. No simulation, feint, or unperspicuous, misty mockery can stand before him without exciting this energetic faculty—insight and blazing denunciation. A fourth peculiarity of his genius is its constant and abiding conviction that moral and social reformation is inward, not outward. The entire machinery of associative agencies, which our age so idolizes and preaches up as all-heals, may not be amenable to the fierce and sturdy detestation which Mr. Carlyle flings at it. But there is, nevertheless, much truth in his assertion, that "men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith in individual endeavour, and in natural force of any kind." And in his expressed opinion that "all but foolish men know that the only solid reformation is that which each begins and perfects in himself." These statements may be somewhat one-sided, and mayhap over-earnestly pressed, but they do not the less on that account indicate the greatness of a good, honest soul, which has looked observantly both upon social institutions and into the human heart, and is not fearful, in this age of timorous honesty, to proclaim his opinions, as if "upon the house-tops," in opposition to (what he conceives to be) the deceiving tendencies of the present time.

We are compelled, unwillingly, to postpone farther remarks till our next issue.

* "Like a picture on a gloomy wall,
Which cannot show its worth,
Nor give delight from colour nor from art."—*Dante*.

Religion.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THAT THERE WILL
BE A RESURRECTION, IN WHICH SOME OF THE
MATERIALS OF THE PRESENT BODY WILL FORM
PART OF THE FUTURE ONE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"But I, even I, know that my Vindicator liveth,
And that one coming after [me] shall arise over [my] dust (or tomb);
Even after my skin shall be devoured, this [shall be],
And out of my flesh shall I see God.—
Whom I, even I, shall see for myself,
And my [own] eyes shall behold, and not another:—
My reins are consumed in my bosom."

Job xix. 25—27; Dr. W. L. Alexander's Trans.

As the duty and privilege of replying to the several arguments urged against our views on this subject now devolves upon us, we shall endeavour to discharge it within as brief limits as is consonant with the importance of the question under consideration.

First, in order, appears the article of G. A. H. E., and which will not require much special notice, as the greater portion of the quotations, which comprise the bulk of his article, may very fairly be claimed as supporting our views. His first objection being the old one, drawn from a consideration of the process of decomposition of physical bodies, we shall pass over, as it was fully dealt with in our opening article, merely remarking, that we know not what is the "possiblensness or impossibility, *a priori*, of any physical arrangement. Mathematical and moral impossibilities may be affirmed. But why should this 'be thought incredible?' Our Lord referred all its supposed difficulties, as they exist in our minds, to a twofold ignorance; 'Ye do err, not knowing the *Scriptures*, nor the *power* of God.' He rests its veritableness on the one, and its simple accomplishment on the other."* However improbable or impossible it may appear, the impossibility vanishes if Omnipotence chooses to perform so mighty a work; and its improbability gives way to certainty, if it is a fact that He has revealed such to be His will in His written word; and that this is not the meaning of scriptural

* Hamilton's "Rewards and Punishments."

language, G. A. H. E. has failed to show. We would also observe, that as this is confessedly a mysterious subject, and involving what appears a contradiction of nature, it is not required that we should be able to show and explain *how* the resurrection body will be formed from the one laid in the grave, or what portion of its scattered dust will be requisite to establish physical identity between the present and the resurrection body; it is sufficient, if we are able to show that Scripture plainly and emphatically declares that there will be a bodily resurrection; so that all objections drawn from man's physical nature, and the absurd calculations of Mr. Hody, referred to by "E. Foster," are not of the least weight as arguments, when urged against the eternal word of the Almighty and Omniscient Creator.

G. A. H. E. quotes from Locke to the effect, that though we read of the "resurrection of the dead" in the New Testament, the phrase, "resurrection of the body," is not to be found therein. We at once allow that the precise phrase is not a scriptural one; but, to use the words of Dr. Hamilton, though "we do not read literally anywhere in Scripture of the resurrection of the body, yet it must be understood when we read of the resurrection of the dead. There must be a reason for this. The silence condemns the various theories which would explain the reorganization of the body, or which would, because of its supposed difficulties, deny the doctrine altogether. 'The vile body,' the humiliated flesh, is to be 'changed.' That of the righteous shall be around them not in its completeness; but rather as it existed in germ, than as it was ever hitherto evolved. The seed is of the nature of the fruit, but the fruit may not always be discoverable in the seed. The seed-body is sown: the only pledges of incorruption, power, glory, spiritualism, were couched in corruption, weakness, dishonour, and materiality." If, therefore, there be no resurrection of the body, what else can be the legitimate meaning of the correlative phrase, "resurrection of the dead?" What is it, we would ask, that will rise? "The spirits of just men made perfect?"—from their graves!—Or, if this be not the meaning, shall these "spirits" be united to other or new bodies, formed on purpose for their use, but which will have no connexion with the frame they animated when on earth? This would be no resurrection, no "lifting up;" it would be a new creation, and not a revivifying of men integrally, to speak correctly, a reunion of their souls with their bodies, and which we understand as being included in the idea of a resurrection. The following quotations in G. A. H. E.'s article do not support *his* position. He says, Byle remarks, on 1 Cor. xv. 51—53:—"At that instant the *dead bodies* of the saints shall be raised up to a glorious and immortal constitution, and those that are then alive shall be transformed into the same brightness and immor-

tality." Again, he is equally unhappy in quoting Iræneus, who explains Phil. iii. 20, 21, as intimating "that it" (the *body*) may be transformed from a mortal and "corruptible, into an immortal and incorruptible *body*." What, we would ask, do these passages mean, more or less than we affirm? The Apostle's illustration of the resurrection by the growth of a grain of wheat is next referred to, and a quotation from Locke adduced, to confirm the argument of G. A. H. E.

As we have before remarked, we understand the Apostle's meaning to be, that the resurrection body will bear a similar relation to that placed in the grave, as does the ear of wheat to the grain or seed from which it springs; and though in its outward appearance it may be very dissimilar, yet this will not destroy moral and physical identity. When we read of the resurrection of the dead, we must understand it to include the resurrection of the body; the law of language requires that we should do so. We also read, that at the crucifixion "many of the dead bodies of the saints which slept arose, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many," and that Christ was restored to life in his human, material frame,—“the first-fruits of them that slept,”—and then ascended into heaven in his glorified body. Enoch and Elijah, who never tasted death, are also there, in all the glory and immortality of our renewed human nature. That so acute a reasoner as Locke should trifle with scriptural language, and commit such a plagiarism as that quoted by G. A. H. E., and which seems to us nothing more nor less than a quibble, appears inexplicable; but it is less wonderful that our opponents have fallen into the same error, by endeavouring to strengthen their position with the weighty influence accompanying even the absurd ideas of great men. To the quotation from the Rev. J. Brown, adduced by our opponent as supporting *his* (?) view of this question, we may add another for the special edification of our friend. "That there will be a general raising of the dead bodies of men and women at the last day, is most agreeable to reason. Reason hints that the law of God was given to our whole man, and is violated by our soul and body in connexion. The body, as an open port, admits hints of good, and temptations to sin; the carnal affections, depending on the body, corrupt and mislead the mind. What outward acts the soul designs, whether good or evil, the body executes. * * * If these different parts of human nature share thus in actions good or bad, it is reasonable that they share together of everlasting reward or punishment, and hence the body must be restored to life, and reunited to the soul, never more to be separated. That there shall be a future resurrection of the dead in general, is also evident from many oracles of Scripture. * * * That the same body will be raised, is evident from the reasons above mentioned, and as well from the

nature of a resurrection ; for, if the same body was not raised, it could be no resurrection, but a new creation. It is their body that once was vile, mortal, diseased, dead, and buried, and that bore the image of the earthly Adam, that shall be raised, changed, glorified ; and 'as we have borne the image of the earthy,' so 'we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.' "*

We now proceed to notice the more elaborate article of "E. Foster," the two quotations from Job prefixed to which solemnly affirm the great truth that "they, that go down to the grave, come up no more" into the present state, to take their part in this busy scene of life. Job himself has gone whence he has not, nor shall return to act his part over again in the land of the living, though he yet distinctly affirms his confidence in a future resurrection to bodily life, in a state far different from the present. E. F. adduces the testimony of a leading rabbi in Prague against the resurrection of the body, and makes him assert that "they (the liberal-minded Jews) don't believe a word of it: it never originated in Judaism," &c. Now, we would ask, Is this doctrine to be found in the Jewish Scriptures? If it is, be its light ever so dim, how came it there—from without? Individual Jews, in ancient or modern times, may not believe in the resurrection ; indeed, there was a sect among them whose leading tenet was a disbelief of this doctrine, and the cognate one of the existence of spirits ; but this does not vitiate positive fact, and however many authorities may be quoted, affirming the Jews' rejection of this doctrine, it is really of very little weight, for we find it in their own sacred writings. Our friend also quotes a single line from Rollin to prove—what? that "the resurrection of the body was unknown to the Pagans"—our own assertion of the fact. In our opening article, we gave it as our opinion that this doctrine was eminently a revealed one, and unknown to all who did not enjoy the light of Divine revelation. E. F. calls upon us to prove this, our assertion. If what we have and shall advance upon this question does not do so to our opponent's satisfaction, we shall be sorry ; but he will allow us to remind him that he has failed to prove his counter-assertion, that "the resurrection of 'dead bodies' (if he will have it so) is of heathen origin, and consequently destitute of the slightest Divine authority." With respect to the assertion that the phrase, "the resurrection of the body," was never met with in any public creed until A.D. 381, nor in any private one but that of Arius, we remark, perhaps not, probably because the existence of creeds cannot be traced much beyond that date ; but we have ample evidence that the belief of the apostolic fathers and primitive Christians was identically the same as our own. In the Epistle to the Corinthians which bears his name, we find Clemens Romanus, the

* Brown's "Dictionary of the Bible."—Article, Resurrection.

"wisest and best of the fathers," endeavouring to prove and illustrate the doctrine of a bodily resurrection by referring to the history of the phoenix, which was supposed to live five hundred years, then die, and rise again from its own ashes.* How, therefore, E. F. arrives at the conclusion that this doctrine is of heathen origin, we have no means of ascertaining. Dr. Dwight affirms that the "doctrine of the resurrection is a doctrine of Revelation only," and that of it "not a trace can be found in all the investigations of philosophy. Paul, when declaring it to the Athenian philosophers, was pronounced by them to be a 'bab-bler.' It was, therefore, a doctrine unknown and unheard-of within the purlieus of their science. No philosopher, to that time, had been so fortunate as to light upon it by accident, nor so ingenious as to derive it from reason."

E. F. next charges us with abandoning the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, because we do not affirm that there will be an absolute identity of particles in the resurrection body with the one laid in the grave. We do not see that this involves an abandonment of, or is inconsistent with, our position. We profess not to explain how the resurrection body will succeed the present; how the "natural or animal" will become the "spiritual," the "corruptible" become "incorruptible," or the "mortal" put on "immortality." It will be sufficient to justify our view, if but the minutest germ of the natural form the nucleus of the spiritual body, and which the Scriptures so frequently represent as rising from the place of sepulture: "The grave and the sea shall give up their dead;" "All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth;" &c., &c. It is evident that whilst the same atoms which compose our bodies at the present day will not constitute the resurrection body, its constitution, arrangement, and qualities will be different, for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." In many important respects it will be greatly changed in its nature, and so much so, as to wear an entirely new character: "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." When E. F. asks, How is the change effected? we answer, that it may be similar to analogous phenomena in nature, as the butterfly of to-day is the same with the crawling caterpillar of yesterday; as the ear of wheat is with the grain whence it springs; or the many individual plants, shrubs, and trees in the vegetable world, which die annually under the chilling influence of winter, are the same with those which, on the return of spring, again renew the face of nature, when each is again clothed with verdure, life, and

* See Bennett's "Theology of the Holy Church."

beauty. Dr. Dwight remarks, "That the body will be *the same, in such a sense as to be known*, appears sufficiently evident from the Scriptures. Even departed spirits, in their intermediate state, appear plainly to be exhibited in the Gospel as known to each other. Our Saviour informs us that 'many shall come from the east, and from the west, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God, with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob.' In order to a complete fulfilment of the intention of this promise, it seems necessary that the persons here spoken of should know these patriarchs. Lazarus, Abraham, and the rich man are all exhibited in the parable as known to each other. Moses and Elias, also, were known by the disciples, on the Mount of Transfiguration, to be Moses and Elias, one of them an embodied, the other an unembodied, spirit. From these facts it is, I think, sufficiently clear that mankind will know each other in the future world, and that their bodies will so far be the same as to become the means of this knowledge."* In our opening article, we showed that it was simply necessary that a similar combination of the primary elements should go to form a body the same in appearance, structure, &c., to ensure personal corporeal identity; we therefore leave this part of our subject with the remark, that the more we try to explain what Scripture has left unexplained, the more unsatisfactory will be the result. Our duty is to rest satisfied with the declaration of inspiration, and leave the possibility of the work to God.

We are next favoured with our opponents' theory of the form and dimensions of the human soul; they "consider the soul of man as a perfectly substantial being, possessed of the human form; or, in other words, as a spiritual body, and endowed with all the organs that constitute the material one with which it is clothed while here." This is not a new theory; and so far from our opponents fixing on us the charge of materialism, we can

* See Dr. Dwight's "Sermon on the Resurrection." Further on in his article, E. F. professes to give a quotation from "the celebrated Dr. Dwight." The entire passage reads thus: "For if we believe that Jesus died, and rose again, even so them also who sleep in Jesus 'will God bring with him;' that is, as the sixteenth verse (1 Thess. iv.) informs us, when he comes to the final judgment. Who are those whom God will bring with Christ *at this time*? Certainly not the BODIES of the saints. *They will be raised from the grave, and cannot be brought with Christ.* The only answer therefore is, he will bring with him 'the spirits of just men made perfect.'" This passage is extracted from his sermon on the consequences of death, where he is treating of the existence of the soul in a separate state, between death and the resurrection, and where he is not referring to the latter event at all. The words in italics E. F. has omitted in his quotation, and has evidently quoted just to "serve his purpose." We must protest most emphatically against this practice of our opponents' mutilating orthodox authors when quoting from their writings, for it is calculated to mislead the reader as to the real sentiments of the writer quoted.

charge them with the grossest materialism, seeing they make the soul of man a "perfectly substantial being," having form, parts, and organs. But what evidence have we in favour of such a theory? None. Again, if it be a body, it must be material, however subtle; for it cannot, by any possibility, be spirit. But we know so little of the spiritual world, and the manner and conditions of existence of the inhabitants thereof, that, finding it impossible to conceive what pure spirit is, we always give to each spiritual being the human form and semblance, highly etherealized in substance, and endowed with wings to ensure swiftness, when, at the same time, we know that such ideas may be as far from having their realization in fact as is possible. We have no idea how a finite spirit can exist, except clothed in a material form, though we cannot deny that such may be the case; and hence, all our speculations of the manner of the soul's existence, separate from the body, may be dismissed as idle and vain, being included among those secret things which belong to God alone. The elements composing the body are doubtless, in themselves, "insensible materials;" the body itself, deprived of life, is also equally insensible to any impression from without. But what is life—life in the vegetable, the animal, and the human creation? Philosophy cannot answer. It is equally at fault with this question, as when interrogated as to the nature of the human soul. All that philosophy can inform us of with certainty is, that life is a state of active being, death the cessation of that activity; while the human soul is something capable of thinking, superinduced on the animal or natural life of the body. According to E. F.'s theory of an organized, spiritual body being the soul of man, it is "*the man himself*;" and though it may have an exquisite sympathy with the material body, the latter is, notwithstanding, unnecessary as an integral part of man, and this "organized spiritual body" rises from the "grave (why the grave?) or tenelement of clay, immediately after death, and enters the world of disembodied spirits." According to this theory, which is also supported by W. W. F., the resurrection is past already with respect to all the dead, and it simply means the future state consequent on death, and in which the soul lives separate from the body. We would ask, How can that be a resurrection, a "lifting up," in respect to which there was never any death? Or, why should revelation be so written as to convey to nine-tenths of its readers the idea of a re-vivification of the body, if it really only means the "putting off of this flesh"? As this is the only explanation of their view of the resurrection ventured by E. F. and W. W. F., and means simply the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body, and as it is asserted by them that the words translated "resurrection" do not necessarily include the popular idea, we shall here briefly inquire into the meanings of the terms employed. Biblical critics tell us that *ANASTASIS*,

the word in the original, refers not only to the state immediately after death, but also that consequent on the resurrection, while another term is employed for the *act* of resurrection. We quote first from Dr. Dwight: "This word, *ἀνάστασις*, is commonly, but often erroneously, rendered *resurrection*. It usually denotes *our existence beyond the grave*. Its original and literal meaning is, to *stand up*, or to *stand again*. The appropriate Greek word for *resurrection* (i. e., the act) is *ἔγερσις*, as in Matt. xxvii, 52, 53, 'Many of the saints which slept *arose*,' &c.*

Dr. Hamilton says, the "radical idea of Anastasis is reinstatement; its sacred application is to manhood as it shall integrally exist after death is destroyed. It expresses the proper immortality of our nature. Resurrection is only the means to it; not itself. It is not in the literal resurrection that our Lord intends that 'they marry not, nor are given in marriage,' but in that state which is consequent on it. The Sadducees denied the after life altogether, and only the literal resurrection inclusively. The recompense which is given 'in the resurrection of the just' points not to that act and 'moment,' but to a condition which follows it. 'That world' is associated with 'the resurrection from the dead.' . . . Sometimes the word is employed where there can be no such allusion: 'This child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel:' sometimes where there is allusion only; 'The first resurrection.' We argue, from this collation, that *ἀνάστασις*, in nearly all instances, while supposing literal resurrection, does not formally express it, but its sequel. Another term is employed by Scripture when the thought is limited to bodily resurrection, *ἔγερσις*. The substantive formed from it, *ἐγερσις*, is given to the immediate resurrection of Christ, Matt. xxvii. 53. This *may* have the most common appellation, whenever it is said,—*arise*; he *arose*; the tempest *arose*—yet one idea is preserved. Death casts down. In the conquest of death there is 'lifting up.' We mark the following references in proof:—Matt. viii. 15; ix. 25; x. 8; xi. 5; xiv. 2; xxvi. 32; Luke vii. 14; xx. 37; xxiv. 6, 34; John ii. 19, 22; v. 21; xxi. 14; Acts iv. 10; x. 40; xxvi. 8; Rom. iv. 24, 25; viii. 11, 34; x. 9; 1 Cor. xv., *passim*; 2 Cor. v. 15; Gal. i. 1; Ephes. i. 20; Col. ii. 12; Heb. xi. 19. It is evident, therefore, from this multiplicity of authorities, by no means all which might be collected, that *ἐγερσις* more commonly denotes the act of resurrection; and that *ἀνάστασις* expresses the idea of the renewal of the whole man, as existing in the eternal future after it†" It will not be necessary that we should quote any other authorities to show that while 'Anastasis' does strictly mean its future state, it yet necessarily includes the idea of 'rising again,' contrary to the

* See Dwight's "Sermon on the Resurrection."

† Hamilton's "Rewards and Punishments," Note K.

opinion of W. W. F., and implies the reinstatement of mankind integrally, body and soul, in the eternal future state, and that the full significance of the term can only be understood by attaching to it this meaning. How, then, we would ask, can that be a resurrection, or "living again" of the dead, if the separate existence of the soul, apart from the body, only is meant, and which, according to E. F. and W. W. F.'s own theory, never was dead, or "cast down"? Or in what sense can Christ be said to have "become the first-fruits of them that slept," if we do not suppose a resurrection of the dead similar to that of our Lord?

We cannot follow E. F. in all his criticisms on the passages quoted in our opening article, but must refer the reader to our numerous commentators on Scripture. In the passage from Dan. xii. 2, the word "many" is not to be understood with a partial signification, but as expressive of the vast multitude—they will be "*many*." The word is frequently used with this latitude of meaning.* On his remarks on John v. 28, 29, we would observe, that a doctrine like this does not depend upon an exact grammatical expression, and which he would have us believe is wanting in the verses quoted. To the candid reader the language seems plain enough. Who are in the graves—*men*, or *bodies*? If the latter, they once were an integral part of men, if they are *human* bodies, and the personal pronoun is correctly used in referring to them, and who are now fast locked in the "sleep" of death, from which sleep, however, there is an hour coming when they shall be awakened by the "voice" of the Son of man, and "shall come forth" from "the graves." The explanation of the apostle's argument in 1 Cor. xv. we pass over for the present, and must leave our readers to exercise their judgment on the different interpretations at issue thereon. The spiritual interpretation of our last quoted passages, with which E. F. favours his readers, is an instance of the method to which our opponents must resort, if they would make Scriptural language teach the contrary of a literal resurrection. Ezekiel's vision of the resurrection of dry bones evidently proves that the doctrine was not unknown among the Jews, or it would not have been employed as an illustration of any event in any sense; and it was to show this that we referred thereto in our opening article, without noticing the primary signification of the passage. One of the

* Matthew Henry, on this passage, remarks:—"The multitude of them that sleep in the dust shall awake, i.e., all, which shall be a great many. Or, 'of them that sleep in the dust,' many shall arise to life, and many to shame. The Jews themselves understand this of the resurrection of the dead at the end of time; and Christ seems to have had an eye to it, when he speaks of the 'resurrection of life,' and the 'resurrection of damnation,' John v. 29; and upon this the Jews are said by St. Paul to expect a resurrection of the dead, both of 'the just and of the unjust,' Acts xxiv. 15."

immediate consequences of Adam's fall was the entailment of death upon his posterity, the death of the body as well as the spiritual death of the soul; and it was to rescue the entire man, body and soul, that Christ came. Hence the apostle's argument, "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order [or, rank]: Christ the first fruits: afterward they that are Christ's at his coming," 1 Cor. xv. 21—23. According to this argument, "they that are Christ's" partake of the resurrection at his "coming." What are we to understand by this, except his coming to judgment? And if so, does it not evidently point to a literal resurrection of the body at that time? "L'Ouvrier," in his second article, having entered somewhat fully into this part of the question, it will not require further notice from us. What, we would ask, in taking leave of E. F., should we think of the wisdom of the man who wrote a book professing to contain all-important truths, and which he desired all should read and understand, if, before they could apprehend the true meaning, such a system of spiritualizing should be necessary as that employed by E. F. to interpret some of the plainest passages of Scripture? Would it not have been better to have addressed his readers in language which they readily understood? Shall we, then, impeach the wisdom of the Most High, and charge Him with foolishness in giving us a professed revelation of His will which, even in its plainest and simplest passages, we cannot rightly understand, unless we attach to them a signification essentially different from that which is the most obvious to the mind of the unprejudiced reader? No; abhorred be the thought! The divine Being has revealed His will unto "babes" in understanding, and made the written revelation thereof, in all its essential truths, so plain, that the "wayfaring man, though a fool, shall not err therein."

We have next to notice more particularly the article of W. W. F., and, as several objections urged by him have already received notice, and he has added little more to the arguments of his predecessors, we need not stay long in showing the fallacy of his position. We demur to his assertion that we deny "there is another life, and only affirm that there *will* be one at some indefinitely distant period;" for it is certain, from Scripture, that the soul still exists in a separate state after the body is dead. But the question at issue involves the further question of the resurrection of the body—"Will the body be raised, and the soul re-united thereto?" That it is "absolutely irreconcilable with reason," and "contrary to its perceptions," W. W. F. has not shown, merely asserted it; while every one is convinced that if the Creator chose to perform such a work, He could easily do it.

W. W. F.'s explanation of Job xix. 25—27, appears to us very unsatisfactory. That our common version conveys to us the spirit of the original can hardly be denied. We have examined many different translations of this passage, and the one which appears to be the closest rendering of the original we have quoted and prefixed to this article.* Matthew Henry, Scott, and Dr. Clarke, also bear testimony to the faithfulness of our common version. That the words "yet in my flesh shall I see God" is *not* fully explained by the subsequent acknowledgment, "now mine eye seeth thee," is evident; for the latter passage refers to Job's entertaining different views of God in His works of providence than he did previously, and which opinion was the subject of discussion between him and his three friends. That the passage refers to the resurrection of the body is also equally evident, notwithstanding the passage in chap. vii. 9, and which we have already noticed; for his *eyes* are to be the instruments of vision by which "out of his flesh" (the common version has it "*in* his flesh;" the difference is unimportant), *i. e.*, from within his body, again restored to him, he should "see God." "The patriarch's boast appears to be that he himself, with his own eyes, should see God as his God, even though disease and death should destroy his flesh; and that by reason of his earnest longings after that day, his 'reins'—*i. e.*, "innermost parts"—were 'consumed within' him: the certainty of the prospect consumed him with intense desire; like the Psalmist, his 'soul fainted for the salvation of God.'" W. W. F.'s interpretation of 1 Cor. xv. next calls for remark. Our opponents are agreed in claiming this famous chapter as their stronghold, and this they do by limiting the scope of the apostle's argument to the proof of an after life. We have before shown that, while the future state is often the meaning of the term "*anastasis*," it yet includes the idea of restoring, or bringing back to life from the dead. The doctrine denied by the sceptics in the Corinthian church was, strictly speaking, that of a future existence in another world. To remove this error, and prevent it, was obviously the design of the apostle in writing this chapter; and

* See Alexander's "Connection of the Old and New Testaments," lect. iii., part 2. In Note K of the same work may be seen the various translations of the Chaldee Targum, the LXX., the Vulgate, Schultens, Pareau, Rosenmuller, Pye Smith, Hürzel, Lee, Ewald, and Hävernick, a comparison of which will show the general faithfulness of the common English version. Dr. Priestly says:—"Christians in general, from the earliest times, maintain that Job (in this passage) declares his faith in a happy resurrection at the last day; and this, I have no doubt, is the right construction." That Job believed in a resurrection, may be argued from chap. xiv. 12. The expression, "till the heavens be no more," evidently implies, as Davidson remarks, "that then shall man rise again from death," which is here, and elsewhere throughout Scripture termed a "sleep," 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 Cor. xv. 6.

he accordingly shows its absurdity in the most triumphant manner, and elucidates and proves the contrary in the first thirty-four verses. As the future existence of the soul will be connected with the future existence of the body, he then enters into a consideration of the latter, by putting an objection against the resurrection in the mouth of an opponent (ver. 35), derived from apprehended difficulties concerning the future existence of the body. In considering this objection, the apostle unfolds many truths of the most edifying and glorious nature (ver. 35—54). He dwells extensively on the nature of the body with which those who are dead will be invested at the final day; declares the "change" which those who are living at the time will experience, resulting in the possession of similar natures with those who had passed the regions of death; and concludes with a song of triumph over death and the grave. To limit the apostle's meaning, as our opponents do, takes from the latter part of his discourse all its power and weight of argument; and the illustration of the resurrection of the body by the grain of wheat being quickened and springing up into another form of life, and the different varieties of flesh, all framed from the same material elements, are absolutely meaningless, and do nothing in the way of proving his position. It is true, in sowing seed we sow "*not* the body which shall be," but still we know the kind and specific nature of the body that will proceed from it; for "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body. So also is the resurrection of the dead." The seed body is sown; it decays; but at the appointed time from that corrupted dust shall arise that same individual being, body and spirit again united, and destined to a never-ending career. If the apostle meant to teach our opponents' doctrine, he would have used less ambiguous language, so that we could not, by any possibility, have failed to apprehend his true meaning. According to them, it is "*this* immortal that must *put off* mortality, and *this* incorruptible that must *put off* corruption." But contrary to this, the apostle distinctly affirms "*this* corruptible must put on incorruption, and *this* mortal put on immortality." Thus it is *this* body that will become impervious to change, decay, or death; and "then shall be brought to pass the saying, Death is swallowed up in victory."

Our view of this question does not forbid us to believe that departed friends are gone to heaven. "Absent from the body," they are "present with the Lord." They are unspeakably happy in their separate state, but that happiness shall be vastly increased by means of, and after, the resurrection. They are certainly "*waiting* the redemption of the body" at the close of earth's mighty drama,* when, at that solemn day, all the nations

* See Rom. viii. 22, 23, and Matthew Henry's comment thereon.

of the earth shall be assembled before the "great white throne," and every individual receive his eternal reward by the Judge of "both quick and dead."

R. G. next comes forward, and in breathless haste propounds to us a long series of questions, the whole of which we may at once leave, with the remark, that to some of them he will meet with satisfactory answers by a diligent study of the sacred Scriptures; while others, being prompted by mere curiosity, may be safely dismissed as idle and vain. The "rest," which the saints are said to experience from "their labours" in Rev. xiv. 13, evidently implies a state so much different from the present, that it may be very correctly termed a state of repose after the toils and trials of this life: in the same manner heaven is termed a "rest for the people of God" (Heb. iv. 1—11), though it does not exclude the idea of activity, and there do they receive the reward of their labours; and it is in this sense that it may be said of the departed saints, "their works do follow them."

In opposition to R. G., we affirm that "disease, death, and corruption," *are* on the "high road" to eternal "health and happiness;" we see this to be the fact all around us; the good man is subject to the same equally with the wicked; and experience tells each of us, that we too must shortly succumb to the stroke of disease, and become a prey to death and corruption. Our Lord's design, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, was evidently to teach the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, and the certainty that each individual will, immediately after death, enter his suitable sphere, and cannot, therefore, legitimately be pressed into any question of the resurrection of the body, respecting which the parable is wholly silent. R. G. asks, if the "worthy beings gone before us" to the world of light, are not "just men made perfect"? thus omitting one important qualification of their nature mentioned by the apostle, who distinctly affirms them to be the "*spirits* of just men made perfect" (Heb. xii. 23). They are disembodied spirits, and, until reunited with their body, cannot strictly be termed *men*; at least, such seems to us to be the apostle's meaning: We do not think that the "body is the *principal* part of man;" but we think that it is an integral part of man, and stands in such close relation to his spiritual nature, that it cannot correctly be said, that the "soul is the man himself," or yet, that the body is man. It is, we think, "man in his entirety," soul and body, "and not a part of man, that must be rewarded or punished," if we are to receive the award of perfect justice for deeds done "in the body."

We know not what the "children of the resurrection" may require to complete their perfect happiness, except what we can gather from revelation; and to us the idea of their resurrection

does not seem so preposterous as R. G. would have us believe. Why should not the contemplation of the omnipotence of the Divine Being being exerted to raise and "change our vile body" be calculated to enkindle within us feelings of reverential awe? and why should not the prospect of such a reunion of our souls and renovated bodies inspire us with deepest emotions of gratitude and delight, that the great Creator should take such care of our nature, and constrain us from the heart to respond, "Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee: thou wilt have a desire to the work of thy hands"? The passages next quoted by R. G., referring chiefly to the existence of the soul in a separate state from the body, between death and the resurrection, we shall pass over. His question about one resurrection at death, and another at the end of the world, we have in some measure anticipated, and answered already. The fact that there is a "first resurrection," mentioned in the Apocalypse (Rev. xx. 5, 6), implies also a second, and *general* one, as the first is evidently *partial*, and limited to those who die with Christ, and live again unto righteousness and holiness, according to the working of the Holy Spirit within them. This "first resurrection" is, therefore, spiritual. In like manner, the "second death" includes the idea of a first; the latter is the death of the body, which *all* undergo: the "second is the eternal dying of both soul and body in the future world:* upon such as have part in the first resurrection," this "second death hath no power." There is no more entering of the soul into the material body after the resurrection, but after death the body lies in the tomb, until the time when it shall come forth, at the call of the Almighty Creator, changed, renewed, and made a fit habitation for the soul throughout eternity. The passage in Rev. vii. 9, 10, referred to by R. G., is obviously descriptive of the apostle's vision of heaven and its inhabitants, and is couched in figurative language. We do not see that it has any bearing on the present question, by way of proof or disproof of the resurrection. Why may we not suppose it descriptive of the character, nature, and employment of the heavenly inhabitants after, as well as before, the general resurrection? R. G.'s explanation of St. Paul's metaphor of the resurrection, by the quickening of a grain of wheat, is another specimen of the system adopted by our opponents, in putting a spiritual interpretation upon the plainest passages of Scripture, to support a preconceived theory.

On E. F.'s second article, exhausted space forbids any lengthy remarks; but in answer to all the objections in the former part of it, and the plausible reasons of Dr. Hody, we may quote the words of Christ himself in John vi. 39, where He solemnly

* See Matt. x. 28.

affirms it to be the will of his Father, "that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." What it is that He will raise up is explained in the next verse, as being the believer in Christ; "and I will raise *him* up at the last day." Were there no other passage, concerning the resurrection, in holy writ but this, it would suffice to establish the truth of our doctrine; for the passage certainly conveys the idea of the resurrection of the body, that it should not be *lost*, but raised "*up again*" by Christ at the last day; and the whole man, body and soul, again be reinstated in their former close relationship, by the omnipotence of the Son of God.

E. F. refers to the phenomena of sensation in an amputated limb, as proof of the existence of a spiritual body within man. Such phenomena are, no doubt, strange, and even unaccountable, by our present knowledge of anatomical science; but it does not prove E. F.'s theory, that the "soul of man is a spiritual body," &c.; for if the latter is affected by the amputation of a limb, it must be *material*, and not spiritual, or no such operation could have any effect upon it. We opine that the phenomenon in question is capable of a different solution, on the principles of animal physiology. The nervous system of man is a thing not only little understood, but appears enveloped in mystery. The nerves seem to be the seat of all sensation, and the medium of impression from without; and we can readily understand that the nervous system of a man, submitting to an operation, may receive such a shock thereby, as would leave behind sensations that would, at times, be felt afterwards, and imagined, as being in the amputated limb, just as if it were still attached to the body. Yet this does not prove the soul to be material, because the medium of communication is; nor, that within the outward visible frame it is enveloped in a spiritual, or *spiritualized* body; but simply that the connecting links of mind and matter are so fine and subtle, that we cannot distinguish them, nor explain the exact *modus operandi* of how spirit acts upon gross matter. This is hidden from our most careful observation; but we know that there is such a connection, and that spirit can influence matter, and be conscious of receiving impressions from without, because we see the results, and can testify from personal experience.

In conclusion, let us see how we stand with our opponents. The debate just concluded involves the question of a resurrection, or no resurrection. G. A. H. E. seems to think that there will be bodies provided for mankind at the last day, but which will have no connection with the present. This we have shown is no resurrection; it is a new creation. Our other opponents affirm, that the term "*Anastasis*," or "resurrection," means simply the future state, into which the soul enters immediately

after death, invested with a spiritual body; which body, indeed, according to E. F., is *no* body at all, but the soul itself, and which being of the form and dimensions of the human being, possessing organs, &c., inhabits and animates the body in the present life. The gross materialism of this theory, and its inconsistency with Scripture, we have endeavoured to show, and also at the same time establish the conformity to revelation of the generally received orthodox doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

A remark or two in conclusion. This doctrine has had its opponents in all ages, and not a few of the noble army of martyrs have been cruelly burnt to death, and their ashes scattered to the winds, the persecutors' avowed purpose often being to frustrate their resurrection; but in reference to all such, we believe that the noble hymn of Luther shall receive full illustration, in both a spiritual and literal signification:—

“ No! No! their ashes are not lost,
But blown about from coast to coast,
They're sown in every land;
And soldiers from that seed shall rise,
Who death and dungeons shall despise,
To Christ a faithful band!” *

Is it thought too great a thing for God to accomplish? Is it a whit easier for Omnipotence to create and impart life for the first time to an organized body, than to collect the dust of one who had succumbed to death, long after it had become resolved into its original constituent elements, and renew them with all the vigour of an eternal youth? Is it beyond human comprehension, or human expectation? This is the way in which it has often pleased the Deity to perform His mighty works, that in their grandeur, and the magnificence of their results, they should far exceed the limits of human imagination, and, in the simplicity of their execution, baffle his boasted wisdom.

What is it that gives consolation to the Christian when the hour of his dissolution draweth nigh, and he feels that the cold, icy hand of death is upon him? It is not merely the hope of a glorious immortality for his spirit—though none can tell the overwhelming interest of such an assurance at that trying hour—but it is also that combined, with the hope of a “joyful resurrection.” His eye of faith pierces the gloom of the future, and in the vista he beholds that glorious Being who is the “resurrection and the life,” who Has^d himself lodged in the tomb, but who triumphantly burst its fetters, and rose the mighty conqueror o’er the grave: and, feeling assured of a similar triumph through faith in Him, the departing Christian readily yields

* D'Aubigne's “History of the Reformation,” vol. iii., chap. iv.

himself up to death, while he records the ground of his hope in the oft-repeated words of the patriarch of Uz: "After I shall awake, though this body be destroyed, yet out of my flesh shall I see God." And his bereaved friends can commit his body to the guardianship of the tomb, sorrowing "not as others which have no hope," for they "believe that Jesus died and rose again," and that "even so, them that sleep in Jesus will God bring with him."

Finally, we have had our attention drawn to a very important and practical doctrine; the attempt to elucidate the meaning of Scripture upon this question has not, we trust, been pursued without exciting the lively interest of our readers. *Our* task is now done; it will be for them to pursue the subject at their leisure, and, we hope, to their benefit. That the Spirit of Divine truth, who alone can guide us into the way of truth, would vouchsafe to lead each and all to sound views upon this question, both doctrinal and practical, is the earnest desire of

Ashton-under-Lyne.

CLEMENT.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN bringing the present inquiry to a close, we must express our regret that further space cannot be afforded for its discussion, seeing that it is so important in itself, and has been so ably treated. But as it has been decreed that "the debate on the Resurrection will be concluded in our next Number," it is essential that we at once address ourselves to the task before us.

And, first, "Clement" takes up some space in repeating the opinions of writers who denied any resurrection at all, and telling us what *death* is. We admit all he says, so far; but when he endeavours to make a certain passage of Scripture have a different meaning to that which belongs to it, we at once join issue with him. By italicising two words in the passage referred to, he attempts to show his idea of a material resurrection. We readily acknowledge that it is asserted that "many of them which sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake," and we doubt not the dead will *awake*, but there is nothing said about rising from their graves in the material form in which they entered the tomb. It would be equally logical to assume that, when a man opens his eyes in a morning, he will rise from his bed, as to say that the words, "Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise" (Isa. xxvi. 19), is conclusive evidence of the resurrection of the body; for this would betray a want of common apprehension. This text (by-the-by, one which our opponents seem to have entirely overlooked) relates to a release of the people from a state of captivity, or, as Bishop Lowth observes,—“The deliverance of the people of God from a state of depression is here thus expressed, with manifest opposition to what is said above (ver. 14) of the tyrants under whom they had

groaned; that they should be utterly destroyed; should never be restored to their former power and glory." We mention this, to show the ease with which a wrong impression may be acquired of the meaning of such a passage. Again, "Clement" falls into the same error in the next section of his article (after quoting John v. 28), by saying, "Here *all* the dead are described as being in their graves," whereas it merely speaks of those "that *are* in the graves," and not of those who "may have turned to their native dust, and long perished from human view." Again, speaking of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, he affirms that, "as he has risen, so must all his followers; yea, all mankind." For our own part, we cannot believe this. That our Saviour rose from the dead with the same body which had been "crucified, dead, and buried," we willingly admit; but that our dead bodies will be resuscitated, as a result of the resurrection of Christ, is what we do not admit. Undoubtedly it is written, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," but we have yet to learn that *because* the resurrection of Christ was a material one, our bodies will, *therefore*, be reanimated. Indeed, further on, "Clement" acknowledges "that the resurrection body will be *very different* from that which is laid in the grave;" and, singularly enough, in support of this statement, he quotes the words made use of by St. Paul, when illustrating this matter (1 Cor. xv. 50), and finishes the third section of his article by quoting Phil. iii. 21, in which the apostle distinctly states that "our vile body" shall be "changed." In the fourth part, "Clement" remarks, "That the resurrection of the dead to life is not beyond the power of the Almighty is evident, from many passages of Scripture," which is very true; but to conclude that because "He has restored the dead to life in times past," that the general resurrection will be a precisely similar process, is, to say the least, very unreasonable. We have as deep veneration for the Scriptures in their integrity, as any can entertain, but we dislike to see an interpretation put upon isolated passages which it evidently never was intended those passages should receive.

"L'Ouvrier" sets out with a text (1 Cor. xv. 44), which at once negatives his position. "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body," is about as plain an affirmation as is anywhere to be found in the Bible. In our estimation, there cannot be two opinions about its meaning; but "L'Ouvrier," with an adroitness for which that talented contributor to the *British Controversialist* is remarkable, attempts to show that the general resurrection of the dead spoken of in Scripture will neither be of the description which we humbly believe, nor yet of the exactly opposite character propounded by his predecessor in the affirmative, but will be a kind of half-and-half affair, of a fashion cut out by himself. Thus, he "presumes no one will be found to advocate the entire re-appearance of man in another world,

as he now is," but he "presumes" that man will be transformed into a something between "the *soma psuchikon* and the *soma pneumatikon*," whatever that may be. This idea is sustained throughout the article, as will be seen from the fact that one of his last sentences is—"although this body shall be so raised as to preserve its identity, it must yet undergo certain purifying changes to fit it for the kingdom of heaven."

The article of "Nemo," it must be confessed, is well written; and he adduces some of those passages of Holy Writ which, taken alone, *tend* to contradict other passages; but when the subject of the resurrection is *taken as a whole*, we are bold to assert that "the Scriptures" *do not* "teach that there will be a resurrection in which some of the materials of the present body will form part of the future one." "Nemo" says, "First, we believe it to be clearly taught in the Scriptures that there will be a general resurrection;"—we believe the same ourselves, but it does it not follow that "the certainty of a resurrection of the body may be inferred from the fact that it has already taken place in particular instances," or from the fact of "the resurrection of Christ himself." Anticipating, we suppose, this obstinacy on our part, "Nemo" quotes from Acts xxvi. 23, the words of St. Paul (when delivering the famous address which made Felix tremble, Festus to cry out, "Much learning doth make thee mad," and Agrippa to assert, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian,") viz.:—"That Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead;" and then he demands, "Now, if there were no resurrection, how could Christ be 'the first that should rise from the dead?'" to which we triumphantly answer, Christ might be

"The first and only one
Who ever found the way."

As "Clement," to whom we replied at some length, uses most of the passages quoted by "Nemo," with the exception of Job xix. 25—27, which is here first brought forward, we have only to request "Nemo," as our notice of this, to place Job vii. 9, and x. 20—21, in juxtaposition with the words quoted by him, and then take another thought ere he finally decides in favour of a material resurrection.

Of the fourth article contributed by our opponents, that by "Eugene Aram," we have little to say (indeed, we sometimes scarcely comprehend what he means), further than we are certain he must "supply" a "defect" in *his* "biblical knowledge," ere he "sets at nought" the "elaborate reasoning" of John Locke; and we have strong suspicion that "Eugene Aram" has been "dreaming" again, or he would not have ventured to adduce a passage of Scripture in refutation of the assertion of Locke respecting the resurrection of the dead, which, instead of con-

futing the great philosopher, only shows a "defect" in "Eugene Aram's" discernment.

We are next favoured with a second article from the pen of L'Ouvrier," the first sentence of which is evidently intended as a "poser," and "presumed" to be totally unanswerable; but it is nothing of the kind, for our reply is, "*we do not think it "a thing incredible that God should raise the dead," though we do consider it "incredible" to suppose that God will raise dead bodies; and we can assure "L'Ouvrier" that he will not "convert" us to any such belief; for an extended course of reading not only corroborates our scriptural studies, but still further confirms the view we take of this subject.*

Bishop Sherlock, in his "Practical Discourse Concerning Death," emphatically states this "as the proper notion of death, the separation of soul and body;—that *the body returns to dust* (Gen. iii. 19; Job xxxiv. 15), the soul or spirit unto God who gave it." In another place, he speaks of "this body which rots in the grave;" and in especial reference to 1 Cor. xv. 50, he says: "this is understood of a body of flesh and blood, which is of a corruptible nature; as *our reason may satisfy us, that such gross, earthly bodies, as we now carry about with us, cannot live and subsist in those pure regions of light and glory which God inhabits.*"

At the same time, we are utterly at a loss to conceive what connection there is between the creation of Adam and the resurrection of the dead at the last day, or what purpose "L'Ouvrier" intended the recital of that event to serve, unless it was to show more fully the inconsistency of "our friend's" ideas. For instance, "L'Ouvrier" informs us that from the consideration of the subjects of the creation and the fall, in detail (no slight task, it must be owned), he has arrived at this "conclusion,"—"man originally was immortal, but now he has no existence beyond the present life;" and yet he takes much trouble in demonstrating the plan of redemption! This contradictory sort of reasoning is continued (p. 159), when he says, "We firmly believe the Scriptures to be perfectly truthful and harmonious in the declaration, that 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven;' and that 'Job will see God in his flesh' with his own eyes, and not with another's,"—a style of argument we certainly cannot reconcile; and, doubtful that any proof of ours would "convert" him "to the realities of fact," we simply invite attention to the articles by our coadjutors.

Had space permitted, we intended to have added somewhat to the present paper, but must content ourselves with only another observation, and it has reference principally to one of the arguments of "Nemo," viz., the resurrection of certain persons recorded in the Bible, and that of our Lord himself, noticed generally by "our friends" on the opposite side.

How far we may be right, we know not; but we submit very confidently, nevertheless, that whatever may have occurred under the Old Testament dispensation, or as a part, of the Divine mission which our Lord Jesus Christ came into the world to execute, can have no relation to the general resurrection of the last day, for this reason; in the perfection of the great work of creation and redemption, the Almighty found it necessary to effect many things in order to prove his own omnipotent power, and as credentials of the sacred and truthful character of His ambassadors, which it is not necessary now to perform; and we therefore think we are not justified in expecting that our dead bodies will rise again after mouldering in the grave, *because* such things have happened, any more than we might reasonably look for a repetition of the ten plagues of Egypt, or the feeding of five thousand persons with five loaves, and two small fishes.

In conclusion, I desire to return my best thanks to E. Foster, R. G., and W. W. F., for the support rendered by them; and again repeating my decided conviction, that the doctrine of a material resurrection is not sanctioned by Scripture, I leave the subject with the reader.

G. A. H. E.

Leeswood, near Mold.

DEATH.—To what base uses we may return! Why may not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander, till it find it stopping a bung-hole? As thus, Alexander died, Alexander was buried, Alexander returned to dust; the dust is earth: of earth we make loam: And why of that loam, whereto he was converted, might they not stop a beer barrel?—*Shakespeare.*

PATHEPIC PREACHING.—It is a mighty change that is made by the death of every person, and it is visible to us who are alive. Reckon but from the sprightliness of youth, and the fair cheeks and full eyes of childhood—from the vigorousness and strong flexures of the joints of five-and-twenty, to the hollowness and dead paleness—to the loathsomeness and horror of a three days' burial, and we shall perceive the distance to be very great and very strange. But so have I seen a rose newly springing from the clefts of its hood, and at first it was fresh as the morning, and full of the dews of heaven as a lamb's fleece—but when a ruder breath had forced open its virgin modesty, and dismantled its youthful and unripe retirements, it began to put on darkness, and to decline to softness, and the symptoms of a sickly age—it bowed the head and broke the stalk, and at night, having lost some of its leaves, and all its beauty, fell into the portion of weeds and worn-out faces.—*Jeremy Taylor.*

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

DICKENS.—ARTICLE III.

It is remarked by Sir E. B. Lytton, that "when we look back upon human records, the eye settles upon writers as the main landmarks of the past;" and it would seem as though the action and reaction of the age upon the author, and the author upon the age, did in their effects, as manifested in his writings, give to the future student the most real picture of an era; for if it be that the statesman and the legislator, each in his own sphere, are too much immersed in the noise and tumult of the conflict to estimate the bearing and effect of the general action, it is surely the author who, from his contemplative eminence, espies all the field and its combatants, who can best depict the scene, and estimate its results. If this be so with authors in general, pre-eminently is it so with those of imaginative literature; for it is to the poets and fiction-writers mainly that we look for a faithful transcript of the social features of their own times. This is emphatically true with the writers of the present day, when characterizing the minutiae of social life has become the chief end and aim of our best novelists; so that, by their aid, the future inquirer will be able fully to understand the kind of influences at work amongst us, and the conflicts and difficulties of our present social state. Among those who are thus painting our times, the two literary artists, about whom we are at present occupied, stand highest, alike for power of conception, brilliancy of colouring, and truthfulness of detail. In fact, so closely are these two connected, that when we wish to speak of our best fiction-writers, we almost instinctively place the names of Dickens and Thackeray together; and (as remarked by a previous writer) they seem so united in one category, that the difficulty of estimating their separate merits is very considerable. We generally think of one as supporting the other, and look upon them respectively as the humourist and the satirist, by whose combined influence we are amused and instructed. Still, of course, there are distinguishing traits, which show their excellences or defects, and divide their admirers into separate classes. The points of diversity and resemblance, and the teaching of each, have been already so fully and ably discoursed upon in the pages of the *British Controversialist*, that it seems scarcely desirable to urge new views of the question, and the duty of the advocate of either now seems to be rather that of reply and criticism than discursive praise.

In this spirit we propose briefly to glance at the value of the objections urged against the claims we support, just premising that our main reason for inclining to place Dickens above his great competitor is, that his chief merit is that of humour, and this, we think, will eventually give him the first position with the mass of the English people, by whom the exquisite satire of Thackeray is not appreciated, because it is less congenial to their mental tastes and constitutional predilections.

The style of Dickens is asserted to be less pure than that of Thackeray. Now, as the ground these writers take is so different,—the one inclining to the lowest depths of the social life, and showing the terrible realities and yet the sweet tendernesses that there exist, the other placing his characters amid the stateliness of aristocratic society, or the charmed circle of historic times,—we cannot compare the sketches of young thieves and workhouse waifs by the one, and the portraits of refined and educated men and women by the other, without being struck with a contrast, which at first may seem to be to the advantage of the latter; but, on closer examination, we contend that the manner in which Dickens portrays his scenes exceeds in vivid and powerful interest any of the seemingly finer pictures of Thackeray. Perhaps the severest test of the style of an author is the manner in which he writes of the filthy, the vicious, and the sinful; and it may, we think, be claimed for Dickens pre-eminently that he has the marvellous power of handling the blackness of vice with clean hands, enabling us to realize the deformity of crime without defiling himself or his readers. Then observe his power of delineating, in short sentences and happy phrases, so abundant in his works, the peculiarities and strong distinguishing points of persons and places; the exquisite prose-poetry in which his pathetic descriptions are given; together with his marvellous powers of idealization in inanimate objects, causing them to sympathize with, and almost to become a part of, his characters. As specimens of genial, hearty, racy English humour of the present day, a candid examination of Dickens's works will, we are persuaded, suffice to place him in the highest position among our novelists.

It is urged that Dickens's conceptions of character are less real and life-like than those of Thackeray. This point has been so ably treated by the last writer on our side, that we scarcely need do more than refer to it; for we very much question whether keener, closer, more real conceptions are to be found in the whole range of literature than most of those which adorn his pages, especially when we recollect that many of them are of a kind the most difficult to depict, from the inability of any author fully to appreciate those emotions which away the outcast and criminal, or the down-trodden and poverty-stricken, unless, by some strange chance, he should himself have been connected

with those classes. Yet this difficulty Dickens has overcome, by the exquisite intuitive powers with which he is gifted, enabling him to depict, in a manner which we feel to be real, the thoughts that are busy with the brain of the thief, the murderer, or the wretch condemned to death.

So, again, as to the charge of a lack of comprehensiveness in Dickens. If by it is meant that he has no large artistic groups of characters, no great gallery paintings, if we may use the expression, we cheerfully concede that, in this respect, Thackeray, for gorgeous accessories and elaborate backgrounds, quite excels him; but that, in the intense clearness of his portraits (after all, the chief merit of such writers), he quite as much excels Thackeray, is, we consider, unquestionable to the careful reader; for Dickens's great power, as has been so often remarked, consists in the individuality of his sketches, by which he has peopled our literature with a multitude of characters, as remarkable in their way as those of Shakspeare.

These sketches are said to be distorted; but, if looked at closely, they will be found only to be caricatures in the way in which circumstances do frequently distort the characters of real life; and in their external appearance, which he dilates on so marvellously, they are but types of every-day experience of close observation; for, as a modern writer says, "we cannot go into any concourse of people, especially of the poorer classes, where the unsuppressed character has been suffered to rise completely to the surface, without seeing several faces, which, by the addition of the vices of social man, might cause many a dumb animal to feel indignant at the undoubtedly deteriorated resemblance. And in these cases the effect is either gravely humorous, or grotesquely comic; and in these cases the dumb original is not complimented." Such being a characteristic of the source from which Dickens's figures are taken, it is scarcely to be wondered that a casual observer should accuse them of caricature, when one with a deeper insight would be enabled to see in them many proofs of their true likeness to "the things that be." Thackeray's characters, on the other hand, mainly moving in a circle where the forces of education and refined intercourse have been largely at work, appear to a greater advantage; but we contend that, if taking into consideration this difference, we strive to estimate their comparative merit by the side of Dickens's, we shall have to confess that there is an element of power, a graphic interest, an absorbing anxiety, evoked in us by those of the latter, which the more brilliant, but colder works of the former fail to produce: for while in extended plot and continuous action Dickens is not so successful; in his power of linking together his scenes by a humour as free and fanciful as it is delightful, often combined with the richest irony, he stands alone and unequalled.

Again, it is urged that Thackeray excels Dickens in power of

elevating us, by being more unprejudiced. This has a plausibility from the fact of Dickens painting with broader lights and deeper shadows; but he never paints in fierce savagery, for in the darkest of his characters he always strives to show some bright features, and to win our admiration for some points in the most depraved. He has certainly given us more telling and correct views of the degradation and misery in which masses of our countrymen live, than any other fiction writer of the age. And having realities so stern to depict, and his mind being of a warmer and more passionate temperament than that of the satirical writer, it was natural that his works should assume a fiercer and more emphatic tone. Then the singular combination of the imaginative and practical in him tends to foster his desire to reach beyond mere amusement, and awaken sympathy or aversion for this or that particular object; and without committing ourselves to his sometimes highly coloured views, we feel that the matters he so severely and yet humourously handles do, in the main, consist of those extremes either in opinion or conduct, the results of which, if not direful in themselves, are so in the reactions they induce. We deem it to be impossible for the imaginative mind to dismiss from its productions views so highly coloured, that to the calm reasoner they shall seem altogether distorted; and therefore are we inclined to feel sympathy for much of the indignation so ironically expressed in some parts of Dickens's works. We are quite ready to admit the superiority of Thackeray in bias, but assert that this arises from a colder and less impassioned nature, which enables him to sketch characters with feelings not so strong; still we cannot prefer his more exact but quieter manner to the glowing, life-like heartiness, the broad and free flow of feeling we have in Dickens, who, despite these acknowledged blemishes, must eventually take the highest place among our modern imaginative authors.

The author who, by the matchless brilliancy of his writing; the deep love he manifests for the true, the beautiful, and the good; the wondrous force of characterization he possesses; and, crowning all, the delightful and unstained happiness of his humour, who shall in the future, notwithstanding his prejudices and blemishes, rank higher than all his contemporaries, will, we believe, not be the brilliant, elegant, and satirical Thackeray, but he whose favourite themes were the trials and difficulties of that lower life, the lot of too many of the toiling millions of our land; whose delight it was to show that in the murkiest moral atmosphere some bright and fragile plants might struggle on in suffering existence—the real, thorough English writer, Charles Dickens.

ANGLO-SAXON.

Politics.

OUGHT THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE system of bowing, which has been of late introduced into our legislature, may be regarded as the worst and most pernicious phase in the politics of the present time. It would be difficult, at the present moment, to form anything like an accurate estimate of the check which sound and liberal legislation will thus sustain. A few things, however, are apparent. It deprives the country of the advantages of a strong constitutional opposition, and places the minister of the day in a servile position. His independence is gone: he becomes dependent upon others; and this leads him to sacrifice the honour and welfare of the nation to the emoluments of office. To principle, he is finally an alien; and so are his measures. As is the tree, so is the fruit thereof. Had the enemies of progress eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and sat in council together, they could not have devised a plan more likely to promote their ends. These remarks are forcibly illustrated in the conduct of affairs during Lord Palmerston's tenure of office. Every bill introduced under his guidance was in homage to some popular clamour raging at the time, or some trivial affair intended to occupy the thoughts of the people, and consequently exclude more substantial reforms. In a word, we think a *Bowing Machine* would be a very fair definition of the noble ex-premier. Fortunately, he bowed rather too far in the wrong direction, and was trundled out of doors for his politeness. Whoever may feel an inclination to doubt the soundness of these views, may relieve their minds, by inquiring what has become of the oft-promised Reform Bill? and who consented to barter our nationality and liberty for the transient smiles of the most volatile people in Christendom?

Any measure laid before Parliament to satisfy a sudden outburst of passion, without previously investigating the merits or demerits of the case, is not entitled to the appreciation or respect of sober-minded men. Sentence is never passed upon the prisoner, until the charge against him has been thoroughly sifted, *pro* and *con.*; and if any discrepancy in the evidence appears, or any doubt whatever arises, he receives the benefit of the same. But in the present instance, this golden rule, which

is an Englishman's pride and boast, has been departed from; nay, worse, the sentence of death has been adorned with the most glowing eulogiums. This, indeed, is a case unparalleled; unless indeed, there is some similitude between it and another, in connection with which we read of one who said, "Hail, Master! and kissed him."

Let this system be as dangerous as it may to the best interests of the nation, it is still more dangerous to make it the basis of an argument (as certain of the affirmative writers have done) in justification of any measure whatever, much less the subject at present under consideration. All that it proves is, that the minister by whom it was introduced was a clever tactician; nothing more. And indeed, to those who have been attentive observers of the debates upon the Indian question, it must be painfully apparent, that the House of Commons is conscious that it rashly committed itself to a suicidal policy, at the bidding of a superficially instructed minister. Better testimony could not be desired, in support of this, than the repeated divisions upon the Indian resolutions, upon each of which occasions the noble Viscount, the member for Tiverton, was signally repulsed. Could a more distinct negative be given to the question, "Ought the East India Company to be abolished," than this? It was equivalent to telling the discomfited hero, We will not taste of your dish, but will direct other artists in the political kitchen to prepare us another, approaching as near to the old as decency will permit.

"Double government," we believe, was the target at which the blank cartridges of popular indignation were fired, immediately after the arrival of the news of the Indian Mutiny. This was the disease with which the Sepoys were afflicted; the burden under which millions groaned in vain. And the nostrum applied to their diseases—to remove this grievous weight from off their shoulders—to dry the tears of the broken-hearted, and to heal the wounds of the bruised, is the metamorphosis of the "Court of Directors" into the "Council of India." Here is the sovereign remedy, that will convert this land of desolation into a modern Eden—a panacea for every woe!

However, it is insinuated by some, that the Company's misgovernment is the cause of the present revolt; and, therefore, that it should be abolished. There may be some truth in this, but we think it is rather too far-fetched. It is no more nor less than finding fault with a government, because it is like every other human society—imperfect. If this principle were adopted, it would lead to the extinction of all fallible governments, for no other reason than that their decrees are not infallible; and this in the end would lead to greater confusion than occasional blunders. We are inclined to believe that our abolitionist friends, in their new-born zeal for the better management of the affairs

of India, have allowed their youthful enthusiasm to bathe their memories in the sweet waters of oblivion, and so omit mentioning a few important truths. It is the superlative degree of absurdity to suppose that a government, extending over thousands of square miles, and millions of semi-civilized souls, differing wholly from each other as well as from ourselves, in religion, language, customs, and prejudices, could be conducted with the same accuracy, uniformity, and impartiality, as in our own country. They should remember that even here, where we are bound together by the ties of kindred, language, and religion—and that the pure revealed will of Heaven—it has taken many centuries, and cost many precious lives, to work out the existing state of things. How much more time, then, is necessary to bring the barbarous hordes of our Eastern empire into a similar state of civilization?—of whom it may be said that,

“ Contrasted faults through all their manners reign;
Though poor, luxurious; though submissive, vain;
Though grave, yet trifling; zealous, yet untrue;
And even in penance planning sins anew.”

And yet we are shamelessly told, that because these individuals who have established our supremacy in the East, who have upheld the dignity and authority of Britain under the most trying circumstances, are to be dismissed, because they have failed to instil a respect for law and justice, truth and honesty, into the hearts of the natives, and some of our own countrymen, in an incredibly short space of time. To treat those who have reared and bequeathed to us an empire thus, is unworthy of the age. So peremptory a dissolution of the only government that has proved practicable is (to speak mildly), at least, premature. Ah! would that the Company were endowed with miraculous power, so that they might have ushered in the dawn of the millennium, for clearly nothing less would have appeased our opponents.

Another class maintain, with all the gravity of sound jurisprudence, that the punishment due to the unprincipled and villanous conduct of private and licensed individuals should be visited on the East India Company; but we must confess that the correctness of this assertion is as obscure to us as the stars at mid-day. But, granting for the present that the cause of this is the dulness of our own intellect, and not the accuracy or the inaccuracy of the argument (?) before us; it follows, that the murders, burglaries, and swindlings, that are daily committed in this country, are to be imputed to Her Majesty's advisers, and members of both Houses of Parliament. Honourable members of St. Stephen's, representatives of the world's fear and admiration, prepare to have your bright fame tarnished with the swindles of a Redpath and Robson, and your integrity

and reputation mingling in the mire of Royal British Bank notoriety. Though admitting this, the questions arise, Which branch of the Indian legislation is to be held responsible—the Board of Control, or the Court of Directors? And upon which are the phials, or rather, the *hogsheads*, of *your* wrath to be poured? Upon the former, or the latter? Now, our humble opinion is, that we have not the necessary information to answer satisfactorily either of these questions; and, therefore, that it would have been more politic to have postponed legislation to some future period—until a thorough inquiry might be made into the nature and cause of the grievances complained of. This is all the Company sought; and we feel assured that had it been granted, as in justice it ought, it would have been shown that this much-abused body were neither ruthless nor barbarous, nor encouraged the barbarity of others;—but on the other hand, that they were merciful, lenient, and discreet in their administration, as will be seen from the following extracts :—

“ In dealing with the people of Oude, you will doubtless be moved by special considerations of justice and policy. The inhabitants of the country, not Sepoys, and not taken in arms against us, who must be regarded as exceptional, cannot be regarded as traitors, or even rebels, for they have not even pledged their fidelity to us, and they had scarce become our subjects. Many, by the introduction of a new system of government, had necessarily been deprived of the maintenance which she had heretofore enjoyed. It is natural that such persons should avail themselves of the opportunity offered, by the distracted state of the country, to strike a blow for the restoration of the native rule, under which the disorganization of the country had been so long to them a source of unlawful profit. . . . Neither the talookdars, nor their retainers, were under any obligation to our Government. You will, therefore, not consider that they are to be the objects of punishment after they have laid down their arms. . . . But while you are depriving this influential and once dangerous class of people of openly resisting your authority, you will, we have no doubt, exert yourselves by every possible means to reconcile them to British rule, and encourage them, by liberal arrangements, made in accordance with ancient usages, to become industrious agriculturists, and to employ in the cultivation of the soil the men who, as armed retainers, have so long wasted the substance of their masters, and desolated the land.”*

Now, here we have a humane and philanthropic dispatch, written on behalf of a misguided, semi-barbarous people; but still men, with like feelings and passions to ourselves—a dispatch worthy of being written in letters of gold. And what do

* From a dispatch, dated May 5, 1858.

we hear? We are told that its framers are inhuman; active only in enriching their coffers, even at the expense of grinding into dust, beneath their iron heels, wretches unable to govern themselves. It is our belief, on the other hand, that future revelations will bear us out in the assertion, that great blame is to be scored against the red-taped gentlemen of Cannon Row. Certain facts transpired, in spite of party tricks, during the Ellenborough *v.* Canning controversy, which point forcibly in this direction. In the meantime, however, it is well to bear in mind, that the Board of Control was a superior branch of the Indian legislature, with power to overlook and revise the doings of the Company; whatever blame we may therefore attach to the subordinate branch, must be brought home with double force to the principal. That they neglected their duty, in no way excuses or mitigates their offence, nor increases the responsibility of the Directors. Practically they were merely servants, to whom we had entrusted the administration of the affairs of our Indian empire, under the immediate superintendence of a superior council. Hence, it may be safely inferred, that the principal share of the responsibility rests with the Board of Control. Taking these circumstances into consideration, we cannot avoid saying, that the abolition of the East India Company was not only ungrateful, but unjust.

There is another feature in this complex question, worthy of at least a passing notice, viz., the Indian debt. Upon what or whom is it to be saddled? The change in the firm naturally transfers all liabilities and assets, and leaves the creditors, from the nature of the transaction, without claim against the outgoing members. Of course the creditors will have security; but whether they are to have recourse to the Indian revenue alone, or the Imperial treasury, is not quite so satisfactorily defined as we should wish it to be. Ministers seem to have steadfastly closed their ears against all inquiries relating to the financial bearing of the Bill; which seems to have awakened a kind of hazy consciousness in the House of Commons, that it has committed itself to an undertaking which, at best, will only be partially injurious. But whether we close our ears or not, there is too much reason to fear the matter will be brought home to us one of these days; and it will not be a very agreeable surprise to hear, that the liabilities of a private company have become a part of our National Debt—a fact by no means improbable in case of war, famine, or any other cause, which may prove fatal to the Indian exchequer. This is rather too high a price to pay for folly. We are aware that a clause of the India Bill declares all debts to be chargeable upon the revenues of India, and that the creditors cannot legally force their claims upon the revenues of this country: but to refuse their claims would be even worse than to admit them, or otherwise our

financial credit will be lost. It would be somewhat difficult to get holders of India Bonds, whose dividends had been stopped, to advance money on the security of the Queen of England, while the Queen of India was miserably bankrupt. Indeed, they would not do so without a much higher rate of interest, which, in the end, will lead to about the same thing. We question if the Chancellor of the Exchequer would expose the credit of the country by refusing to pay the debt; for we should lose much more on our first loan, than any saving in the India debt would be likely to amount to, and from which we should not easily recover. No statesman would be so mad as to tamper with our commercial credit, by carrying out so suicidal a policy.

We wish our friends to put on the "spectacles of observation," and ponder these things, and ask themselves, Would it not have been much wiser not to have abolished the East India Company?

EUGENE ARAM.

Social Economy.

IS THE INCREASE OF A NATION'S WEALTH FAVOURABLE TO ITS MORALITY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"The foundation of independence is property; the great motive to exertion, to active virtue, is property; the most potent inspiration, next to religious motive, to a life of harmony with the highest laws is property,—property accumulated by our own hands, by justice, by labour, by upright conduct."—*The Age and its Architects.*

WHETHER the future state of the human race is to be a happy one, to which the present directly tends, or to be arrived at only after startling and unimagined revolutions, or whether it is to be a future of dark and savage ages, are questions that have occurred to most thoughtful minds. For six thousand years has this world been inhabited by men. In that time civilization has had many homes. Though there have been numerous religions and systems of national polity, we have no reliable record of any society having reached that state of perfection in which each part was in the exact position for which it was suited, and in which it was content to remain. When time had peopled the world with nations, and when simple patriarchal life had given

place to courtly, deceitful, and emulous citizenship; while the competitive influences at work induced the invention of numerous designs for rendering life more endurable; and while industrious toil drew riches from earth and sea, proving by such means life was really capable of greater pleasures, it somehow became true that, after a certain point, neither power nor morality increased in proportion to the increase of the national wealth. That this increase of wealth has, in many instances, been a great agent in the corruption of morals is evident. But whilst admitting this, we should guard against thinking that because such is the case, it must necessarily be the same under all circumstances, however changed their nature. Increase of wealth is said by some to produce effeminacy and immorality. A poor people have not the means of obtaining luxuries. Their days are spent in toil, or starvation ensues. Their health is preserved. Their greatest care is to procure a sufficiency of food and clothing. If this is done, they are content. Having neither leisure nor taste for aught save their own confined round of duties, they never doubt the propriety of existing social or political arrangements. They live in unsophisticated simplicity, after the manner of the heroes of Florian and Fenelon, until wealth increases, and then comes a woeful change. A desire for vain display is evidenced by all; and as it is impossible to gratify extravagance by fair means, fraud of every kind prevails. Deceit becomes a characteristic of the people; drunkenness contributes its share to the demoralization of society. Then arises a class who live by catering to the whims of fashion. Idleness, that will not toil for bread, preys on the wealthy. The poor, with large desires and small means of gratifying them, are discontented, and ask why their neighbours should be clothed in purple and fine linen, and fare sumptuously every day, while they are sadly straitened? Foreign enemies, taking the opportunity, attack this unfortunate country, which, divided against itself, and robbed of all strength by luxury, sinks to the fate of magnificent Assyria. Now this is a pretty strong case against wealth in the cause "Morality *v.* Riches," and that this is the story of many empires is true. But there is a difference between society of the present day—and especially English society—and society as it has existed in other days, and this is found in the juster partition of the national wealth. Formerly, the golden streams flowed wholly into the domains of the upper class, and the only effect they had upon the people was such as might be experienced from the sight of the increased splendour of the nobility. Now the position of each class is improved by national prosperity.

It may be said, that if men had not the means to obtain luxuries, they would not become effeminate. Yet immorality is no more a necessary attendant upon plenty than it is upon poverty. Whether a nation increased in wealth or not, it would

lose its simplicity. The results of man's natural desires would be apparent with time, and no one will say that were there no increase of wealth, there would be no extension of crime. Is there anything to show that if a nation is found on the path of emancipation from the hatreds born of opposing interests, the bigotries of class, the bitternesses of religious factions, and the evils of ignorance, additional wealth will decrease the zeal for progress. Admitting that much may be said on the negative side, we think a fair comparison of the disadvantages and the advantages of enlarged national wealth will demonstrate the truth of our arguments, that such a position is not unfavourable to morality. There is much wickedness produced by poverty. How many have not sinned against society until urged by hunger! To what yet remembered parental counsels have thousands done violence, ere the act was committed that made them outcasts! But a little more of this world's wealth would have saved many a victim. Want of gold causes as much immorality as its possession; and although the lack of money would not, without the evil propensities, lead to wickedness, it does become a cause of evil, just as in some instances it produces morality. When men are well fed and clothed, they are little inclined to crime. "Men that are fat, sleek-headed men, that sleep o' nights," do not plot. Let every inhabitant of this country have food to eat, and wherewithal to clothe himself, and crimes will decrease. The shivering, moneyless wretches, begging where they can, and stealing where they dare, would not be so numerous. Those ragged "Joes" who inhabit "Tom Allalone's" would move on to school; and instead of using their talent for the appropriation of other persons' property, would learn the good policy of being honest. Joined to this would come a desire to be well thought of by their neighbours. It would be seen that to obtain this good opinion a consistent practice of morality is necessary. They would also see that a knowledge of various arts is not only profitable, but productive of happiness; and, having the means, and being disconnected with the temptations by which they are at present surrounded, they would attain it. Thus poverty and ignorance, two of the greatest incentives to crime, would be abolished; and contentment, the surest safeguard of natural virtue, would become general.

According to the testimony of magistrates and judges, drunkenness is fruitful of crime. We do not think that this vice would be more prevalent were riches increased. It should be remembered that a large and regular income is not necessary for the drunkard. You have drunken labourers and drunken beggars. It may with no little reason be argued, that if men had plenty of money, they would not be put to the shift of committing crime to satisfy their appetites. It is not the drunken lord, but the drunken beggar, who robs and murders. Were

we considering whether or not the increase of wealth was favourable to national religion, the arguments must be different. But it is very true that the most rigid moralist is often dead to religious sentiment. A sense of duty is not the only preservative of virtue. Morality is practised through that selfishness, but for which, in the words of John Foster, our planet might have been accomplishing its circles round the sun for thousands of years past, without a human inhabitant. In short, when poverty and ignorance are removed, there is an increased apprehension of the excellencies and advantages of virtue as contrasted with the evils of immorality.

If a nation delights in war, steel will be used for bloodshed. If the people are peaceful, that steel will be beaten into the innocent weapons of industry. If in this English society there exist the seeds of decay; if this nation is doomed to the same end as some others, riches may be one of the means for accelerating that miserable consummation; but if there is that in the present aspect of society which sanctions the belief that all this turmoil is but as the bubbling of the metal which will come from the crucible seven times refined, then we may be confident that riches are not disadvantageous to the state. We confess that we have high hopes for humanity, and the reasons upon which they are founded forbid us to speak differently. To do so would be to say that the teachings of earth's great ones—the martyrdom of its saints—the wisdom of its Bacons—the sublimities of its Miltons—the discoveries of its Newtons—and, above all, the revelations of its Creator—will have no worthy result; that mankind are so depraved, that God's gifts will never tend but to the destruction of the beings for whose benefit they were lavished; and that the human race is destined, Ixion-like, to be ever turning the wheel of an unhappy fortune. Will any of our readers admit that this is the fate of mankind, or be hopeless of better things? Will they not rather agree with us, that it is the disposition that leads to immorality, and that with the growth of the better taste already visible the human race will—even as the youth who, regardless of temptations to luxurious ease, still bore his banner through Alpine ice, with the word "higher" ever on his lips—pursue a course of moral and intellectual improvement?

Whitby.

R. T. G.

The Reviewer.

HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE FALL OF WOLSEY TO THE
DEATH OF ELIZABETH. By J. ANTHONY FROUDE, M.A.
London: J. W. Parker and Son. Vols. I.—IV. 1858.

SINCE the days of Moses every age has had its historians, most of whom, until recently, seem to have been content to go on compiling from each other's chronicles, taking for granted whatever has been asserted by former writers, and extenuating or exaggerating characters and circumstances for their own entertainment or for the amusement of the critics.

Whether events of the past should be treated in this battle-dore-and-shuttlecock fashion we will not pretend to say, except that it appears to us alike unjust to the past, the present, and the future.

Mr. Froude heartily abjures this silly follow-my-leader system, and steps forward in the face of the accumulated prejudices of 300 years, and holding up Henry VIII. in the character of a wise, chaste, and christian prince, has done for him what his noble contemporaries Macaulay and Carlyle have so ably done for Oliver Cromwell. We rise from the perusal of Mr. Froude's history with the conviction that the astute and philosophical Mackintosh must either have been mistaken, or very partially informed, when he said that "Henry VIII. was the most notable scamp of modern times." Surely, the fact that he was the author, however accidentally, of the Reformation in this country—that he encouraged the translation and circulation of the Bible—that in all his relations with the fickle and treacherous Francis, and his yet closer connection with the able though superstitious and crafty Emperor, Charles V., he sustained the character of an honourable and covenant-keeping monarch—entitles him to a more respectful consideration at our hands, warrants Mr. Froude in demanding that the whole case should be heard over again, and justifies us in eulogizing and calling attention to him as in the main a trustworthy guide on this most important subject. We have been so long accustomed to regard Henry VIII. as an unmitigated villain, that most of us find no difficulty in believing, without the slightest evidence, all the calumny that has been afloat respecting him. But, in the name of fair play, let us give Mr. Froude a patient hearing; for having, through the generous kindness of Sir Francis Palgrave, had access to the State Paper Office and the MSS. of the Rolls House, he has been enabled to unearth an enormous mass of material, throwing light on the

early history of the English Reformation. His plan seems to have been to collate from the statute books and other contemporary MSS. all that is to be learnt of this long and troublous reign. Although this is a far more laborious process, it seems to be a much fairer way of writing history than the plan of jumping at conclusions and imagining consistent results, which has so long been in vogue. We think that when the public have had time to digest Mr. Froude's volumes, they will come to the same conclusion to which we have been led; namely, that he has in the most masterly manner cleared up for us a dark page in English history, which has hitherto been involved in inextricable confusion. He has subpoenaed and cross-examined witnesses whose testimony we have all along been prevented from hearing. We regret we cannot stay to point out the several features in this remarkable case, which the *contemporary* light thrown upon them by Mr. Froude has caused to stand out so differently to what we had expected: in fact, such is his estimation of *modern* history, that in his Oxford Essay he says that there has been none written worthy of the name for the last 200 years, except Carlyle's Cromwell.

We cannot close these few desultory remarks without commending the elegant classical taste displayed by Mr. Froude in the use of language. Apart from their intrinsic worth—as a specimen of pure English—they will well repay a careful perusal, and entitle him to the warmest thanks of every earnest student. His style is attractive and agreeable. He does not bore the reader with many reflections—those he does give are clear, sententious, and weighty. In his own words, “To draw conclusions is the business of the reader. It has been mine to search for the facts among statutes and state papers, misinterpreted through natural prejudice and imperfect knowledge, and among neglected manuscripts fast perishing of decay.”

We trust our readers will take an early opportunity of testing the justice of our remarks by reading for themselves the works of Mr. Froude, and we are convinced they will not then be surprised at our calling their attention to the improved method of writing history which the last few years have witnessed, and to the share which the works of Mr. Froude will have in perpetuating this great change.

S. E.

A GOLDEN AGE.—Though the time may never have been when “rivers of milk and rivers of nectar” flowed through the plains in any other way than the land of Canaan flowed with milk and honey; yet, if ever there were a time when men had not commenced the business of accumulation; if ever there were a time when the earth and its fruits were common, when men were uninstructed in the *science of hoarding*—that time was a golden age.—*The Savage.*

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

184. *Pembroke College, Oxford*.—"Theta's" inquiry must surely have escaped the attention of your readers, or it would have been answered before. He only needs to be apprised, that he will obtain full information respecting all the Oxford Colleges, by purchasing the "Oxford University Calendar," published by J. H. and J. Parker, Strand, and the particulars of any vacant scholarships in Pembroke College, by writing direct to the Rev. Dr. Jeune, Master.—X.

195. *Ossian*.—It is most generally believed now that Ossian was a literary imposture. This seems very probable, from the fact that Macpherson translated Virgil in a similar style. The Highland Society have recovered some Gaelic scraps very much resembling Ossian, but no lengthy work. He, however, "died, and made no sign." The question was much debated last century.—D. V.

196. *Zoist*.—The following note in regard to the etymology of "Zoist," I

extract from No. II. of that journal:—"Zoist is derivable—1. From *zoom*, an animal; and, as cerebral functions are the peculiar characteristics of animal nature, is applicable to the phrenologist. 2. From *soe*, life, and is therefore applicable to the mesmerizer, who studies a principle which is not confined to the brain, but extends to all living parts. We could invent no other word applicable to both phrenology and mesmerism."—JESSE.

The Lakers.—In answer to "A Reader of the *British Controversialist*," who requires an explanation why the term "Lakers" is applied to the poets Coleridge, Southey, and Wordsworth, I would inform him, that an explanation is found in the fact of their residence at the famous lakes of Cumberland and Westmoreland. To no other poet, I believe, is the term applied. By Wordsworth, I have often been patted on the head in childhood, when my family were resident in the vicinage of "Rydal Mount."—JOHN HENRY GORDON, *Edinburgh*.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.—A picnic was held in connection with this Society at Warwick Priory, on July 20th. Upwards of 250 of the members and their friends were present. An excellent quadrille band was in attendance, to the enlivening strains of which most of the company "tripped it on the light fantastic toe" till a late hour in the evening. Warwick Castle was open to visitors, many of whom also availed themselves of the boats on the river Avon. These amusements, combined

with the beautiful weather and satisfactory arrangements of the committee, tended to make the day one of unusual pleasantness.

The complete success of this their first reunion will, no doubt, induce the committee of the society to consider it as the first of an annual series of the like kind.

London.—*Crosby Hall Evening Classes*.—*Elocution*.—The members of this class, unwilling that their meetings should be stopped during the summer vacation, met as usual eve-

Wednesday evening; and although deprived of the valuable assistance of their professor, Mr. L. Smart, yet by a system of mutual improvement they trust they have gained some benefit in this necessary art; as a proof of this, we may refer to the Public Entertainment given by the class to the members of the Institution at large, on Wednesday evening, September 15th, at the conclusion of their holiday session. The programme was well selected, and presented less of the dramatic character than is usual at some elocutionary entertainments. A prologue, written for the occasion, was recited by the author, Mr. J. Millard. We feel that we ought also to refer particularly to the very able manner in which Mr. Millard recited the other two pieces allotted to him, viz., "The Soldier's Return," and Hood's "Bridge of Sighs." The humorous portion of the entertainment was well sustained by Messrs. Barlow and E. Ashmead, the former in Ingoldby's "Look at the Clock," and the latter in Dickens's "Election for Beadle." Messrs. Brown, Bunker, J. Smart, Shepherd, Frankenstein, and Ohlson, also shared in the evening's entertainment.

A Prosperous Society.—We have received a pleasing communication from the President of the Faversham Mutual

Improvement Society, from which we make the following interesting extracts:

"We have at the present time between 300 and 400 members; and I may remark, that one cause why our Society progresses so, is its unsectarian character. We have persons of *all* religious denominations, and only object to the admission of applicants, when it is known that they are immoral. We never have reason to complain of disorderly conduct; and we have the gratification of knowing that our Society is now recognized by the very persons who at first opposed it. Its position has even been made known to the Attorney-General by our charity trustees, and represented as furnishing all that is needed (in the shape of literary wealth) to our working classes.

"Another cause of success is, our never getting into debt. Our treasurer always has a balance in hand, and we are enabled (after engaging good lecturers), to add from 60 to 100 volumes of useful books to our library, *yearly*.

"I mention these few things, because I fear many societies fail by overlooking them. Sectarian societies cannot, in my humble judgment, live to a good old age; nor can they be very useful, or much respected. The larger the field, the more fresh air, and the more abundant crops."

LITERARY NOTICES.

DANA, the American poet, has had his name conferred upon a township in Wisconsin, U.S., as a token of regard.

"*The Dublin Review*," the oracle of Cardinal Wiseman, has been sold to Sir John Acton, Bart.

The centenary of the birth of ROBERT BURNS is the 25th January, 1859. A national festival is spoken of. Eglintoun and Dr. Rogers "to the rescue."

Dr. M. KATZENBERGER, of Bamberg, has produced an excellent work entitled "The Bases of Logic."

DOUBLEDAY, the author of "A New Theory of Population," &c., has been rusticated in Moffat, a Scottish watering place of mark.

BLACKIE is said to be Blackwood's reviewer of GLADSTONE's "*Homer*;" and HANNAY is given as the author of "*Blake*" in "The Quarterly."

We are requested by a correspondent to state that "*The Dial*," unless obscured by metropolitan fogs, will unfold its broad sheets to the sun very early in the next year.

Thomas Carlyle :—

A LITERARY BIOGRAPHY AND A CRITICISM.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of the Art of Reasoning, &c., &c., &c.

"If an author's life is more agitated and more painful than that of others, it may also be made more spirit-stirring and exalted: fortune may render him unhappy; it is only himself that can make him despicable. The history of genius has, in fact, its bright side as well as its dark. And if it is distressing to survey the misery and, what is worse, the debasement, of so many gifted men, it is doubly cheering, on the other hand, to reflect on the few who, amid the temptations and sorrows to which life in all its provinces, and most in theirs, is liable, have travelled through it in calm and virtuous majesty, and are now hallowed in our memories, not less for their conduct than their writings. Such men are the flower of this lower world; to such *alone* can the epithet of great be applied with its true emphasis."* Thus wrote Carlyle in the heyday of his passion for literature, and the eminence it gives, about the year 1823; and now, thirty-five years thereafter, he is himself, though grey with thought, years, and labour, garlanded with a fame which is brightening rapidly out of the mist and mystery of criticism which shrouded it, and is among the most illustrious examples of the present time of a true and faithful servant of the Muses winning the guerdon of deserved renown. In him the generous glow of living enthusiasm is yet undimmed, the charms and the perils of literary exertion have been enjoyed and vanquished without becoming a traitor to the honesty of his own soul for its lures, or bending as a coward in deprecation of its dangers. Among those "that keep awake the finer parts of our souls, that give us better aims than power or pleasure, and withstand the total sovereignty of Mammon in this earth," the name of Thomas Carlyle stands admittedly high. In the eventless similarity of the times, circumstances, and activities of a literary life, he has traced for himself a notable career, on whose results even now a nation is anxiously busy, and with estimates of which the press has of late been teeming. The misfortune of scanty space, or the fault of wordiness, kept us from including in one issue our

* "Schiller's Life," p. 69.

notice of this man of letters; and we require here somewhat tardily in appearance to resume the thread of our "literary biography and criticism" of the author of some of the choicest and most original productions which have been spun on the distaff of thought, and woven into texture by research, industry, and genius on the loom of Clio.

"It is with other feelings than those of poor, peddling diletantism, other aims than the writing of successful or unsuccessful publications, that an earnest man occupies himself in those dreary provinces of the dead and buried"*—the ages of the past and the historical researches needful to flash light upon their secrets. Human heroisms, valours, labours, self-denials, and loyal dutifulnesses, are to be recorded with pen of sunlight picturesqueness; shams are to be transformed into shames; forthright purpose and act are to displace seemings and falsities; the highest, and deepest, and holiest elements of true well-being are to be made potent and supreme; and society is to be convinced that "man's little life has *duties* that are great, that are alone great, and go up to heaven, and down to hell." This is the gospel of the modern apostle of earnestness, old gospel newly and forcefully preached—"whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, *do it with all thy might.*" This same faith has had its prophets and martyrs more than once in the world, and its preachers too, though they have been often effectless. "But there is *one* preacher who does preach with effect, and gradually persuade all persons; his name is Destiny—is Divine Providence,—and his sermon the inflexible course of things."† There is no voice and no language in which the speech of this same stern-faced preacher is not heard; but to the multitude the dialect requires interpreting. Interpretation is, therefore, clearly the historian's prime duty and sacredest use. It follows, as a most natural corollary thence, that "histories are *as* perfect as the historian is wise, and is gifted with an eye and a soul. For the leafy blossoming, present time, springs from the whole past, rememberable and unrememberable."‡ Yea, "under the green foliage and blossoming fruit-trees of to-day there lie, rotting slower or faster, the forests of all other years and days."§ To know the past rightly is an all-important matter for the present time; for the historian, like Shelley's "Queen Mab," in very apology for his being, must assert,—

"I find

The future in the causes which raise
In each event."

In this view of the matter, as we have already stated, "the business of history is not merely to record, but to interpret; it

* "Cromwell's Letters and Speeches," p. 3. † "Past and Present," p. 393.

‡ "Cromwell's Letters," &c., p. 12. § *Ibid.*

involves not only a clear conception and a lively exposition of events and characters, but a sound, enlightened theory of individual and national morality, a general philosophy of human life whereby to judge of them and measure their effects."*

With an ideal of history so exquisite as that which in his articles in "Fraser's Magazine," and elsewhere he expounds, and so exemplified as in the "French Revolution, a History," it is scarcely to be wondered at that this self-named "writer of books" should attain the repute, not of an artizan, but of an artist, and that he should have begun to exercise a large and palpable influence on the younger thinkers of the age. This Thomas Carlyle did.

In the five years preceding 1840 (the period at which we left off our notice in our previous paper) he had, through his former pupil, Charles Buller, we presume, been made known to certain [then] young men forming a somewhat extraordinary combination of friends, among whom were, we believe, John Sterling, John Stuart Mill, Frederick Denison Maurice, Archdeacon Hare and his brother, Richard Chevenix Trench, Alfred Tennyson, Richard Monckton Milnes, G. L. Craik, &c., &c., many of them semi-disciples of Coleridge; and through them orally and by his writings and lecturings, he began to influence the literature of the time, and to impart to it a certain dim, indefinable, though recognizable quality, known in our days as Carlylism, though Carlylesianism would express, we think, better, what was not so much discipleship as intellectual sympathy and tentative literary *adhesion*.

We forgot to mention that in 1839 Sterling had contributed to the "London and Westminster Review," then under the editorial care of John S. Mill, the ablest logician and political economist of our time, a paper on "Carlyle," which the historian regards as the "first generous human recognition" of his "poor battle in this world," and for which he expresses himself as "very grateful." This paper we have been unable, in our present seclusion, far from books, to see. This supplied omission will serve, as well as any other thing, perhaps, to enable us to get into the biographic route again; for it enables us to remark, that if Carlyle exerted a considerable influence on the young minds of the age, he was repaid in kind, by having his thoughts excited also, and being brought to consider "the condition of England question" with greater earnestness and to better purpose than he might otherwise have done. To the living energy of these men of manifold thought and intense political speculative activity we attribute the turn which the mind of Carlyle at this time took in forsaking the study of the "French Revolution," to look at the changes requisite at home—the quiet revolutions of political and social science—to

* "Schiller's Life," p. 157.

make men better and happier. Hence he wrote "Chartism," 1839, a work whose utterances, though regarded as rhapsodies then, are now regarded as true and sound; indeed, the two true helps for England then, and therein forcibly pointed out, are now the acknowledged requirements of our age, viz., universal education, and well-ordered emigration; and it might be well for us if even now the words "move and not rot" were addressed by some "fit official person"—in a manner so emphatic as to be attended to—both to the conductors of schools and ships. To the same influence we attribute the issue of "Past and Present," 1843, a work whose motto, "Life is earnest," men have not yet learned to appreciate, though Longfellow has incorporated it into his "Psalm of Life," and it is spouted, on an average, from pulpit, press, hustings, and senate hall, on a small average, once every day in the year. The contrast drawn between the Britain of the Middle Ages and to-day is able and graphic. But we relish more the profound sayings which glance like stars on a clear, frost-graven sky from each of its pages, the general spirit of which may be summed up and shown by quoting this one—"The wealth of a man is the number of things which he loves and blesses, which he is loved and blessed by."

While he and Edward Irving strove to instil into Kirkcaldy youthhood the elements of knowledge, Carlyle had ample opportunity of seeing that the great need of man was genuine and not apparent education; in the wide waste of briefless barristers, chargeless clergy, taskless scholars, which London holds, he had seen enough to prove that in the "passionate want of simply one thing—work" there lay the elements of much evil, and that emigration was highly requisite. Therefore, says he, and truly too, "a *right* education bill, is not this, of itself, the parent of innumerable wise bills!" Therefore does he ask, and that imperatively and earnestly, "a free bridge for emigrants," an effective system of emigration, supplied with funds, forces, and idle navy ships to work it.

In the lectures on "Heroes and Hero-Worship," which he delivered in London in 1840, and published in 1842, Carlyle had been led to adduce Cromwell as a veritable king (knowing and able man) among men in illustration of his doctrine of kingship. His view of "Cromwell and his Times" meeting with some sharp criticism, and it being withal an interesting, speculative, and historic inquiry, Carlyle was led to re-investigate it in a thorough and unmistakeably workmanlike manner in such books and documents as he could come at, in those days of red-tape sequestration of State papers. Though in 1840 he had studied "with the honestest wish to admire, to love, and worship them [such characters as Hampden, Eliot, Pym, &c.] like heroes," yet he found the field, as it then showed itself, "heavy as lead, barren as brick-clay." Farther study, more extended reading, a per-

ception quickened by the criticisms, too, we presume, of those same genial, young, fervent souls who formed the *Sterling Club*, and by the wish to seek out the veracities of history, caused him to modify and even materially to change his tone regarding these men and his position before them. So that his "heart remains cold before them" no longer; but in admiration of their "valiant, patient energy," their "slow, steadfast, English manner," he recognizes them as men "who would be worth their weight in diamonds even now." In 1845, therefore, he laid the results of these researches and re-investigations before the public in a very important work, from which we have already quoted, entitled, "Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches, with Elucidations." This is a plain, honest title, not pretending to even so much as is really to be found in the book. It is, indeed, no artistic unity, fused, distilled, or elaborated into oneness; no prose-epic, like the "French Revolution," no graphic picture, Salvator Rosa-like, with gloom and glory rudely mingled, like that fierce, flashing, burning outburst of history, in which fact is lighted up into visuality by "the shaping spirit of imagination;" it is a series of artist's sketches, materials, illuminations, parts, and aspects—let us use his own word, "elucidations"—of a history, rather than a history. His whole soul, in a most uncompromising, fearless, and enthusiastic manner, all life, fire, energy, vivid expressiveness, and forcible intensity, Thomas Carlyle throws into his subject. "Few nobler heroisms," he says, "at bottom, perhaps, no nobler heroism, ever transacted itself on this earth" than "English Puritanism, the last of all our heroisms." He is discontented with the "deadly indescribable *Cromwelliad*" of ordinary written history, so betouched with the mace of death, as to be "a chaotic torpor," a "grand unintelligibility," and with most vehement trouncings he belabours Dry-as-dust, the constructor. metaphorically speaking, of the "dull, dismal labyrinth," miscalled history, which leads men too often "into the domain of the Nightmares." He laments that "not the body of heroic Puritanism only, which was bound to die, but the soul of it also, which was, and should have been, and yet shall be, immortal, has for the present passed away," but comforts himself and his readers meanwhile with the thought that "this, too, was a heroism; and the soul of it remains part of the eternal soul of things. Here, of our own land and lineage, in practical English shape, were heroes on the earth once more, who knew in every fibre, and with heroic daring laid to heart, that an Almighty Justice does verily rule this world, and that it is good to fight on God's side, and bad to fight on the devil's side—the essence of all heroisms and veracities that have been or that will be." The work itself, as its title implies, is an edition of the Protector's letters and speeches. Of some twelve hundred pages, these occupy about a third, and Carlyle's eluci-

dations—biographical, historical, and explanatory—make up the rest. There is an introduction of five chapters, followed by the work itself, divided into ten portions, extending, in point of time, from 1636 to 1658, *i. e.*, twenty-two years. It is an able, great-thoughted, marginal note sort of a book, which makes one hope that he may realize some day a *desideratum* mentioned by himself, a "History of English Puritanism," or, at the very least, leave behind him "Oliver Cromwell, a Historical Biography," by Thomas Carlyle. By so doing, he will more truly than with this fulfil his "destiny to write about Cromwell," to which Sterling, in one of his letters, playfully alludes. Of *this* book, we have been told, he corrected the proof-sheets with tears, to the memory of John Sterling, in his eyes.

A "man of letters" cannot long remain idle, especially if he be, professionally as well as professedly, "a writer of books." Forecasting in his mind the need for labour, shall we say that Carlyle recollected the grand epic hero of whom Schiller had intended to make so much? or shall we rather say that we have the key-note of association given us by himself in these words: "This also is one of the peculiarities of Friedrich, that he is hitherto the last of the kings; that he ushers in the French Revolution; and closes an epoch of world-history"? However we account for it, we believe that, in casting about for some heroic soul among men, on a consideration of whose life and times he might usefully exert himself, at this time he chanced (or otherwise was led to determine) upon Frederick the Great. How difficult a matter he found it to get "the essence of it fairly evolved from all the chaff, the portrait of it actually given, and its real harmonies with the laws of this universe brought out, in bright and dark, according to the God's fact as it was," the reader will find an account (*mirabile dictu!*) in paragraphs three and four of the *proem* to the "History of Friedrich II. of Prussia." These great difficulties, though not, as we now indubitably know, insurmountable, were often so perverse and unmanageable, that rumour, whose thousand tongues were now busy with his doings, gave out confidently that the grand design was abandoned. The world was unwilling to give credence to the tale, and it wisely determined to hold such gifts as Carlyle could or would bring to it on *that* subject as a matter to be valued.

The work was gone on with for awhile; in the midst of preparation a demand was made for a manifoldly improved edition of Cromwell's letters, &c.; and social questions of intense import arising, Carlyle thought himself called upon to write, as his contribution to their solution, the "Latter-Day Pamphlets," light, skirmishing things, effervescences from the rage for serial publication, and undertaken, it appears to us, *more* from the persuasion of the publisher than the conviction of the writer. Carlyle does not shine in controversial literature; he wants the

light, sententious, pragmatic utterance of the serialist, and he is withal too dramatic and stage-gentlemanly to be successful in the production of the foam-froth of literary serials. It was, we think candidly, and say so respectfully, an unwise step; but, as yet, there is a potency in the pulse-feeling of a publisher which an author cannot well get over. We certainly do admire his "Stump Orator," and his "Jesuitism;" but we, nevertheless, think *this* competition of Carlyle with Dickens and Thackeray was not only unwise, but uncalled for, except for publishers' policy, of which we know enough to satisfy us that it is not always the *best* for minds of the Carlyle stamp.

The year 1851 is memorable for that beautiful—we had almost said, holy—"Life of John Sterling," which brought the heart out of Carlyle into the world's eye and sight. We do not find it needful to pitch in contest Hare and Carlyle: we accept gladly both biographies; we see, in this man, a loving and a loved soul, elevated by these two reciprocal activities into a prominence, good for the world to look at, but sadly evil for the young immortal whose loveable and loving disposition brought upon him a world of criticism, to bear which his *doings* were incapable. Honestest zeal for the memory of their friend we grant; the policy of the double life-story we doubt. In all sincerity we believe Sterling to have been in himself a man of more intrinsic worth than *both* biographers have been able to discern; but this is *not* our present topic.

To return: the "Latter-Day Pamphlets" being abandoned, and Sterling's "Life" being issued, new trials awaited Carlyle. His mother's health, which had become somewhat productive of anxiety, still continued to fail and wither. Critics used more frequent liberties with his name and fame; and the subject of his industrious investigations seemed somewhat unfitted for a hero. A new issue of his works, too, seemed to be called for; and their revisal and reconsideration required time, care, thought, and drudging painstaking. Rumour became again busy with tales of abandonment, and ran the round of gossipry in literary circles and elsewhere. About the year 1853 we first met John Stuart Mill, and he, in a conversation in the India House, first excited our curiosity regarding Carlyle. In the same year, we think, we had the pleasure of an interview with G. H. Lewes, during which, among other topics, Carlyle and his writings formed one. We visited Cheyne-row, Chelsea, but did not then, for some unrememberable reason, see Carlyle. Since that, though much desired, we have not been able to become personally familiar with this retired and studious "man of letters." Accident has brought us into contact with his brother, Dr. Carlyle, the translator of *Dante*; and reverence for private sorrow restrained us from gazing on the sage of Chelsea at his mother's grave. This summer, two days only intervened between our

landing within the precincts of his summer residence and his departure to Germany. There, so far as we know, he still abides, gathering material for the concluding volumes of his recent work, "History of Friedrich II, of Prussia, called Frederick the Great," the two first volumes of which have been the success of the present publishing season, and with a brief notice of which we must now conclude our rapid sketch of the, in our opinion, with our present lights, "worthy and manful" battle which, both by "might and right," he has maintained.

"History is not *linear*, but *solid*;" stereoscopic, not plane. In this there lies an indisputable difficulty for the historian. He has no *palimpsest* on which to touch in the several incidences and coincidences, accidents, sequents, and consequents, which make up an event, and are the essential, residuary, and concomitant causes of historical phenomena. To give life and vivid reality to events, as well as to employ a luminous logic regarding their causes and results; to give the fittest form to narrative, the most authentic exposition of facts, and the clearest "heart-insight" into the doings of the ages; to pencil, with graphic pictorialness, vigorous palpability, and on-rushing continuity, the panorama of events, are the chief characteristics of a popular historian. He must have studied into the very inner soul of the times and circumstances of which he writes; he must have pierced into the secret purposes and heart-desires of the various actors, and have looked below the shows, diplomacies, treaties, protocols, parades, pageantries, and outward seemings of the scenes he depicts, and hold his eye, earnestly and fixed, upon the very centre pivot of the course of each series of events. The historian must bring forth from the caves of "Time, the subtle thief," the treasured secrets he had hid; and, with the strictest measure of true judgment, appraise them. The "Open sesame" of earnestness, to which alone these caves do "ope their ponderous jaws" he must use skilfully; and, with a true and dauntless honesty, recite the inventory of the things he finds. Industry, tact, concise narrative, pure, and unbiased interpretation, clear statement, correct knowledge, must all be his; but, more than all, a true philosophy of life must form the ground and basis of all that the historian utters, for then alone—

" Truth shows her glorious face,
While, on that *isthmus* which commands
The councils of both worlds, she stands."

Without attempting to define the *peculiar* elements of the life-philosophy of Carlyle, or endeavouring to gauge it by any given orthodox metronome, we may assert our personal conviction that there is in him a deep-seated, earnest, ever-active *religiousness*—a faith in God and goodness, in the intense beneficiality of holiness, in the absolute requisiteness of true piety, *i. e.*, purity of heart and life—which is rarely found in popular historians. Such

perfidious sparks as this are not unfrequently struck off in the revolutions of his thoughts :—"It is mournful to see so many noble, tender, and high-aspiring minds deserted of that religious light which once lighted all such, . . . pitching tents among the ashes, and kindling weak, earthly lamps, which we are to take for stars. This darkness is but transitory obscurity ; these ashes are the soil of future herbage and richer harvests. Religion is not dead ; it will never die. Its dwelling and birthplace is in the soul of man, and it is eternal as the being of man."* Carlyle is by no means, if we read rightly, one of the world's "little-faiths ;" nay, we should rather say that there is in him a very true and sturdy Calvinism, which his early Scotch training may be credited with ; and there can be little mistake about the excessive Protestantism of his latest book. That he looks for a higher and more heaven-invigorated manifestation of Christianity than is locked up in the cold, logical (and too little acted on) creeds of our modern churches is, we should presume, very likely ; but, if so, he is only waiting with an expectancy which fills the hearts of many believers, who accept present forms, while anxiously ardent for greater spiritualization and purer practice.

Of other points in Carlyle's philosophy we cannot, however anxious, in view of our waning space, enlarge. He has studied the tenets of the German idealists, and these have lent "confirmation strong" to the thoughts which he found burning in his own bosom. The mere objective, sensational, "gospel according to Jeremy Bentham" view of human nature and its qualities he cannot abide. He is intense and earnest in his advocacy of the need of personal honesty, of the culture of the deep-lying, spiritual elements of human nature, of pure-hearted devotion, of lofty, social principle, and of a legislation founded upon the opinion that man, as a rational, moral, and religious being, is *really* made "in the image of God," and intended to bear that image stamped upon, yea, into his soul. Not *self* but *God* is the true object of supremest regard for man in his present life and state. *Be*, and do not *seem* ; *act*, and do not merely *enact* ; work without quirk ; and worship without guile or pretence in the very light of life's duties, and it shall be well with thee in all states and modes of energy or being,—seems to be the essence of the life-rule of Carlyle.

This, however, is a divergence, and we must recall our vagrant speculations to the more definite labour of noticing the biography of Voltaire's *quondam* patron, "Frederick the Great." The work is, in all points, remarkable, and praiseworthy in almost everything, except in a too great, though not altogether undeserved, depreciation of all preceding writers, and an over-weening forthputting of his own personality. He evidently takes a workman's pride in his task, and perhaps over-estimates

* "Miscellanies," i., p. 84.

its worth, because of the intense and protracted labour he has undergone in its execution. Professing merely to be a biography of Frederick, it is—or, at least, will be—in reality, a history of Prussia, and such a history as shall form the grand storehouse of all future compilers. From the far, mythic times, down to the very days of the British Anne and the Georges, he traces the course and progress of the Prussian monarchy. Fine individual portraits, keen-sighted criticism, exquisite, on-dashing picturings, and able epitomizings, are grouped and interspersed—yea, all fitly framed together into a rare homogeneous mass, showing singular architectonic skill, a wisdom and art unique and priceless.

Space prevents our offering an abstract—even of the most skeletonic meagreness—of the facts in history of which his recent volumes give account; some future more eligible opportunity may yet present itself to us, for we must now hasten to a conclusion.

A short time ago, a commission for the collection of a National Portrait Gallery was nominated by Government. On this commission Thomas Carlyle most fittingly found a place. That implies, we believe, a salary of £200 per annum—a much better form of encouraging or patronizing letters than any mode of pensioning on which our Government has yet fallen.

About three years ago his mother died, and his grief was such as genius only feels, and the fervent affection of such a soul alone can adequately express.

Carlyle, we believe, is childless. His mind is now the Banquo of his body, “father to a line of kings.”

A few months ago, he walked along the banks of his native Annan, and, in the solitude of his boyhood’s rambles, sought to escape from the effects of his labours. On the banks of the Nith, too, he wandered, and stood by the grave of Burns. If we mistake not, Thomas Aird—the truest and most genuine poet in Scotland—and he held kindred colloquy; and in the hallowing light of sisterly affection he half forgot the glory of his efforts. But labour has again called him to the land of Frederick; and we believe that, ere long, we shall receive from his hands the completion of that work which gives to Britons the first readable history of that country which has become the home of England’s Princess Royal. We wait longingly.

P.S.—We find that Thomas Carlyle was born in Ecclefechan; that he removed to London in the summer of 1834; and that he is to be carefully differentiated from Thomas Carlyle, Esq., of the Scottish Bar, author of a work entitled, “The Moral Phenomena of Germany,” a book sufficiently well worth reading, but wanting in the fine *aroma* of genius which distils from his elder namesake. A friend has just informed us that Carlyle has returned from Germany; that a second edition of *Frederick* is called for; and that next spring may place his other volumes among her choice blossoms from the tree of his life.

Philosophy.

WHICH IS THE ABLER WRITER—DICKENS OR THACKERAY?

REPLY.—DICKENS.

As the opener of this debate upon the part of Dickens, it now becomes our duty to review what has been advanced by the admirers of Thackeray, whether in disparagement of the former, or in praise of the latter. Fairly and candidly we shall endeavour to perform our task, conscious that controversy, to lead to a profitable issue, must be commenced in earnest, conducted amicably, and concluded fairly. Discussion is prone to degenerate into mere disputation when pride, or pique, cliqueism, or censoriousness, are allowed to usurp the offices of truth and justice. Controversial opponency ought never to be brought to a level with personal hostility, nor partisanship be allowed to triumph over principle. If a mutual toleration exists between opponents in these literary wars, and a desire for information, with a love for the truth, impel them to the fray, there will be little fear of their advocacy being inflamed by invective, or soiled by imputation. With me, as with Bishop Watson, "a philosopher, in search of truth, forfeits all claim to candour and impartiality, when he introduces railing for reasoning, vulgar and illiberal sarcasm in the room of argument." But to the task before us. Taking the articles of our "friends on the other side," in the order that they appear, the one by "Justitia et Veritas" claims our attention first. He says, "Our ideal of an able writer is *he* who produces works, the study of which is calculated to rouse the better feelings of our nature, and generate new ideas of good as heirlooms to posterity." This definition is so consonant with our own ideas, that we do not hesitate to adopt it as the criterion of ability, and shall forthwith inquire whether Dickens or Thackeray presents the nearest approximation to this ideal standard of perfection. That writer's works, surely, are not calculated to "rouse the better feelings of our nature" who constantly pictures humanity in its worst aspects, with whom all men are "snobbish," and virtue an imaginary principle; who, with painful iteration, dwells upon man's worthlessness and deceit, upon woman's fickleness and guile; who provokes suspicion or contempt in man for his fellow-man, by so repeatedly displaying him as a creature that violates every trust, and leaves every promise unredeemed, and with whom the majority of mankind are either selfish or simple, weak or wicked? To all these objections, Thackeray, in our opinion, is amenable. "One of the hardest things said of Douglas Jerrold

was, that he was most effective when finding fault." The same holds good of Thackeray. Of human faults, follies, and foibles, he is an able limner; but of human excellencies or virtues he evidently knows little, and says still less. For man's trials, cares, or sorrows, he has neither sympathy, solace, nor balm. Even his jokes possess a malignancy that would not discredit Mephistopheles himself; whilst the constant tenor of his works would lead us to conclude that he, like St. Patrick's Dean, might say, "the chief aim I propose, in all my labours, is to vex the world rather than divert it,"—and, we may add, instruct it. Dickens, free from the "bilious peculiarities" of Thackeray, stands prominently forth as the great teacher of humanity. In him the "disinherited and resourceless," the "down-trodden and afflicted," find a true friend, a warm advocate. The vindicator of whatever is right, he is the uncompromising foe of whatever is opposed thereto. Crime and oppression come equally under his ban; nor are their perpetrators allowed to pass uncensured, uncondemned. More skilful and versatile as a writer than his gifted contemporary, as a teacher he is purer and better. The suit that he wears is not all motley, as some would lead us to believe; wise counsels and sage remarks teem in his pages, while his sentiments are invariably ennobling. Instead of depicting human nature as bad, and prone to degradation, we find him drawing the sweet sketch of little Nelly, riding in the showman's cart, surrounded by wretchedness, and companioned by "vice, feeling no shame," and "taking no tint but from heaven." Of the peoples' trials and vicissitudes, hopes, joys, and sorrows, he is the great prose poet; and it has been pronounced "no hyperbole to call him the Shakspeare of familiar life." Linked with his brilliant intellect, he has the most genial of hearts. The fountains of laughter and tears are equally at his command: and if he does not, like Bulwer, "deal largely in rapture and despair," he can nevertheless sway the minds of his readers as he lists; "now exciting them to irrepressible laughter, now moving them to tears that cannot be controlled; now making their hearts burn with the foul filthiness of a mean wrong; anon making them glow with pity at the tender tale of suffering,—guiding them through the wondrous maze of feelings with an ease and power which can only be exercised by one possessing the clue thereto." In proof that the possessor of this wondrous power has used it with beneficial influence, testimonies innumerable might instantly be cited. An authority, whose opinion upon another point we have previously quoted, speaking of the attendance at one of his readings, remarks:—"We were glad to observe many clergymen amongst the audience. It is almost impossible to overrate the influence that a popular writer possesses for good or evil. Mr. Dickens has ever used his powers for good purposes, and he deserves to be recognized for what in

truth he is—one of the *great moral teachers of the day*," &c. Whilst another observes:—"It will not, perhaps, be saying too much of Dickens that he, of all his contemporaries, has *done the most good, and afforded the most pleasure*." Therefore, taking "J. et V.'s" own definition of an able writer, we conclude, if cheerfulness breeds contentment, contentment happiness, and happiness be favourable to virtue,—if pictures of innocence and purity, existing in spite of adverse circumstances, have a tendency to inspire the degraded with emulation, and the philanthropist with renewed hopes, we say, if all this be true,—Dickens, not Thackeray, is the abler writer.

True, a charge of want of reverence for religion has been brought against him. J. et V. insinuates it, "Aleph" and Y. E. openly pronounce it; but the charge is as false as it is groundless. Certainly, in several of his works, he has typified in no enviable guise characters found more or less in all religious circles,—persons that are more amenable to criticism than the church or chapel-going community would seem willing to acknowledge;—individuals who account every error a crime, and dissent from themselves a sin. It is these parties, hypocritically engaged "in a trading copartnery to do the devil's business, without mentioning his name in the firm"—as rollicking Michael Lambourne, in Scott's "Kenilworth"—has it, that Dickens, whenever it has come within the scope of his story, or the purposes of his plot, has invariably unmasked, and deservedly exposed.

Doubtless there have been scores who, in these characters, so ably etched, have intuitively recognized a portraiture of themselves, and winced at its fidelity; and lest the world should perceive the truthfulness of its execution, or the excellency of its object, they have raised the cry, fallacious as delusive, that religion has been attacked, when, in truth, it was their own exposure that was sought. If Dickens has erred on the side of excess in this matter, his error's justification may be found in the causes that produced it. What is more detestable than cant? What more disgusting than hypocrisy? And which of all their phases is more repulsive than the counterfeit of religion, assuming a sanctity not felt; preaching piety, yet practising iniquity; with God's name for ever on their lips, and Belial as constantly in their hearts?

Dickens, in all probability, esteems—

"The temple as a good, a holy place;
But quackery only gives it an ill savour;
While saintly mountebanks the porch disgrace,
And bring religion's self into disfavour."

Hence his hostility to hypocrisy and cant, to bigotry and intolerance, to ostentatious charity, or spurious benevolence,—whatever form they take. Real religion, or the truly pious, need not fear these salutary and well-meant attacks.—

"Virtue is bold, and goodness never fearful:"

and he who exposes the hollowness and falsehood of the Pecksniffs, the Howlers, and Chadbands, renders truth the highest tribute, and religion the purest homage.

We have dwelt upon this point longer than we should have done, had it not been one at which "our friends on the other side," without an exception, have levelled the heaviest of their guns, and discharged their choicest shots. Baffled at all other points, here they thought was one *pregnable* to attack, and they plied their missiles bravely. Doubtless they calculated, with a judgment as true as it was vengeful, that if these charges were not refuted, they would damage the reputation of Dickens still further in the estimation of the "unco gude and rigidly righteous." Otherwise we might have contented ourselves with retorting—if Dickens has offended in this respect, Thackeray is no less blameable. He, in his "Newcomes," has satirized both Quakers and Methodists. Some members of the Newcome family were religious people, and these it has been the study of Mr. Thackeray to delineate in a rather ridiculous light, in which congenial task he has found an able coadjutor in Mr. Doyle, of whose picture of the dissenting ministers dining at Mr. Thomas Newcome's, it has been said—"Nothing can be more absurd or untruthful."

Let us now see what "our friends" have advanced in favour of Thackeray. One asserts that "his (Thackeray's) charity shines out like the sun at noon," which is so ludicrously beside the mark, that even Thackeray, mindful of the adage—"Praise undeserved is satire in disguise,"—must blush at the unpremeditated, unintentional irony of his eulogist; inasmuch as we have generally found him either cynical and contemptuous, or cold and indifferent. At rare intervals, a refreshing bit of kindness appears, but it lacks the spontaneity of Dickens,—the naturalness to make it effective. It is too studied to be other than artificial, too formal to be genuine. Another says, "All women should have his books on their tables. He is one of the few authors who do give to the gentler sex their true value." But can he draw, or has he drawn, the character of a true woman? We opine not. To our mind, his female characters, with barely an exception, lack the charm of womanhood,—nobleness, without pride,—gentleness, without weakness. True, his "Becky is a paragon,—but of intrigue, selfishness, and deceit. His good women are too soft, as in Pendarvis, and his clever ones too unprincipled." Of his abilities as a story teller, his friends have been judiciously silent. "We do not expect a story from Thackeray," is the stereotype phrase of the reviewers, and it meets with national concurrence. Of his latest work, the "Virginians," a critic recently remarked, "It lacks interest; and despite the characters being ably drawn, I cannot rouse within myself any care for anybody in the book." "Aleph"—whose

article is seasoned with a few assertions which are not true, and a great many inferences which are not logical—more expert than exact, quickly glides from extravagant eulogy to causeless censure; from lauding Thackeray, he veers round and libels Dickens, in whose works he unadvisedly says, "There is nothing *half equal* to many passages which could be pointed out in 'Vanity Fair,' 'Esmond,' and 'The Newcomes,'" that "Dickens has so many faults, that *everything* he writes is greatly marred by them;" that all his characters "are false;" that he has propagated "far-fetched untruths," penned "revolting ribaldry," and perpetrated "sneers at the words of Christ." Holding, with John Sterling, that "a man, whom it is not worth while confuting courteously, is not worth while confuting at all," we shall content ourselves by simply making "Aleph" confute himself, by just observing that he has betrayed an inconsistency that does not reflect much credit on his logical acumen, or say much for the clearness of his ideas, in penning this reckless rhodomontade of imputation and invective against Dickens, after telling us, in his opening remarks, that he had "every respect" for him, and accounted that country "blest" that included him in its "brother of the pen." Too partial to be just, and too fond of Thackeray to be fair to Dickens, "Aleph," in his zeal for his literary idol, evidently forgot not only what was due to that idol's rival as an author, a citizen, and a man, but to his own fame as a controversialist. And so here, and thus, we leave him.

To Y. E. I certainly must devote some little attention. His rare candour compels this. In whatever category I may class J. et V. or "Aleph," whether as opponents or fellow searchers after truth, J. Y. is one about whose intent there is no disguise, and whose object—the complete refutation and discomfiture of ourselves—is as openly avowed as it is infelicitously expressed. The charge of satire against his idol, Y. E. rebuts the assertion that it is an "old one," as untrue as it is obsolete. In reply to this, we may remark, that nothing can be more *apropos* than one of the latest notices of his latest work. Reviewing the current number of the "Virginians," the *Dispatch*, September 5th, 1858, says, it "overflows with the author's bilious peculiarities, with those satire touches of humour which form his pungent *specialité*, and with those sharp, and at times merciless hits, that under a disguise of argumentative playfulness, make him so terribly effective." Surely, after this, Y. E. must confess that the charge is not so groundless or obsolete as he would lead us to believe. Again, Y. E., by adoption, says, Dickens can "describe a town pump, but not the falls of Niagara." This is a kind of criticism that may be made to cut either way. For instance, it may as justly be said of Thackeray that he can "cut a Colossus out of a rock," but certainly not "carve heads upon cherry stones." All his strokes

are heavy ones ; there is nothing *petite*, delicate or minute, in his manipulations ; the rare gift of “dropping” pearls as he proceeds, or beautifying by a touch, he does not possess,—all is huge and heavy, and grimly grand.

Again, Y. E. disparagingly remarks, “it is in low life, and its surroundings, that the forte of Mr. Dickens lies ;” and that “he has a far better understanding of crossing street sweepers, bailiffs, flunkeys, Punch-and-Judy men, &c., than of persons of a higher social status.” But what of this ? Is a novelist’s pre-eminence dependent upon his knowledge of aristocratic assemblages or usages ? Ere he can secure the stamp of approval, must he display his proficiency in picturing dowagers and duchesses, lords and ladies, with all the effeminacy of fashionable life ? Is distinction only due to those who write novels descriptive of patrician pastimes, to the exclusion of plebeian sorrows ? We think not. As wisdom is not necessarily associated with wealth, nor goodness with grandeur, so neither is poverty of intellect, or limited comprehension, necessarily to be inferred of that author whose task—the self-allotted one of Dickens—it is to describe “low life and its surroundings” for the purpose of making the lower classes interested in and instructed by the fortunes of their compeers. Mr. Dickens, to quote the words of Lord Brougham, in his recent address upon popular literature, has written of “the struggles of heroism, the endurance of privations, the resignation under sorrow of the working classes,” with a higher aim and a loftier purpose than to amuse them. He has sought to make the more fortunate—the affluent and influential—members of society actively interested in the hopes and destinies of their poorer brethren. He has brought to the task a feeling heart, a searching eye, and able hand, and drawn for their study the dual principles displayed in the erratic lives of the uncultured and untrained, and shown how these Pariahs of society, under different treatment, might have been as useful as they are now inimical. He has pictured precocious ingenuity leagued with ignorance, and vicious habits accompanied by chivalrous yearnings ; and asked, why the ingenuity of the one, and the chivalry of the other, were not trained to industry and virtue ? And who shall say he has not done it well ? or that he is censurable for the doing of it ? Honour, say we, to the man who has asked for, striven for, written for, and demanded, education for the young, help for the lowly, and justice for all ! But we claim for Dickens the acknowledgment of being able to conceive characters and scenes bright and lofty as any that befalls a novelist’s pen to portray. It is not alone in courts and alleys that he is true in his descriptions ; the gilded saloons of the opulent are vividly realized in his pages,—all scenes and persons come alike to him, whether belonging to St. Giles or St. James, to Belgravia or

Cockneydom. The "National Magazine" remarks, — "No fictionist pure has had a range so extended as Dickens. Though individual in its character, yet, from its comprehension, he claims affinity with Cervantes and Fielding, with De Foe and Leigh Hunt." Pertinent remarks, anent this subject, have been made by S. E., and by "Anglo Saxon,"* to which we beg to refer those who choose to pursue the subject further. Y. E. prefers Thackeray, because he not only "faithfully conceives and portrays the present," but can also "sympathetically realize the past." Mr. Thackeray's ability to "conceive and portray the present" we will not stay to question or dispute, but of his realizations of the past, we may remark, that while he depicts the past, and throws around it the halo of his genius, and imposes its traditional glory upon us, as if in mockery of the events of to-day, Dickens deals with the present; he communes not with the dead, but associates with the living. He goes not to the grave for his characters, nor to a bygone age for his incidents. Founding his stories upon the occurrences of to-day, not upon the events of past periods, he identifies himself with the age in which he lives. This is an epoch of invention, and he has illustrated it in the prodigality of his works, and the multiplicity of his characters.

Y. E. (page 174), says of Dickens that "the highest article in his creed is good nature; and this, coupled with a little cheap sentimentalism, constitutes the *summa totalis* of his religion." May we not with more justice say of Thackeray—his creed is a cynical one, and misanthropy leavens the gospel that he preaches? Y. E., with all a sceptic's exaction, cries out—"proof—proof!" for our various assertions, forgetful or heedless of the fact that we, in our opening remarks, declared that we had "dealt with general characteristics" only; for had we cited instances, they would doubtless have been pronounced unfairly chosen, or wrongly understood. That such a course was as judicious as it was prescient, we may refer to the remarks by S. E., page 22.

Amongst the "thousand and one" frivolous objections urged against Mr. Dickens, is the one of making contemporary affairs furnish the staple of his works. One blames him for making boarding schools, banks, lawsuits, and administrative incapacity, the subjects of remarks; and another for trying to "unite in his own person the politician, philosopher, and ultra philanthropist," as though it were less commendable for an author to blend instruction with amusement than to amuse alone; or that a writer is in error when he strives to make his works subserve some national purpose, either in exposing the bad, or advancing the good. A romancist may be excused if he does nothing but write a romance that may be read to no benefit, and forgotten

* Pp. 225, 6, 7.

with no loss, but a novelist should aim at more than this. If the actions of to-day furnish the *materiale* of his work, they should be arranged so that they will "point a moral, and adorn a tale." A book, whether of history or fiction, that comes into the world with a story that points no moral, or teaches no reformation, should remain unread, save by the time-killing and aimless, whom fortune has left little to strive for, and carelessness robbed of all inclination for reflection. As individual vices need correction, and personal wrongs redress, so national evils need exposure, and social ills reform. By way of pendant to our remarks, we may quote the following from the preface to "Little Dorrit," thus letting Mr. Dickens speak for himself:—"If I might offer any apology for so exaggerated a fiction as the Barnacles and the Circumlocution Office, I would seek it in the common experience of an Englishman, without presuming to mention the unimportant fact of my having done that violence to good manners in the days of a Russian war, and of a Court of Enquiry at Chelsea. If I might make so bold as to defend that extravagant conception, Mr. Merdle, I would hint that it originated after the railroad-share epoch, in the times of a certain Irish Bank, and of one or two other equally laudable enterprizes. If I were to plead anything in mitigation of the preposterous fancy that a bad design will sometimes claim to be a good and an expressly religious design, it would be the curious coincidence that it has been brought to its climax in these pages, in the days of the public examination of the late directors of the Royal British Bank."

Ere we conclude, there is one other objection that we wish to notice. It has been said that some of Dickens's characters are "unnatural." The various epithets, "oddities," "caricatures," and "monstrosities," have, with a view to detraction, been employed in their designation. Suppose we admit the objection, to what does it amount more than that Dickens—as Shakespeare, Scott, and others have done before him—has occasionally overstepped probability, and drawn characters whose prototypes are rarely seen? A Caliban, "half fish and half monster," or a Falstaff, a Dominie Sampson, or Flibberty Gibbet, are as rare as any "fat boy," or undulating Pancks.

Half ashamed of occupying so much space, and wholly penitent for having so severely tested the reader's patience by the length of our review, we hasten to conclude. Butler, the author of "Hudibras," somewhere observes:—

"They that do write in author's praises,
And freely give to friends their voices,
Are not confined to what is true;
That's not to give, but pay a due;
For praise that's due, does give no more
To worth than what it had before;

But to commend, without desert,
Requires a mastery of art,
That sets a gloss on what's amiss,
And writes what should be—not what is."

This has not been our object, nor indeed can it fairly be said of us that we have laboured to prove either that Dickens has *absolute* perfectness on the one hand, or that Thackeray has neither ability, merit, or genius, on the other. We have not defended Dickens at the expense of Thackeray, so much as against the attacks of Thackeray's admirers; and if we have not said much of Thackeray's merits, it arose not from an intention to ignore them, but from a well-founded belief that "our friends on the other side" would fully inform us of them. In conclusion, we can truly affirm that, from an examination of the works of the two writers, whether viewing them as literary efforts, or as writings calculated to give a tone to society, and from a review of this debate, we have found nothing to modify our opinion "that Dickens is the abler writer; because we think his plots are better laid, his stories better told, his characters better drawn, and altogether have a better tendency than those of Thackeray;" and, we may add, because they give us a philosophy agreeing with that of the poet's, who exclaims—

"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh or crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared fruits,
Where no crude suspect reigns."

Bilston.

H. V. M.

REPLY.—THACKERAY.

THE battle has been fought; the victory, like the celebrated one of Sheriffmuir, remains in a glorious state of dispute. Thackerayians, no doubt, are sheathing their bloodless swords, Dickensonians are regretfully doing the same. And whilst either may be inwardly chuckling at their success and their adversary's discomfiture, we, oh, happy fate! have still the privilege of remaining on the field to give the *coup de grace* to any wounded lying about.

Spoony individuals of a forgiving disposition may here interpose with a "Oh, be merciful!" But to these we reply, the spirit of slaughter is in us. We are Brutus and Athos amalgamated, under Matlock's most petrescent springs. Supposing H. V. M., S. E., or "Anglo-Saxon," could exchange situation with us, should we not foresee the fate impending over our tête, and shall we be more generous than they? Forbid the thought. Men of mercy, avaunt! H. V. M., S. E., and "Anglo-Saxon," tremble!!

Deliberateness is the *acme* of enjoyment in torturing. The

Great Gahagan tells us with what exquisite satisfaction his sable executioner eyed the pincers which were intended to form a warm attachment to his nails; how he cooled them, and heated them, and twisted them, and turned them; gambolling all the time promissory twinkles of the perspective organs towards his victim, as much as to say, "Oh, won't I tickle you, my fine fellow?"

We will be deliberate then. The inkpot shall remain in suspense over our enemies, and, whilst we advance to them slowly but surely, we will review the manner in which they attacked our standard.

H. V. M. reminds us of one of those early chevaliers who, before engaging in the combat, gets the benedictie pronounced:—

"Take thy banner, and if e'er
Thou shouldst press the soldier's bier," &c.

There is a system about his attack we particularly admire. He makes his will out at the onset, "If I do not carry the fort, at any rate here are the plans for future attack." The missiles fall into our hands; there is only one mistake about them,—they are untrue. They calculate upon weaknesses where there is strength. One would think he had trusted to some one else's reconnaissance of the fort, rather than his own; he affects a confident tone of almost contempt at the Thackeray battlements,—"they look frowning and snappish, but they won't bite." Nevertheless, as H. V. M. ventures nearer, he seems to meet with a something he cannot overcome; perhaps it is a misgiving as to the justice of his cause, for he gets suddenly savage; he dashes along with his head down, like an animal we will not name; he rips up layers of earth, and tosses them about with fury,—there is an immense dust and scuffle, and uproar. For a time one fancies he has swept everything before him. The cumbrous walls are a heap of smoking ruins. No, they are not! the dust clears away, and there they are, just as massive, just as imposing, just as real as before. H. V. M.'s wrath has not disturbed their security a jot.

We kiss the tips of our ink-stained fingers to H. V. M., and waft him a thousand compliments, but assure him it is *thus* we regard his attack upon Thackeray; his conception of the latter is every bit as unnatural as of the fort above; to have summed up the elegant humour which pervades our hero's books with the startling expression that, "it is as though it ran out of a vinegar cruet," is to suggest to any one that H. V. M. had himself been imbibing the liquid referred to, previous to inscribing the sentence.

S. B.'s attack differs entirely from his ally's. There is a drollness about it we cannot help noticing. We feel, in turning our pen upon him, something like a Samson Carrasco couching lance at a Don Quixote, such doubtful countenance does he show

In the field of battle that we bethink ourselves instantly of Luther going out hunting. There's the hare, Sir Preacher, fire away, and don't stand thinking, a man can't hunt hares and soliloquise at the same time. But Luther has brought his sermon-box with him; his gun is rammed down with morals. Pooh! pooh! such shot as that won't kill hares.

S. E. storms the Thackeray battlements with weapons we should never have imagined,—Aristotle, Bacon, Goethe, and Johnson, arithmetic and philosophy are all brought to bear in the great contest of “Dickens *versus* Thackeray.” An hypothesis turns the doubtful scale when it is trembling in the balance. It seems to us S. E. had not made up his mind whose side he should fight on when he rushed into the field—(Dulcinée or paper bags). Unlike Jove weighing the fates—when one scale strikes heaven, the other touches earth—S. E.'s scales persist in an infinitesimal leaning,—now on this side, now on that, without settling anywhere. Perhaps they are ill-regulated scales—made for “*troy*” very likely, and no good for “*avoirdupois*.” S. E. has been shooting hares with morals; and these shots will do our battlements no more harm than did H. V. M.'s horns; Thackeray is still exactly *in statu quo*.

“Anglo-Saxon” pursues a similar course to the Cossacks, after Moscow; he never comes to a general engagement, but pounces upon the enemy when scattered in groups. We give him credit for the clever manner in which it is done, but cannot fall into ecstasies at his valour. The question with him is not, “Here are two men, so-called giants, let us put them back to back, and measure which is the tallest.” But, taking up a telescope, he eyes his hero through the small lens, and immediately cries out, “Oh, what a great man!” Then, reversing the sight, our hero is despatched a furlong's length forthwith, and appears in size but a veritable Lilliputian, lean and deformed perchance, like any one or other of us!

We cannot think H. V. M., S. E., or “Anglo-Saxon,” have been impartial combatants; this is understood we tell them so, because they will have no opportunity of denying it, or the same accusation might be retaliated upon ourselves.

But we will here drop the bellicose, and take up the argumentative for a few finishing lines. H. V. M., in his defence of Dickens, has noticed traits of character in his rival and contemporary we should never have discovered of our own searching. “Thackeray is cynic, censor, satirist, and anatomist; his chief power consists in dissection, and in that alone. As a story-teller, he is far from a match to Dickens. His plots are poorly constructed, barren of interest, and made subservient to his love of satire, cynicism, and acerbity.” This is the whole sum of H. V. M.'s paper. There is throughout it nothing else to be commented on. “Thackeray, like a

lynx-eyed detective, is continually diving into the recesses of our nature, to drag some miserable offence to light we were ignorant of ourselves." H. V. M. has exalted *Dickens* on this showing; *he* becomes *more able* as Thackeray waxes fiercer; if only the latter would explode with some violent tableau, H. V. M. would be prepared to prove that *our* hero had no pretensions to address *his* hero's boot black.

Now, a word about this vinegry temper of Thackeray's. We have read again and again most of his published books, and have failed totally to find any of the misanthropic tendency in them so strongly alluded to. We have never *met* any one who has confessed to an opposite conclusion. That he deals largely in satire, *we* admit; but that it is ~~anything~~, except when hurled against hypocrisy and crime, we do utterly deny. H. V. M. seems to draw no distinction between the scornful showing up of mean wickednesses,—from which heaven guard us!—and the pitiful, almost humorous, handling of little weaknesses, to which we are all subject; and yet this distinction must be apparent to every one, not totally blinded by prejudice, on every page he has written. The titled thief, the unnatural kinsman, the bankrupt spendthrift, meet with his most withering contempt; and may his arm be stronger, and his whip reach longer, to castigate these as they deserve! But come within the narrower circuit of "Vanity Fair,"—be moderately hypocritical, pardonably vain; limit your shadow to anything within the length of a street,—and you are at once on milder terms with your scribe. The lash only makes you wince good-naturedly; your taskmaster has become one of yourselves; he is jogging at your elbow; you feel not the least disposition to shake off his mentorship, and he conciliates you at once with—"Am I not also a snob and a brother?" That this is truth to all young men, particularly the manner in which Thackeray brings his George Osbornes, Pendennis, Clive Newcomes, Harry Warringtons, through temptation, is sufficient to prove. We might call him an elder brother, of the jolliest species, amongst them,—so compassionate and excusing is he withal.

S. E. and "Anglo Saxon" have concurred in the views of their predecessor only in a minor degree; they have carefully avoided endorsing his declamations against Thackeray's splenitude; their chief argument, however, is still of his suggesting, viz.—"That Dickens is more entitled to the term, 'abler writer,' than Thackeray, from his books being more humorous than the latter's,"—their co-aggerant appellation, in fact, for the two writers, is respectively—"Humorist and Satirist." Now *were* we willing to accept this latter designation as expressing all our author can honestly claim to, we should still have good ground for upholding him as the "abler writer," inasmuch as honest, wholesome satire is capable, any time, of removing the most

rancid abuses, where humour would fall quite unheeded. Solomon was a giant satirist; Cervantes, Le Sage, Swift, Voltaire, dealt a death-blow at every stroke of their pen to any sham they struck at, from knight errantry to man-worship, or, as very superstitious folk would say, king-worship—and we are proud to affix to the names that of Thackeray, a satirist, too, and one of the most dreaded among the snobocracy. But to *accept* him as satirist *ONLY*, would be unfair to the allegiance we have sworn him; inseparable from his value as teacher in this one respect, comes that of accredited historian and moralist. We place his merits as an historical writer on a par with his unswerving honesty as a moralist. It is in the possession of this triple power his superiority to Dickens as a writer lies, is proven, as we at first said. We read Dickens's books (ah! and with wonderful pleasure, too), but we study Thackeray's. Dickens is undisputed master over our risible faculties, and oft, we do not wish to deny it, touches the tenderest chords of our hearts; but Thackeray's empire is loftier than this, in that *HE* comes, the conscious sovereign, and gives an irreducible force to our intellects. Here is the partition wall between them, rising up to divide mind and matter. A noticeable division this, dispensing with scales and weights, and all such signs of huckstery,—putting even spectacles out of conceit,—need but to take in, with the naked eye, the measure of the men, there they are—laughter, mimicry, pathos, but only *MATTER*; wit, wisdom, truth—sister graces of the *MIND*:—take your choice. Ah! what use is it scribbling? Thackeray's our man!

JUSTITIA ET VERITAS.

Birmingham Mutual Improvement Society.

BONDS OF NATIONS.—In the intercourse between nations we are apt to rely too much on the instrumental part. We lay too much weight on the formalities of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wisely when we trust to the interests of men as guarantees of their engagements. The interests frequently tear to pieces the engagements, and the passions trample upon both. Entirely to trust to either is to disregard our own safety, or not to know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together, even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.—*Burke*,

Politics.

OUGHT THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO BE ABOLISHED?

NEGATIVE REPLY.—II.

THE English Parliament we conceive to be a fitting representative of the English people. Not merely are we persuaded that it at all times exhibits the true political bias of the country, but that it is also the faithful delineator of the feelings and prejudices which sway the masses. Never has this been more clearly evidenced than in the total change lately made by that august body in the government and management of a corporation only second to itself. But five years ago the Commons of England, in committee assembled, held an inquiry into the state of government exercised by the East India Company, and they came to the deliberate conclusion that the Government of Leadenhall Street, held in check by the Board of Control, was all that could be desired. In point of fact, they found that the system of double government was acting perfectly satisfactorily, and they confirmed it. Four years roll on, and nothing occurs to alter the decision of the committee, or to shake their confidence in the existing mode; when suddenly, without warning, an avalanche has burst upon the Company. The natives have rebelled—or rather, the native soldiers in the employ of the Company have mutinied. Horror upon horrors swell the already great crimes of the Sepoy. All England stands aghast; and a great cry arises that the East India Company must fall. In a few months, before the mutiny is subjected, necessarily before its causes can be inquired into, the Company's doom is fixed; and on the 31st of August, 1858, that great body, that for upwards of a century had ruled millions, rendered up its power to the rulers of England, at the bidding of a Parliament, the predecessors of which had, in 1853, declared its occupancy safe, and its government honourable.

The reason for this sudden change seems inexplicable. We do not mean to pretend for a moment that we believe the Parliament of 1853, as a body, to have understood anything about India; nor do we think its successor at all improved on the subject; but presuming that the previous verdict was honest, and according to evidence, we are at a loss to discover what additional evidence has come out, whereby the East India Company has been proved baneful to the English interests in

India, and worthy to be abolished. But the deed is done; and we are now called upon to assist at its *post mortem* examination. Whether the deceased came to her death by fair or by foul means, it is for our jury of readers to decide. As they have already had the case laid before them, and heard eminent counsel on both sides, the only duty that now devolves upon us is to avail ourselves of the privilege to reply to the arguments brought forward by our adversaries.

W. O. H. E., who opens this debate on the affirmative side, devotes a page and a half to its discussion. We have carefully read his article, but must confess we can hardly divine his argument. His accusations against the Company (he does not, however, substantiate them) are, that they have enriched themselves at the expense of millions, by "pillage, murder, and brazen injustice," an account of which he confesses we have yet to "receive at the hands of a truthful historian." He is eloquent, but wordy. He brings before us a witness,—and no less a witness than Burke,—who branded them with "having sold every monarch, prince, and state in India; broken every contract, and ruined every prince and every state who had trusted them;" "in which quotation," says he, "all we would urge is embodied." We will not insult W. O. H. E. by reminding him who Burke was, but he seems to forget that a considerable portion of that great orator's lifetime was taken up in the prosecution of a man as daring and unscrupulous as he was able, of many of whose acts the Leadenhall Street Board were entirely ignorant; that for nominally seven years, but in reality a much longer period, Burke, as an advocate, actively carried on the trial for the impeachment of Warren Hastings (who, be it remembered, was acquitted) both in Parliament House and Westminster Hall. That W. O. H. E. should bring forward so partial a witness, and that a solitary one, does not, we think, confirm the soundness of his cause; and when he "contends that justice demands from Englishmen redress for the terrible wrongs inflicted upon our darker brethren," it were a pity he had not deferred his paper to the following month, that his attention might have been called to the extract from Macaulay, given by "Aleph," ending with this remarkable sentence:—"From that moment (when the Company began to take part in the disputes of its ephemeral sovereigns) commenced a great, a stupendous process,—the reconstruction of a decomposed society."

In passing on, we have to meet our antagonist, D. K. This writer bestows rather more labour and time upon his subject than his predecessor. We do not, however, consider him the more difficult to repulse. He resolves the question into two inquiries; and under these heads we propose following him.

First, then,—“Was the policy of the East India Company, from its establishment, the wisest that might have been adopted?”

266 OUGHT THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO BE ABOLISHED?

This question embraces rather a long period of time, and we must confess ourselves surprised that D. K. has so readily and easily answered it. For our own part, we should have been more inclined, than D. K. appears to be, to have examined whether the acts of torture (?), pillage, and other hardships employed against the natives to enforce payment of taxes,—whether the private conduct of the officers and soldiers, really emanated from the East India Company, or may be laid at the door of the late Leadenhall Street Board. We do not believe that they can. We believe that frequently the conduct of the Governor-General to the Calcutta Board was, *post factum*, reprehended by the English Council; and we have D. K.'s own words that "it must not be forgotten that the East India Company sometimes disapproved of successive conquests and annexations by various Governors-General; it has even been affirmed, that they protested against them on more than one occasion." The manner in which the Company's officers are generally reported to conduct themselves with regard to the native women, we believe, in too many cases, to be true. It is not our place here to accuse them, nor do we defend them; but we must protest against such a topic being introduced into this debate. It is entirely foreign to it;—for to suppose or to argue the private peccadilloes, crimes, or whatever they may be termed, of the servants of the Company as a ground of complaint against the Company itself, carries absurdity on its face.

To cast the mind over the length of years that this great Corporation has existed, from its establishment to the 31st of August last, and to include in the survey its long catalogue of acts,—to observe with comprehensive eye the commissions—shall we add omissions?—of this long period, is no light task. There will, we think, be found none who would venture to contend that every step taken during that time has been the "wisest that could be adopted;" but we are prepared to maintain that, taken as a whole, the government of the East India Company has been as wise, as sagacious, and as beneficial, not merely for their own interests, but also for those of the Indian people, as it was possible for a great society of its nature to be. It is not possible, in the limited space here afforded us, to follow, in anything like detail, even its most prominent acts; we will merely allude to the state of India before the Incorporated Company commenced their rule, to that which the country presents now. All writers refer to the period prior to the Company's ingress as dark in the extreme,—as a time when it was indeed a hotbed of social crime and social cruelty; when father and son, brothers and sisters, nay, hardly mothers and their offspring could lay claim to natural affection for their personal safety. Too much of this, it is true, remains; but the vast improvement in the condition of all classes, the comparative civilisation which prevails, must be

placed to the credit of the East India Company, through their indirect influence.

But here we are arriving at the very pith of the question. This is what the accusers of the Company complain of:—"You have gained enormous wealth," say they, "from the Indian territory. You have been endowed with immense authority; have been the ruler of millions, and the arbiter of their fate, and you have yet done nothing, or next to nothing, for the civilization of the masses, for the furtherance of their religious interests."

We do not think that more direct attempts at the civilization of the people would have been attended with any better results, if even as good, than those attained, as they have been, indirectly, by the moral influence conveyed by a great commercial body; for the social habits of the Hindoo and the Mussulman are as closely connected with his existence as his religion itself—the evil effects of tampering with which we have but too fatal evidence. And here we come in contact with D. K. Our friend is especially indignant at the "gross culpability" of the Company "in neglecting to infuse a religious element into their administration." We would respectfully submit that the religious element *has been* conveyed into the Company's administration. That a body of men, nominally Christians, should occupy the seats of judgment and authority; that a large army, similarly composed, each regiment having its own chaplain, should exist in the land; to say nothing of the English civilians scattered over the country, mostly in that Company's own employ, and that yet the religious element should not be there, is a paradox. The strongest proofs, however, that we can bring forward of such element being present is, that law and justice were administered under the English code,—a code founded on and embracing Christian principles. That this was not logically fair, we admit, but such was the case. True, a bill was in preparation to establish an Indian code for Indian justice, but this was arrested by the breaking out of the mutiny.

But D. K. has a more serious charge against the Company:—"Neglecting the propagation of the gospel amongst its millions of subjects." This is tangible, and cannot be controverted. The fact is admitted, and the presumption is, that had they done so, at least at any time within the present century, the mutiny of 1857 would have broken out so much the sooner. That they "*wilfully retarded*" the advances of Christianity, we are prepared to dispute, because, in the first place, there were no advances to retard; and secondly, and consequently, there can be no proofs to bring forward! for we have yet to learn that the Sepoy of Meerut was degraded *on account* of his conversion. Again, we are of opinion that the East India Company were not in a position to agitate the propagation of the gospel in India. There

will be found those who maintain that, as a commercial body, the right to do so was not theirs; but without entering upon this question, we would ask, whether the time had, aye, or *has* come, for the public introduction of a ministerial body as the professed converters of the natives? We will, therefore, take up our position here,—that such propagation would have, at any period, been injudicious and foolish; and we believe the Company knew it, and well considered it.

We must now briefly consider the second head of D. K.'s inquiry:—"Will the empire of India be benefited by the executive and administrative powers being transferred to the Crown?" We must for once agree with D. K. that we are dealing with a question of "a more lucid nature than that preceding it." In consequence of this, perhaps, the writer brings only one argument to support his view of the case, *i. e.*, the evils of a double government. No reasoning is, unfortunately, introduced to prove why the Leadenhall Street Board should be sacrificed in favour of a Government Board: it is inferred, probably, because it is, or was, likely to become "a fact;" but the strong prophecies the writer indulges in of the improved state of things, which he affirms will exist under the new régime, fully proves his personal and unbounded confidence in Lord Stanley and Co. It is ours to supply the deficiency. We wish to know how, when, and in what respects, the Board of Control, or Government Board, has, since its establishment, exerted a more beneficial influence on the fortunes of the Indian people; adopted any more favourable measures, or originated any plan of Indian social or religious amelioration, other than the City Board? We would have it remembered that, since 1786 (we accept D. K.'s date on trust, not having a reference at hand), the English Government Board of Control has been privy to every act, either of commission or omission, that will be found, or not found, in the annals of the Company; and if a protest has gone forth on any subject of importance, such as the absence of the "propagation of the gospel," or in favour of the "fettered press," it has yet to be recorded.

If, then, we have no great instance in which the Board of Cannon Row has been of such essential service as to justify the abolishment of the authority, &c., of the Directors in favour of its own enlargement in numbers and power, for such is, in fact, the case, we have a fatal instance before us of the mischief that may be done by a headstrong and powerful minister in the famous Ellenborough dispatch; and we see how Lord Canning, in writing home, though with great deference to the Secret Committee, yet places all his reliance in the support and judgment of the Court of Directors.

Time will certainly show whether the transference of the Indian Government to the Crown will act for the better; but we

must confess our doubts that the amount of knowledge and judgment on Indian affairs, as yet evidenced by any Parliament, has been sufficient to suggest any bright augury for the future. We therefore submit that it has not been proved that there are any cogent reasons why the East India Company ought to be abolished; in the absence of which we must adopt Parson Dale's dictum—"Quieta non movere"—and contend that it ought not.

FIDES ET PATIENTIA.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN availing ourselves of the privilege of reply, we at once proceed to notice the negative article of "Aleph;" and in doing so, would at the outset record our admiration of his outspoken style—*Have the East India Company governed India well!* What, then, must we think of the opinions popularized of late, conclusions the result of residence, political and religious activity, philanthropic exertions, or the love of truth? During the early stages of the outbreak, editors "wrote down" the "savages" in terms sometimes, we believe, rash and untruthful; by degrees, however, truth and right obtained a hearing; many, previously embittered by exaggerated statements, became doubtful, arriving at length at totally different conclusions. We do *not* defend atrocities committed in the name of justice, out we do uphold the right of any people to resist oppression. Because India is now comparatively prosperous, in a commercial point of view, are we therefore to overlook the injustices so frequently committed by the Company's officials? Is "Alpha" aware that during the fourteen years ending 1851 the expenditure of the Government of India had exceeded the income by £15,541,470, and that during eighteen years the dinner bills alone amounted to £53,000? We do not blame only the Company for this robbery, but we hold that they have never shown themselves backward in thrusting hangers-on or relatives into posts requiring little else than plenty of assurance, and an aptitude for treading down the weak. We agree with "Alpha" in his remarks upon Exeter Hall moonshine, and consider that it behoves us to be careful in the future how we thrust our religious opinions upon the natives. We shall no doubt, ere long, crush out the active manifestations of revolt, but the spirit that evoked it will not die; the tortures and brutalities will again be handed down in bitter words to future generations;—that must be a wise and humane policy which will efface the remembrance of our progress in the Indian empire. Grant ability in the conduct of war, what then? Must the authority remain, because a justly indignant people have been crushed with energy? The only guarantee we have for the future better government of India is the remembrance of the lesson of late taught us, and the rapid strides of reform principles evidenced in the certainty of the *people* becoming

properly represented in Parliament. We will grant a division of guilt between our own Government and that of the Company; but we contend that the only possible prospect of reform is in the fact that, excluding the interference of the Company, our people, and our glorious press, will be enabled to ventilate far more effectually any evils that may arise. The Company having been abolished, the remainder of "Aleph's" article may be thus summarily noticed. If the bill now in operation fails, we can make necessary improvements; but we cannot yet judge the matter; let time and truth record the issue.

"Eugene Aram" seems to miss the basis of argument. It is not *because* the "individuals" alluded to "have failed to instil a respect for law and justice, truth and honesty, into the hearts of the natives," that they "are to be dismissed." To us the necessity for abolition seems, in part, the fact, that in ruling the natives the Company have acted upon principles directly opposite to those mentioned. Let any man of ordinary intelligence ask himself, "What would now be our position in India, had justice, truth, and honesty directed our negotiations?" Let us hope for evidence of these in the future; the records of the past afford us but the opposites—injustice, untruth, and dishonesty. The principles contained in the "despatch" quoted by our opponent were *rather* late; for had the Company's officials been compelled to act out such Christian sentiments, had the spirit which framed those sentiments evidenced its existence years ago, our opinions respecting the Company's rule might now be very different. But the humane considerations here enunciated, we say again, came rather late. It reminds us of "locking the stable door after the steed is stolen." The Company's authority, having been abolished, nothing more is needed from us, and especially as our space is limited. To "Aleph" and "Eugene Aram" we would tender our respects, and wish them and all the *incogs.*, together with our beloved organ, a happy and prosperous new year.

W. O. H. E.

God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take which you please, you can never have both. Between those, as a pendulum, man oscillates ever. He in whom the love of repose predominates will accept the first creed, the first philosophy, the first political party he meets—most likely his father's. He gets rest, commodity, and reputation; but he shuts the door of truth. He in whom the love of truth predominates will abstain from dogmatism, and recognize all the apposite negations between which, as walls, his being is swung. He submits to the inconvenience of suspense and imperfect opinions; but he is a candidate for truth, as the other is not, and respects the highest law of his being.—*R. W. Emerson.*

Social Economy.

IS THE INCREASE OF A NATION'S WEALTH FAVOURABLE TO ITS MORALITY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN this our nineteenth century, when philosophy, the arts, and the sciences have reached a state of perfection to which they never before attained, it would not have been unreasonable to suppose that the morality of the people would have kept pace with the general improvements of the age. But how different is the fact! The philosophy of morals was, perhaps, never better understood than now, and living according to that knowledge was never less practised. The reasons for this state of matters are various. Among the foremost, we regard not only the accumulated, but the accumulating wealth of the people. It may seem rather strange that what was intended for a blessing should ultimately be converted into a curse. This however, we think, is nevertheless the truth. Many and various are the means by which that distinguishing characteristic of the present age—the money-grubbing spirit—is being pursued by the people. Let us turn where we may, wealth is the grand object of pursuit, and the means to its attainment are, in the vast majority of cases, highly unjustifiable. Not only do we see people labouring night and day for its accumulation, but continually devising schemes whereby to gain “short cuts” to competency. This continual grinding is enough of itself to impair the moral faculty; but the great dishonesty that invariably accompanies such a spirit is enough to destroy that sense altogether. It has done so in innumerable instances, and it is just a natural consequence. It is impossible for a person to indulge in an evil propensity, and not become assimilated to that propensity—not have his moral sense of the evil of it deadened. Qualms of conscience are continually troubling the young man who has commenced a course of profligacy; but, as he sinks deeper and deeper in sin, he becomes quite dead to such admonitions, and all thoughts of the nobility of his nature are then thrown to the winds. It is the same with the accumulators of wealth. Their principles and desires are centred in that which deprives them of their better being, and renders them, literally, “worms of the dust.”

But this is only one phase of the subject. Accumulated wealth is either hoarded up, or squandered in the greatest profusion. To hoard it, is as great a sin against morality as to squander it

needlessly and on animal gratification. Yet the monied portion of society generally occupy the two extremes. Few, very few, use their riches aright. "Human nature will be human nature" is an adage that may be pleaded in extenuation, but it is nevertheless quite true that wealth is a moral evil, or, rather, a spring from which moral evil flows. Miserly propensities are signs of the most grovelling nature, and elicit the most unqualified condemnation. Careless profusion, on the other hand, is as much to be condemned; but still these two habits seem to be part of the being of society.

When a country is rich, luxurious living is indulged in very much. When this is the case, the animal part of our being becomes ungovernable. When the passions become ungovernable, men plunge into a course of profligacy;—profligacy is antagonistic to morality; therefore the increase of a nation's wealth is unfavourable to its morality. This is theory, we do not deny; but does it not correspond with fact? Did not the Roman empire become a prey to surrounding nations when steeped in debauchery? Was not this debauchery produced by the riches she possessed? Were not these riches the cause of her moral evil, her decline, and her fall? Most assuredly they were. And, to look at our own dear land, does profligacy abound in it? Are our riches squandered in vice? Both these questions can be answered only in the affirmative. However unpalatable it may be, we must confess that our riches are, in many cases, a curse.

Where there is a monied population, the people do not require to work for their bread. When people are idle, their thoughts generally become corrupt. There is nothing more easy than the transition from long-cherished thoughts to desires, and from desires to actions. Thus wealth in another way produces profligacy. We would call this one of the most prolific sources of vice. Although people are sometimes led to believe that morality is rigidly observed among monied people and the magnates of the land, the fact is, that crimes of the deepest dye are committed by them. There is no reason, in the present state of affairs, for supposing that our aristocracy are not vicious. Their lives being spent in accomplishing nothing, subsisting on what arouses and strengthens their animal passions, it would be no wonder if there were fewer of them virtuous than there are.

We have thus set before our readers our principal reasons for holding the negative of this question, and surely none can gainsay what we have advanced. Conclusions which are drawn from facts are the only sure grounds upon which we can tread; and these we have endeavoured to secure in this brief article. It is only by the most sedulous employment of our faculties upon high and ennobling themes and objects, that we shall be enabled to keep free from vice and immorality; therefore it is a

moral impossibility for a money-grubbing people and an enfeebled aristocracy to live as they ought.

Bishopmill.

W. Y. M'C.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

If the awful yet somewhat strange state of society described by G. A. H. E. exists,—if crime is so rife among us,—if the whole social existence of England is at the present time so corrupt,—for goodness sake let us do our best to return “to the simple majesty of our former ignorance;” let us give up our education and enlightenment,—let us forget all we have ever learnt, and, despising the experiences of the past, again become “forest philosophers,” and stoics of the woods. But if the state of the nation is not quite so black as it has been painted—if civilization and refinement are of some small advantage,—let us not despise wealth, which has earned us that civilization, and created for us that refinement.

The dreadful revelations of G. A. H. E., though of rather a mixed and miscellaneous character, from “the disgusting disclosures touching foreign princes, royal dukes, peers of the realm” (against whom, by the way, our friend’s invectives seem chiefly directed) down to the heinous crime of the prime minister and Parliament, after long and hard work, taking *one* day’s relaxation and pleasure on the Downs of Epsom, are, indeed, sufficient to stagger one in his faith in the advantages of wealth, did not he think that, in every human institution and society, there must be some crime and fault; and though in England—wealthy England—there are Radcliffes, Davidsons, and Madame Audleys, yet, in poorer countries, there are many more offenders than here, against laws human and divine. And again, we feel assured that wealth is not injurious to the interests of morality; and if there was wanting anything to fully convince us of the accuracy of our opinion, it would be found in the example taken by G. A. H. E., from “where,” he says, “national wealth has been enjoyed (where has it not, to a certain degree?) He takes Stockholm—far from a rich city; Naples—decidedly a poor one. True, that the former is “rightly called the most licentious city in Europe;” true, that in the latter “vices of the foulest licentiousness prevail unpunished,”—yet this state of morals cannot be laid to the charge of national wealth; and did it never strike G. A. H. E. it might be caused by national poverty? There is one part of G. A. H. E.’s essay with which I most entirely agree, and which I would most respectfully again direct his notice to. He says, “the fact is, we are choked up with cant.” Did it never strike him that his invectives against “the squares, the parks, the Traviata,” might possibly be a little in that strain? Did it never strike him that all that tirade about “the wise and peaceful Numa,” “the patriot Curtius,” &c., might possibly be

but the rhapsodies of an idealist, picturing to himself an unattainable state of society—a perfect one?

Those who have taken the negative side of this question seem to think that nearly all, or at least, most of the sin and profligacy in England lies at the door of the higher classes. This I deny. I deny that they have, as seems to be thought, nothing to live for but profligacy. I deny that there is more immorality in the higher classes of England than in the lower. Nay, I go further,—I assert that there is less licentiousness and covetousness in the higher classes than in the lower. I deny that, as our wealth, our philosophy, and our sciences have increased, so our morality has decreased. Nay, I go further;—I assert that we have made gigantic strides in the advance of morality since the days of Charles the Second, or William the Conqueror.

C. C. A.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

“Unblemished honour is the flower of virtue.”—*Thomson.*

THE full and complete manner in which this question was treated in our opening article must, on this occasion, commend us to the favourable consideration of our readers, and also serve as an excuse for a more brief “reply” than, under other circumstances, might perhaps be expected. Moreover, our friends on the opposite side have not attempted the denial of any assertion made by us; and it remains for us, therefore, simply to notice the ideas propounded by them.

Now, we did think that the real meaning and import of the inquiry would have been at once clearly understood by all interested in its discussion. Such, however, seems not to have been the case, or why does C. C. A. trouble himself to define the term “wealth”? The most cursory glance, we imagine, will show that “the increase of a nation's wealth” is presupposed, and the only question is the *result* of this increase. It is not, we think, quite so obvious that the increase of wealth produces a corresponding increase of industry, as C. C. A. would wish to make it appear; indeed, we incline to the contrary opinion. We willingly agree that “industry must ever have the best moral influence,” but, judging from appearances, we believe it to be decidedly evident that the present race of mankind are anything but “favourable” to *hard work*. “Another way in which wealth affects the moral well-being of a nation is the refinement it produces,” says C. C. A., which is true, to a certain extent; but is it not notorious that the refinement of our time is all a sham,—purely affectation,—in short, merely the glossing over of ignorance, thus vainly attempted to be concealed? As an illustration, the writer of this paper can adduce an instance wherein a person who, from being a common workman, advanced (by what means this deponent saith not), to comparative affluence, and,

apeing "refinement," gave three hundred guineas for a painting which was not worth so many shillings.

In respect to the influence of luxuries upon a nation, the procuring of which C. C. A. seems to consider one of the blessings attendant upon the increase of wealth, Chenevix says, "It is to luxury that Asia owes her long stagnation in intellectual inferiority,—a melancholy compensation for the earlier advances she once made. It is by luxury, also, that Africa has been held in sad subjection to the rest of mankind, and that all traces of mental cultivation have been constantly rendered weaker, in warm and fertile countries, than in those where labour is necessary."

Now, we think it is hardly fair that, because we are found advocating a different view of the matter to that supported by C. C. A., we should be charged with "prejudice." Who, we ask, would desire to believe worse of any man, or nation, than what one knew to be absolutely true? For ourselves, as we said before, we wish for a better state of things than that which at present exists; but, meantime, it is impossible to close our eyes to what we see daily and hourly. We do not pretend to affirm "that we are daily growing worse," but we do maintain that our moral character, as a nation, is no better than that possessed by our ancestors, while our wealth has increased at a rate which our forefathers never dreamt of. By way of testing this assertion, we ask,—Is our *prestige*, as a nation, equal to what it was in the days of Cromwell? Is it possible to find an equal, at the present hour, to either Milton, Baxter, or John Wesley? These are simple questions; but we think they cannot be answered otherwise than in the negative.

C. C. A. points to America to show "how wealth works upon morality;" but such a comparison is perfectly absurd, for this reason,—America is not increasing in wealth, as the following statistics fully prove:—"In 1818, the poor-rates of England and Wales amounted to £9,320,000; in 1858, with about double the population, the poor-rates are under £6,000,000. In 1841-2, the number of paupers reached 1,900,000 (because we had a corn law and protection); in 1858, the pauperism has been reduced to 807,000 claimants, or by about 65 per cent. During all this time the beggary of America has been steadily on the increase, and now constitutes a formidable item in the taxation of the state. In the same period, the taxation of the United States has advanced from 73 cents to 298 cents per head. The local taxation of New York rather exceeds forty-eight shillings per head per annum. That sum, on the population of London, would amount to £7,200,000. The actual amount, it is believed, is about £500,000, or about one-fourteenth of the New York taxation." Further, is it not a fact that the monetary panic which lately paralysed the commerce of the whole world, and wrought a

greater amount of misery in this country than any similar previous visitation, commenced in America,—was brought about by the over-speculation of American merchants, or, in other words, from the too full infusion of the “go-ahead” principle into their business transactions? And, moreover, is it not true that the greatest and most reckless adventurer of the present day is P. T. Barnum, an American? and that “Barnumising” and “swindling” are synonymous terms? We are sorry to be obliged thus to write, but facts speak for themselves.

C. C. A.’s idea of the “national poverty” of the French reminds us of a similar assertion in respect to Ireland, which we heard made, not long since, by a Methodist preacher, whose experience of the world should have taught him better. The truth is, the poverty of France, alike with that of Ireland, is the consequence of bad government, and of the despotism under which the people of those countries have so long groaned,—evils which have been preventive of a proper and useful development of their respective internal resources, and not to the result of what the minister called the “irreligion,” and C. C. A. styles the “immorality” of their inhabitants.

The article of R. T. G. is far more to the point than that of his predecessor, but, strangely enough, it is more confirmatory of the view we take of this subject than otherwise. Thus, he says, “That this increase of wealth has been, in many instances, a great agent in the corruption of morals is evident.” And again: “A desire for vain display is evidenced by all; and as it is impossible to gratify extravagance by fair means, fraud of every kind prevails. Deceit becomes a characteristic of the people; drunkenness contributes its share to the demoralization of society.” His remarks on the distribution of wealth we consider hardly relevant to this debate; but one sentence which R. T. G. gives, by way of pointing out a remedy for the evils complained of,—“Let every inhabitant of this country have food to eat, and wherewithal to clothe himself, and crimes will decrease,”—deserves to be written in letters of gold.

It is not a little surprising, and yet no less true than strange, that the consideration of our social condition, now occupying much of the attention of society, terminates in an unanimous verdict of “Guilty;” the only difference of opinion being as to the extent of the existing depravity; and we cannot but regret that the limited space at command precludes the reproduction of a mass of evidence, collected by ourselves, corroborative of this conclusion. We trust, however, that the cordial response of our friends to the proposition of the proprietors for an enlargement of the *British Controversialist*, will obviate this want of space for the future; and, hoping soon to meet under more “favourable” auspices, we take our leave.

Leeswood, near Mold.

G. A. H. E.

The Reviewer.

THE EIGHTEEN CHRISTIAN CENTURIES. By the Rev. JAMES WHITE. Wm. Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1858.

MR. WHITE is already favourably known to the reading public,—“courteously or ironically so called,”—as the author of an instructive and pleasing work, entitled, “Landmarks of the History of England,” concerning which it were superfluous to remark, since, in a short time, it has gone through several editions. Nor need we hesitate in predicting that the interest excited in his larger work will be such as soon to call for a second and cheaper edition. As some of our readers may like to know a little of its matter, as well as its manner, we will briefly indicate its leading characteristics. It cannot be supposed that anything more than a catalogue of the events of eighteen centuries could be crowded into a single octavo volume. This is done with such rare judgment and good taste as to make it not only intelligible, but entertaining to the ordinary reader; while to the student of history it becomes a valuable treasury of information. It acts as a refresher to the memory, and is a most agreeable companion after a close application to works of a more recondite character. It is so seldom that compilations of this sort are interesting to any beyond the historical student, that we are glad of the opportunity cordially to recommend Mr. White's work. With the style we can scarcely find fault, except that we think it occasionally a little too light. This is, however, a rare fault; for, generally speaking, the dignity of history is synonymous with dulness. We are glad to find that Mr. White is content to sacrifice this dignity of history in his desire to represent its teaching and truths in an attractive form.

Appropos of a second edition, we suggest that Mr. White supply two deficiencies, namely, a preface and an index, without which, strictly speaking, the book has neither beginning nor end. With the first we may dispense, but historical works are rarely so appreciated as to supersede the necessity for the latter. It reminds one of a certain town in the provinces, whose streets are named, like our author's chapters, but whose houses are unnumbered.

S. E.

THE YOUNG DEBATER; a Hand-book for Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies. By SAMUEL NEIL. London: Houlston and Wright.

THE Essay on Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies, which appeared in our pages some years ago, and was afterwards

published as a pamphlet, proved very useful in directing the right formation and proper management of many of these important institutions. Having been for some time "out of print" in its separate form, not a few of our readers will be glad to learn that in the hands of its talented author it has greatly increased in proportions, and has just been brought out by our Publishers in a very neat and attractive form. The work now contains Seven Chapters, treating upon Order, its Needfulness, and Rules.—Outline of a Constitution for Mutual Improvement or Debating Societies.—The Advantages of Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies.—Hints on Study.—The Logic of Study.—The Laws of Debate.—The Logic of Debate.—The Logic of Public Speaking.—The Rhetoric of Debate; and a list of questions for discussion on Social Economy, Politics, Philosophy, Science, Religion, Literature, and History. The appearance of the work at the present time is very opportune, and we trust it will receive an introduction to all our societies, and be regarded, as it deserves to be, as "a Hand-book" for their members and managers.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

British Literary Society.—We have been favoured with a copy of the general report of this society, which was read by the secretary, Mr. J. Drake, at the annual meeting noticed in a recent issue. The following extracts will be read with interest. "A series of papers by Mr. Samuel Neil, entitled the 'Art of Reasoning,' which appeared in the *British Controversialist* during the years 1850 and 1851, may be said to have been the immediate cause of the formation of our society. A number of the readers of that magazine, who were for the most part contributors also, in order the better to profit by the systematic study of these valuable papers, formed themselves into a corresponding class, Mr. Neil himself, with much diligent painstaking, examining their several exercises, and reporting as to their merits or otherwise in each succeeding issue of the magazine. This went on for some time, when the necessity for

a closer means of intercommunication grew, as it were, out of the circumstances of the case. Three of the leading members of this class considered the matter carefully, and after much correspondence, a circular was issued in the spring of 1852, signed by Edward S. Jones, Robert Lewis Gerrie, and John N. Crossland,—the three gentlemen referred to,—which contained a proposal for the formation of the 'Neophyte Writers' Society,' in much the same form, as regards essential features, as, under another name, it now exists. The chief object was still, however, the study of Mr. Neil's papers on logic, which were used as themes for the essays. A prospectus and rules were drawn up, Mr. Neil elected President of the Society, and the first general issue of papers was made in October of 1852. Under the able and energetic management of the Secretary, Mr. Gerrie,—upon whom the chief work of the Society had,

from various causes, already devolved—steady progress was made, and the position of the infant Society at the close of its first year's existence was most encouraging.

"In the autumn of 1854, new life was infused into the Society by the holding a series of meetings at London, Huddersfield, and Glasgow, successively; at one or all of which Messrs. Gerrie, McDougall, Ross, Cork, and other principal members attended. At these meetings the Rev. Mr. McDougall was unanimously elected President, and Mr. Cork, Secretary, for the ensuing year. These gentlemen entered upon their duties with vigour,—the prospectus and rules were revised and reprinted,—and the first number of a *Quarterly Circular* was issued in the March of 1855. During the Presidency of Mr. McKellar, in the following year (1856), another, and it is hoped, a final and successful attempt was made to rescue the Society from the difficulties of its position, and to bring it more extensively before the notice of the class for whose especial benefit it was originally designed. Under the Presidency of Mr. Elwes, in 1857, the position of the Society had so far improved, that the executive felt itself justified in resuming the publication of the *Quarterly Circular* in an extended form. New members were also added,—the work of the sections and of the Rectorial Council proceeded with vigour,—and the already favourable position of the Society was fully maintained and improved upon.

"During the past year, the production of original papers—prose and poetical—upon a great variety of subjects, has proceeded steadily. Several of these papers have since been made by their authors the foundation of published works of various kinds, whilst others have been widely circulated through the newspapers and periodical press. During circulation through their respective sections,

these papers have in most cases been carefully, candidly, and most elaborately criticized, and, with occasional exceptions, passed on within reasonable time.

"Especial attention has been drawn during the year to the facilities afforded by the Sectional MS. Magazines, as media for the friendly discussion of questions of interest; as also for the insertion of short sketches, poems, and other literary trifles, too inconsiderable in themselves to be circulated as separate papers. Twenty-eight new members, of all classes, have been admitted during the year, and from one cause or other, fourteen have resigned. Our change of name at the beginning of the year, from that of the 'Neophyte Writer's Society' to the British Literary Society, although by some of our friends objected to, as being somewhat too assuming, has been generally admitted to be a more appropriate title for a society, exclusively 'literary' in its objects, and whose members reside in all parts of Great Britain.

"During the year several of our members have been successful in obtaining degrees in arts or laws at various Universities, or have advanced themselves into influential positions in connection with the newspaper and literary press.

"Several favourable notices of our Society and its operations have appeared during the year in various periodicals and newspapers. The thanks of the Society are also due to the Editors of the *British Controversialist* and *Phonographic Examiner* for the gratuitous insertion of the Society's notices monthly upon the wrappers of their respective magazines. The income of the Society for the year may be set down at about £20, which will probably be barely sufficient to cover necessary expenses of printing, posting, and advertising.

"From this brief summary of the past year's progress, it will be seen that the present position of the Society

is satisfactory and encouraging, and that it is steadily and quietly pursuing its career of usefulness.

"A brief enumeration of the principal advantages our Society, when efficiently managed, holds out to the earnest student, may not form an inappropriate conclusion to the present paper.

"It introduces him, then, into a circle of congenial minds, engaged equally with himself in the work of intellectual improvement,—a sort of literary freemasonry, in short,—ever ready to hold out the hand of friendship, and to aid him in any way he may suggest.

"It affords him numerous opportunities of exercising his critical acumen, as also of having his own faults, of thought or style, pointed out by critics who have the best of reasons for being candid and impartial in their judgments.

"Whilst it supplies a constant incentive to literary activity, it encourages, and, in fact, demands, a greater accuracy of assertion and thoroughness of attainment than are usually to be met with at the meetings of local literary societies: since the strong temptations to rhetorical flourish and superficial inquiry, so frequently noticeable upon such occasions, are, by our own plan of postal communication, entirely removed.

"It dispenses altogether with the necessity of personal attendance at a given time and place, as with local societies. In the case of country residents, more especially, this is an advantage not to be slightly esteemed.

"To sum up, then, in the words of a recent reviewer,—himself a respected member of our literary union:—The Society offers no royal road to literary distinction, nor even to literary excellence, but it does provide motives and means by which the attainment of both may be much facilitated. Emulation may incite to many a flight of fancy, or flood of eloquence, which, in solitary practice, laziness or inertia

might prevent. The sharp criticisms of others may free the young student of many a blunder and foolish notion—may expose the trickiness of his favourite mannerisms, the barefacedness of dextrous or the folly of unconscious imitations—may eradicate the first symptoms of affectation—may pass from other hands to his the torch of truth—may suggest new and various fields of inquiry and speculation. In presenting it to the notice of the large class of our readers for whose benefit this article is written, we are placing before them a genuine, though unpretending means of advancing their literary status, of improving their faculties, and getting rid of their faults.'

"These objects are surely noble enough, and these advantages large enough, to ensure for our Society—under the blessing of Him who blesses every good work—a future of usefulness and honour!"

The Phonographic Literary Society.—This Society has been established by the union of a number of Phonographic MS. Magazines—of which there are eighteen in connection with the Society—the Editors forming the General Council. The objects of the Society are the improvement and extension of the Magazines, by enabling the conductors to give and receive suggestions, by instituting competitions for annual certificates of merit, and by the issue of a published magazine, "The Phonographic Observer," as the organ of the Society. One essay competition has already taken place, when fourteen candidates appeared. There are now 120 members. The Secretary is Edwin Gardner, 18, Laurence Street, Sunderland.

Liverpool.—Claremont Literary Association.—This society's (fourth) session was opened, as usual (Tuesday evening, 19th Oct.) with a public *soirée* in the schoolroom under the Independent Chapel, Kirkdale, near Liverpool (where the society holds its meetings), and though the weather

was not propitious, the rooms were filled. After tea. Mr. Peter Marsh, president, occupied the chair, and, in his opening address, referred to the rapid growth of young men's associations, their tendency to assist the cause of social science, to elevate the tone of literature, and to beneficially influence the formation of both moral and religious character. Mr. M. W. Emery read a paper entitled, "What is he talking about?" humourously complaining of some of the features observable in modern conversation, giving rise to that question. Mr. Nicholson gave an entertaining address on "Comic Songs," suitably illustrated, showing that appreciation of them depended rather on their delivery than on their matter. Mr. J. Lingham recited Hood's "Sailor's Apology for Bow Legs," and was encoored, when he gave Stevens's "Daniel *versus* Dish-clout." Mr. R. Boyle's paper, "A Few Minutes with Hood," illustrated that eminently people's poet as a pathetic writer. Mr. J. Marshall recited Hood's "Bachelor's Dream." An intermission of fifteen minutes here took place for refreshments and social chat. Mr. B. H. Grindley gave a successful address on "Eloquence." Mr. W. B. Luckman's recitation of the "Quack Doctor," in character, was encoored. The proceedings throughout were satisfactory. The members of the society, in addition to their ordinary meeting once every week, have engaged to deliver a course of twelve lectures on various interesting subjects during the winter, in aid of the chapel Sunday school fund.—M. W. EMERY.

Crieff Debating Club.—The inaugural soiree of the Crieff Debating Club was held in the Weaver's Hall, Crieff, on the evening of Tuesday, 19th Oct., Mr. Scrimgeour in the chair. Several members of the Waltz Band were present, and performed a variety of airs in their usual felicitous style; and Messrs. M'Nab, Crerar, Dow, and Comrie enlivened the occasion by

singing a number of excellent songs. Professor Whitworth, who attended the meeting after his entertainment on electro-biology, in the Mason's Hall, was conoluded, likewise added much to the hilarity of the intelligent audience, by several admirable performances on the concertina. A blessing having been asked by Mr. Gow, the meeting partook of a service of tea and pastry. Thanks being returned, the chairman was congratulatory when he looked back to the early days of the club—some ten years ago—and contrasted its appearance then with the flourishing condition to which it had now arrived. In those days the members were apt to start "even at the sound themselves had made," but now they could stand up calmly in a meeting like this, and deliver what they had to say, at least, in an intelligent way. There was great pleasure in acquiring information, and great pleasure in communicating it when once acquired. All intellectual men were anxious to raise up their fellow-men to their own individual status, or as near it as possible. The works of Professor Nichol and the late Hugh Miller were intended to benefit the many and not the few. He was happy that a flourishing literary society was in existence in Crieff, and he hoped that all such would prosper. Lord Brougham Roebuck, Shiel, Goldsmith, and almost all great men, were once connected with such institutions. Many who have been members of their own society, but who now were resident in Australia, America, England, and other quarters, would, he was confident, if they knew of their present meeting, be with them in spirit if they could not be so in body. Mr. D. Kippen, accountant, then addressed the meeting on "Society;" Mr. J. C. Fisher, teacher, on "Happiness;" and Mr. Samuel Thompson on "Union." After a vote of thanks to the chairman, &c., the meeting broke up.—JAMES McNAB.

Bury Castle Croft Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of the above society held their first *annual soirées* in the Castle Croft schoolrooms, on Wednesday evening, Oct. 27th, when about 280 persons sat down to tea; after which the chair was taken by the Rev. W. Boseman, the president of the society, who delivered a most appropriate and instructive address, urging upon young men the necessity of self-improvement, but, above all, the importance of personal religion. Mr. W. Swan, the secretary, read the report, which, on the whole, was cheering and encouraging. The essay and debating classes seem to have progressed favourably. Essays have been written during the year on phrenology, sectarianism, education, &c. The various classes of the society are for reading, writing, arithmetic, English, German, essay, and debating; and a class is about to be established for chemistry. The meeting was also addressed by S. Knowles, Esq., Mr. R. Hadfield, and Mr. R. Butcher. The even-

ing's entertainment was varied by select pieces performed by the band. Duets were also sung by the Misses Howarth, accompanied on the harmonium by Mr. J. F. Howarth. The meeting was protracted to a late hour, and gave general satisfaction.

Glasgow.—The St. Vincent Young Men's Society.—The first of the second series of lectures, in connection with the above society, was delivered in the schoolroom of the Unitarian Church, on Tuesday evening, the 9th Nov., by the Rev. M. H. W. Crosskeys, on "The Life of Milton," in which the poet, the statesman, and philosopher, was depicted in a manner at once pleasing and instructive. Votes of thanks were proposed, and heartily awarded to Mr. Crosskey, as a lecturer and as the patron of the society; also to the committee of the church, for allowing the members to hold their meetings there. The meeting then broke up, all well satisfied with the evening's proceedings.—C. Mc G., Sec.

LITERARY NOTICES.

SIR E. B. LYTTON's "What shall we do with it?" is underlined for republication from *Blackwood*. He has been re-elected Lord Rector of Glasgow University, and has forwarded £100 for prizes to the students.

ALBERT SMITH has returned from China; and CARLYLE from Germany.

Funds for a CAXTON memorial pension are being raised among printers.

ROBERT OWEN died, 17th ult., aged eighty-eight.

A statue of ISAAC BARROW, by Noble, the gift of the Marquis of Lansdowne, was erected in Trinity College, Cambridge, 15th ult.

"Club" law will shortly receive "a new reading in the case of Yates v. 'The Garrick.'"

Scotland is all aglow with preparations for the fitting celebration of BURNS's centenary. He was born Jan. 25th, 1759.

The trial of COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT has created a great stir, and ended in the *offender* being sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and a fine of 3,000 fr.

A printer's "Trade Library" has lately been inaugurated in Edinburgh.

BERANGER's library, rich in autograph-inscribed presentation copies of the works of modern authors, is to be sold by auction.

MISS STRICKLAND is about to manage a revival of the masque at Mr. Dent's residence, Sudely Castle. The subject is taken from Shakspeare's Henry VIII.

An attempt has been made to poison RISTORI.

MR. PHELPS's son is the author of the new farce, entitled "A Tenant for Life."

The publishing "season" promises to be duly active.

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